foreign policy of the Cuban government and the departure of Che Guevara. from the political scene, is of particular interest.
-Niedergang begins by.quoting from the letter from Che Guevara which was read by Fidel.Castro last October: "Fidel, other nations. of the world call for my modest efforts. I can do that which is ©~ denied you because of your responsipility as the head of Cuba and the time. has come for us to part. ;
These few phrases, says Niedergang, can be found prominently displayed injmany.local headquarters of the new Communist party of | Cuba from Havana to Santiago.
‘He: then. quotes from Fidel Castro! s . March 13, 1966 speech, a in "which the Cuban leader reminded the students he was addressing * that the Cuban Revolution could take pride in having introduced a law that is unique up to now: "A law of the Revolution, one of the first laws of the Revolution, prohibited naming any street, any city, any town, any factory, any farm, after a living leader.
: Le. Monde! s correspondent continues: "This law is rigorously observed. In Cuba you cannot find a statue of Fidel Castro, of 'Che' Guevara: or. of anyother leader. But the farewell message of the Argentine doctor, so closely and so brilliantly associated with the Cuban Revolution since the organization in Mexico of the Granma expedition, is offered for. meditation to the;..'guajiros' (peasants ) of: thé smallest villages and towns. in the. most remote places in Orienté: Andi:-his well-known portrait, ironical smile and broad. black beret, is often placed beside that of Camilo Cienfuegos,. Fidél"s other lieutenant of great prestige, who disappeared tragically in 1959. As if he. would: never - return..."
“In Cuba, according to. Niedergang,. the disappearance ‘ef: ‘Che for a year now has not aroused the kind of concern and speculation to be found abroad. As a whole the Cubans appear to be satisfied with the successive :explanations..given by the prime minister, who still ‘said on December 4,.1965: "We can tell you. that Ernesto Guevara” is _alive and in. good health. este . ; .
‘Tt is only among the circles of leaders ‘and some “intellec- | tuals that the deeper reasons for his departure and.the questions posed by his present fate are. brought up, "rarely, with discretion and a certain embarrassment." At the time of the. Tricontinental ~ | Conference an African delegate asked one of the members of the Cuban delegation: "Why didn't 'Che' send a message of sympathy to the Tricontinental?"
To this question, and more "insidious" ones, some Cubans "particularly well placed to be informed," replied: "We are certain that 'Che' regularly sends news to his family in Havana.
‘Niedergang affirms:."That-he had a rather sharp verbal exchange | with the.-prime minister when he returned in March 1965 from his long trip. of three months.in Africa and Asia is undoubted and’ is not denied: in top circles." Che was very popular in Cuba because of his temperament, which was quite different from that of the Cubans, his intelligence, his exceptional. role in the Revolution
before and after” the victory; his. intransigence of character, -his. prestige as the rémiantic’ guerrilla fighter. ‘He is still. very popular.
"His theses were well known: violently anti-imperialist and a theorétician of guerrilla warfare, he never hid his distrust ‘with - Pegard to the Soviet system of political and economic organ-. ization:* The real application of proletarian internationalism was one “of ‘his. ‘dominating © ‘ideas. 'If his revolutionary ardor (the: ardor | of a ‘revolutionist) is blunted when the most urgent tasks are being adcomplished on a local scale and if he forgets his proletarian . internationalisn, the revolution which he leads will cease to be an inspiring force and he will sink into a comfortable lethargy which. imperialisn, our irreconcilable enemy, will utilize well. Proletarian internationalism is a duty, but it is also.a:s revolutionary necessity.'" [Socialism and Man, by Che Guevara, p. 19 in the edition published by the Canadian Fair Play for Cuba Committee. J
"The overly long silence of 'Che,'" continues Niedergang, "has aroused a good deal of speculation outside of Cuba, not only in thé United States, but likewise among certain revolutionary: ...circles in Latin America. ‘The most summary and most frequent thesis is that 'Che,' considered to be 'pro-Chinese,' became separated, voluntarily or otherwise, from the majority of the revolutionary leadership and from Fidel’ Castro who have.been resolutely ‘'pro- Soviet' since the last conference of the Communist parties of Latin América held in Havana (November-December 1964). The pro- visional conclusion of this outright polemic is to be found in the . communiqué of the Guatemalan MR 14 (Yon Sosa's Revolutionary movement of the 13 of November), accusing Fidel Castro: of. ‘Lining up with Moscow and betraying the revolution. mn —
‘Niedebgang calls attention in a footnote to Castro's counteraccusation at the close of the Tricontinental that the MR 13 isa "Trotskyist movement." This charge touched off widespread protests. [See recent issues of World Outlook.] However, the correspondent of the Paris daily does not go into the repercussions to Castro's speech. He offers instead -his own conclusions concerning the thesis about Castro being "pro- Soviet" and Che: being ' ‘pro Chinese. ne
"The least one can say is that this thesis is too simple. and does not take into account either 'Che's' latest public positions or, above all, the ambiguity of the Cuban Revolution and its influence in Latin America since the crisis over the missiles . (fall 1962) which constituted a major date in the history. of relations between China and the USSR..
