SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT
GIVES RISE TO A "THIRD CURRENT"
By Pierre Frank
Some new developments in the continuing crisis of the official Communist movement are worth noting in following the process of the decomposition of Stalinism.
The dominant element still remains the Sino-Soviet conflict. But it is evolving in a different way from the time when Khrushchev was in charge of the Kremlin. The elimination of Khrushchev marked, in a certain way, the high-water mark for the Chinese leadership, both in progress politically and in influence among the Communist parties and revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries.
Since then, the Sino-Soviet conflict has changed by and large from an ideological conflict between parties to a quarrel between governments, involving in the first place the policies to be followed in the war in Vietnam. The influence of the Chinese leadership has declined, due to its sectarian policies, without the Soviet leadership -- which has sought to skillfully exploit the situation -- being able to recover its position.
This was shown rather clearly at the congress of the Bulgarian Communist party which was just held at Sofia; and it will certainly also be the case at the Hungarian Communist party congress in Budapest.
The leadership of the Bulgarian Communist party, undoubtedly acting under the inspiration of the Soviet leadership, proposed holding an international conference of Communist parties, the principal object of which would obviously be to condemn and put a ban on the Chinese CP. The support given by Brezhnev to this proposal shows that the Soviet leaders who succeeded Khrushchev and who at the time reversed the machinery set in motion by Khrushchev for such a gathering, have given up hope of reaching an understanding with the Chinese leaders. Instead, they consider it necessary to resort to extreme measures in their effort to lessen the crisis, which is whipped up by the Chinese attacks, regardless of their content. The Chinese policies do not attract much sympathy today, but they greatly undermine the authority of the Kremlin.
How was the Bulgarian-Soviet proposal received? The Kremlin won the approval, as always, of the leaders of the French Communist party, the Czechs, etc., but resistance or opposition to the proposal was widespread. The Poles condemned the Chinese policies, but turned a deaf ear to the proposal. The Romanians flatly stated that so far as they were concerned any condemnation was out. The same for the Italian leadership. Likewise the Yugoslav leadership, which has not forgotten its experience with the Cominforn.
Let us recall what has happened recently in what could be considered the pro- Chinese camp. The Indonesian Communist party suffered a defeat so bloody, a slaughter of such proportions, that it has been reduced to but a minor factor for some time to come. The Japanese Communist party at its recent congress officially took its distance from the Chinese Communist party. We do not have at hand the official declarations of the left-wing Indian Communist party, but it has recently been reported that it has sought rapprochement in actions with the right-wing Indian Communist party. Moreover, it should be remembered that the left-wing Indian Communist party was not a product of the Sino-Soviet crisis but of the long crisis that broke out in the Indian Communist party because of the policies it had followed since the country won independence in 1948, long before the Sino-Soviet dispute; and the left-wing Indian Communist party could never be considered to be a satellite of the Chinese Communist party. Finally, it should be noted that the leadership of the Albanian Communist party, even during its recent congress where a Chinese delegation was present, did not at all line up with Peking with regard to the "cultural revolution."
The most interesting new phenomenon in the crisis of the official Communist movement is the appearance of a kind of "third tendency," directed "against revisionism and against dogmatism." Its outline is clearly apparent. It consists of a bloc of parties and governments, including north Vietnam, north Korea and Cuba. North Vietnam, due to readily understandable reasons, is still rather discreet. While the Chinese and Soviet leaders accuse each other of the worst things in connection with the aid they have or have not given to Vietnam,. Hanoi thanks both of them but says nothing more. And if it says nothing additional, it is obviously because it does not want the Sino-Soviet conflict transferred to Vietnamese soil through troops not under Vietnamese command.
The leaders of north Korea and Cuba, on the other hand, speak more openly. It is understandable that they, more than any of the others, are sensitive to the American escalation in Vietnam. They will be among the first next victims in case the Vietnamese
revolution is defeated; and they do not have the advantage of offering Washington a problem of the size of China. Quite recently in Pyong Yang, President Dorticés of Cuba, and Premier Kim Il Sung, took a joint public stand [see World Outlook November 18] which by implication condemned the policy of the Soviet government in according such feeble aid to Vietnam and condemned the policy of the Chinese government in rejecting a united front on this question. ~
What is most interesting in this demonstration, so far as Cuba is concerned, is that it accompanies or follows other statements of position that clarify the attitude of the Fidelist leadership on some of the points which were brought into question by the speech made by Castro at the beginning of the year at the close of the Tricontinental Conference. At the time, Castro's attack against the Chinese on the one hand and Trotskyism on the other raised the question -- has Castro lined up with Moscow?
We will not take up here the motives that led Castro to attack Trotskyism; we said from the beginning that we did not think he did it in order to serve Moscow, which in any case is unable today to use slanders against the Trotskyist. movement scavenged from Stalin's time. But one could quite legitimately wonder if Castro had not gone over completely to Moscow. For some months it has been clear that Castro did not line up with Moscow and that he has even become all the more aroused in view of the frustration to the hopes he entertained at the time of the Tricontinental.
At that conference, the resolution on Latin America and the body which it set up to assure solidarity in action was based.on a revolutionary line. But upon returning home, the old leaders of the Latin American Communist parties (Argentina, Chile, and also Venezuela, where the guerrilla fighters were disavowed in fact) continued as if the conference had not taken place, pursuing the policy of "peaceful coexistence" and the "peaceful road" to socialism.
Under various guises, the Cuban press has been attacking these pseudo revolutionists, these fake revolutionists, to call them by the right name. Pablo Neruda came under attack from the Cuban writers and artists because of his equivocal attitude in the United States. [See World Outlook September 9.] The Cuban government has not hidden its feelings over the $100,000,000 granted by the Soviet government to the military regime in Brazil. In addition, the Yugoslavs have come under sharp attack for the support they have accorded the Christian Democrat Frei in Chile. Tsee World Outlook April 22 and April 29.] Finally, quite recently, Granma, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Cuba, carried a criticism of the Indonesian Communist party for stopping midway on the road to revolution, thus contributing to its heavy defeat.
This "third current" has only begun to come forward. For these small countries, the identification of the party with the state, which is general. among the workers states, constitutes a handicap in giving expression to their differences with the leaderships of the big Chinese and Soviet states. But in view of the fact that their position constitutes a development in the direction of a revolutionary orientation, particularly in the burning question of the day, what to do about helping Vietnam, it cannot fail to have repercussions. It will contribute to preventing the shipwreck in sight on the course now being followed by the two giants of the official Communist movement.
November 27, 1966
FORBES BURNHAM