STORMY INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN CHINA -- I
By Livio Maitan
LThe following article is part-of a study of current developments in China undertaken by Livio Maitan in July. The first half of :the. study ‘considers Péking' s official version of happenings, numerous quotations from the - foreign-language * “publications ‘of the People's Republic of China being cited. Since much of this material has already appeared or been referred to in various accounts in World Outlook, we are reproducing only the .second half of Livio Maitan’s study in which he poses some tentative con¢lusions: We _ havé divided this into two parts of which the first part: follows. The concluding part is scheduled for our next issue.
The numbering | of the footnotes has ‘been maintained to | conform “with those ‘in the: manuscript. The translation is by . World. Outlook. J .
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An Interbureaucratic Conflict
The official version claims, as we have seen, that the present events have their origin in the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. But not a single concrete fact emerges from the numerous and lengthy documents published ol. by the Chinese press which could’ serve to support the hypothesis: of a genuine development of restorationist forces. There are only — altogether general allusions to the possibility that dangerous ~ breaches might be opened up in the area of ideology which might subsequently produce political catastrophes, quotations from: Lenin” on the tendency of the petty-bourgeoisie of the towns and ‘the country to reproduce bourgeois elements, or commonplace references to the inevitable attempts of the overturned classes to return _ to power. (32) This, obviously, is too little to convince us. ‘of the correctness of, the official "analysis."
On. the other hand, there are no elements present which suggest the existence of seriously strained relations between the leaders. and the masses. In 1956, conflicts occurred not only a, between the leaders and the intellectuals but also between the leaders and the masses (demonstrations and’ strikes). This time nothing | indicates: that: ‘Such’ phenomena have occurred.
I believe,” therefore that the present conflicts are of an essentially’ interburebuerati¢ nature and that they’ have been
a. (32). See,. for example HNA- [Hsinhua News haency, London edition), June 19, p.5.
developing under the, pressure of domestic and international problems within the context of the crisis existing in the international Communist movement. -It goes without saying that the problem of relations with the masses still exists for the leaders and influences their attitudes in the last analysis ~~ but at this stage, it is not. a direct and immediate factor.
tet one accepts this interpretation, the present polemics ‘are in. large measure clarified, and it is possible to grasp the real issues behind the frequently ritualistic and Byzantine verbiage. a, ;
. The polemics and aiscussion of the past months all echo a central. leitmotiv --politics in command, the primordial role of . the party and’ the thought of Mao Tse- ~tung in all sectors of society, from the army to literature and the sciences. What does all this Signify if not reaffirmation of the primacy of a:particular layer of the bureaucracy, the ones most purely political, the only group in position to guarantee the cohesion and dynamism of the regime?.:. Isn't it logical, fundamentally, that differentiations and conflicts of the type which have weighed so heavily in the life of the USSR and the people's democracies © in the past ten years should also appear in China?
