FOURTH INTERNATIONAL -
By Joseph Hansen :
One of the targets in ‘Fidel Castro's January 15 speech attack~ ing "Trotskyism" [see World Outlook February 11], was Adolfo Gilly,. author of some informative and perceptive articles in the Monthly Review on the. guerrilla movement in Guatemala and on developments in Cuba. These articles have been much admired among North- and Latin- American: radicals.
Tn: ‘the April. issue of the Monthl Review, Gilly replies. to cs: Castro, at the same time offering his own estimate of the Tricontin-. ental Conference which ended with Castro's controversial speech. The. editors of the Monthly Review, Leo Huberman and Paul M..Sweezy,:in:... the. same number of the magazine weigh both Castro's appeal for united action against imperialism and*his violation of that appeal in de-. nouncing "Trotskyism." [See World Outlook April 8.] They also indicate certain differences with. Gilly.
Actually, Gilly' s reply to Castro. takes the form of | a sharp counterattack that raises broad new questions. His position is there-. fore well worth examining in determining the framework of the dispute and in coming to grips with the central issues.
First of all, at the risk of considerable oversimplification, let me state what appear to me to be the principal positions as they have been developed up. ‘to: bhis point:
(1) In his January 15: ‘speech, Castro charged that "Trotskyites" of the "Fourth International" have been the "main spokesmen in the imperialist. campaign of intrigue and slander against Cuba in regard to the: case of comrade Guevara," going so far as to state that Guevara is dead: -~ murdered by Castro; that "Trotskyite" agents have infiltrated the MR-13 [Movimiento Revolucionario 143 de Noviembre ] guerrilla forces in Guatemala, thereby leading them into isolation from the masses; and that, in general, "if Trotskyism represented at a certain stage an erroneous position, but a position within the field of political ideas, Trotskyism became in later years a. vulgar instrument of imperialism and reaction.
oo (2) The United Secretariat of the Fourth International in. an "Open Letter" to Fidel Castro [see World Outlook February 18] replied that in every single "fact" cited by Castro to bolster his charges, the publications and personalities involved have nothing to do with the Fourth International. Included among these is Juan Posadas, quoted at some length by Castro, who heads a small group that split from the Fourth International. ‘in.1962 but which makes the fraudulent © claim that at constitutes the Fourth International.
The United Secretariat cited the consistent support. given to the Cuban Revolution by the world Trotskyist movement from the beginning and pointed to the responsible way in. which it handled the announcement of Guevara's departure from the public scene in Cuba.
Lo ~The "Open Letter" stressed the Stalinist origin of the slanders repeated by Castro, and asked him to make a rectification; or, if he preferred, five leaders of the Fourth International were pre- -pared to argue the charges with him before a people's court in Cuba. Castro has not yet responded to the challenge. a
(3) On the other. ‘hand, Adolfo Gilly holds that Castro has become a virtual agent of the conservative-minded Kremlin bureaucracy; that.as a result of this he eliminated Guevara from the leadership of the Cuban Revolution, openly espoused the line of peaceful coexistence, cut his links with the Latin-American revolution, and attacked the Guatemalan guerrilla movement, the socialist vanguard of Latin America, in a slanderous way.
‘The Tricontinental Conference, in Gilly's opinion, was a "failure." It "began with a. disloyal and distorted attack.on the Chinese, using rice as a pretext, and. ended with the .approval. of a text with no political value, full of generalized declarations,. and Cons tA Tut Ang : a fraud on the responsible revolutionary movement.
(4). The editors of the Monthly Review hold that the situation is much more complex and contradictory than Gilly pictures it. In: their opinion the Tricontinental Conference was a "great historic achievement" insofar. as it. "laid to rest once and for all the illusion of peaceful coexistence between imperialism and its victims:
They consider Fidel . Castro to still be a sincere revolutionist although they think his attack on MR=13 was “ugly and perhaps ominous." They take issue with Castro's assertion that Trotskyism is an agency of imperialism,.pointing out that this.was the "accusation which provided the rationalization for the Soviet purge trials of the 1940's." The "malice" in this attack originated from some of Castro's advisers, they believe. In their opinion Castro acted in ignorance and they suggest that he take time out to study the history of the movement. Isaac Deutscher's biography of Trotsky, they: indicate, would be a good work to begin with.
