Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Canadian Socialists Hold Conference

World Outlook Vol. 4, No. 19, 10 June 1966 · pp 23-35 · 5,256 words

Canada and Quebec Germany Communist parties Stalinism

CANADIAN SOCIALISTS HOLD CONFERENCE —

_A highly successful delegated conference of the League for Socialist Action [LSA] and the Ligue Socialiste Ouvriére [LSO] took | place in Toronto May 21-23. The LSA is the revolutionary-socialist organization in English-speaking Canada -- the LSO is its homologue in French-speaking Québec. :

The exceptional growth, youthfulness and political develop- -: ment of both organizations during the past two years were reflected in many ways. The all-day sessions were attended by more than one -_ pundred persons. The average age of the delegates was under twenty- ive. oan os

The conference began by paying tribute to the young socialist antiwar fighter Leo Bernard, who was slain just a few days before in the Detroit headquarters of the Socialist Workers party by an ultra-

rightist influenced by the Vietnamese war propaganda, and to Jan Garrett and Walter Graham of the Young Socialist Alliance, who were seriously wounded in the same murderous.attack. A telegram was sent expressing sympathy and solidarity. It.was the conviction of the delégates that the SWP, YSA and the entire U.S. antiwar movement will not fatter in their. efforts to- force U.S. -withdrawal from Vietnam. Pk - .

Both ‘the LSA and LSO have closely identified themsélves with the Fourth International -- the world party of socialist revolution’ founded. by. Leon Trotsky in 1938..The assemblage heard a presentation of the major documents adopted at the last world congress of the Fourth. International and expressed solidarity with their socialist aims... The: _Teport was given by Alan Adair who had attended the recent congress. oo

High on the agenda was a discussion. on how to step up the — opposition in Canada to the American-waged war in Vietnam. The con-: ference was unanimous in its opinion that the Pentagon's "escalation" policy-in Southeast Asia is aimed at China and ultimately the USSR. The conference took a firm decision to strengthen every effort to. build bigger and better antiwar committees across.the country and to popularize the slogans: "Get American Troops Out. of Vietnam Now!" and "End Canadian Complicity. " ce

Testifying to the growth and development of the vanguard forces in Canada was the important and thorough discussion on the situation in Québec. A complete day was devoted to analyzing the class forces at work in this highly. industrialized and superexploited part of the country. This discussion was on a high plane as it. involved the whole question of nationalism and what kind of ‘program revolutionary socialists should project in light of this complex question.

The conference took into account the increased radicalization of the Québec. working class and the favorable opportunities open before: revolutionary socialists. Decisions were taken to aid the LSO:- in various ways. a Spe

Among the other major documents was one on the New Democratic party (Canada's. labor party) and one on the trade unions.

John Riddell, editor of the Young Socialist Forum (a bimonthly magazine) presented a report on the reasons for. .a marked increase in political activity among Canada's youth, particularly in opposing the war. in Vietnam. a

‘In summing up: the conference and indicating the tasks ahéad, Ross ‘Dowson, editor of Workers Vanguard, said: "I. have attended. many conferences of this nature in the past but none have been as important and impressive as this one. None have been as big -- not only from the point of view of numbers but also in the realm of ideas. And none have been as youthful. This conference marks a turning point in the struggle for a socialist Canada."

7 = 24

HAVEMANN'S PROPOSAL FOR A "NEW COMMUNIST PARTY"

[Recently Professor Robert Havemann, the well-known East German chemist, came under fresh attack from the Ulbricht government. The East German Academy of Sciences voted March 24 to’ strike his name from the rolls. The March 26 Berliner Zeitung said that = seventy percent favored expulsion. This measure was challenged, however, Since a seventy-five percent majority is required to make it binding.

[The 66-year-old Professor Havemann was director of the Physico-Chemical Institute of Humboldt University in East Berlin and a life-long Communist who has continued to characterize. himself as a "true Marxist." A controversial figure in the academic world of East Germany since 1956, the eminent scholar-scientist was dismissed from his post on March 12, 1964, and subsequently expelled from the Socialist Unity (Communist) party of East Germany for his critical views.

[He had told students in a lecture series on freedom and; morality that under Stalinism man is "educated to hypocrisy and dishonesty" by a police state that kills thought. "All this must change completely." When dogma blocks the free exchange of ideas, it "creates the conditions for a disastrous development" by blocking social progress. But then "reactionary regimes have always striven to keep their people stupid."