Let us. look at the official documents. The first symptom of the crisis appeared in the communiqués on the conference of. the political department: of the army which ended on January 18. "The general. view taken at the. conference," said the first communiqué,."wasthat the principle of keeping. politics in the fore. formulated by Comrade Lin Piao, complies. with the: consistent a teachings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung; it. was. put: forward. in accordance with the. historical. experience of the Chinese people's armed forces’ and. the present. situation,. in. accordance with the laws of develop-.. ment and the economic basis of socialist society, and with the fact that. classes and class struggle still exist in socialist society. The principle. is the. foundation on-which.to strengthen the revolutionisation and. modernisation, of.the army. - Chairman. . Mao Tse-tung's ideas on party building must. be followed in order to strengthen the work of Suiiding party organisation in the arny. (HNA, January 19, D. 9-10.) . a,
Hsiao ‘Hua! s report, furthernore , gave a clear enough indication of the line of the leading. group as well as its position ain: regard to certain criticisms that: were said to have been made.. ced "Some people say," his report declared among other things, mg lie tary affairs are politics,' ‘military affairs and politics are of equal importance' and ‘military. affairs and politics should be given first place in turn. Such views are absolutely:wrong, they © are most harmful and run counter to what Chairman Mao Tse-tun has always taught." (See HNA, January 25, p. 4 and following.) The implications of these general statements were drawn at once: "Carry through the principle that military affairs must be run by the whole” party and. strengthen the party's absolute leadership over the |
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army... The system of dual leadership by the military command and the local party committees, under the unified leadership of .the party's Central Committee, must be resolutely | enforced. . The nucleus of the leadership. and unity in the company and the bulwark in the ‘Struggle is the party branch." = “One can understand what the underlying basis of the debate — was. ‘Elements in the army wanted to have a free hand in their own: domain and not. submit to constant interference. from the party bureaucracy; and, in the presence of an accommodating attitude on the part of the political leadership (for example, certain state-. ments by:Chen .Yi-last fall),- they emphasized the importance of the factor of military technique. They are supposed to have said, “Weapons decide.everything.'' The reply to this was, "We always rely for our victories on the factor of man, the factor of politics. This is the moral atom bomb which our side alone possesses. oo
‘Tightening up in the army was thus necessary for the ruling group, which executed this operation first of all, reaffirming its primacy and reenforcing the. position of Lin Piao. It was only. -.after this move that the army and its press. were mobilized for ‘the battle in other areas. a
‘Did similar polemics develop in the industrial sector?. It is probable.that here the leading group only ‘perceived symptoms , since:there is not yet as structured an economic bureaucracy-in.: . China as there is in the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia. But the | themes are roughly the same. Primacy belongs to the party and to the thought. of Mao, the capital -methodological importance of which in the construction of. industry, technological ‘progress and new discoveries,-is exaggerated to the point of absurdity. In April, a little. before the opening of the attack against the oppositionists, two conferences were held, one on work: in industry and - transportation, the other on political work in the industrial and transportation department. (The conferences were organized jointly by the state. economic commission and the appropriate subcommittee of the party's, Central Committee.) The article reporting these .. conferences,.in. the People's Daily (HNA, April 4) bore. the. eloquent title: "Run the > Enterprises in Recordance. with Mao Tse- bung! Sioope Thinking." os en
After emphasizing the necessity of resolutely adopting a proletarian class point of view and of educating the workers (who need education because. of their petty-bourgeois peasant origins ) and recalling. the need,-for, threefold cooperation between the leadership; the technicians, and the masses, the commentator. concluded:.:"To- run: the. enterprises . in line with Mao Tse-tung's thinking: it is necessary to ensure absolute leadership by the Communist .party...Ensuring: absolute leadership by the. party over the enterprise calls for unified leadership by. the party. That is to say, on the one hand, all tasks from the higher administrative, technical and other organisations should, without exception, be — under the unified control of the party committee of the enterprise and be carried out according to actual conditions in the enterprises.
On the other hand, all work in various spheres, such as that of: the enterprise’ ‘Ss Communist Youth branch, trade union branch, women's association branch, and the militia, should be done under ‘the unified leadership of the party committee of the enterprise.
These ideas were reiterated in an editorial in the Liberation Army Daily praising the experience of an industry in the military sector where the principles of the Central Committee and of Lin ~ Piao had been put into practice. Here, once again, they polemize with phantom oppositionists: "Some people say that the job of factories is production and that they should turn out products.. Our factories must persist in the socialist direction, take the socialist road and serve socialist construction and the broad masses of the working people. How are they different from capitalist factories if their sole purpose is to turn out products?" (See’ HNA, June 23, p. 2.)
