TAKES HIS STAND IN THE SINO- SOVIRT CONFLICT.
By Joseph Hansen
_ ‘The declaration made by Fidel Castro February 6, on the dif-.. ferences that. have arisen between the Cuban and Chinese governments has been widely interpreted as signifying a rupture in diplomatic. relations between the two countries. This remains to be seen, but it is nonetheless clear that Fidel Castro is concerned about making the record as to. the responsibility for the increasing coolness in. relations that. has, seveloped.
“Two. main issues are involved, ‘one can conclude from reading the text. (1) Mao subjected the Cuban government to economic blackmail in, hope of winning a political concession.. (2), The Chinese government sought to flood Cuba's armed forces with political literature and persisted in ‘this course. ain the. face of. a strong © official protest. ; ; ;
In addition to these points, Castro charges the Chinese’ leaaers with conducting themselves in an uncomradely way; i.e., the ~ Chinese government aped the attitude of an imperialist power toward a small weak country, disregarding the . common socialist ties binding them together.
- On the latter matter, Castro charged that a minor and anonymous official was given the chore of calling Fidel Castro. ‘a "liar". in connection with his public version January 2 of the decision of the Chinese government not to increase or extend the previous year's level -in the barter of:rice and sugar. This way of proceeding, said
Castro, was hypocritical, "because: such pronouncements can only © emanate from the highest levels’ of the: Chinese government."
Besides “being “di shonest:; " ‘the Cuban prime minister added, "such a method reveals an attitude of depreciation toward other peoples, because it-is:equivelent to saying that the declarations of the prime minister: of:.a small. state; although the question under dispute: seriously affects:this state, ondy;merits the reply of a minor and anonymous functionary of China's Ministry of Foreign Trade."
Obviously aiming his remarks at Mao Tse-tung and the close cirele around.the-Chinese leader, Fidel Castro’ said that he would proceed in:a different way. Citing facts and figures from both Chin- -ese and Cuban sources, he took up the dispute over the exchange of rice and sugar item by. item.
From this detailed account , which occupies quite a few pages, it would seem that the best that. can be said.for Mao's case is that the Cubans might have had a misunderstanding of the agreement and. that.they; should have gone to the highest levels of the Chinese government if they wanted to keep up or increase the 1965 level of rice imports: in exchange for sugar.
Castro indignantly rejects the concept that a small country must go hat in hand to a big power, begging for handouts. He points out that the offer to’ the Chinese government to increase the level. actually meant no added. cost.;to:the Chinese government. On the contrary:it could prove quite: advantageous: financially. But the Chinese government would not:even grant the Cubans: extra: rice, for. the ten million in credits’ they: still have in Chinal. ms :
The. Chinese argue. ‘that (a) they do not need more sugar because they have finished paying off a loan in kind from the USSR in this commodity; (b) they must. hoard rice in preparation for an attack by U.S. imperialism;:(c) they’ must sell rice. on. the world market: in order to get money to purchase other grains’ in short ‘supply in China.
-~Castro's rejoinder to.this is (a) that the Chinese ended the arrangement so abruptly as.to make it impossible to obtain the .needed rice elsewhere for the:coming year; (bd): that the: blockade of Cuba by American imperialism progressively cut off Cuba's normal sources of supply -- Castro stressed in particular the charges about the alleged Cuban role in guerrilla activities in countries like Venezuela which led to a resolution of the Organization of American States in July 1964 virtually isolating Cuba from the rest of Latin America and compelling her to turn in an ever greater degree toward the workers states for markets and for goods; Ce) that in'the common struggle against U.S. imperialism, Cuba, which is in the front lines only | ninety miles away from the U.S., surely deserves special consideration, at least in the matter of economic supplies. If China is proceeding correctly in building up stockpiles, what about Cuba which is threatened with attack at any time!
Despite the sharpness of his language, Castro did not place
the entire blame for this bad situation on Mao. "We do not blame the Chinese government exclusively for lowering this quota." he said. "The responsibility lies primarily with the Yankee imperialists who placed an economic blockade : against US " a : To this he added that the Chinese government bore responsi- ‘bility "for having submitted in practice to this blockade" and that the Cuban government itself bore responsibility "for having believed in the internationalist spirit of the Chinese government."
