Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

A Shift in Japan's Policy toward China?

· World Outlook Vol. 4, No. 21, 24 June 1966 · pp 14-16 · 1,329 words

Japan and Korea China United States Vietnam and Indochina

SHIFT IN JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARD CHINA?

By Joseph Honsen

; \Vhat went weong" at the nine-power conference held in Seoul June 14-16? Instead of ending up with a strong endorsement of |;:. Johnson's war in Vietnam, as projected, the gathering came out with an equivocal statement; and while, as planned, it condemned nuclear tests in the Pacific, it refrained from naming either France or the People! s Republic of China, the two countries involved.

; The conference was carefully managed from the wings by the State Department. Washington did not even:take credit for initiating it. Lee Tong Won, the foreign minister of the puppet South Korean government, was said to have thought it up.

All the participants -- South Korea, South Vietnam, Chiang “Kai-shek's "China," the Philippines, Malaysia, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand and Japan -- have already sent troops to Vietnam or taken. a public stand backing Johnson's escalation of the war.

"To avoid compromising its. [the conference's] integrity," as Robert Trumbull put it in the New York Times of, June 14, the State. Department "declined an invitation to send a team of observers from the United States Embassy, headed by Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown." And to spare "everyone considerable embarrassment," Nguyen Cao Ky cancelled his scheduled appearance at the parley. toe

Everything was thus skillfully arranged to give maximum weight to an endorsement of Johnson's policies in Vietnam.

Yet the strongest thing achieved by the conference appears to have been an. agreement to meet annually, to set up a standing committee and to name the new association the "Asian and Pacific . Council" or ASPAC -- "an attractive name with a masculine sound," according to Thanat Khoman, the foreign minister of Thailand.

The stumbling block was Japan. Reporting from Seoul June 16, Robert Trumbull indicated this rather clearly:

"Japan's Foreign Minister, Etsusaburo Shiina, took what conference sources called a soft stand -- because, it was said, of heavy political pressure on the Tokyo Government to broaden contacts with Communist China. The war in Vietnam is also not popular in Japan, although Premier Eisaku Sato! s Government supports the United States position.”

A Japanese | diplomat said, according to Trumbull: "We can 7

support American policy on Vietnam, but to take a stand on our own responsibility is ‘more difficult.

In other words, without the physical presence of an American

representative to ride herd, not even this gathering of puppets and

--]4—

satellite powers could be trusted to carry out the belligerent line laid down for them by Johnson. .

The unexpected outcome of the Seoul conference apparently irritated the Johnson administration. As a result a two-day meeting was called for June 19-20 at Sengokuhara, a resort at the foot of Mount Fuji. Washington will be represented by a ten-man policy-planning _ team, headed by Samuel D. Berger, Assistant. Secretary of State, and Edwin0. Reischauer. Nobuhiko Ushiba, vice-minister of foreign So affairs, will head. counterparts. from the Tokyo Foreign Office.

The secret talks "may be complicated by Japan's confusing role in the diplomacy of the Asian and Pacific region, as demonstrated this week at the nine-nation conference in Seoul," Trumbull explained, reporting this time from Japan in the June 19 New York Times. After the talks, "the Americans expect to have a clearer idea of Japan! Ss new Asian diplomacy.’ :

It would thus seem that the State Department came to the conclusion, on the basis of what happened in Seoul, that Japan has already made a considerable shift in its foreign policy.

"The effect of Japan's position in the Seoul conference," according to Trumbull, "was to prevent the formation of a 2 Strong regional organization of countries opposed to Communisn.

"Etsusaburo Shiina, the Japanese Foreign Minister, gaid on his return to Tokyo yesterday that he regretted the use of the term ‘council' in the title of the new group. He added that he had really won the point anyway because, in his:view, the establishment of an ambassadorial committeé and the- agreement "$0. meet. again did not constitute an organization. eee

“Above: the. confusion produced at ‘Seoul - Was “the clear indication that from-now on: Japan. will. exercise.a governing voice, if not decisive leadership, in any international deliberations among the non-Communist states of Asia and the Pacific.

"The talks in Seoul showed that Japan is emerging from two decades of diplomatic seclusion following her defeat in World War II.

What happened at Seoul becomes even clearer when it is placed against the background of. " developments during the previous three weeks An ‘Japan.

“On May 24 Kenzo Matsumura ,. the 83-year-old elder statesman of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party, returned from his fourth postwar trip to Peking. A spokesman of the more liberal wing of the party, credited with negotiating the Liao-Takasaki trade agreement with China, Matsumura has long advocated a positive policy toward the People's Republic of China. Up to this point, however, he had gone along with working for it within the framework of the restraints "imposed by Washington which bar the Japanese government from acting independently. © —

Upon arriving in Tokyo, Matsumura came out for a change in this policy. He called on the Sato government to make a strong friendly move in the direction of Peking. "The Government and Liberal-Democratic Party should open their eyes wider and act with boldness," he said. He even went so far as to indicate that the question was so important that a split in the Liberal-Democratic party would be justified if “the = Sato. administration: failed to ache

Whether it was done strictly on his” own initiative or in accordance with a’ behind-the-scenes understanding with the right wing of the party, Matsumura's stand created a sensation. On June 7 the top leaders of the party.held a-:secret session attended by Prime Minister: Eisaku Sato, Shojiro, Kawashima, the vice-president of the LDP, three key:sparty officers.and Chief Cabinet Secretary Tomisaburo Hashimoto. All -that was reported about the discussion, however, was an agreement te-bring the government and the. party "into line" “on Japan’ s policy toward China. - -

In a series of meetings with party figures, academicians. ‘and businessmen, Matsumura continued his campaign. A persistent suggestion in his talks was that Japan should reconsider its present "eradual approach" to Peking.-and start thinking about steps toward restoring full ties. with» China;

That Matsumura net with. a “favorable response can be judged by the observation of Junichiro. Susuki in the June.9 Japan Times: "Now nobody disputes Matsumura's counsel that Conservative politicians need not be frightened at the Chinese communism and that they look: into the developments in. the mainland with an open mind . "

The big question, Susuki declares, is” “what would be the "con- “sequences” -- obviously .in Washington --~ “OF. a. reversal in Japan' Ss: nonrecognition policy..."?. _—

In the Diet June 9 Foreign Minister Shiina said: "It is not so easy as Matsumura would have us believe for the Government to scrap the current ‘accumulation formula, ' that is, a gradual approach in favor of a bold move to 'normalize relations once and | -for»all.'" But Shiina also said,."We have not. arrived at any con- | clusion on the.question since we intend to base our ultimate deci-. sion on the trend of international opinion." (This is a diplomatic way of saying the trend of. opinion in Washington. )

The domestic political situation is also a strong element in Natsumura's calculations, it appears.: Kazuo Kuroda observes in the June 11. Japan Times: "He is firmly convinced that the conservativeminded Japanese Should not let the Socialists and the Communists monopolize the matter of closer relations with mainland China and this motivation of his may deserve appreciation."

What remains unknown is whether or not on the eve of the Seoul conference a decision was made to utilize the occasion to bring Washington's "nonrecognition" policy a bit closer to the ‘toppling point. That, probably, is the main question the American contingent wants answered at the quiet lake resort at the foot of Mount Fuji.

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