[He scoffed. at the party's "pitiful distortion" of Hegel's dictum that freedom is the recognition of necessity. "One cannot attain freedom by doing ‘voluntarily’ what one must do in order to stay out of jail."

(He called for freedom to encourage "dissatisfaction with things as they are. -

(Professor Havemann was assailed in the East German press as "a degenerate thinker" and the party's Central Committee condemned him as one of "those intellectuals who lay rotten eggs in the party's nest."

(Nevertheless, the Communist party cell at the Humboldt University voted to back the outspoken chemist.

[The following article, a critical appraisal of Professor. Havemann's views concerning the kind of party that is needed, has been translated from Die Internationale, the German-language ° quarterly of the Fourth International. A one-year subscription to Die Internationale can be obtained by sending $2 to Franz Pokorny , Marche ttigasse 18/13, Vienna VI, Austria. ]

* Ok OF

Through the public initiative of Professor Robert Havemann, the profound process of transformation visible in most of: the

European Communist parties has likewise become apparent in both parts of Germany. When Apel, the head of the state planning agency, committed suicide at the end of.February, 1966, the public became _aware of critical developments in the economy of the German Democratic Republic and in its trade relations with the Soviet Union. Shortly before this incident, Havemann published a sensational article in the weekly magazine, Der Spiegel, on the need for a new Communist party in the Federal Republic. -

While the campaign against those writers. who dare to go beyond the limits of the "liberalization" acceptable to the bureaucracy continued in East Berlin and the entire German Democratic Republic,:and while Ulbricht was proposing "necessary measures for the maintenance of order" against those who had | developed a "free market economy" in literature, cinema and art; Havemann protested the uniemocratic law banning the German Communist party ({KPD -- Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands] in the Federal... Republic. And he proposed to neutralize this ban by founding a new Communist party on democratic organizational principles, free of dogmatism and the ‘residue of Stalinisn.

At the same. time, he linked this proposal with an overture to the leaders of the German Democratic Republic to replace the merely formal existence of several parties within -the national front, which presents a single, unified list of candidates at elections, with a multiparty system via the legalization of a- German Socialist party [SPD -- Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-— lands] in the Democratic Republic.:He also raised a series of other democratic demands in connection with this proposal.

The rather ordinary and often contradictory ideas expressed in this article were demonstratively rejected by the leadership. of the illegal KPD. Furthermore, the form and tone were such as to make objective discussion impossible. a

The December 1965 declaration of the Central Committee, signed by Max Reimann, states among other things:

"Professor Havemann, who was expelled from the SED [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands -- Socialist Unity party of-Germany (the East German Communist party)], has published a iladé-to-order letter in the West German publication, Der Spiegel. With the connivance of West German agents and the approval of the West German minister, Mende, he calls for a split in the KPD and in the West German working class. In his article, Havemann opposed the legalization of the KPD in the Federal Republic and proposed to dissolve the KPD and found a new Communist party of the Federal Republic in its place. In Havemann's opinion, this party must be completely purged of all Marxist-Leninist ideas and function as a. kind of auxiliary force for the defense of the constitution. |

"It is no accident that the Springer press quoted excerpts. from this article before the magazine appeared; it shows that

higher directives from Bonn were involved. The haste with which | Mende: Seized on the statements of ‘Havemann clearly reveals ete source." ; Bs

The Central Committee of the KPD relapses here into A se period in which slanderous epithets like. "agents" or vauxiliaries" of the. bourgeoisie were the mildest Phrases: used in political | disputes. i

If‘we question some of Havemann's remarks in a critical manner ,_ this has nothing in common with such contemptible accusations.

On the other hand, the actions of the SED against Havemann oe ‘and the treatment he has received.from the Central Committee of the - KPD must not be used as an excuse to give up the unconditional demand for legalization of the XPD. Freedom of the press, of | assembly, organization and association are among the elementary | rights in defense of which the workers movement has continually © raised its voice in the course of its century-long struggle. And it has not proceeded on the basis of political agreement with the political tendencies involved. As long as Havemann keeps to this line, he will have our support. But we cannot second him if he seeks to achieve the legalization of the KPD by pointing out its hopeless weaknesses. Democratic rights are indivisible. We are : absolutely opposed to his attempt to link the demand for. the legalization of the KPD with relations between the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic, with reunification and other demands of a diplomatic or state character.

