STALIN AND THE NAZI AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION
{In its first issue, the new Italian political magazine La. Sinistra (The Left) published the minutes of a discussion held at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism between historians and members of the General Staff of the army. The discussion, which was held behind closed doors, concerned a book entitled simply June 22, 1941 (the day Hitler launched his invasion of the Soviet Union. )
{The editors of La Sinistra explain the importance of this document: "In the months preceding the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU, a furious political struggle developed around an attempt to undertake at least partial rehabilitation of Stalin. News of the struggle eventually reached the West; and a letter which a group of Soviet intellectuals sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU, expressing their concern over the feared rehabilitation, received considerable publicity. The book by Nekrich, which was published in the spring of 1965, and which had become a significant element in the struggle of these tendencies, was subjected to violent attack because of its anti- Stalinist position. It became the topic of a debate that served as a testing ground in the attempt to move toward a condemnation of the views contained in it, and thereby to a reversal of the position taken by the Twentieth Congress. This attempt at rehabilitation failed because of the opposition not only of broad groups of intellectuals but also of high-ranking representatives of the army. As the reader will see, the discussion published below, besides involving Stalin, touched on the policy of the USSR in the period of the nonaggression pact with Germany, as well as the repressions to which the Polish Communists fell victim and the policy of the Comintern in the so-called Third Period. This is the first time we have heard -- even by way of rumor -—- that Soviet historians were engaged in revising with such breadth and daring the official theses about Soviet policy."
[The text below was translated by World Outlook from the Italian version in the October issue of La Sinistra. The footnotes are those supplied by the editors of La Sinistra.]
Agenda: discussion on A.M. Nekrich's book "June 22, 1941." Present: Major General E.A. Boltin, Major General B.S. Telpuchovs Professor G.A. Deborin, and A.M. Nekrich, academician in the historical sciences.
Deborin: The central question is the research into the causes of our failures in the first period of the war. In his section, "The Warnings that Were Disregarded," the basis of Nekrich's thesis is incorrect. He reduces everything to Stalin's stupid pigheadedness. This is superficial. This means that with Stalin's death the problem ceased to exist. But this is not accurate. It was not only a question of Stalin. In one instance the author bases himself on a statement by Marshal Golikov, who, in those years was the head of the Intelligence Service of the General Staff of the Red Army [he cites that part of the book]. Golikov did not inform the government as much as he deceived it. Altogether his reports were a complete deception. These reports are divided into two parts: the first consists of the reports that Golikov considered reliable; these include information about the German preparations to invade England. The second part consists of reports which he considered unfounded; for example, the report from R. Sorge on the dates bracketed for the German attack on the USSR. It is neces-—
sary to go more deeply into the criticism of the cult of the personality. There were persons who altered intelligence reports to please Stalin, to the disadvantage of the truth. °
The Tass communiqué of June 14, 1941, was a normal diplomatic maneuver. It was necessary to test the reaction of the German government. But because of the situation that had been created in our country this was taken to be true.(1)
In evaluating Stalin's behavior, it is not necessary to base ourselves on Khrushchev's statements, which are often not objective. Thus, for example, it is difficult to agree with the statement that Stalin feared the war. Since he received incorrect intelligence, he reached incorrect conclusions. Stalin placed too much hope in the pact, while the Germans, under cover of the pact, were preparing to attack. And Stalin's judgment was confirmed by all those who surrounded him. We cannot blame everything on Stalin. :
There is a series of errors of fact in Nekrich's book. Among other things, 45millimeter cannon were useless against the German tanks and because of this the government decided to stop producing then.
A Voice in the Hall: That's not true! the 45's were used throughout the war and worked splendidly against tanks. It was a crime to stop production of the 45's. We fought the German tanks with our fists. At the beginning of the war we didn't have any antitank weapons at all. :
Deborin: Besides Blucher and others knew that the Tukhachevsky-Yakir group were innocent and still they condemned them.
A Voice in the Hall: Of course they knew it.
Deborin: But, comrades, I do not believe that it can be doubted that Voroshilov and Budienny, who were there at the time, were men of conscience and honor! (2)
Outraged Voices in the Hall: Voroshilov was not at the trial. What honor and conscience did these persons have? Cowards and bootlickers! (Deborin leaves the podium amid tumult in the hall.)
