JOHNSON" S. CALCULATIONS: IN BOMBING HANOT AND BATYHONG:
Spon. SO By” Dick Roberts
The official reason’ why the. Johnson administration began heavy ‘bombing of the oil-storage depots in Hanoi and Haiphong June 20’ is that "infiltration" by north Vietnamese troops into south Vietnam had greatly increased in recent weeks. This position was maintained by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in a press con- ference held the day the bombings began.
‘McNamara’ contended that "enemy truck movement ‘to South Viet-_ nam has doubled during the first five months of 1966, compared to the same period in 1965" and the "rate of infiltration [is] about 4,500 a. month... "
Even at face value, these ‘figures are not very convincing. : The . 4,500; figure is not new. McNamara gave it at least twice earlier” this year: first, at the culmination of the "peace offensive" in January when Johnson ordered renewed bombing of north Vietnam; and, second, in his Chamber of Commerce speech May 2, when he promised the huge increases in U.S. troop commitments which have subsequently been sent, to Vietnam.
As to doubling the. rate of truck movements, it need only be commented, comparing the same periods, that U.S. troop commitment had increased almost tenfold; that the bombing of south Vietnam had increased five times; and that the bombing of ‘north Vietnam had tripled -- before the oil-storage depot attacks. Do Do.
Very few observers, if any, have accepted McNamara's conten- | tion that the main or even an important. determinant of the June. 29: decision was increased north Vietnamese troop movements. But the question of what really lay behind Washington's drastic escalation of the war is one that is of paramount interest to most people, and not just to war critics alone.
A glance at the leading American newspapers shows that concern about Johnson's decision is deep-going even: among those who generally support the war. The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, for example, devoted: considerable attention to the bombing decision -~- and the conclusion about its causes that these _. two newspapers came up with is quite different from the one McNamara gave in his press conference.
In the first place, it was widely noted that the bombing of-..; Haiphong and Hanoi marked a turning point in Washington's tactics that goes far beyond the initial steps of destroying these oil- .. storage tanks. The New York Times treated this question in its main editorial July 3:
"The policies now being followed were those advocated in essence, by Senator Goldwater in the 1964 campaign and criticized
at that time by Mr. Johnson. The once strong emphasis on negotiations has faded. It appears illogical to escalate the war, as the United States is doing steadily, and still expect the North Vietnamese and Vietcong to 'negotiate.'
"Another change that now requires notice," the New York Times continued, "is the shift in emphasis from a war whose main. objective was the containnent of Communist China..to a war aimed ~ almost exclusively at the military defeat of North. Vietnam and the Vietcong.
"There is an obvious calculation that Peking will not move, just as there has been all along a belief that Moscow would not fight for Hanoi. President Johnson now seems assured that the war can be fought and won exclusively in South and North Vietnam.
According to the New York Times, therefore, the bombings marked a shift to the all-out war concept long advocated by the Pentagon and supported by Barry Goldwater in the 1964 elections -a concept that leaves little room for a negotiated settlement short of surrender. vey Cy
And, according to the Times, the bombings showed that for the time being, at least, Washington is confident that neither the Soviet Union nor China will enter the war; and it is this "calculation" that is the main reason why Johnson made the bombing decision at this’ time.
The two conclusions set forth by tice, Rew’ York Times about
Washington's policy were corroborated by members of the newspaper's staff who attended various "high-level" press briefings in Washington: ° during the week the bombing began, or who were privy to other inside sources. Arthur Krock, the Times' senior correspondent in Washington, devoted a column to, “the subject June 29.
Krock addressed. himself to the question of why President Johnson had chosen to reveal the bombing intentions in a press conference June 18, ten days before they actually took place [see World Outlook July 1]. "Was the President's purpose...to prepare the American people and-.those of friendly nations for the attack, thereby softening the impact of the policy change?" Krock asked, or, “was the purpose also, or only, to assure Moscow and Peking in advance that the attack on the. facilities did not represent a change of policy to unlimited war?" (Emphasis. added.
. Krock inclined toward the second answer. ) ne mere ritual denunciation of the attack by the Soviet Union," he pointed out, “suggests that if this was the objective of ene. caveat. it was | comprehended and accepted."
The ‘opinion that Johnson had made the early statement in order to warn the American people and their allies could be rejected, Krock believed, because the reasons for the policy shift of bombing Hanoi and ‘Haiphong. were ‘known long beforehand both to. ‘leading ©
Democrats and Republicans. and to Washington’ Ss main allies abroad.