The legalization of the KPD would in no wise alter the political and social character of West German bourgeois rule or the reactionary content of its opposition to reunification, or | z its policy toward the Eastern bloc. Neither should the legalization of the KPD be proposed as a political exchange, as Havemann . Spas intimates -- the legalization of the KPD here for the legalization of an SPD in the Democratic Republic -- especially when he poses no political conditions for the legalization of an SPD in the Democratic Republic.

Revolutionary Marxists, as such, support the legalization of multiple workers parties in the German Democratic Republic. Nowhere: in the Marxist classics is there a demand for a one-party. state in the transition from capitalism to socialism. Furthermore, the creation of a state of this kind in the Soviet Union was not foreseen by, the leaders of the October Revolution.

But precisely the ‘experience: of the Soviet Union leads us to pose this question more concretely and to make. the legalization of opposition workers parties and groupings dependent. on their recognition of the new basis of society. What is on the agenda in this period is not the implementation of formal democracy but rather the realization of socialist, or workers democracy.

This means that the policy of a new SPD in the Democratic . Republic could not be based on the model that has been developed by the SPD in the Federal Republic, at least since the failure of the "Plan for Germany," since Bad Godesberg, etc. Support for such a model would virtually amount to support. -for capitalist restoration.

Having made these preliminary remarks , we come now to the real heart of Havemann's proposal for a new | Communist party. He formulates it as follows: Sere a

"...in any case, the Communist. party. that emerges from the shadowy existence of illegality, now or-in-the future, must be a new changed party, from the ground up. The party must say both yea and nay to the old KPD.: The party is no specter but a living being. Therefore, it must Iearn to draw conclusions from its own experiences."

The neéd for a new Communist party, which is expressed by Havemann today, corresponds entirely to the precepts of the Trotskyist movement and was already recognized thirty years ago. Since that time, recognition of the need-has been the guideline for all our strategic and tactical considerations and practices. New organizations of historical importance, like a new Communist. party, cannot be called into existence on the basis of purely subjective insights. The organization of the First, Second, and Third Internationals developed in accordance with the historical process. Each stood.at:-the level of the given stage of social development and the maturity of the class struggle as well as the level of the best: of:the preceding movement. The older organizations had to give: way to-the-new, not arbitrarily, but at. the crossroads. of the historical process.

We experienced such a turning point in 1933 with the fascist seizure of power. :In 1933,>the; German working class.was led into a defeat of historic proportions without a struggle..It was not the. i lack of understanding of the:masses, but the leaderships. of the. ‘big? workers organizations, the SPD and the KPD which,.by their policies: and actions, made the working class incapable of resisting the: i massive assault of fascism. If. the historic guilt for this defeat” weighs’ more heavily on the Communist party than the Social Democ— racy, iti is because, since 1914,..the Social Democracy ceased irrevocably to be a socialist. organization with the historic oe responsibility of leading the working class. It went over to the camp of the bourgeoisie with ld, its banners and it has not left it to this day. Sat ¢ a

The: decisive. turning point which occurred on August 4. i914, did not involve suddenly giving up abstract fundamentals of : Marxism or adherence to a, Marxist program. The leaders of the . Social Democracy had already thrown these.overboard at various. stages of their evolution. (If they ever really understood what ™ Marxism was all about. ‘) What was in question was their duty to ‘the masses. to protect: them against the horrors of the imperialist war — and, failing this, to put a quick end to this war through mass action. Instead of fulfilling this responsibility, the leaders deserted to the camp of the forces that had steered consciously

toward war.

They helped to mobilize the masses for the war instead of in opposition to it and suppressed any movement that had — the least possibility or bringing a quick end to the war. This was the historic crime of the leaders of the Social Democracy in the August days of 1914. This was their historic betrayal of the workers movement, a knife blow against the concrete interests of the working class in the imperialist war. This behavior of the party leadership during those critical days and during the entire imperialist war made the development of a revolutionary political leadership of the ‘working class a necessity. The entire development of the Social Democracy since that time has justified the decision of the revolutionary groups and tendencies to constitute ‘a Communist party (KPD) in the years 1918 and 1919.