Anfilov, of the General Staff: First of all, on the honor of Budienny and Voroshilov. These persons neither had nor have any honor. Considerable material in our archives, which is barred for the time being from being made public, compels us to draw decidedly negative conclusions concerning their activities. I will cite only one minor episode. Toward the middle of 1937, at a very representative gathering, Stalin said: "And Voroshilov and I arrived at Tsaritsyn in 1918 and in a week we unmasked the enemies of the people." And he said this about many ex-officials of the General Staff and front-line forces who served the Soviet government with honor.
A Voice in the Hall: And he drowned them all in the river without a trial!
Anfilov: "While you," Stalin continued, "are not even able to unmask your neighbors." After Stalin, Voroshilov joined in, declaring he was in complete agreement with Stalin and he called on us to denounce our own friends and colleagues. My heart beats with anger when I see Voroshilov on the mausoleum during parades. (3)
(1) The communiqué referred to was written, according to A. Tasca (Due anni di alleanza germano-sovietica) [The Two Years of the German-Soviet Alliance], by Stalin himself. In it the British ambassador, who had tried to warn Stalin of the imminent German attack, is accused of spreading false rumors, the product of propaganda emanating from powers hostile to Germany and the USSR.
(2) The tribunal which condemned the Tukhachevsky-Yakir group was presided over by Ulrich and was composed of Alksnis, Budienny, Shaposhnikov, Belov, Dybenkov, Kashirin, Goryachev and Blucher. Voroshilov, who supported Stalin in the decapitation of the General Staff, did not take part in the tribunal. However, it was he who announced Jun 12, 1937 that the Soviet generals had been shot on charges of having been in contact with an enemy power. (3) Voroshilov, who was commander of the Tenth Army on the Tsaritsyn front, was the chief opponent of the kind of military organization projected by Trotsky.
And now, as regards the beginning of the war. If all our forces had been prepared for battle, something that depended completely on Stalin, we would not have suffered such a disastrous defeat in the first period of the war and, in general, the war would not have been so long, so bloody or so costly.
Of course, it is necessary to take into account also the degree of responsibility of our most important military leaders. In their speeches, Golikov and Kuznetsov seemed to be heroes. In reality, Golikov passed on to Stalin a report in which the entire Barbarossa Plan was outlined, writing, however, that it was a provocation emanating from those who wanted to see us go to war against the Germans. Kuznetsov writes that when he received the communication from the naval attaché in Berlin, Vorontsov, on the dates and plans of the German attack, he immediately referred everything to Stalin. It is true. But in which way did he refer it? You should read his story! He writes that Vorontsov's report was a provocation sent us by counterespionage.
Stalin is still the main culprit in the tragedy. Not long ago, I spoke with Zhukov. He told me that Golikov was directly responsible to Stalin and did not report at all either to the head of the General Staff (Marshal Zhukov), or to the People's Commisar of Defense (Timoshenko). They did not know the plans and dates of the attack. I wasn't able to talk with Timoshenko -- he doesn't speak with any of us.
Zastavenko, from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism: The people around Stalin did not help to evaluate the situation properly. In the beginning of June (June 5, 1941) Kalinin gave a speech at the Political-Military Academy. He said: "The Germans are preparing to attack us but we are ready. And the sooner they do it the better. We will wring their necks."
A Voice in the Hall; The old windbag!
Zavstavenko: That was the way the Politburo judged the situation; they underestimated the power of the Germans. Stalin was not the only one responsible for what happened. (Murmurs in the hall.)
Dashichev, of the General Staff: Deborin has said some incorrect things concerning the 45 cannons. At the beginning of the war this cannon shot clear through all kinds of German armor. To stop production amounted to disarming the army, since the other type of cannon (the 82 millimeter) was not yet ready for production. The army found itself without antitank artillery and without ammunition.
As for our sources. The worst things is that the Soviet sources have not yet been published. For example, to consider the communication of the Soviet attaché on the fact that the war would be begun on June 22, it is necessary to quote from the book by the English historian Ericson. When will all the sources finally be opened and made available? Berezhkov records the meeting of Ambassador Schulenburg with Dekanozov during which Schulenburg told him that Hitler would attack the USSR. But there must be data in the Foreign Ministry archives on the meeting between Schulenburg and Molotov in the presence of Pavlov when Schulenburg betrayed his country by revealing that Germany would attack the USSR on June 22. Schulenburg wept and begged him to mobilize the Soviet armed forces in the hope that Hitler would be frightened. But they did not want to believe Schulenburg. (4)
On the trials of our military leaders (the Tukhachevsky-Yakir group). The false evidence was prepared by the Gestapo but the idea came from Stalin, who caused it to be suggested to the fascist leaders through General Skoblin. Our misfortune is that these documents are inaccessible. Golikov committed crimes, not only because he doctored intelligence to please Stalin, but because he had the best agents of our counterespionage abroad arrested.
