CONTINUING CRISIS IN CHINA
- By Livio Maitan
The events of the past two months have shown in the clearest possible way the dramatic character of the situation inside the Chinese Communist party. The Central Committee plenum which took place in the first half of August was a crucial episode in the factional struggle which is becoming ever more open and vehement. (1)
Because of the bureaucratic customs of the Chinese leadership, it is impossible to know under what circumstances and with what real aims the plenum was called after a hiatus of four years. Did the’ group around: Mao think that the victory was already won and that the Central Committee would confine itself to formally ratifying the decisions already adopted and approving the changes in the official hierarchy? Did they, on the contrary, call the plenum to launch an attack on members of the Political Bureau who opposed the Cultural Revolution. or even advocated a turn in the party's general line?.For the time being, there is no material that could: provide answers to..these questions. Nonetheless, it is clear that a very intense struggle took place at the end. of July and beginning of August and that the Mao-Lin Piao group won their new victory by a narrow margin. (2)
Various factors have operated in such. a way ‘that far from subsiding after the vicissitudes of the April-June period, the struggle is continuing and even growing more intense. First of all, the action initiated by the partial mobilization of sectors of students, by its very nature produced defensive reflexes and engendered discontent extending beyond the persons and social strata against which.it was directly aimed.(3) . :
(1)An analysis of these events up to the middle of July is contained in a previous article entitled, "Stormy. internal. Conflicts in China." See. World Outlook - October ? and 14. (2) An article appearing in Red Flag No. ll, explained that "An error on questions of orientation and an error in line appeared for a short time." It was only Mao's intervention that reportedly corrected them. A whole series of texts; and in particular the : sixteen-point document of the. Central Committee, speak of serious differences and of "rather strong resistance," of "a struggle which will have its ups and downs." The length of the plenum -- twelve days -- is in itself symptomatic. (The 1962 plenum lasted only four days.) Furthermore, this last plenum seems to have been broadened much more than the previous one. (4)See in this regard, for example, the sixteen-point document: (p.7). "The heads of certain educational institutions, bodies, or work: groups organized counterattacks against the masses who criticized then. See also the Red Flag article reproduced by Pékin information, No. 24, p. el. :
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In the second. place, the isolation of the Chinese CP, which had already incurred the serious liabilities of the Indonesian defeat and the political break with Cuba, deepened further after the break with the Japanese CP, the cooling off of the North Koreans.,. and the refusal of the Vietnamese to associate themselves in any way with the denunciations of the USSR as: "an accomplice" of American imperialism.(4) But it was, above all, the evolution of the international situation with the new stepping up of the criminal escalation against the Vietnamese people which must have put into question a line whose results were turning out to be more and more disappointing.
“The sixteen-point document which was published: during the plenuin of the Central Committee provides rather’ clear indications on at) least. some of the differences in the party, and the leading | group: itself. And, in a certain sense, it appears.to be a reply to arguments advanced by the opposition; though, of course, it avoids. giving any objective information.about this’ opposition to the: Party membership and to: the international _working- -class: public. (5)...
To. judge from this document, those who opposed the. student movement +-~ the.so-called Cultural Revolution -~- offered the. following arguments: The mass mobilization was dangerous because, of the immaturity of the students, and because it might result in widening the gap between the different tendencies and groups in the party. (6) Party: cadres and leaders might be pilloried by. personal attacks, in particular in wall. bulletins. Certain extremist attitudes on questions of culture might hinder scientific work; and, more generally, the movement as a whole might create difficulties in normal production.
The reply of the majority group was the mobilization of the masses was a prime necessity, that: the masses would educate themselves in the course of the movement, that production, in the last analysis, would be stimulated by the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, however, certain guarantees were given, and there was an attempt to quiet some fears: All personal criticism in the
when the open break with the Fapeneae CP occurred with “the. crisis in the Gensuikyo (the Japanese committee against the A and ‘H-bombs). (5) According. to official sources, a "centrist" tendency. also. exists. See the Red Flag article already cited which appeared; in.. Pékin. information, No. 34, p. 22. (6)A common. accusation against oppositionists and those who might: be: .characterized as "conciliationists" was fear of the mass movement. See, among other sources, HNA [Hsinhua New Agency] July 7, pp. 8-9; and August 8, p. 3.