From that time on, or at the latest since the unification of the KPD with the proletarian left wing of the USP [Independent Social-Democratic party], the Communist party took on the tasks of a leadership and thereby the responsibility for the politics of the revolutionary class struggle. This’was especially true, in | the years 1932-43. The initiative in the struggle against fascism rested necessarily with the KPD. ~

The decisive defeat, which at the same time sealed the fate of the Communist party, was the victory of fascism. The mistakes . of the party in those years, which were the immediate basis for. the fascist seizure of power, were of sucha scope that quantity. (mistakes) became transformed into quality (crimes) that delivered . the working class over to fascism without a fight. ep

‘Through the construction of their own unions [RGO -- Rote Gewerkschafts-Opposition (Red Trade Union Opposition), the de facto splitoff trade-union organizations :set up by the German. Communist party during the ultraleft "third period" of 1929-43], they split the German trade-union movement and left.a large section. under the exclusive influence of the reformist leaders who had . already shown. themselves ready to betray the unions to fascisn. The Social Democracy was branded as a fascist movement ("social fascism"), with the logical consequence that it was impossible to: fight together with it against fascism ina united front. =~

The struggle against fascism was’ further weakened. because they viewed fascism as already in power in the shape of the Social Democratic government, and in the succeeding transitional governments like that of Bruning, Papen, Schleicher. The Nazi movement was contemptuously ignored -- German fascism was not rallying under the swastika, but under the black, red and gold banner of the Social Democracy. Later, they prepared the proletariat for the "inevitable" victory of the Nazis with the slogan, "After Hitler, .. us," or with .the claim, "The Nazis won't stay in power twenty-four hours." As a consequence of this policy, they backed a Nazi-sponsored referendum to oust the Social Democratic government of Prussia.

~ > In 1933, the Communist party did not solve the * Problem of the fate of the German working class. _ . al

They have. not yet been able to undertake a serious selfcriticism and .to acknowledge their historic guilt for this defeat of the working class, with all of its horrible consequences. Therefore, they have not been able to draw the necessary conclusions from it and to raise the. demand that Havemann raises: Zhe construction of a new Communist party.

This consequence of the evolution of the Communist: “party is a necessity. But if there is no longer any possibility of reforming the SPD or the KPD, or of restoring them to their original positive roles, it is not enough to merely declare this truth and to proclaim a new party.

‘The formation of a new working-class party is closely bound up with the immediate condition of the: class and the tempo of the class struggle. If this party is not to be a "splinter.sect" (Havemann) without influence on the movement of the class, then it can: only arise out of the tide of the political struggle and the process. of differentiation which it produces in the party that is at present followed -by the majority of the politically conscious elements:of:. the working class. The need for a new party must be an axiom for ::. + the strategy of the left and the revolutionary forces. It can-only :. make the leap from theoretical understanding to political reality =... when it has succeeded in separating the decisive class forces from their. present leadership. In the present social relationship of forces’and in the present. situation of the workers movement, this is a long and difficult process.

The formation of a new working-class leadership, furthermore, . does not consist in gathering together the many scattered "homeless. individuals and groupings. That would be a caricature of a genuine revolutionary party. Before a new Communist party can take form, important sections of the working class must undergo larger processes of political and organizational transformation, processes effected through serious discussions on the program, strategy and. .-: tactics of the new party. Whoever seeks to avoid this task or to ..: use’ it as a springboard for irresponsible phrasemongering or unin- .. spiring halfway measures cannot lay a serious foundation: for a new ... Communist party. On the contrary, they: would prepare. new illusions . for the revolutionary cadres by. their failures and distortions, |

Havemann sees the problem clearly when he raises the demand for the liquidation of the Stalinist epoch. Unfortunately, Havemann's critique of the causes of Stalinism is limited to organizational -questions.* He neglects thereby the very important national and international: conditions ‘that led to the development of the bureaucratic deformations and distortions. Thus, he contents himself, like many “leftists," with a one-sided application of Rosa Luxemburg ' Ss critique of the Bolshevik form of organization:

"The reconstruction of the party, which is unalterably on

~%0-

the agenda today, can and must be based directly on Liebknecht and especially on Rosa Luxemburg, whose writings have been suppressed. for many decades by the Stalinists. They were suppressed because she saw the first dangerous steps toward the abandonment of innerparty democracy, that would later lead to Stalinism. With prophetic clarity, she recognized and criticized then."

The most important element in Luxemburg's criticism of the actions of the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution was her fear that the dictatorship of the proletariat would become a dictatorship of the party and finally the dictatorship of the dominant group in the party.