Voice in the Hall: Including Sorge!
Dashichev: Are the causes of the tragedy of June 1941 completely clarified in this book? It is necessary. to explain them still more profoundly. Stalin was the one chiefly responsible for this tragedy. He was the one who created such a situation in our country. Stalin's greatest crime was to usurp power, to destroy our best cadres in the army and the party. None of our leaders, although they understood the international situation, had the courage to fight for the measures needed to defend the country. This is their terrible guilt before the party and the people. There are still
(4) Schulenburg, German ambassador to Moscow at the time, later became involved in the plot to assassinate Hitler and was executed in 1944.
people today who say that we must not speak ill of Stalin, that Stalin was not the only one. This is wrong. For. a driver of a bus, any accident that happens is his fault. Stalin took the responsibility of leading the country on himself alone. And his guilt is enormous.
It is necessary to define with more precision the positions of Churchill, Schulenburg, Rader, Halder (the latter two in Hitler's staff were opposed to a war with the USSR). It is necessary to explain the motives for their actions; they were not exactly lovers of our country. Hitler strongly influenced the decision of the military. During a meeting at the highest level, Hitler said: "The Red Army has been decapitated; eighty percent of its commanders have been liquidated. The Red Army has been weakened as never before; this is the fundamental factor which leads me to make this decision. It is necessary to go to war to prevent the formation of new cadres." Every historian must have the courage to speak the truth.
Roshchin, of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism: Some hold that we must speak only of the victories and that it is better to remain silent with regard to defeats, but we must not do this. Such a procedure damages not only the science of history but causes enormous harm to our state. It is necessary to analyze and to understand the causes of the defeats in order to prevent mistakes in the future. Stalin was the one chiefly responsible for the defeat. I do not agree with Deborin with regard to the Tass communiqué -- it was not a diplomatic maneuver but a crime. This communiqué disarmed the people morally. Stalin and those around him did everything to prevent the Soviet people from readying themselves for war. When Kuznetsov informed Malenkov that some defensive measures had been carried out by the fleet -- it was June 17, 1941 -- Malenkov laughed at him and said: "You act as if the war was going to start tomorrow." Zhdanov was present at this meeting; his attitude was more serious, but even he did ‘ nothing. Malenkov revoked all the measures taken. But even our military leaders cannot avoid responsibility.
Melnikov, of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR: - According to Deborin, it would seem that Nekrich overrated the negative role of Stalin in his book. This is not true. The role of Stalin is underrated in fact.
Let's speak about a problem that still can't be raised today because it is tabooed, that is the negotiations between Molotov and Hitler in Berlin in November 1940. Let's examine the situation. The Barbarossa Plan was nearing completion, the movement of German troops towards the frontier of the USSR was beginning. The Hitlerite diplomats were stepping up their activities in the Balkans and Finland. To hide these preparations from the Soviet government, Hitler proposed a top level meeting. The chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov goes to Berlin. Hitler conveys to him a plan for partitioning a good deal of territory in general. Molotov asks conconcretely for the Dardanelles, Bulgaria, Rumania and Finland. Hitler did not want to initiate a discussion of this type because he feared that the news would leak out to his future allies. In response to Molotov's requests, he proposed that the Soviet Union should join the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis.(5) This demonstrates his principles of action.
Vasilenl--, of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism: Deborin's concern that the book puts too much emphasis on Stalin's role is without foundation. Objectively we had every possibility of resisting the Germans. But Stalin ruined everything. When it was too late to justify his shameful defeat, he put forward the commonplace notion that the aggressor is always better prepared for war.
Kulish: We are witnessing the birth of a "new" understanding of the causes of the defeat at the beginning of the war, proposed by Deborin. It was not only and not so much Stalin, he says. This is in the line of the cult of the personality. That Stalin is guilty or not too guilty, is a typical notion of the cult of the personality -- it is always Stalin alone. It is necessary to study the problem more deeply. Why did such a situation develop? How did our government, ruled by Stalin, rule the country? How did it defend our people against the danger? Was the government fit for the position it occupied? No, it was not fit. It is necessary to analyze the process that produced Stalin, who was not fit for his position as head of the party and of the state, with unlimited powers.
