Un service He presse ouvrier
Vol. 4, No. 3 . February 18, 1966
SENATE WITNESSES DEPLORE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
Johnson's hastily .contrived Honolulu sideshow succeeded in capturing newspaper headlines for a few days in the United States. But the spotlight placed on Hitler-loving Gen. Cao Ky, the favorite puppet of the president of the United Stetes, failed to dislodge the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from the attention being paid to them by the American public, which is becoming increasingly worried over the administration's escalation of the war in Southeast Asia. What the key witnesses said last week is being discussed from coast to coast.
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Lieut. Gen. James Gavin appeared before the committee February 8. A paratroop commander in World War II and later ambassador to France, he is considered to be a leading authority in the field of military strategy. It was Gen. Gavin who advised President Eisenhower in 1954 not to send U.S. troops to back French forces in their effort to maintain French colonial domination of Indo-China.
The general made clear that in view of the extent of current U.S. involvement in Vietnam, he was opposed to withdrawing from the scene. He held that U.S. troops should be maintained in south Viet- » nam... But he argued insistently against any major escalation of the war. It would affect the capacity of the United States to meet what he considered to be more important "commitments" elsewhere in the world. He warned about the possibility of provoking China into intervening in the situation.
He charged that the government had become so "mesmerized" with Vietnam that it had allowed its involvement to become "alarmingly out of balance." As a. result, "we have been escalating at the will of our opponents rather than on our own judgment."
If the escalation of the war were carried too far, China, in the general's opinion, would be provoked into intervening. And the Chinese might not.confine themselves to Vietnam. They might open a ‘second front in Korea. Embroiled in: an Asian land war, the U. S. would be tempted to resort to nuclear weapons.
Gen. Gavin also argued that "if. you got far down the road" of a "war with China," this might well bring in the Soviet Union at some point.
The military expert stated that he felt. that the U.S. was "slowly creeping" toward "urban bombing" in Vietnam. He deplored — _this trend. "The bombing of Hanoi or Peking would achieve little, he said. After World War II, he recalled, a survey showed that "strategic bombing" had not "achieved either its projected military or psychological aims. Moreover, to borb cities would have a bad effect on world opinion.
‘George F. Kennan testified February 10. “The airthor of the Marshall Plan and the postwar policy of the "containment of Communism," Kennan is viewed in knowledgeable capitalist circles as one of the country's top experts in the diplomatic field, particularly with regard to the Soviet. Union. ; _ Kennan backed the position of Gen. Gavin, holding that the U.S. should not undertake further escalation but simply "dig: in." When asked if this position did not contradict his 1947. policy, Kennan said’ that at that time there had been only “one center of world Communism," Moscow, and that the policy had aimed.at protecting Western Europe, a big industrial complex with the will and capacity to contribute in carrying out the policy.
"Vietnam is not a region of major industrial-military impor-
tance," he said. "It is difficult to believe that any decisive development of the world situation is going to be determined by what happens on thet territory." Even if "the Vietcong" gained complete control in south Vietnam, Kennan said he saw no dangers "great enough to justify our direct military intervention." Only "considerations of prestige" are involved in maintaining U.S. ‘troops in Vietnam today.
Kennan held that it was "a most, dangerous assumption" to believe that if "sufficient military pressure" is brought to bear in south Vietnam "there will occur at. some point something in the nature of a political capitulation by the other side." The fighters of the National Liberation Front have much "space and manpower to give up, if they have to, and the Chinese can give them more if they need it."
To attempt to crush Hanoi "would almost certainly have the effect of bringing in Chinese forces at some point, whether formally. or in the guise of ‘volunteers,’ thus involving us in a military conflict with Communist China on one of the most unfavorable theaters of hostility thet we could possibly choose."
Not only. are great and potentially more important questions of world affairs not receiving, as a consequence of our preoccupation with Vietnam, the attention they should be receiving, but in some instances assets we already enjoy, and hopeful possibilities we should be developing, are being sacrificed to this unpromising involvement in a remote and secondary theater of activity."
Kennan indicated some of the things he had in mind. "Our relations with the Soviet Union have suffered grievously, as was to be expected -- and this at a time when far more important things — were involved in those relations than what is involved in Vietnan, and when we had special reason to cultivate them."
Besides the Soviet Union, Kennan expressed concern about relations with Japan. "The confidence and the good disposition of the Japanese is the greatest asset we have had -- and the greatest asset we could have in East Asia." With its war-making potential, "Japan is of vital importance to us..." Yet relations with Japan are being seriously affected by the "military struggle in Vietnam, . and particularly when we press it by means of strategic bombing."
Kennan likewise deplored the injury to the "image" of the United States due to "inflicting grievous injury on the lives of a poor and helpless ‘people, and particularly a people of different race and color..."
_. Neither Gavin nor Kennan fundamentally oppose the war in — Vietnam. They represent the view of the sector of the capitalist = class that believes this to be the wrong war at the wrong time at the wrong place. But this rift in the capitalist class over tactics is of importance to genuine opponents of the imperialist aggression in Vietnam and they should utilize it to the utmost in pursuing their own objective -- immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops.
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