‘The offensive which took its inspiration from the slogan of politics in command is aimed moreover at all who might want to emphasize the importance of the work of the-specialists. "Some. of our comrades who have come under the influence of bourgeois thinking have consciously or unconsciously developed the tendency to pay attention to technical matters only. They immerse themselves in their job and pay scant attention to politics and so lose sight of the correct direction for their work... If in the question of building socialism, it La socialist country] considers that ‘cadres decide everything" or ‘technique’ decidés everything, ' then in practice the tendency will arise to get immersed in the job while neglecting politics, and there will grow up the style of work of commandism and isolation from the masses, and, as a result, bourgeois. ‘elements and’ political degeneration | will find their way into various branches of work in the guise of 'specialists' and ‘scholars’: and will seize the leadership in’ some places | and some institutions. (See | HNA, April 15, pp. 5-6. 5 ¢ (33) -
With regard: to the polemics ‘on cultural questions, matters are still clearer and the objectives are quite openly proclaimed. The ruling group does not at all hide its preoccupation over a dialectical process in this realm carrying over to political questions proper, thus inducing the formation of oppositionist groups and tendencies. (This fear was expressed not less clearly
(33) See also HNA, “April 23, p- 7 and June 1l, p. 4. ("The watershed dividing Marxism-Leninism from revisionism, revolution from counter-revolution lies between the alternatives of whether: one supports or opposes the placing of Mao Tse-tung's thought right in the forefront, whether one supports Mao Tse- tung's: thought in command, supports ‘politics in command,' or one © advocates money-making in command and the placing of professional skill in command." )
by Khrushchev at.the time of his campaign against some circles of the intellectuals a few months before his downfall.) It. must be said that on the basis of the available information this worry..was — not without foundation. To prevent. the possibility that certain. groups of intellectuals might . consolidate important positions of, influence or control; that is, create real bastions, the ruling. group intervened, reaffi rming the primacy of the party, of politics. and of Mao's thought; more concretely, they lashed out against all those suspected of not being entirely in accord with the line and promoted others more disposed to play :the role of spokesmen loyal to their orientation and views. C34).
In. order to better ‘understand the present struggle as well as the official interpretation of it, it is necessary to recall — another vital element; that is, the explanation given by the Chinese leaders for the evolution of the Soviet Union. According to them, Soviet revisionism has a bourgeois class content and, in fact, a process of capitalist restoration took place after Stalin's death. But how could such an évolution occur? What were the factors that facilitated it? Without going. back to the numerous Chinese documents on this question, their:views are clearly indicated even in the documents of recent months dealing with the crisis. Thus, according to the. Maoist theoreticians, it was primarily in the realm of ideology - that revisionism won its first battles, opening up dangerous breaches which weakened the socialist systen. as a whole. The social base of this occurrence resided in the formation of privileged layers that tended to:crystallize out, particularly among the specialists, the technicians, leaders that separate themselves from the masses, etc.:,Concepts dealing with material incentives and introducing the category of profit into a socialist economy presumably reinforced these tendencies. Along with the Petofi circle, the constantly recurring negative example is Khrushchev, whom they claim carried: out a real coup d'état after resistance had first been broken down on the ideological front.(45) ° -
(34) Kuo Mo-jo can be> indexed as the symbol of the absolutely orthodox intellectual type. Distorted reports last April led to the. impression that Kuo Mo-jo had been attacked and that he had made a degrading self-criticism: It must be concluded on the contrary that Kuo Mo-jo made his statements, which received considerable. attention, precisely to-align himself with the "cultural revolution" orientation ~~ to confirm the fact.that he was still at the disposal of the ruling group. (In 1956 he made speeches perfectly in tune with the line of the time. ) (See HNA , May 2s pp. 42-43 and July 5, pp. 12-13.) (35) See among other references, HNA., ‘April 7, p. 4. ("In a socialist society, the new relationship has: its concentrated expression in the relationship between the functionaries and the masses. At all levels functionaries of the Communist party and the state are servants of the people, not overlords riding on their backs. They
From such premises and the concomitant analysis, the Chinese leaders draw the conclusion that it is necessary to fight: with extreme vigilance not only certain ideas and the pursuit of material privileges but also all centrifugal tendencies within the bureaucracy itself. If the so-called de-Stalinization movement ©” involved a certain loosening and "liberalization" to the advantage | of various sectors of the bureaucracy desirous of limiting the grip of the political bureaucracy of the party, a process that culmi- ~~ nated in the last analysis in a kind of redistribution of power © within the ruling stratum; it is logical that the Maoists, who now condemn the de-Stalinization in its entirety (forgetting or rectifying their own judgments of 1956), should seek to move in the opposite direction, countering any tendency toward "autonomy" in specific areas. This implies reinforcing the central apparatus and bureaucracy of the party, the ideological expression of which is the universal primacy of Mao! Ss thought.