They agree with Gilly that the fate of Che Guevara -- along with economic: conditions in Cuba -- will play an "important part" in determining the outcome of the present situation. The: Mystery Around Guevara :
Both Gilly and the editors of the Monthly Review stress the -importance of the. Guevara affair. The statement by Huberman and .Sweezy on this question carries all the greater: weight because of | its restraint. It is worth quoting in full:
"In his final speech to the Conference, Castro said that 'some day mankind.will learn all the facts. That will be the day when the villains will see that comrade Guevara was not murdered; each of his steps will be fully -known.' Let us hope so, and let us hope. that. the day comes soon. For Fidel should be under no illusions that only imperialists and their agents are interested in Che's fate. More than anyone else, even more than Fidel himself, Che has come to
symbolize all that is best, all that is pure, all that is beloved in the Cuban Revolution, a great historic event which belongs not only to seven million Cubans but to all the people of the Americas and | indeed to all mankind. If, as some charge, anything untoward has hap-+ pened or should happen to Che, those responsible (and that would necessarily include all who knew and kept silent) will be forever disgraced. A Cuban regime guilty of such a crime would lose its moral authority and either would be replaced or would degenerate into a police state. In the latter case, of course, the worst bureau+ cratic elements would rise to the top and do whatever was demanded of them by their more powerful counterparts abroad.
"On the other hand, if the official Cuban story about Che turns out to be correct, if he reappears as a revolutionary fighter and theorist elsewhere, and if he retains his close ties to Fidel and his other former comrades in the Sierra Maestra, then the bonds linking the Cuban and’ world revolUtions will be strengthened and the chances of a favorable evolution inside Cuba will be immeasurably ~ improved. Is Fidel Castro aware of the real issues at stake in the Guevara affair? And does he realize that every day's delay in clearing up the mystery brings anxiety.and doubt to honest revolution— aries everywhere and joy to ‘their enemies?" see
Gilly repeats an argument first raised to my Inowledge. in an article I wrote in The Militant of January 31, 1966; i.e., the disproportion in Castro's attack on "Trotskyism. i" If the alleged agents of imperia lism were utilizing Guevara's absence from the public scene in Cuba in order to damage the Revolution and to disrupt unity in the struggle against imperialism, why didn't Castro answer in the easiest and most devastating way possible -- by reading a letter or message from Guevara greeting the Tricontinental Conference if he could not personally be present at this very important gathering?
Gilly goes much further than this suggestion, however. He asserts that "it is completely clear that one of the conditions of this alliance with the Soviet leadership and of this Conference was the disappearance of Guevara from the Cuban leadership."
As to the form of Guevara's disappearance, Gilly quotes with apparent approval the opinions of Juan Posadas, whom he characterizes as "a leader of the Fourth International." Posadas is "convinced" that "they" have "assassinated him, or that’he is incapacitated or confined..."
Perhaps Posadas has special sources of information. The rather broad selection of choices he leaves the reader, howevér, would indicate that he is engaging in mere speculation like many others. He excludes only that Castro might be telling the truth about Guevara.
. Why does Gilly ‘cite ‘Posadas as an authority? We do not know. But he weakened his own authority in the field of Latin-American: radical politics by not taking the opposite course and helping to puncture the fraud that the _Posadas group constitutes the Fourth io
International. *
As Gilly sees it, Castro has gone over to the Brezhnev- Kosygin team and their line of "peaceful coexistence." This required sacrificing Guevara, who, in contrast to Castro, if we are to believe Gilly, held to the line of world revolution, the same line as the "Guatemalan guerrillas program" and "the position of the |. Chinese." It would seem that Gilly is even tempted to imply that.. Guevara might have been moving toward the camp of Posadas. He includes a footnote quoting a conversation between Guevara and the. followers of Posadas in Cuba on April 15 1965, in which Guevara allegedly told them "that very soon all the works of the revolutionary, Leon Trotsky, would be published in Cuba." Guevara is also alleged to have said, "The Communists call me a Trotskyist and you Trotskyists call me an adventurer." Likewise: very soon we will | sweep out all these conservative bureaucrats. :
It seems dubious that Guevara would discuss such matters in. this way with the Cuban followers of Posadas. Guevara took the trouble to gain .a rather accurate picture of the world Trotskyist movement as a whole, not hesitating to check with first-hand sources. He was well aware of the claims made by Posadas and discounted them.
Lest there be any doubt as to Guevara's own stand, up to the time of his last contact with real. Trotskyists (in North "Africa) he had not espoused Trotskyism although he displayed a fraternal attitude to its representatives as he did to other sincere and dedicated revolutionists.
Gilly assumes -~- assumes is the right word -- that differences of a most fundamental kind arose between Castro and Guevara. As to hard evidence of these differences, Gilly offers very little. No articles, no speeches, no declarations. This, of course, is easily explainable as due to the absence of established procedures in the Communist party of Cuba for the expression of conflicting views.