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press was placed under the control of the party bodies at the various levels. As for the army, all power of decision was left to the Military Commission of the Central Committee and to the general Political Department of the People's Army. A policy of caution toward "men of science, technical personnel and ordinary personnel" was envisaged, and the method of persuasion through rational argument was recommended as the solution for differences and conflicts. (7) . Ds -
‘At the same time, the polemic continued, growing sharper on other questions already debated in the preceding months. It was probably not by accident that the day the Central Committee plenum opened, the Liberation Army Daily published an important article once again criticizing the thesis of the primacy of the technical factor over the political factor and drawing in particular a. balance sheet of the major struggles that took place in the army following the war in Korea up until recently.(8) Attacks were again opened likewise against "revisionist" concepts in the economic field, Sun Ken-fang being indicated as the main spokesman of this tendency.(9) In addition, in the ambit of the struggle against the danger of revisionism, they insistently advanced an idea attributed to Mao Tse-tung* and characterized as an "epoch-making development of. Marxism-Leninism," according to which from now on the traditional — division of labor can now be more or less overcome, the workers engaging also in military affairs, the field of culture, in commerce and, if possible,-in agriculture and the peasants also going beyond their specific activities.(10) Be
(7)With regard to science, the attitude of the ruling group in general seems to be prudent; at the very height of the Cultural Revolution, some articles and speeches stressed the importance of Western’ scientific contributions and the duty of learning from the experience of other countries with modesty. (See HNA .Hsinhua News Agency], July 23, p. 16° and July 24, p..5.) .
(8)See HNA, August 2, p-°4, and August 21, p. 4. The article cited speaks of three fundamental struggles: at the end of the war in Korea, in 1959, and "not very long ago." The third struggle enabled them to strike the "representatives of the bourgeoisie who had got hold of important posts in the army." |
(9)See HNA, August 10, pp. 4-5. Sun Ken-fang was said to have diffused his “poisonous" ideas for ten years, particularly between 1960 and 1962 "When all’ kinds of monsters in China came out into the open." Sun Ken-fang's theses must have been even more farreaching than those of Liberman. See also in HNA, August 14, pp. 31-33, an article that takes up the ideas of the leading Chinese group on major economic questions of the transition period.
(10)See HNA, August 4, p. 11: "In such an-army of workers, all are all-round people who make work in industry their main task but who also engage in other trades and occupations. They are both red and expert, fighters and civilians, workers and peasants. With hammer
_ The official documents-make only rather rare and indirect allusions to differences on the mostpressing current problems of international policy. There is no doubt; however, that it was in this area that the most violent polemics developed at the time of the plenum of the Central Committee. There is no doubt, too, that this is where they are continuing to develop.
It is highly»probable also that, in face of the continuing escalation and the increased danger of aggression against China by ~- American imperialism, the:ruling group has become still more profoundly split. On: the‘one hand, what one might call the Mao- Lin Piao tendency may hold that the situation requires a hardened attitude toward the USSR, whose "treachery" demands all the greater denunciation, ‘as well as within the country (in order to avoid any possible split. at the: time of a major test). On the other hand, the. opposition tendencies may ‘have advocated a more realistic appraisal of the military potential of the country and a serious effort:to::establish, if only partially, an anti-imperialist united front with the USSR.(11) An ardent reflection of these polemics was the noisy reappearance of the paper tiger thesis, and the resurrection of certain propaganda themes accompanied by attempts at .an analysis of the causes of the weakness of American imperialism in the present stage.(12) ~ 7 oo
in hand they are able to do.factory work, with plough they are able to do farming, with the gun they are able to fight the enemy and with the pen.they are able to express themselves in writing." By applying such a concept, "it will be possible to promote the narrowing step by step of the gap between workers and peasants, town and countryside and mental and manual labour, prevent abnormal urban and:industrial development." (HNA,; August 2, p. 7. See also August 7; p. 3, where the Army's exemplary application of Mao's concepts is stressed.) The "voluntarist" .aspect of ideas of this kind is clear. In reality it is impossible by means of this kind to overcome the unripeness of objective conditions and actually open a passageway to the higher stage of a-socialist society. But all this can have a rather concrete bearing if the aim of the ruling group is to prepare the country for a prolonged war in which they may be compelled to reconstruct the productive apparatus by exploiting all the possibilities above and beyond the "normal" division of labor.