‘Some telling arguments were thus scored by Castro. Certainly one would think that if Mao considered the interests of China's own defense in an objective way, he would do his utmost to strengthen Cuba's position -- if not with missiles, then at least with rice from this year's bumper crop -- and this regardless of-the merits’ of the dispute over the barter arrangement and regardless of any political differences he might have with Castro. In fact even if the Cubsns were completely in the wrong about the length of time or the amounts involved in the bartering of rice and sugar, it would seem to be much in Peking's interest -- including factional inter-: est in the dispute with the Khrushchevist revisionists -- to block a dispute of this nature from being taken as a pretext for an attenuation of relations with Havana.
“Castro stands on much less: firm ground in his second main point. The Chinese government, he said, began to import and dis-~— tribute massive amounts of propaganda among Cuba's armed forces and the lower ranks of the government. A formal protest was’ lodged: with the Chinese representatives in Cuba on September 14. However, the propagandistic activities did not halt. They increased. From September to January, a pericd of five months, a total of 58,041 "bulletins" were brought into Cuba from abroad by the Chinese.
‘In addition, after the September 14 protest, "tens of. thousands of other bulletins and material of a political character, printed or accumulated by the Chinese representatives in Cuba, were distributed."
The abrupt ending of the rice-sugar barter agreement came, Castro charges, as the answer of the Chinese government to the protest lodged over the distribution of Chinese political literature among Cuba Ss armed forces. a
. And whiy was Fidel Castro SO exercised over the distribution of this free literature?
"This was a really unheard of happening that no sovereign state, no government that respects itself will ever tolerate. A flagrant violation of the norms of the most elemental respect that must exist among socialist and: even nonsocialist countries."
Castro does not develop. ‘this: ‘point. Yet it raises a series: of questions relsting to the broad principles of revolutionary socialism as well as Havana’ s position in the current dispute between Moscow and Peking. ~ are
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ss €1)-It would. be: interesting to know the content of the literature distributed in Cuba by the Chinese. Was there a single item directed specifically against either the Cuban Revolution or the Cuban: government? Most: likely it-consisted:of.the same material be- ‘ing distributed on a world scale by the Chinese against U.S. imperialism’ on the one hand and the ‘Khrushchevist revisionists on the _ other.
“Since the Cubans ean match, ‘if not outdo the Chinese in mater- Sial exposing U.S. imperialism, it can be coneluded that so far-as:. content was concerned what embarrassed the Cuban government: was the attacks levelled against the Khrushchevist revisionists. This can easily be deduced: from Castro's speech itself, for it includes a strong attack against U.S. imperialism, a powerful defense of the . ~Vietnamese péople and their cause, and an appeal for united action “among all the revolutionary: forces in behalf of the common struggle. “Castro, infact, quotes extensively from his March 13, 1965, speech on the need to close ranks in face of the escalation of the war in Vietnan. He does not say a word about Khrushchevism.
It should be noted, likewise, that a blanket condemnation of propaganda issued by the Chinese sounds somewhat strange coming from Fidel Castro. During the first years of the Cuban Revolution, it was widely acknowledged that the July 26 Movement had learned much from the Chinese revolutionists. In particular, teachings of Mao on guer- “rilla warfare were widely referred to in Cuban literature.
(2) It would be interesting to know what successes might have been registered by the Chinese with their. propaganda campaign in Cuba. Did it lead to the formation, or incipient formation, of apro-Peking tendency in the Communist party of Cuba? Or among the troops or government ranks?
Elsewhere in the world Peking's extreme factionalism and ultraleftism (sometimes combined with or offset by the grossest opportunism) have proved self-defeating; and in many countries where rather promising beginnings were registered, the pro-Peking tendencies have withered on the vine.
Must we conclude, then, that the Fidelista leadership is incapable of meeting a tendency of this kind on.the political level and defeating them with political argument? Why must the armed forces be barred from reading any kind of political literature .. they wish? Are they vulnerable to Peking's arguments against Moscow? If so, it is a dangerous delusion to think that it is possible to compensate for it by banning the overly tempting literature.
(3) In resorting to this kind of argument, Castro descends to the level of Mao and the Khrushchevists. While Peking and Moscow have reprinted selected pieces from the polemics of the other side, both of them have barred the free circulation of the opponent's literature -- and this in countries that claim to be "socialist"! The tradition involved here belongs to Stalin, who, in his concern to maintain and safeguard the special privileges of the bureaucracy, sought to hermetically seal off Soviet society from ideas or prac-
tices connected in any way with proletarian democracy ‘such as was practiced in the days of: Lenin. o
(4) There is no escaping the conclusion that in addition to. the reasons advanced by Castro for the cooling of relations between the Chinese and Cuban governments there is an additional unspoken. one. In the Sino-Soviet conflict, Castro now feels he has no choice but to line up in a public way on Moscow's side. However justifiable “his case is in relation to the dispute over the sugar-rice barter agreement, Castro is granting a considerable political. concession to the Kosygin-Brezhnev team.
