VIETNAM IN BACKGROUND AT KYOTO MEETING
While the diplomatic formalities could not have been more punctilious at the heavily guarded fifth Joint U.S.-Japan Minister-— ial Meeting in Kyoto July 5-7, Secretary of State Dean Rusk's ain, it appears, was to bring his fist down on the table. The representatives of the Sato government, bowed politely before their heavyhanded guest, but nevertheless advanced certain differences along with Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shiina's acknowledgment that "the basic policies and objectives in the international community of the two countries are the same.
‘The: Japanese indicated their worries over the situation in Vietnam, an understandable reaction in view of the way the escale-tion has aroused popular opinion in Japan and fostered a huge and growing antiwar movement.
Rusk sought to leave the impression that a turning point had been reached in Vietnam. In a conference with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato July 7, he reportedly promised "that his country has no intention. -of expanding its bombing operations in North Vietnam beyond. the strikes on oil. storage facilities near Hanoi and Haiphong. " [fhe Japan Times July 9.] =
~The Japanese diplomats did not press the point. Their real views, however, may be guessed at from the following comments by : Kazushige : ‘Hirasawa which appeared in the July 9 Japan Times: "in Japanese eyes, the war’ seems to be nearing a turning point. By that it is meant that the war is about to sink into the quagmire of a
military stalemate where it can no longer be won or lost by either belligerent.
"The more the military stalemate grows, the more decisive will become podaacat and economic. factors in determining the future course “Of the war.
pis anticipated change in the situation will make ita matter of. concern for” Japan what steps should be prepared to cope with tbe - .
oo wjapanaalies 4's point that economic assistance toward
Southeast Asia, too, should be examined comprehensively, with this question | in mind.
|‘ WWowever, the Americans seem “to be still preoccupied with | the military phase of. the war." | a
: Another. "shade’ of difference" involved Japan' fs ‘relations with China. ‘At the conférénce itself, International Trade and Industry - Minister. Takeo Miki told the U.S. representatives that Japan wants to ease its trade terms with China to the level of those adopted by West European countries. He suggested extending long-term credits to China and using. Export— Inport Bank funds for plant exports to China. *. =
The American’ delegation hedged somewhat on this. They objected to. extending credits but did not meet the other suggestions head on. They were in a rather uncomfortable position at the moment, since Johnson's latest. "peace" offensive has raised the question of a modification in Washington's policy of “absolute quarantine" of. China. Rusk could hardly blow up this ploy while in Japan.
But the Americans argued stiffly that increased contacts with China, would bring “little profit." As a staff writer of the Japan Times [July 9]. put it: "The U.S. seems to believe that the best thing to do at the moment is to drive Red-China into a corner so. that it will be forced to end its isolation spontaneously. Cy
The policy of the U.S. “delegation appears to have been. to give Japan a green light in promoting its "leadership" in the "regional development" of Southeast Asia. At the moment this would appear to relate primarily to Indonesia and its new anti- Communist “dictatorship.
In’ passing, the Americans brushed aside Japanese efforts for abolition of the U.S. tariffs assessment system and easing of "antidumping" controls. oa
They then rubbed salt into this wound by putting the squeeze on their hosts for a "liberalization" of direct investments by ~ Americans in Japan. They got the ‘concession, though it may Prove to be a token gesture.
THE CRISIS IN YUGOSLAVIA
By Henri Valin
The elimination of- ‘Aiéksanaar Rankovic from the leadership of the league of Communists of