"There is another speculative assignment here for its aes timing," Krock’ then: added. "This is that the internal troubles. of the Peking Government-have removed risk there ma ever Deve ~ been of -a military response." Emphasis added. oe NS
To other Washington journalists, the importance of the Chinese and Soviet responses, the internal fighting between them, and the wave of purges in China, were not speculative matters in determining Johnson’ s- ‘move.
Wall - Street. Journal staff reporter Philip Geyelin reported
June 30, "Much more than practical military: need was involved in the decision,: which has been the subject of intense deliberation for weeks.... To the experts, Hanoi looks to be increasingly isolated from its big Red patrons, Russia and Communist China, as these two concentrate increasingly on their own quarrel] and the Chinese are convulsed by purges and internal strains.
New York Times Washington correspondent Max Frankel, who possibly attended the same briefing as Geyelin, spelled out the influence of Moscow and Peking's response (or lack of it) in greater © detail. "Strains between the Communist nations and a great political upheaval in Communist China," Frankel reported in the May 30 New York Times, "have encouraged the Administration to intensify its pressure. a . ee
"Far from uniting in support for a Communist ally," Frankel continues, "Moscow and Peking have been quarrelling more and more about which is to blame for North Vietnam's unhappy predicament and for the ineffectiveness ‘of Soviet: and Chinese help." .
And it -is not only the polemical exchanges between Moscow and Peking which are carefully watched in Washington: "The Soviet Union has taken pains all along to emphasize that it.is supplying only 'defensive' weapons to North Vietnam. These | have not proved an effective deterrent to American air assaults. "(Emphasis added. a
"More effective for a time," Frankel then explained, "was the memory of Chinese intervention in the Korean war.16 years ago. In deference to the huge Chinese Army, Washington has repeatedly disavowed any desire to conquer or destroy North Vietnam. To. prove’ its point, it has long spared Hanoi and Haiphong, has tried to stay away from civilian targets: and from Chinese frontier areas, and had only gradually expanded the pattern of attack toward the two main cities.
"The fear of Chinese intervention has abated here in recent months," Frankel concluded, "as Peking has apparently toned down. | its ambiguously worded threats of last year and has spoken more and more of the need for the North Vietnamese to stand on their own
(Emphasis added.
But. Washington can never be absolutely certain that the. .-.,..-° Soviet and Chinese leaders will refrain from defending north Vietnam indefinitely. Each step of. the U.S. escalation serves as a further test of Moscow and Peking's resolve., Besides being a significant step towards greater destruction of north Vietnamese material resources, the present bombing attack was also. orand perhaps mainly ~— a test of Soviet and Chinese policy.
Three large air pases. capable of lending jet ‘fighters are known to be in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. "North Vietnam' So. first reaction to the raids today," Frankel continued in the June. 30. analysis, "was viewed here as relatively restrained. Some officials had believed that the best of. its Soviet and Chinese-built air force had been committed to the defense of Hanoi. The absence of a. serious challenge was: taken.as a sign that. Hanoi feels itself . isolated and. unsure ‘of more aid..."
Washington' Ss "calculation" which lay.behind the decision to bomb Haiphong and Hanoi, therefore, had two sides to it: One was the decision that the Soviet and Chinese leadership would not respond;: the other was the decision that this failure to respond would set the stage. for a | Sweeping | escalation of the war against : Vietnam. mae
It was clearly the second side of the reasoning which led the New York Times to the conclusion cited earlier that a new stage of the war had been opened. The bombings of oil- ~storage depots. ‘are only a preliminary step. Once begun, the Pentagon's plan is to continue escalation until -~ stopped..
New. York Times reporter. Willian. Beecher reported the. - Pentagon's viewpoint as of the first day of bombing, June 29: "Even as black smoke rose over Hanoi and Haiphong after today's air strikes on petroleum installations," Beecher wrote, "top military men at the Pentagon were looking toward further escalation of the war effort..”. (New York Times, June 30. ).
Beecher | listed the following imnediate steps on the Pentagon’ Ss. agenda:
“Closing | of the harbor at Haiphong. It is estimated that . two-thirds of North Vietnam's s imports, ancluding 95 percent of its oil, pass ‘through Haiphong. .
. “Destruction ° of the three largest jet airfields in the Hanoi~ Haiphong area. Most.of North Vietnam's 70. MIG fighters and le IL-28 bombers are based on those fields.