(1l)4n article that appeared on the eve of the plenum attacked "certain persons" who proposed a "joint action" with the USSR, a new version of “united action," according to the People's Daily. (See HNA, July 31, p.:7.) This allusion unquestionably concerns the leaders of certain Communist parties, but also the domestic proponents of such an orientation. ‘S
(12)The official articles emphasized in particular the deepening inter-imperialist divisions and the unproductiveness of the — escalation of the war in Vietnam. (See especially HNA, August 25, | 28, and 30: and September 1, 4, and 8.) "
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The rejoinder of the Mao-Lin Piao group to dn opposition which, far from surrendering, continued to fight. with increased vigor, was outlined in the Central Committee session and. filled out in ‘the days: immediately following.
After giving guarantees to those who feared the consequences of a line pushed to the extreme (that was the meaning, as I indicated, of several directives contained in the sixteen points), the majority operated simultaneously on various levels. First of all, despite the silence ofthe official communiqués in this respect, they reorganized the leading bodies, probably removing Peng Chen from the Political Bureau and the candidate members Lu Ting and. Lo. Jui-ching, from the Secretariat, and promoting Kang Shen to full membership and to membership in the Secretariat. Undoubtedly of still greater importance, the hierarchy was changed at the highest level with the demotion of Liu Shiao-chi in particular and the consolidation of Lin Piao! Ss position as No. 2 man and Mao's unchal- — lenged “heir. (13) er : They decided, furthermore, ‘to: ‘launch a new wave of the cule. tural Revolution, appealing to the masses, and establishing the |. subsequently celebrated Red Guards. Thereby, they sought to strike harder blows, to intimidate their adversaries, and to create situ~~ ations of irreversible accomplished facts. At the same time , they intensified the campaign against the Soviet leaders, going so far as to engage in. threats. They organized a huge demonstration in’ | front of the Soviet embassy with the obvious objective of deepening the already very deep split. Another wave of the cult of Mao , pitched in the most frenetic language ,. crowned all these operations. “Mao — himself participated in Giant meetings | in » Peking. 4) Gayas for Kane Shenae, ae Should be pecalled that he was . already a special memberof thé Political Bureau before the 1956 congress. Finally, without exaggerating the-importance of questions of precedencé, atténtion should ‘be:paidto.the difference between the list of figures present-at: the ‘August:18 demonstration and.the list of those present ‘at’ the demonstration of August 31. In the second list, Chen: Po-ta, previously presented as’ "head of the:group-in. charge -of the Cultural Revolution under.:the ‘Central Committee": (HNA, August -18, p. 3 and August 28, p. 4) no longer-appears.: And after the names of Chou En-lai and Tao-chu appearthe names of Nieh Jung-chen, -acmem= ber of the Central Committee, deputy prime minister and vice-chairman of the Council of National Defense, and Chiang Ching, Mao's wife,. introduced as "deputy head of ‘the Cultural Revolution group underthe - ‘party Cc." CHNA, August 18," p- 3, and September 1,:p. 4). Chen-- Po-ta's ‘name appeared again in. the list: of August .18 in the report : on the September 15 demonstrations: Nieh Yung-chen's name came fur ther down, while Chiang Ching appeared in the list of less important figures. (See HNA, September 16, p. 3 and 5.) (14)More or less grotesque examples can be found in all Chinese publications of the period in question. Note especially the campaign to sell Mao's books -- the publication of which, to believe the
Let us come back to the Cultural Revolution and Red Guard movement: The abjectives of the Cultural Revolution have not been clearly stated from the beginning, and there are:still variations in defining both ends and ‘means. In the first phase, the movement: was directed rather -= so it seemed -- at improving a situation ‘in the cultural -»sector, in ‘the: universities and schools:.which was dangerous: for the ruling group. Progressively.,,: however, it broadened in scope and it became more openly an instrument of struggle against the oppositionists in general. According to its partisans, this movenent would: ‘sweep. iaway all the residue of the past, blocking the way to the revisionists..and, in the last analysis, would contribute to expanding. the. productive forces. (15).
In a more general. way, furthermore, they introduced the perspective that the Cultural Revolution was::the beginning of an--economic and political revolution. .(HNA, August 30, p. 4.) And Lin. Piao. sittated: on August 18: "The great proletarian Cultural Revolution is aimed precisely at eliminating bourgeois ideology, establishing proletarian ideology, remoulding the people's: soul, revolutionising their ideology, digging out the roots of revisionism and consoli~ dating and developing the socialist system."