She wrote:

"However, with the suppression of political life in the entire country, the life of the Soviets must also wane. Without general elections, a free press and freedom of assembly, the free conflict of opinions, the vitality of all public institutions will wither away; it will become a mere semblance of life, in which the bureaucracy alone will remain an active element. No one can escape from this’ law. Public life gradually becomes dormant; a few dozen. party leaders of inexhaustible energy and idealism rule.. .Fundamentally, a clique-run economy, a dictatorship certainly; but not the dictatorship of the: proletariat, ‘rather. the dictatorship of a handful of politicians..."

This is where almost all the critics of Bolshevism stop in quoting Rosa Luxemburg. Up until this point, everything that Rosa Luxemburg wrote against the Bolsheviks seems to have found confirmation in the actual development of things. For, in fact, the character of the Stalinist dictatorship | largely resembles the ‘picture that Rosa sketched in 1918. hl. :

She was by no means a devotee of: “pure. democracy, " however. She was for decisive and powerful revolutionary assaults on. the political and property rights of the defeated bourgeoisie. A dictatorship of the proletariat otherwise would be unthinkable...However, Rosa Luxemburg wanted to be sure that the principle of democracy would be preserved for the workers. She was for the control of the state apparatus by the: broad masses as Lenin outlined it in State and Revolution. And she was firmly convinced that the Bolsheviks also would have followed this direction if there were not: more powerful circumstances that were beyond their control and opposed to their will. She expressed this Judgment directly following the criticism cited above :

“The Bolsheviks would have proceeded in exactly the same way - Lin accordance with their original aims] if they had not suffered from the terrible pressures of the World War, the German occupation and the difficulties which accompanied it, which of necessity, would distort a socialist policy with the best aims and the most beautiful principles."

These lines have been deliberately overlooked by otherwise "conscientious" critics. Rosa indicated the deeper context of the actions of the Bolsheviks which she criticized in a letter. to Warski':

“"T also shared all your reservations and hesitations, but dismissed them with respect to the most important questions,: “and often I did’ not go as far as you do. Terrorism, certainly, demonstrates ae great weakness; but it is directed against an internal‘ enemy that: bases its hopes on the survival of capitalism outside Russia and on receiving support and encouragement from it. With the advent: of the European revolution, the Russian counterrevolution would lose its support and more importantly also its courage. Thus, the Russian terror is above all the ‘expression of the weakness of the European “ proletariat. "

Rosa Luxemburg ‘by no means presented an exhaustive analysis of the conditions under which the degeneration of the dictatorship would ensue ; but she indicated. clearly the line of approach.

All “the critics of the Russian Revolution and the Russian: one-party state consciously ignore the fact that there was a civil war in Russia, that the enemies of the Bolsheviks did not "criticize" Soviet power but fought against it arms in hand, that they didnot object to the commands of the bureaucracy but fired at these: ‘Yeaders” with pistols. Neither before nor after the’ October Revolution “did the Bolsheviks plan to eliminate their political opponents. The latter, through their counterrevolutionary activities, whith madenecessary all-out mobilization of the party forces and forced the’ civil-war regime on the party, themselves contributed to the conditions that led to bureaucratic degeneration in’ ‘the wake of the defeat of the revolution in the West in 1923.

The’ ‘Mensheviks’: (Social Democrats) were not outlawed and suppressed because they proposed an evolutionary path to socialism but | because they fought arms in hand on the side of national and international militarism in the Revolution and in the civil. war .and because their leaders. “took part in- White governments.

The break with the left Social- Revolutionaries’ came only. when they tried to substitute the assassination of leading Bolshevik comrades (Lenin, for example ) for political debate on social problems and the concrete’ questions of Soviet policy (for example, they opposed the signing of the Brest Litovsk Treaty and called for continuation of the. war. )

In the same sense, the machinations of the international Social Democracy (support for the counterrevolution in Russia and. betrayal of the European revolution) contributed decisively to the bureaucratic degeneration.

Rosa Luxemburg's criticism, which she restricted more and more, as we have shown, could only be borne out subsequently by history through the interaction of the various national and: international » conditions under which the Russian Revolution took place. Under. these

conditions, Stalin played the role of the representative of the Thermidorian forces which arose and constituted ‘themselves. into. a. ruling bureaucratic stratum. .