"Bombing of power plants and industrial installations. High on the list would | be ‘the ‘Thainguyen steel plant, about 35 miles north of Hanoi. ye, _— :
Beecher also took note “of the reason “why Johnson had not. bombed Hanoi earlier, and what the implications of the present move
were: "For months," he stated, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed for. such. @SSaults..... Their. arguments ‘were resisted, however, because of the danger that | striking. at the. heartland of North Vietnam might cause Communist China to enter the war in a bigger way, might | force the Soviet Union to step up its material support to Hanoi, and might injure the United States' reputation throughout the world if substantial numbers of civilians. -were killed . -in ‘the “bombing.
"Now. that President Johnson. Yias . decided to run those risks..., " Beecher continued, "some key Pentagon planners. feel that, in time, they. may be permitted to .attack other. major MAESH Ory targets in the formerly off-limits areas. ".
Therefore all eyes in Washington + were on the response: Would Moscow finally alter its policy of "ritual denunciation" and de facto "peaceful coexistence" with the West? Would Peking cease its ultrarevolutionary sounding harangues against’ Moscow, bid for a united front against Johnson and actually come to Hanoi s support? Those were the major questions in the Pentagon war room, and. the answers were” duly Tegistered.
New York Times correspondent Peter Grose. wired: ‘the Soviet ~ response from Moscow. "About 20 petitions of protest were handed in yesterday ‘and today at the United States Embassy," Grose reported July 1. "The petitions, all similar in wording, were’ brought by © small delegations. There were no threats of large- scale demonstrations, the (U. s.J official said." -
Grose continued, "To most observers, the initial Soviet reaction to the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings has been guarded and reserved -- about the minimum required by the long-standing Soviet olicy of giving the Vietnamese Communists full political support while remaining aloof from thing approaching military engagements." (Emphasis added. )
Grose also observed in passing, "Enthusiastic offers of. volunteers to fight beside the North Vietnamese,’ heard in public meetings in months: past, have not been reported now.
Washington was not as confident about Peking": s “reply. No official assessment was made until Hanoi and Haiphong had been pounded with bombs four more days. When hundreds of tons of bombs had produced only one note from Peking, however, Washington was Jubilant. The story made the front page.
_"Peking's: carefully: worded reaction to the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong," Max Frankel wrote in the July 6 New York Times, "has reinforced the Administration's calculation that. China will not directly intervene in the war at this stage. ©
"That calculation," Frankel continued, "was supported by . nearly all of President Johnson! Ss principal advisers before he ordered the attacks. " Even = the gloomiest, Pentagon planners were
pleased with the results, Frankel reported: "Those who most feared a Chinese military involvement last year and those who opposed the | resumption of bombings last Rebruary » find little reason to challenge ~ that judgment now." | 7
‘And Frankel comes to the crux of the matter: "Far from using tougher language, the Chinese were found here to have held back even from the language they used in the spring of 1965...This was the reaction predicted throughout the top levels of the United States Government. In fact, one of the major purposes of the intensified bombing was to demonstrate to Hanoi that it. must stand essentially alone against increasing American pressure. "(Emphasis added. )
THE PROTESTS IN GERMANY AND JAPAN
The shocked protests that swept the world over Johnson's deci- . sion to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong were especially Significant in two countries -- Germany and Japan. :
In Munich, 600 demonstrators appeared at the U.S. consulate, shouting, "Johnson, murderer!"
A similar demonstration occurred in Stuttgart. One of the placards depicted American planes loaded with bombs marked, "Made in Germany."
Clashes with: police and reactionaries flared up in both cities. In Hamburg, where a crowd of 500 tried-to break into the U.S. consulate, the police used fire hoses and clubs.
In Japan, Johnson's popularity could be gauged by the fact that when Secretary Dean Rusk landed July 4 at Kyoto, 4,500 police were on hand to: protect him from the crowds and help sneak him along | back roads into town. Some 1,600 police were deployed around Rusk's: hotel to keep the stone throwers out of range. Apparently the head of the U.S.State Department is: a | ight Sleeper and wakes at the sound of breaking glass. i Salus
On June 30, the Japan Postal. Workers Union sent a ‘eable to Johnson protesting the bombings at. Hanoi and Haiphong. The annual convention of the 244,000-member union adopted the message the following day at its opening session. The message expressed fear that the bombing of Hanoi may lead to a third world war. It urged the U.S. government: to immediately suspend bombing, to withdraw its troops, and recognize the self~determination of. the Vietnamese people.