(5) The dead=end factionaliam of the Mao group is proving: to be self- defeating as’ well as extremely damaging to the struggle | against imperialist aggression. In the face of the revisionist politics of the Khrushchevists, Peking should seek a united front on the governmental level. This would serve a dual purpose. On the one hand no more effective means could be found to expose Moscow's revisionism in practice; on the other hand it would help assure a much more powerful force to deploy against U.S. imperialism, particularly in Vietnam at the present moment. Instead, the Maoists offer verbal attacks against Moscow's revisiotiism -- which they could do in any case -- but put themselves in the position of deliberately rejecting a united front and thereby sabotaging the struggle against - ‘imperialism. Where does this leavé those like the Cubans who were:. among the first to propose a united front -- and not fcr revisionist reasons?.
7 tn. conjunction with this it must ‘be said that Fidel Castro's charge about Peking's arrogant attitude toward smaller countries is certainly justified, at least in the case of Cuba. It would seem only realistic on the part of the Chinese to appreciate the difficult position of the Cuban revolutionists. No matter what their sympathies for Peking's side in the dispute with Moscow, they have no choice but to depend on Moscow’ for economic .and military aid. To insist that they line up in the Sino-Soviet conflict and convert Cuba into the Albania of the Caribbean is. equivalent, in the present relationship of forces, to demanding that they commit suicide.
Of course, from the viewpoint of Peking this is perfectly consistent with the policy of openly rejecting any united front whatsoever with the Khrushchevists unless they give up revisionism and make a public self- criticism. But in addition to other disadvantages this leaves*no opening for those in no position to operate as big powers. In the case of the Cubans’ it means forcing them. into deeper dependency: on the Kremlin.
(6) This is undoubtedly a very difficult situation for the Cubans. Instead of the relief from their exposed position which they confidently counted on through one or more successful revolutions elsewhere in Latin America, they have become increasingly isolated. By their struggle for power and their éstablishment-of 4° workers state anda planned economy they have set an imperishable . example. But they remain in the position of a: beleaguered fortress. The imperialist colossus has succeeded in drawing the noose of the
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blockade tighter and tighter. They are. becoming ever more closely linked in with the bureaucratized workers states on whom they depend economically. The Sino-Soviet dispute:worsened everything for them.
The main‘strength of the Cuban revolutionists has been their strong. inclination for. practical action.. As is well known, for a considérable | period: they: appeared to. have achieved’ a revolution. without “paying. any attention to theory. While this was considerably _ exaggerated, it remains ‘nonetheless’ true that the whole emphasis was on practice and it was only after the. deed was accomplished that they came to. ‘recognize its meaning” in theory.
Despite considerable efforts to. overcome ‘their depreciation. of theory, it still remains true that the Cubans have not yet pro-'~ duced a theoretical work of. importance and there is still great re- _sistance. to theory. This was. particularly evident at the recent .. Tricontinental Conference where Castro openly voiced depreciation of theory , calling for the revolutionists of Latin America to stop. theorizing and to go ahead and make their revolution. It was not» entirely illogical of him in the same speéch to attack "Protskyism" where the main theoretical arsenal of the revolutionary-socialist_ movement is to be found. ; . ;
a One: of the. colseqaences. of this attitude of the Cubans is |
to be seen in the way. they have floundered, in the Sino-Soviet dis-_ pute.. Castro. did’ “very well last year in stressing the need for a . united front in opposing the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism but he has shown little skill in advancing this position.
Instead he’ has: traded political support for. material aid from Moscow in a way that appears quite unprincipled. He has sought to make up for this by. such devices as the Tricontinental Conference where heavy emphasis was ‘placed ‘on the need for armed struggle in| advancing. the revolution, particularly in Latin America. However ~ strong the will, it is ‘extremely dubious that another successful revolution can be carried, out: anywhere in Latin America without much greater theoretical clarity, not least in: relation to the basic issues in the Sino-Soviet conflict.
_; “To achieve clarity ‘among the. ranks. of the revolutionists is also a kind of action and. one that will most likely prove to be the decisive link in the next great stage of the world revolution. e Cuban revolutionists would do wéll to consider this question more deeply and to find better means of establishing the truly ~ independent position which they are obviously. seeking.
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