"The Cultural Revolution
One of the central themes of the campaign of the ruling group is the voultural revolution:' ee a
We must note, however, ‘that the ideas expressed in the last two months are not new. It is symptomatic that in supplying | theoretical and methodological generalizations, the official press utilizes essentially Mao's’ old contributions. It could be said that the Maoist group, in derniouncing the penetration of "revisionist" and "bourgeois" ideas, seeks at the same time to defend what it considers: to be the main thread of orthodoxy; and, to this end, it is striving to popularize once again, on a vaster scale and in more
should show themselves among the masses as plain working people and they must not enjoy any privileges. To put this principle completely into effect, it is necessary to place proletarian politics in the forefront, strictly practise socialist principles and thoroughly change the old relationship between man and man, in production and labour, left over by the old society. Otherwise it will be possible for the functionaries to use their power to place themselves in a privileged position, with the result. that a privileged stratum will come into. being to the detriment of. collective ownership and socialist ‘ownership by the entire people. The social base on which the Khrushchov revisionist clique is: effecting the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union is. © precisely a privileged stratum of this kind.") See also HNA, May 6, p. 4 on the corrupting role of material incentives; June 3, p.4 on the danger of a bourgeois mentality in privileged specialists; June 8, p. 5 on breaches in ideological front; June 12, pp. 3-4 for a historical analogy -=a quite dubious one ~~ with the methods used by the / bourgeoisie to assert itself asa ruling class.
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dramatic tones, its basic notions on the primacy of the party, on - adopting the political point of view in all realms; on cultural production by the masses themselves, on the necessity of living among the masses in order to be able to understand their needs and their feelings , etc.
“Moreover , on the cultural front the battle has gone on almost uninterruptedly, as we already knew and as we are now. informed by .new reports (for example, Mao's intervention in June 1964 mentioned above). :The point of departure in the current polemic, as we have indicated, goes back some years, linking up ultimately with the debates of the thirties and forties. Let us recall,:for instance, some important arguments of the years 1962-64 -- ‘the polemic between the supporters of the official views and the partisans of the philosopher Yang Hsien-chen, who is: supposed to have counterposed the concept of wewo fuse into one" against the concept of "one divides into two"; the polemic against those who thought that it was necessary "to write about average people"; and the polemic over modernizing the Peking opera. (36) The attacks against such Soviet intellectuals as the movie director Chukrai and the writer Sholokov aré also quite likely a reflection of debates among the Chinese intellectuals.
All these polemics have always had a rather direct political Significance and the aim of the supporters of the official line has been to demonstrate systematically that the questions under discussion are not of an exclusively methodological or artistic nature, but in the final analysis put in question the line of the party and Mao's thought.(37) That is precisely why these polemics are interesting and often rather lively. If one were to judge them contrariwise, solely in accordance with their intrinsic cultural merit, the balance sheet would be lamentable. On the one hand, the representatives of the official views base themselves on a moderate Zhdanovism, continually resorting to the same commonplace arguments and using a scholastic methodology replete with quotations from the classics of Marxism and Chairman Mao. On the other hand, the oppositionists also have had to respect certain taboos, giving the impression of timidity and inconsistency. Thus the philosophic
(36) The discussion on the philosophical topic was opened through an article by. Ai Heng-wu and Tin Tsing-chan in Guanming Ribao (May 29, 1964) and it was developed in particular in a seminar organized by the staff of Red Flag. (See Peking Information, No. 38, 1964.) The notes on the discussion concerning "average people" appeared in Wenyi Bao, September 30, 1964.