(5) Molotov remained in Berlin the twelfth and thirteenth of November 1940. Hitler tried to convince Molotov that the Soviet Union's natural sphere of interest was in Asia, while Molotov asked instead for European territories. On Hitler's offer to join the Axis, Molotov replied, according to the testimony of the interpreter Schmidt (Statist auf diplomatischer Buhne 1923-45) that this was acceptable in general but only on the basis. of equality.
Still another very obvious error: in all our historical literature, the reunification with the western Ukraine and western Belorussia is always held to be a factor that improved the defensive capacity of the country. Still we know that things were different. These areas, for a series of well-known reasons, weakened the frontier defensive capacity. Therefore in judging the reunification of the western regions, it is better to speak of the liberating and internationalist functions of the Red Army.
Gnedin: It is a good book. I did not want to speak but the discussion has forced me to take the platform. For two years I gave intelligence reports to Stalin and Molotov. All these reports passed through my hands. Golikov, of course, was a deceiver, but that is not the question. All the "reliable" parts of the reports, were usually reflected in one way or another in our official press but Stalin paid attention fundamentally to the things considered "dubious." He knew everything and his policy was to do nothing. Golikov was responsible for the repressions among the cadres of the GPU, but it is not his fault that defensive measures were not taken. In our historical literature it is claimed that Stalin became head of government on May 5, 1941 to prepare the country for defense. But we do not have a single fact to confirm this evaluation. And Stalin, in fact, did nothing to strengthen the defensive capacity of the USSR. We have every reason to believe that Stalin became head of government not to prepare the country for war but to make a deal with Hitler. (6)
Slezkin, of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR: I was at the front and when I was nineteen years old, I participated in the battles at the frontier in 1941.
Stalin acted in a way that can easily be described as criminal. The situation of the cult of the personality -- provocations, repressions -- created a vicious circle. Everyone strove to please his own boss, giving him only such information as would please him, or adding a negative commentary on information which would not please him. Everyone tried to avoid expressing his own ideas. All this brought immeasurable harm to the country. Everyone is guilty, although in differing degrees. Some are guilty for not having decided to say what they thought. The more important the officials, the higher you go, the greater the responsibility. At a certain level the renunciation of truth in the name of one's own privileges is a crime, and the higher the level, the greater the crime. The chief culprit was Stalin. The 1939 pact was perhaps necessary. It was a crime to base one's hopes on this pact, and above all to Stalaa) a result of it, to fight against fascism (and this was done on orders from Stalin).
Yakir, of the Institute of History of the Acade of Sciences of the USSR:(7) The book is very good. Some speakers have dealt with the Tukhachevsky-Yakir affair. I believe that the speeches on the fascist provocation, on the "red fascicle" and the documents contained in it are useless and even harmful, in that they draw the discussion away from the central point. There was no red fascicle at the trial and the red fascicle was not brought up. All of the accused were found guilty on the basis of accusations inspired by Stalin which were made to the War Council on June 1-4, 1937 and of the desire openly expressed by Stalin to be rid of them. Some among the preceding speakers have spoken of Stalin as "Comrade Stalin." This is improper. Stalin is no one's comrade and still less ours.
Stalin impeded the development of our armaments by liquidating many eminent technicians, among others the founders of missile science, Ikomirov, Langeman (the inventor of the katusha, a multiple rocket launcher used as ground artillery) Kurchevsky, Bekaury. It is necessary to study the problem of the concentration camps. Study it from the economic point of view. It was wartime and in the concentration camps were imprisoned millions of healthy men, who were specialists in all sectors of the economic and military life of the country. Furthermore considerable forces were required to guard them.
. Telegin: The author has a noncritical attitude toward foreign sources, in particular toward memoirs which contain few elements of truth...
(6) Before May 5, 1941 Stalin had no official responsibilities in the government of the USSR. Shortly after that date, the Belgian, Norwegian and Greek diplomats, representing countries occupied by the Germans, were expelled from the USSR. At the same time, Bogomolov was sent as ambassador to the pro-Nazi Petain government. (7) The son of the Yakir mentioned in the proceedings.
-3]-
Voice from the Hall: And-in our memoirs?
Telegin: In our memoirs, too, there are many outrageous lies. (Laughter. )
It is necessary to remember that there are obvious traces of the exaggerations of the Khrushchev period in these memoirs. (Murmurs in the hall. )
_Telpukovsky: The political leaders of all countries underestimated Hitler. However after the fall of France, these evaluations were reconsidered, except those of Stalin. Stalin relied on the hope that Hitler, if he did not break his neck, would become entangled in the war in the West. Clearly, when the war began, Stalin was still making attempts to avoid the conflict. Otherwise it is difficult to explain the three separate strategic directives of the high command of the Red Army in the first days of the war. Stalin is the main culprit, but there were others too, each in his own sphere.