The explanation, however, does not remove the difficulty. If differences arose between Castro and Guevara, what were they exactly? We are left with little but deductions and unfortunately -- Gilly, I am afraid, is guilty of this, too -= the deductions tend
*As an ultraleft faction in the world Trotskyist movement, the Posadas group at first sought to win a majority through an internal. discussion. When it became clear that the project had little hope of quick :success, Posadas: simply called together representatives of. his own faction and proclaimed the meeting to be a "world congress of the Fourth International." The faction set up duplicates of the top bodies of the Fourth International and even issued publications counterfeiting the official journals down to the style of typography.: The venture could not have played into the hands of the Stalinists better if they had conceived it themselves; and they have put it to good use, particularly in Cuba.
to fit preconceptions. *
If we check the fields where differences might have arisen, these are not nearly as great or profound as the fields of. agreement between the two leaders. For instance, Guevara stressed the factor. of morale, of revolutionary fervor, in the matter of economic incentives. His opponents. pressed the virtues of material gain. A con- °. siderable public debate was conducted on the subject. Castro tended: to side with Guevara’ s opponents but certainly did not reject Guevara's ‘views.
A sharper difference that was not made public may have arisen. around some of Guevara's speeches in North Africa, particularly about. certain "socialist countries" taking economic advantage of others through the. mechanism of the world market, and about the duty of giving full and free material aid to the peoples struggling for liberation. If these remarks were interpreted by the Soviet bureaucrats as referring to Moscow, complaints may well have been sent to Havana to which Castro responded. This is a legitimate deduction inasmuch as Guevara did not again appear in public upon returning to Cuba. But there is no solid evidence to indicate that more than tactical differences might have arisen between Castro and Guevara.
As to the area of agreement between Castro and Guevara, it is- only necessary to check their public utterances. They see eye to eye on a whole range of issues, not the least of them being insistence on the primacy of armed struggle in seeking to conquer power. for the revolutionary forces. It was not without reason that Castro from the very beginning of his movement displayed the greatest personal confidence in Guevara by consistently asking him to take the most difficult and trying assignments... Guevara displayed equal consistency in accepting them. Until thére is hard evidence to the contrary, Castro's assurances must be given due weight and not .simply be brushed asidé as unworthy of credence merely because it would | fit in better with this or that preconception.
And what if it turns out that Guevara's disappearance is due to some kind of monstrous, as’ yet unexplained betrayal on the part of Castro? The editors of the Monthly Review have stated the consequences: "A Cuban regime guilty of such a crime would lose its moral authority and either would be replaced or would degenerate into a police state. In the latter case, of course, the worst bureau-
*A good example of this common-enough method.of. thought can. be found in the opening page of'.Gilly's article. He asserts that Castro -- : despite being the leader of a socialist revolution and possessing © revolutionary sentiments -- "must" launch "an-attack against and . |: attempt to destroy the most politically influential guerrilla movement in Latin America: the leadership of the Guatemalan. MR-13." Why? We are-told by Gilly: "...in order to defend Soviet. policy.' Not a shred of evidence is offered for a Single one of these assumptions, including the predominant influence of MR-13, although Gilly" s subsequent deductions depend completely on them: ...
. cratic elements would rise.to the top. and do whatever was demanded of them by: their more powerful counterparts abroad." If this dire . alternative envisioned by Huberman: and .Sweezy were to be realized, -the Trotskyists would call such a structure a degenerated - or deformed workers. state; and, regardless of the political character of the regime, would: ‘still defend. it with alt: ‘their energy and: determination against | ‘imperialist attack. : .
For Trotskyist “theory, this politically very ‘unwelcome ‘outcome would offer no difficulty. We have said from the beginning that the Cuban Revolution must expand or it will go down -in one: way or another; revolutionary | Cuba cannot remain isolated indefinitely. . However ;* at still remains good. advice not to cross bridges before you come to ‘then. * _
“One of the decisive ‘factors in a qualitative. change in Cuba would be deep demoralization among the masses, particularly the workers. As Trotsky explained repeatedly, this was one of the most important elements in the rise of Stalin. To believe someone like Posadas, the masses are surging forward. in Cuba ---Castro is holding them in chéck. While not too clear on the subject, Gilly appears to lean in that direction. He claims, for instance, that Castro distorted Gilly's charge that Cuba failed to give "active support" to the Dominican Revolution, by making this out to mean "the sending of soldiers and arms," whereas Gilly meant "mobilization of the. :. masses." The purpose of the distortion, says Gilly, was "to contain the discontent of the Cuban masses” who do not understand why Cuba did not act. . :
The cuban people have: provided history with the world! Ss outstanding. example to date of unremitting mobilization. It would be: blind not to see. the role Castro has played. in this. Yet there are probably signs of weariness’ to be detected: as year after year passes of unbroken imperialist blockade, continual threat. of invasion and international defeats like the one in Brazil. Accurate information on the mood of the Cuban people is needed to judge the . state of health of the Revolution there. Unfortunately, this is not. easily obtained, one of the reasons being that Cuba.is in the situation of a heavily besieged fortress.
