JUNTA IN ARGENTINA
Buenos Aires
The new regime is Bonapartist in character. Its aim essentially is to serve as an arbiter in the disputes between sectors — of the Argentine bourgeoisie, between the industrial bourgeoisie and the landlord-cattleman interests, between the lower and middle sectors of the bourgeoisie and the oligarchical circles at the top.
The coup d'état is a consequence in addition of the labor movement's retreat since 1959. In this respect, the coup has a preventive aim, but not in an immediate sénse. Thus it differs from the coup d'état in Brazil in April 1964 which was organized ° in direct response to the immediate threat of 5 -popular and workingclass mobilization. aan i Cee ;
le Monde's analysis is mistaken in concluding that it closely parallels the Brazilian coup d'état. The Argentine coup is Bonapartist and not semifascist, a rightist Bonapartism but not semifascisn.
The view of revolutionary Marxists here is-that this is probably the last chance the bourgeoisie will have to establish a stable bourgeois government. After this regime, the situation can become openly prerevolutionary.
The prospects of the new government are not very bright. It’ is almost certain to run into squabbles among the armed forces then- selves at an early date. There are cleavage lines running between the navy and the army. Moreover the various sectors of the bour-: geoisie will be’ compelled to find expression through groupings in the armed forces inasmuch as political parties have been banned.
If these differences, which aré inherent in the present situation, should develon, as vhey most lixely will before long, the sole present base of the regime will be broken; i.e., the discipline and unity of the military will be shattered. Something like this happened in the coup d'état of 1955.
The trade-union leaderships are up to their necks in the filth of class collaboration. The leadership of the CGT [Confederacion General del Trabajo], which has been. .noneymooning with the Stalinists, went along with the shift in power. They issued ‘public declarations granting a certain. degree of political confidence in the new government.
The Stalinists, who in turn were honeymooning with the previous bourgeois governient , have been reticent. Along with the Trotskyists they will be the first targets to be singled out by | the reactionaries. However, the Stalirists are not converting their reticence into a plan of struggle. On the contrary, they are placing complete faith in the CGT leadership, which will possibly support the military regime.
Perén and the Peronist leadership also appear to have decided on a policy of watchful waiting with signs of a favorable attitude toward the new government.
The junta’ s method of operation appears to.be quite different from anything experienced up to now. They are proceeding cautiously and slowly. They appear to be trying to avoid provoking resistance. However their economic and social plans leave no room for the least doubt. They intend to shift the burden of the economic crisis onto the backs of the workers, increasing productivity by putting a greater squeeze on them. June 29, 1966
WASEDA STUDENTS END STRIKE