More concretely, the sixteen points state that "the movement in progress is directed primarily against those who hold leadership positions in the party and:follow the path of capitalism," (point five). If one takes: into: consideration the: fact that according to the’ Chinese leaders: al:l::those who:do:not share their: views and support their present: policies, -"follow the path of capitalism," it is perfectly clear that: the Mao-Lin Piao group launched the Cultural Revolution and created: the: Red Guards in: order: to provide themselves with. an organizational structure which could be used to defeat all. resistance to their line and to apply pressure to the state and: party apparatus, which was itself divided.
They: therefore, considered it. necessary to set going a mass mobilization. But they addressed themselves in fact to a quite limited sector of the masses; namely, the young students. This choice was made for several reasons. First of all, since the first phase of the. strugglé was.centered in the area of culture, it was easier to get the attention of the students. Secondly, a mobilization of students was: necessarily limited;:it thereby implied less danger for the bureaucracy, and did not appear likely to involve’. : .serious negative effects on production. In addition, the ruling ©
official sources, had previously been sabotaged! -- and the extreme declarations of the Red.Guards: "We Red Guards, we are the most resolute in following Chairman Mao's teachings. We do whatever he says." (HNA, August 30, p. 18.) (15)The Cultural Revolution movement is officially linked to the movement for socialist education launched in 1963. (See HNA, August 13. See also on the Cultural Revolution HNA, August 8 and... September 10.)° oe
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group had the possibility in this to establish ties with those who would be the party and state cadres in the more or less proximate . future; and the Cultural Revolution could represent a kind of. | synthetic substitute for the youth for experience in the revolution: which they lacked due to their age. (Elsewhere I have emphasized how much the ruling group seems to be preoccupied with this particular gap distinguishing the youth from the generations of the revolutionary war period.) :
In order: to facilitate the desired mobilization and to arouse the enthusiasm of the youth, Mao and Lin Piao had to utilize certain themes and a tone which would enable them to appear as the most radical wing of the party and the one closest to the democratic demands of the. masses. This is why they resorted to the constant exaltation of the indispensable role of the masses; in the sixteen. points, they codified the necessity of democratic debate and minor-.. ity rights;. they: invoked the democratic revolutionary tradition of the Paris Commune with regard to the system of electing leading bodies of the Red Guards.(16) This is why they tried to give the movement the appearance: of a struggle against the vestiges of’ capitalism and against all the bulwarks of conservatism and privilege.
If the news transmitted by various sources from Peking is true, and if one may so interpret the! repeated words of caution voiced by the ruling group, the movement, or a part-of the movement, slipped:beyond the control of its promoters. The destruction of old symbols, the change in the names of streets, localities, public buildings, etc., are well-known,.as well as the excesses, extending from altering haircuts to: the pulling down of ancient monuments.(17) This probably entered into the plans of the leaders; and it is also possible that they made allowance. from: the beginning for attacks against the representatives of the former possessing classes, and more especially against the "national" capitalists, who received considerable compensation for their expropriated properties.(18) But the: blows delivered by the Red Guard often fell
(16)See especially HNA, July 30,'‘p. 3; August 12°and-19, pp. 3 and 9, onthe role of the masses. On "the confrontation of different. opinions,..inevitable, necessary and beneficial," and on respect for minorities, "because sometimes the truth is on their side," (see point six of the sixteen points. On invoking :the Paris Commune, see point nine of the sixteen points. (17)On“acts of this sort by the Red Guards, see, among other sources, HNA, August 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 30 passim.