' Petrovsky, of the Institute of Historic Archives: It is necessary to keep in mind that fascism emerged while Lenin was still alive. Mussolini took power in Italy, the Kapp putsch, etc. Lenin pointed out that fascism was the main enemy. Stalin did not pay any heed to Lenin's warning and declared that the social democracy was the main enemy. This "theory" was widely disseminated and. divided millions of workers throughout the world. Stalin-is a criminal.
Boltin: Comrade Petrovsky, in this hall, on this platforn, it is necessary to choose your words. Are you a Communist?
Petrovsky: Yes.
Boltin: I have not read in any document, in any directive of our “party, obligatory for both of us, that Stalin was a criminal.
Petrovsky: The Twenty-third Congress of the party voted to remove Stalin from the Mausoleum for his crimes against the party. Therefore, he is a criminal.
Snegov. Nekrich's book is an honest and useful book.: When there is disorder in a military unit, when the breechblocks are in one place and the guns in another, when the patrols and sentries are asleep, the unit is defeated. When headquarters orders it, the commander of a detachment of this kind is shot. And none of us has anything to laugh about. Stalin was in the same position as this commander, but his detachment was our entire country. Stalin ought to have been shot and instead | they are now trying to justify him.
Why is Nekrich's book, where Stalin is attacked, submitted so quickly to discussion and even condemned, while the book of the notorious falsifier of the history of the party I. Petrov, which attributes positive acts to Stalin: which he never did, has awaited discussion for some years already? Why did Deborin attempt to justify Stalin?» When Hitler was preparing to attack Poland, Stalin helped him. (8) He shot all the Polish Communists in the USSR and outlawed the Polish Communist party. Why is the fourth partition of Poland defined as a liberating expedition? How can you be a Communist and speak calmly about Stalin who betrayed and sold out Communists, who liquidated almost all the delegates to the Seventeenth Congress and almost all the members of the Central Committee elected at that Congress, who betrayed the Spanish Republic, Poland, all the Communists in all countries?
Deborin (in conclusion): I have not created any new theory and I have not taken on the task of defending or justifying Stalin. It is necessary to examine all: the aspects of the cult in greater depth. As for Snegov's remarks, we have heard what Snegov said about Poland more than once. And these claims came from the enemy camp.It is strange that Snegov also shares this point of view. Comrade Snegov, you must tell us to which camp you belong.
Snegov: I am from Kolyma.(9)
Deborin: All these things have to be verified.
(8) It is evident that it is considered that the existence has been confirmed of the secret August 23 protocol which granted Germany a freé “hand in attacking Poland (the partition of which was provided in the protocol) and: which promised to furnish. Soviet supplies for the war against France and England. , -
(9) Kolyma was a famous concentration camp in the Stalinist period.
Voices in the Hall: Do you want his telephone number? Like the old days? (They do not permit Deborin to continue.)
Nekrich: Thank you for your observations. There's no doubt that Deborin does not hold the ideas that have been attributed to him. One often exaggerates in the heat of discussion. The main one responsible for the grave defeats and the whole tragedy of the first period in the war is Stalin. However, one should not give his own chief incorrect information just to please him. Stalinism begins with us, with the little people. Stalin wanted to outwit Hitler and instead deceived himself and the whole business ended in a catastrophe. He knew better than anyone about the liquidation of the leading cadres and about the weaknesses of the army.
Snegov (three minutes on a point of personal privilege): I thought that I was participating in a scientific discussion. Deborin, instead of scientific proofs, has introduced "arguments" vintage 1937. But it is not easy to frighten us with concentration camps! Times have changed and the past will not return. (Applause. )
Boltin (in conclusion): This meeting has produced many new and interesting things on the entire problem in its complete context. The remarks of comrades Snegov and Petrovsky were very impassioned. I can agree with much of Comrades Snegov's remarks but not all. Our country cannot be accused of desiring to deprive the Polish state of its independence or of partitioning it. This is the point of view of the bourgeois historians and the White emigrants. It was up to us to defend the independence of Poland. Some comrades have described criticism of the cult of the personality as an exaggeration of the Khrushchev period. This is fundamentally wrong. The resolutions of the twentieth and twenty-second congresses on the cult of the personality are not exaggerations of the Khrushchev period but .are of vital importance for every honest Communist. (He thanks the author and all those present. )
The sessions lasted from 10:15 to 4:45 with -n intermission of one hour.