Perhaps this is the place to mention another hypothesis. advanced to explain Castro's: attack on Trotskyisn. Cliff Slaughter of the Socialist Labour League argues, in an article entitled: with Singular appropriateness, "How not to answer Fidel Castro," that.-.. "Without a shadow of doubt, Castro's attack was part of a world-wide
*The Socialist Labour League, a British ultraleft, group, interprets Castro's attack:on Trotskyism.as crushing proof that Castro stands at the head of .a capitalist state. The Posadas group, which for all its ultraleftism is able to see that Cuba is at least a "deformed workers state," scores a telling point in criticizing the "brainless" SLL theoreticians for maintaining such a sectarian position. (See the March issue ‘of Red Flag, the monthly newspaper devoted to publishing the declarations of Juan Posadas in English.).-.-
reaction by Stalinism to the growing influence of Trotskyisn.. (See the March 26 Newsletter.) Posadas anticipated the slower- witted British sectarian, declaring January 17: "Fidel Castro would not -come out with - such groundless statements.if there did not exist. within Cuba and within: Guatemala a great development of Trotskyisn. m" “Gilly Likewise ‘sees a groundswell of opposition to Castro in Cuba. which he identifies as "guevarista and pro-Chinese," identified in turn with the line of extending the world revolution; i.e., Trotskyisn.
“Unfortunately, these statements correspond closer to wishes. than to reality. The editors of the Monthly Review are more accurate in stating that’ "Trotskyism is certainly not a large or important . political force in Latin America as a whole." My own impression is : that Trotskyism has more prestige, standing and influence than the editors of the Monthly Review realize, particularly in certain areas. This is especially true among the new generation of youth, who are not burdened with old prejudices and who are turning to the books with open minds , anxious only to learn something that can genuinely help them in the revolutionary struggles they are engaged in. But Trotskyism, it is true, has not suddenly begun advancing in a big way organizationally and it remains a rather small minority current in Latin America as‘a whole. Castro's attack is thus not a reaction to a sudden phenomenal growth of Trotskyism ¢ as: the ultralert: sec-— tarians. hopefully assume.
What the sectarians leave out of account, either due to ignorance or to blindness, is that attacks such as Gastro levelled against Trotskyism are not new in Cuba. The Stalinists, or those under Stalinist influence, have been campaigning consistently in this way against Trotskyism since the beginning of the Revolution. In the July 30 andi August 135-1962, issues of The Militant, for instance, I had occasion’ to* answer a series of: articles: ‘in Hoy that. attacked’ Trotskyism. utilizing precisely the same frame-up and amalgam methods to be seen in the attack: voiced by Castro. Even the same "leading Trotskyist" was utilized; namely, Juan Posadas. And he was not named. I had to name him and’ identify the source of the quotations ascribed to "Trotskyism. "*
Were these Stalinist- engineered attacks occasioned by the "growing influence of Trotskyism"? No. They were directed against the growing influence of: Fidel: Castro’ and his: appeals. to the rest of Latin America to follow the example of Cuba..From the Stalinist point of view, of course, Castroism does constitute a species of the genus "Trotskyism.": |
ns What is new-in the current.attack is that it is voiced by Fidel Castro himself. This can be explained by a weakening of . . Castro's position in relation:to Moscow. Which is not necessarily synonymous with the strengthening « of Trotskyist influence.
*The answer. to. Hoy was reprinted as a pamphlet, “Trotekyism and the Cuban Revolution. Pioneer Publishers, New York. 15 cents. .