"In February 1965 in Algiers, where he participated in the second Afro-Asian economic conference, 'Ché' admitted that .'the conditions of struggle had changed in South America since the . victory of the Cuban Revolution' and that :'American imperialisn .. would never let itself be caught by surprise again south of the... Rio Grande.' This is exactly what Fidel Castro declared in Havana, -
in January 1966, at the close of.an important conference, held behind: closed doors, with the heads of Latin-American delegations — who attended the Tricontinental.
"This aia not involve any renunciation by. either of them of revolutionary struggle in Latin America or of aid to. the movements. already engaged in armed rebellions, but implied a better, more . realistic-evaluation of the. true ‘objective’ conditions of combat ‘against American imperialism in South America and elsewhere.' It ; is true that Che's Guerrilla Warfare has been and still is the bible of leaders of a great many insurrectional movements that have. : . erupted in the hemisphere since 1959. Today it is’ admitted, and it was one of the lessons drawn by the Tricontinental that ‘plind, “ systematic imitation of the Cuban example has been outmoded.'"
Niedergang. continues with his analysis” of. the latest public positions of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro:
= "Before his: ‘withdrawal, 'Che' said nothing different and he likewise seriously amended. his theories on the 'role of the national bourgeoisie during the more or less long transitional period of a alliance with all the anti-imperialist classes,' separating himself here too from the strict.,rthodox Chinese position on this subject. If it is absolutely necessary to compare the 'Che' of the spring of 1965 (concretely discovering the profound solidarity between the national liberation movements of Africa and Latin America) with anyone, one shovld conceive rather of Franz Fanon...
“"To picture 'Che'.as a 'diehard pro-Chinese' is as simplistic as to imagine that Fidel Castro is 'under Moscow's orders'; it displays a profound misconception of the psychology of two of the most important leaders of the Cuban. Revolution. Voluntarily or not it signifies ignoring the. fact that the debate begun in Cuba and in Latin: America between those who could, if really demanded for the sake of simplification, be called 'pro-Chinese' or 'pro-Soviet' has’ undergone such an: evolution in the. past two years that it is no longer at all occurring within the perspective of possible allegiance to Moscow or to Peking but within the frame ‘of a revision of the concrete revolutionary strategy applicable in each country in Latin America.' This, too, was an important lesson drawn at the ‘Fricontinental. ae o. "The rumors; the charges, the speculation, the uneasiness provoked inside Cuba by the rumors incited Fidel Castro to take up © the ‘Guevara affair' at length and brutally. before the delegates at the Tricontinental. By evoking, to the. general. ‘Surprise of almost all those present 'the imperialist campaign of intrigues and slanders against Cuba with. regard to the case of Comrade Guevara,' he gave the impression of seeking to associate in the same censure > ‘the Trotskyists and the Chinese.' Should this be viewed as a , warning addressed to the most intransigent Cuban elements, partic-~ ularly in the army and in university.circles, who ‘are more sensi- ~ tive and above all more affected by.the 'anti- Soviet Chinese a brochures' distributed up to the end of 1965 despité the numerous protests of Fidel Castro to the ambassador from Peking? The purge
begun. in March, hit not only. the elements of the 'new class,' | charged with or suspected of indulging in the 'dolce vita,' but also, less obviously, some important figures in the armed forces."