(37) See the arguments of the defenders of the official theses in the debate against Yang Hsien-chen (Peking Information, No.-. 38, 1964, p. 9); and the denunciation with which Yao Wen-yuan closes his article against Wu Han, which has already been. cited several. times
débate ‘referred to above was -- at least as it was presented in the press painfully scholastic. The debate ovér whether in literature priority should be given to average people or: to heroes verges: on the grotesque, repeating arguments often advanced in the Soviet Union in the Stalin period. Even the polemic over Hai Jui Ousted revealed a contrived character, the only valid arguments being elementary methodé logical | Statements made by some of the timid defende?’s cof Wa Han. via
eee potton, ‘bhe’ ‘fervor of the "eultural revolution" campaign is explained: not ‘by a real ferment of new ideas but by the decisions of the ruling group to launch a noisy assault against all critics and oppositionists.' It was precisely the constant reappearance of discussions and polemics and the role played in these by persons ' holding important positions in the party and in the government *: which no doubt convinced Mao and the faithful behind him that after all the: results obtained in the’ realm of culture were ephemeral and that a'’new drivé’ was needed to sweep away elements considered particularly dangérous. They seized’ the occasion for a purge, - for striking down some old mandarins, bringing in replacements and: promoting relatively new cadres, more docile in relation to an apparatus to which they owe their positions.
It was in this more general framework that the campaign on educational organization was probably conceived. Here one gets the impression of a campaign’ analogous to that of the most — frenetic phase of the "great leap forward" when, for example, the revolutionary experiment ‘of backyard furnaces was extolled. The agitation has taken on an iconoclastic tempo, often in seening defiance of the most elementary norms and criteria.
it is not hard to. believe that outdated systems remain in Chinese education, along: with well-rooted "idealistic" tendencies. (The sudden! nature of the discovery, however, is somewhat surprising.) Likewise it is-not hard to believe that the sons of workers and peasants have in practice been put in a position of inferiority. The proposed remedies, however, do not seem to be of a kind likely to engender a positive outcome. Some of the measures are conspicuously conjunctural, empirical, motivated by the immediate requirements of the current pattle; others seem to concern limited sectors and may have incidental goals. (38) As for indications of more general import, it-is difficult to believe that the
(48) The suspension of examinations and the Six-month postponement of admission to institutions of higher learning were announced June 18. (See HNA, June 19, p. 10.) On this question, see also HNA, June 20, passim, and June 14, p. 3 and following, where, in particular, a critique is. offered of the system. of. examinations, in. effect, now consideréd to be a rampart of the former ruling classes. It is possible that need for cadres in the various sectors is at the bottom of the measures intended to reduce the time. in. school.
educational system in China will gain much:if the decried "idealism" is replaced by compulsory teaching of the works of Mao, if the scholasticism is countered with indoctrination of a vulgar, stultifying politics and:if:a preponderant amount of time is devoted to-demonstrations, meetings and. assemblies, etc. (39) Participation in practical activities in-lLabor in the factories and in the.fields is likewise not the panacea:which the partisans of ‘the ruling. group proclaim it to be. Experiments in this respect were made in other workers states, particularly in the Soviet Union, with very dubious results. I venture the hypothesis that sooner or later this question will -bé“posed anew and in very ‘different terms from those now employed in the official propaganda.
_LTo be concluded in: the next issue. a Coy,
(39) ‘The ‘students of -a school in ‘the :capital of Hunan province reproached their teachers’ for: not permitting them to devote more — than ten days a month to. the current. political campaign. (See. : HNA, June ‘20; p.°13:)° We have seen that the question of ‘the time to be devoted: to. poltitical.activity per se is more generally. a: subject of heated polemics: It should be recalled’ that .in- 1956,- . Chou En-lai-°said-in .a: report: “The Central Committee considers it: essential to make sure thatthe intellectuals can devote at least | five-sixths of. ‘the: wore < week. ‘for: their work : Chee e., forty hours .:::: per week}. pe sy. . bers ot rs