The General. Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) issued a similar protest. and announced that it was calling on all affiliated... unions to hold workshop rallies immediately and to organize protest actions on a nationwide scale.
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THE INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK FROM PEKING
By George | Novack
‘The snags ‘encountered by Premier Chou En-lai ‘during his eight- aay visit to Bucharest in June, which resulted ‘in a rift with the Rumanian leaders, underscore the deepening isolation of China at a time when it is menaced by U.S. military aggression and most in need 6f solidarity and support from the other -Gommunist states.
The extent of this isolation can be measured by contrasting Peking's present international situation with its bright outlook when Khrushchev fell in October 1964.
With the deposing of the first secretary and chairman of the Council of Ministers it looked as though Peking had gained a smashing victory over its archopponent and was.on the way to attaining most of its principal objectives in the Sino-Soviet dispute . Peking had demanded Khrushchev's political head; it had .been chopped off: The leader of the Russian revisionists had apparently been repudiated as well as removed. .
On that very day the Chinese exploded their first nuclear bomb, a remarkable feat considering the Russian withdrawal of nuclear, military and economic aid in 1961.
“These two events dramatically demonstrated how high Peking": s star had risen while Moscow's prestige had fallen. | :
Mao and his associates doubtless awaited signs of willingness on the part of Brezhnev and Kosygin to grant substantial concessions to their viewpoint. This expectation was reasonable since Peking had amassed broad backing from a variety of other: Communist governments and parties, not so much for its policies as for its tactics in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
For months Moscow had been pressing for an international conference of'Communist parties which would repudiate Peking's positions, condemn its intransigence, and virtually excommunicate’: it from the Communist community. Peking opposed the convening of such a conference ‘as unwarranted and divisive. and | insisted that it: be indefinitely ‘postponed. “
After dumping Khrushchev, his successors did attempt to mollify thé Chinése by ‘making small overtures and suspending open polemics. Although they did not alter the policy of peaceful coexistence in any essential respect, -they did have to beat a retreat at the 19-party meeting in Moscow: in March 1965. So many of the participants, from the Italians to the Cubans, objected for diverse reasons to any bans against the Chinese that the Kremlin was forced to abandon the projected typeof international conference.
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Despite the absence of the Chinese and their closest allies, this rebuff to the Soviet leaders was a gain for Peking. The communiqué that came out of the March meeting did not comply with any of the Kremlin's key demands, among them a proposal that dogmatism, not opportunism, be recognized as "the main danger" in deviating from the correct line. This would have meant shifting the center of attack from Yugoslavia, the target in 1960, to Peking.
It can now be seen that this marked the high tide of Chinese influence in the Communist world between the outbreak of the Sino- Soviet dispute at the beginning of the 1960's and today.
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The turn took place soon after the March 1965 meeting, beginning with the demonstrations of Chinese and Vietnamese students before the U.S. embassy in Moscow which was broken up by police and soldiers. This incident was staged by the Chinese embassy on orders from Peking in protest against the Kremlin's behind-thescenes negotiations on Vietnam with Washington. This action, however justified by the sluggish Russian reaction to Johnson's bombing of north Vietnam, was widely construed as a provocation and a deliberate widening of the breach between the two powers when greater solidarity was in order.
This feeling was confirmed when the Chinese followed up with vehement accusations that Moscow's guiding line was "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" and that his successors were conspiring with Washington to sell out north Vietnam and the National Liberation Front.
Since that. time relations between Moscow and Peking have steadily deteriorated until today they stand farther apart than ever with no prospect of reconciliation short of direct American assault upon China's territory.
Meanwhile Peking has suffered an almost uninterrupted series of setbacks in the colonial countries. These began with the postponement of the Asian-African Conference scheduled for Algiers in June 1965 after Ben Bella's overturn by Boumedienne. Peking received two black marks by its indecent haste in recognizing the new military regime and then by the nullification of the conference which it was eagerly promoting with a view to barring Soviet participation.
The interventions of the Chinese in various of the newly independent African countries have not met with much success, in part because of the reverses of the revolutionary struggles on that continent highlighted by the suppression of the Congo rebels with the aid of U.S.-Belgian-South African mercenaries. Chinese representatives have been expelled from several countries (Burundi, Kenya). By the end of 1965 Peking's influence in Africa had been largely reduced to the Congo Republic and Tanzania.