‘What has been motivating Fidel Castro, and possibly Che Guevara, in the- recent period? Niedergang offers his own theory: 2 - "Undoubtedly ,’ in order: to win his: current bets, the, prine -: minister. must ‘play a tighter hand than ever. A '‘revolutionist': ‘to: the: bottom of his soul, asolittle: ‘bourgeoisified' as 'Che' after seven - years’ in power, burning to really.help by all means 'all those in the’ world who are’ fighting against imperialism,' he also has;it 16 clear, the responsibilities of a statesman. This is the. big difference between him and 'Che.' But in his way, Fidel is a "Guevarist,' hence the equivocation or embarrassment in some of his declarations. One of the themes for which 'Che' argued on the economic level was ‘the’ necessary redistribution of tasks within the socialist camp,' because. 'the socialist countries have the moral duty to end their tacit complicity with the exploiting countries .. of the West.' He took up the subject at. some length in his speech. in Algiers in February 1965, published by Maspero.
"At. the Tricontinental, the Cuban. delegation had prepared. _ a complete, documented report on this theme in hope of having.it adopted among the general resolutions. On the last day, they had to give it up due to opposition from various sources. 'But we will fight to the end for this idea: which weconsider to be correct, I was told by a number of leaders responsible for the project.., oo
"The Cubans, in fact, are far from being completely satisfied with the commercial agreements reached with the USSR. and the East European courtries. To listen to the functionaries of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the sheaf of grievances is rather heavy. The Czechs offered an industrial center, but refused the raw materials necessary to keep it running well. The Czechs, the Bulgarians (and the Russians?) are ‘charged' with having resold Cuban sugar on the free market at a time when the difference between the 'free' and the '‘preferential' price permitted this operation. It remains true, of course, that the Soviet aid, estimated to be $300 million a year, and the delivery of oil from the Baku gives. the USSR exceptional importance in. the Cuban economy, an importance grown all the greater with the question : mark. placed over the trade agreements with People ' s China since November 1965. oe
"Naturally, this revision is 'political' from two sides, _ as the Cuban prime minister himself finally admitted. Minister of Defense Ratl Castro's trip at the beginning of 1965 to Moscow, where he participated in a consultative meeting boycotted. by the hinese was already a sign that was:not sufficiently noted. During ‘thecourse of the year, the 'lider maximo' increased the allusions which*were likewise courteous but firm refusals, in opposition to the Chinese anxious to compél the Cubans .'to take sides in the. ideological quarrel dividing the socialist world.' When Fidel .- Castro chose the platform of the Tricontinental and the celebration
- 34
of the seventh anniversary of the. Revolution to. reveal the existénce of the 'crisis' between Havana and. Peking, the die had already. long been cast. ,
"Also, while advocating the ideal, probably unrealizable under present conditions, ‘ofa redistribution of tasks within the socialist camp,' the Cuban leaders are trying to diversify their foreign trade (noticeable reduction in agreements with the countries of East Europe, intensification of trade with Great Britain, Spain, France, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, Japan). Thus France is °. selling trucks (much appreciated), bulldozers, locomotives, and could: certainly buy more nickel. The English are exporting a $25... million order of Leyland buses and a five-year, 60 million dollar: agreement has been reached with Spain to construct fishing boats | and freighters.
"Despite the 'return to sugar,' a rational industrialization plan, based in particular on the: very important and rich deposits ... of nickel as well as electrification, could assure Cuba in the next years a desirable equilibrium. Despite a still difficult immediate future on the economic level, Fidel Castro does not seem | to have sought to renounce his ‘revolutionary role.' The results of the Tricontinental, moreover, have ‘perfectly shown the extent of his bet and its limits. :
- "'The Tricontinental, ' he nepeatea last March 13, ‘was a:
victory for the revolutionary movements, a victory of the "small nations" and not the big: and powerful ones.'
"The most important result of the Tricontinental (aside from the choice of Havana as the provisional headquarters of the new body) was the creation of a coordinating bureau for all the revolutionary movements and parties of Latin America. This 'orga- . nization of the peoples,' a reply and counterstroke to the ‘Orga- . ‘nization of States,' was not imposed by the Latin Americans, but decided on by the Cuban leaders after the Tricontinental and -at the end of what all the delegates agree was an ‘exceptionally positive work session.' It would thus be hazardous to affirm that Fidel Castro is seeking to slow down the ‘revolutionary élan in Latin America! by advancing the argument that he agreed to 'coordinating' and ‘organizing' things. on.a continental scale in agreement with the pro-Soviet Communist: parties. On the contrary, everything indicates, “despite > the necessary discreet reservations in this field that the aid is. _ going to be intensified and rationalized.