(18)In several instances, the Chinese press itself alluded to places frequented by the privileged. (See, in particular, HNA, August 25, p. 11 and 25.) As for the former capitalists, American sources estimate that the indemnifications were rather substantial (five | percent per year on the value of the confiscated properties). These
on bureaucrats also -- houses were ransacked, cars blocked by crowds, and the incursions into certain luxurious places did not affect only the survivors of. the past -- the habitués:-of these same. places were by preference highly placed dignitaries. qf the regime and. their foreign guests. When you make extensive:use of-equalitarian slogans, as. the - Chinese leaders have done,:-you - cannot; in the long run, avoid the ‘eventuality that:some will take you: at.jyour word and attack privileges of all kinds, above all if the masses are mobilized. On the other hand, if a constant propaganda barrage explains that capitalists have infiltrated party bodies and established their dictatorship. there, it is inevitable that the party itself, at various levels, will become subject to accusations and real attacks.(19) >
‘The Mao- Lin Piao group is again faced with a difficult choice -- either to permit the movement to continue, with all the dangers this would imply from the point of view of bureaucratic power, or to restrain it, giving respite to their adversaries. As of this writing, they seem to:have chosen an intermediate solution: The movement continues, its essential goals are confirmed; but-some measures and directives of. a limiting character have been introduced. Thus, the students were-.urged not-to search state and party. functionaries, to leave.-in peace workers. and:peasants, who "constitute the principal force of the revolution" and whose productive activities must not be-.hindered; to avoid alk:acts of compulsion, including ;any directed. against: elements ;considered to be the most hostile to the party. At the same. time, the Red Guards have been requested to participate in agricultural. work, and.their influx into Peking is regulated in the most precise way..in order to prevent the gatherings from building up too much. (20
It) is difficult to say how much truth there is in the reports of serious incidents which have been.widely circulated, including by the press services of the USSR and the other East European countries. According to these reports, the gamut of incidents is
benefits reputedly went to some 90,000 families. (See the September 16 New York Herald Tribune published in Paris.)
(19)According to the press services, some wall bulletins of the Red Guards attacked Li Hsueh-feng, who replaced Peng Chen in the leadership of -the party in Peking. Yang Hsin-feng, the chairman of the ‘Supreme Court, is also said to have been subjected to a session of criticism, (See Le Monde, September 16. )
(20)According to the reports in the press, attacks against the . houses and cars of party and state cadres were forbidden under the pretext that secret documents might fall into indiscreet hands. As for the directive to avoid violence, see HNA, August 30, Septenber 1 and 6. The other directives were- set down, in’ ‘the main, in the first half of September.
extremely varied, ‘extending from scuffles in hairdressers' shops to " . conflicts between Red Guards and local party leaders, from brawls — between students and workers or peasants, to a veritable assault on a party headquarters in Shanghai. What is certain is that resistance _-to the policies of the group that has been in the majority up to:now ‘has been vigorous in the most diverse sectors -- and clashes have no doubt occurred on several occasions. The official sources themnselves support such a hypothesis. (21)
‘In fact, the forces at work are by no means homogeneous, even if certain tendencies predominate on both sides of the barri-: cades. The front commanded by Mao and Lin Piao is polarized essentially around a sectarian bureaucratic tendency, but in the movement which it has created for the indicated objectives, there are ~unquestionably sectors of the youth motivated by revolutionary demands and aspirations. Among the oppositionists, tendencies of a Khrushchevist type very probably have the preponderant weight and, for obvious reasons, they represent the most serious danger for the Mao ‘group at the present time; nonetheless, even the official documents merition the existence of left-wing elements,(22) and it is entirely plausible that many cadres and party members side with the oppositionists who reject merely the excesses of the majority | policies. As for the resistance to the Red Guard movement, its | origin may be’different. There are probably some whose reaction is confined to instinctive self-defense. There are probably actual _ representatives of the former ruling classes. There are probably intellectuals revolted by a grotesque neo-Zhdanovisn, and even workers and peasants who refuse to accept ‘steictures | or to Waste time on incessantly repeated | rituals. (23) ag
The struggle is still undecided, and no one can “exclude the possibility that spectacular changes will occur, above all in view of the explosive international situation in Vietnam. The Mao group itself, forced to the wall, might try to execute a turn. In any © case, the Chinese leadership as a whole will emerge from this test with its capital considerably reduced in the eyes of the party -membership and the masses who will have a more. critical attitude toward them from now on. The time of the myth of a monolithic ‘party united around prestigious leaders of the revolution has gone forever.
September 16, 1966
(21)See HNA, September 6, p. 6, and also point seven of the sixteen points.
(22)See HNA, August 23, p. 4: "The resistance has come mainly from the counter-revolutionary revisionists at home and abroad and from all kinds of 'left' and right opportunists in the party."
(23)Some articles have explicitly noted conflicts between students and "a minority of workers and peasants." (See, among other sources, the articles in the People's Daily, August 23, cited by Pékin Information, No. 36, pp. 15-16.)
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