The most dramatic blow came at the end of February 1966 when Nkrumah was overthrown while on, bis way. to Peking...
In Latin America, “pro- -Peking splitoffs. have been organized from the Communist parties in Brazil,. Colombia,. Ecuador , ‘Peru and Mexico. Many guerrilla fighters are inspired by the example of the Chinese Revolution, adhere to its ideas of colonial struggle, and look hopefully toward Peking for material..aid...But it cannot be said that the Chinese have made sizeable. headway. at Moscow's expense. Castroism remains the predominant . influence .within the revolutionary left in Latin America.
In the past year and a half, Peking's influence in Asia has lessened, not only among its states, but also among its Communist parties. China won no laurels by its abortive mobilization during the India-Pakistan conflict. It has seen both north Korea and north Vietnam turn from sympathy to neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute and attend the twenty-third congress of the Soviet Communist party in defiance of Peking's boycott.
Even the Japanese Communist party, irritated by Peking's obstinacy in rejecting united action of the Communist countries against U.S. military escalation in Southeast Asia, is becoming alienated. Its daily newspaper has stopped publishing the broadcast... schedules of the Peking, Hanoi and Pyongyang radio stations.
The military coup in Indonesia last October was the severest setback for Communist China on both the diplomatic and party level ge cus The keystone of Chinese policy. in Asia against Washington and .. Moscow was the close alliance with Sukarno. The shunting aside of | the Indonesian head of state and the reorientation of the generals. : toward the imperialist.powers have shattered this strategy and . shifted the relation of forces in that part of the world to a Peking's disadvantage. Peking is left with no strong and reliable partners in the Afro-Asian bloc.
The bloody crushing-of the Communist party of Indonesia, the largest outside China and the Soviet Union, was a double blow. Though formally neutral, the PKI was actually one of China's | firmest allies in the tussle with Moscow. It was also held up as aprize example of the success of Peking's line in "the third world." The repercussions of its total annihilation, so completely unen- _ ticipated by everyone from Djakarta to Peking and Moscow, are .still resounding throughout the Communist world as well as within the Chinese Communist party.
After this came Castro's attacks upon Peking and closer alignment with Moscow. From the inception of the debate Havana was tacitly sympathetic with the Chinese positions on the colonial revolution and unbending opposition to U. S. imperialism. However, Peking's sectarian attitude in dealing with the neutrals in the Sino-Soviet conflict, coupled with Cuba's inescapable economic and military dependence upon the Soviet Union, have nullified this Sympathy.
For a time, neutralist Rumania sought to play the role of honest broker between Moscow and Peking. Now the schism produced by Chou's visit, either through the Chinese premier's intention to make a public denunciation of Moscow or through opposing any concession to U.S. imperialism in the Vietnam war, has left Peking virtually alone.
Its only remaining staunch supporters are Albania in Europe and an assortment of smaller Communist parties, ranging from Burma, New Zealand and Australia to the Grippa group in Belgium. China can count on only half-hearted backing from north Vietnam and north Korea against Moscow. This is not much to boast of after five years of bitter ideological struggle.
The prospect of improved: trade and diplomatic ties with Japan and other capitalist governments does not compensate for these accumulated losses on the world arena.
China's growing isolation within the Communist bloc is all the more troubling in face of the tightening of U.S. encirclement and the relentless edging of its military machine toward Chinese territory, now grimly emphasized by the bombing of the oil installations at Hanoi and Haiphong and the repeated reports from Washington that more is to come. ,
Even a fissureless monolith would tend to crack under such stresses. A realistic view of China's worsened international situation must be one of the principal generators of dissension at the top of the Chinese Communist party and the government.
Prominent spokesmen in Peking have dismissed the reverses as unimportant and asserted that such temporary setbacks are inevitable on the road to complete victory. Such official optimism cannot quash all doubts.
Some influential voices must be raising such questions as: how did we land in this plight within a year and a half after Khrushchev's downfall? Can there be some flaws in Mao's omniscience? What must be done to turn the adverse tide and break out of our isolation? Isn't a new course necessary?
Such "dangerous thoughts" of critics in high circles may very well have been major precipitants of the regime's ongoing purge and its stiffening of thought control over the whole range of China's intellectual and political life.
HEKMATDJOU AND KHARVI WIN STAY OF