"Moreover, - the Cuban delegation kept. up the pressure through-
out the conference, thus ‘rallying' around their banners ‘all: the forces engaged in armed struggle against imperialism in Africa and ‘the’ Americas,' and the main theme: of Fidel Castro in his closing speech was: 'Some day or other. all the peoples will. take up arms: to free themselves. ' In specifically stating that ‘Cuba would support the revolutionary movements by deeds and not by words, :in practice and not in theory,' he implicitly criticized China and. ~
recognized in the USSR ‘the role of the big Power that actually carries out its promises.
"But it was; ‘also a call to order and an invitation addressed» to Moscow.: Although the Soviet delegate had publicly declared . that the USSR ‘was ready to aid the peoples. engaged in armed struggle against imperialism, ' everything may still depend on the concrete application of this. maxim which is not exactly new. The contnra- ‘diction then does not. lie on the side of Cuba where they. are inspired by the formuia: 'We have need of. you, but you have just” as much. need of us.' It lies, and will lie perhaps tomorrow on the side. of Moscow in facing the necessities of ‘peaceful coexistence,' which is not ‘necessarily applicable to the "third world,"' and the demands of 'those with arms in hand' who count more than | ever on Cuba, to point out their needs and to 'prescribe' for — them...
REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE REPORTED BEGINNING IN THAILAND _
A number of items in the press point to the conclusion that the Vietnamese Revolution.is beginning to extend into Thailand where a revolutionary ‘struggle conducted by guerrilla fighters is already spreading in several provinces.
Last “April Li, an underground broadcasting. station. called "The ‘Voice of the People of Thailand" appealed for armed struggle. in order to liquidate the American troops based in Thailand ~— territory. and the traitorous group headed by Thanom, the prime minister. + . a
In an April 26 broadcast, Radio Pathet Lao (which proad- _ casts from the part of Laos controlled by the revolutionary o forces), the announcer violently condemned the repressive and counterrevolutionary actions of the Thailand government. He promised the Thai-.people. that they.would be. helped by the’ peoples of the entire world, particularly the peoples. of Indochina.
Recently the Thailand government is reported to have i undertaken a big "mopping up" operation inthe northeast provinces near Laos, Thousands of police and soldiers are said to have participated, as well as American troops. The direct participation of American troops in the "mopping up" operations in the Nong Hua Lamphoo district in the province of Udorn was confirmed by the underground radio "The Voice of the People of Thailand."
A Thailand Patriotic Front is reportedly Leading ‘the armed struggle. A."Patriotic Organization of the Thai Youth" is said to have been created to support the efforts of this Front to. recruit youth. :
In its April 27? issue, the People's Weekly of Peking greeted
"the recent victories gained by the patriotic armed forces of the people of Thailand." By stepping up their repression of the mass. struggle, writes the Chinese Communist party organ, American imperialism and the Thai reactionaries seek to prevent their country from becoming "a second south Vietnam." But they will | finish "by accelerating precisely this very process."
It- appears’ likely that the unleashing of armed struggle» ‘in- Thailand is the direct effect of a rise in the revolutionary ~§ . struggle in south Vietnam and Laos. The fact that American troops have been utilizing: ‘airfields in Thailand for some time in their: aggressive actions against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is ™ certainly one of the factors that have incited the toiling masses in Thailand to take ‘up arms in active support of their Vietnamese and Laotian brothers and at the same time to take the’ first steps along the road to their own emancipation.
~*~ :
The recent decision of the Thai government to send an expeditionary corps to fight in south Vietnam along with American imperialism will only stimulate this vanguard. .
DOCUMENTS OF FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS
The main documents of the last congress of the Fourth International are now available in French, English and Spanish. A German edition is underway.
The congress, held in Switzerland December 5-12, 1965, was" the second congress since reunification of the Trotskyist movement and the eighth Since the Fourth Tnternational was founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938. It was attended by more than sixty delegates and fraternal observers.
Four major documents were adopted: "The International Situation and the Tasks of the Revolutionary Marxists"; "The Progress and. Problems of the African Revolution"; "The Evolution of Capitalism in Western Europe"; and "The Sino- Soviet Conflict and the Crisis: of the International Communist Movement. "
A copy of the documents ‘in “French can be obtained by sending :
For the Spanish edition, send 4% pesos [$. 35] to Editorial: Indice Rojo, in care of Miguel Fuente, Apartado Postal 27-509, Mexico 7, D.F. Mexico.
‘The documents in English can be ‘obtained by sending $1 to. the » International Socialist Review, 873 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10003.