Thus, it is correct to say, as Havemann does, that the causes did not reside in the "person of Stalin" but rather that Stalin represented the entire period of deterioration and degeneration of.the workers state as well as the crimes that went with it. ,

“It has been necessary in connection with some aspects of our’. critical remarks to go far back into the past. Only an understanding of the stages of development of the workers movement in its various | phases can-lead us to a correct view of present-day measures. It must be stated that not Bad Godesberg, but the fourth of August, . 1914, already condemned the SPD and condemned it irrevocably. Therefore, it follows that the splitting of the Social Democracy in 1914-18 was .a necessity, even if.the KPD in its later evolution did not fulfill the hopes thet were placed in it. Havemann questions the necessity of this anc asks if the split was not the underlying factor of the weakness of the German workers movement, without which Hitler's victory in 1933 would not have been possible.

We have ‘already determined the conditions of Hitler's victory. Havemann's question, "whether this split was a mistake," interests us here from another aspect.

It is- quite: typical of opposition Communists in the German Democratic: Republic and in the other East bloc states that their political orientation follows the same lines as that of the revisionists, Togliatti, Amendola and.Lombardo- Radice, in Italy; Ernst Fischer and Franz Mareck in Austria; as well as. Kolakowski in Poland, etc. The recently concluded CP conference in Italy should have. shown the kind of liquidationist dead end into which this course leads..:.The actions of the Communist. parties in several countries which: are aimed at a reunification. with the Social] Democracy or the subordination of the Communist: parties to it are part of this tendency which, in. these parties also, would "throw the revolutionary deadweight overboard." Havemann follows these tendencies not only on the question - of the split, but also on other questions.

For example, he demands that the Communists free themselves "from the odium of being a party. of radical revolution," and later asks the question: "Ought not the question of socialism. or. capital-_ ism in Germany, after all, be decided by the will of the people, . thus by elections?" These statements agree entirely with the line ™ of the Swedish CP which figures prominently in his article and in which the process of liquidation has gone the furthest.

We would go beyond the limits of this article if. we. . expanded on this problem and ventured into another historical digression. We merely want to stress a few historical facts at this point. Under the pretext of the peaceful, democratic, road to socialism, the November Revolution of 1918-19 was beheaded. Under the same sign, the Social Democracy helped German capitalism to overcome its pastwar

crises: of:.1919-24:. and thereafter. This peaceful, road to socialism disarmed ‘the defense of the German working class against the fascist onslaught. The history of the Weimar Republic and its collapse were in the: last analysis: also the collapse of this "theory:" In thehistory of: thei workers movement, "theoretical" considérations of_ this sort have been merely the ideological reflection of acts of class treachery. This holds true also beyond the borders of Germany for the actions of the Communist parties of other countries and their class collaboration in peoples fronts, "peaceful coexistence," etc.

However., Havemann' s article expresses his inconsistency in all its contradictions -- an” inconsistency which is probably characteristic also of the forces which, in a certain sense, he represents:.: i

It bears the stamp. of isolation, of the position of a single individual. It is a collection of many still unelucidated problems, problems which are often not entirely thought out, and many highly speculative reflections...The absence of collective judgment and consideration, of an intellectual and. organizational center for the antibureaucratic struggle in the Democratic Republic comes out clearly.

We have discussed.primarily the negative aspects of the article. A whole series of points are positive without qualification | and of great usefulness as’ fresh formulations for which. Havemann is" to be thanked. (In one or another form they have already been ns sketched in the pages of the Die Internationale. )

Particularly relevant, in our opinion, is his demand for democratization of the organizational life of the party, which . includes the right-of factions.

Of especial importance, moreover, are his'‘proposals for the broadening of democratic rights in the Democratic Republic, which he views in connection with the development of a new socialist movement in the Federal Republic.

He proceeds from the correct consideration that "socialisn. with less democratic rights and freedoms than’the bourgeois state already has achieved is a distortion" and, finally, that "the democratic conquests of the bourgeoisie must not be destroyed but guaranteed and increased.".

He calls for a multiparty system and a parliamentary opposition in the Democratic Republic. The emphasis which he puts on his demand for the right to strike in the transitional stage of society from capitalism to socialism is very positive. Unfortunately,;: we must express some reservations: here also. This catalog of democratic demands is buried in .a desert of ambiguous and dubious formulations, as is the greater part of his article; this considerably weakens the forcefulness of these demands.

~ 34

Thus, ‘the article can only. : serve as a basis for discussion. on a variety of problems. In itself, it is by no means a document that clarifies the positions of opposition Communists, to say nothing of being a manifesto of an opposition Communist organization, or the. starting point of a process” of differentiation | in the KPD and the SED. -

-- G. Gerbel

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