. The Sino-Soviet Dispute
Gilly pictures Fidel Castro as having become a completely servile agent of the -Kosygin-Brezhnev ~ "peaceful coexistence" team, so servile, in fact, as-to willingly carry out orders ‘to liquidate his co-leader Guevara. Likewise in accordance with his new role, - Castro utilized the Tricontinental Conference, as Gilly sees it, to launch: an ‘utterly: rdisloyal and distorted attack on the Chinese, using rice as a pretext. we
Ana. where does Gilly stand in the Sino- Soviet dispute? His. article is filled with references to the Chinese. Not one of. the | references contains a word of criticism. Quite the contrary. "The same line," he tells us, "unites the Guatemalan guerrillas’ program, the position of the Chinese, and that of ‘Che's supporters in Cuba. It is the line of extension of the world revolution against the line of peaceful coexistence. ". ” oo
On this point it would seem that there is some substance to the boast made by Posadas (in the March issue of Red Flag) that Gilly is a "journalist influenced and orientated by the Interna- . tional"; that is, the group headed by Posadas.** For those who are
*The editors of the Monthly Review appear to agree with Gilly’ Ss view that Castro used rice as a pretext. They state that they do not wish to imply any criticism of the Chinese decision to cut shipments of rice to Cuba, the reasons given for this by the Chinese being "valid and justified. " They add: "At the Tricontinental Conference Fidel talked a lot about the duty of all revolutionaries to help Vietnam and carry on the struggle against imperialism. Does he now presume to tell. the Chinese, who are doing most of. the helping and a large part of the struggling, that all that comes after the duty to supply Cuba with the amount of rice it asks for?" The irony is misplaced. From the. viewpoint of defending revolutionary China against the escalating imperialist .aggression in Southeast Asia, it. would seem well worth while to make sure that no slashes occur in the rive ration of the fighters in the front lines ninety miles from Miami.
**There is sometimes a curious coincidence between. the views of Posadas and Gilly. For instance on the virtues of nuclear war, we learn in a declaration made by Posadas December 4, 1965, and published in the. December issue of Red Flag: "The nuclear war is at the same time the revolution." He predicts the annihilation | of New. York, London and Moscow:
"When the masses of the world will’ see, will. ‘learn that 'New York is destroyed' all the faith in the capitalist system and in the bourgeoisie and in the strength of capitalism will vanish." The disappearance of Moscow will have an opposite effect. "On the other hand as we have said the bombardment of Moscow will be the rising of the world proletariat and will provoke the revenge of the world and European proletariat."
This is only the most recent formulation of a line advanced by
— 34H
not connoisseurs of the remarkable declarations of Posadas, it should be explained that among other oddities he believes that Mao has taken over a good deal of the Posadas line. In answering Castro, Posadas notes with satisfaction: "And the Chinese do not attack us; they have not said a word." Gilly could be charged with having been orientated to reciprocate. oo mo
Do the Chinese bear no responsibility for the strengthening of Stalinist tendencies in Cuba? Among the so-called "pro-Chinese," two currents can be found. One consists of young revolutionists attracted by the guerrilla background cf the Maoists, their firm declarations against. imperialism, and even their .wltraleftism. Castro and Guevara are outstanding examples. The other current is Stalinist to the bone. Examples can be found’ in many places besides Albania. Mao's rehabilitation of Stalin has encouraged and fortified this current. Posadas is simply dead wrong in his assumption that the strengthening of the "pro-Chinese" elements in Cuba equates automatically to the strengthening of Trotskyism. Depending on other factors, it can just as well have the opposite effect of strengthen— ing the elements bitterly opposed to the "de-Stalinization" process initiated at the famous twentieth congress of the Communist party. of the Soviet Union.
_ - More importantly, Mao's policies are far from.being Leninist. Often they are completely opportunistic, bearing the seeds of eragic defeats. An outs tarding instance is the’ catastrophe in Indonesia.
The Indonesian Communist party under Aidit's leadership espoused and followed the line of peaceful coexistence with Sukarno, the political leader ofthe Indonesian bourgeoisie. Class collaboration, practiced under the notorious theory of revolution "by stages," paved the way for the biggest debacle since the collapse of the German Communist party: under Stalin's genius—like guidance.
Posadas since he split from the Fourth International. Earlier formulations are even more lurid, the suggestion being made that it would be wise of the Kremlin to launch a preventive nuclear war.
Now turn to Adolfo Gilly's introduction to the recently published Studies in-a_ Dying Colonialism by Frantz Fanon: "And it is easy to imagine that if one day the transistor radio of a Bolivian miner, or a Colombian peasant, or an Algerian fellah tells them that Moscow eaa Felxing have been destroyed by atomic bombs, they will rise up furiously and instanteously to destroy in turn all that which represents their enemies. And if in the same moment they are also told. that, on the other side, New York has disappeared from the map, their strength will be multiplied because they will see that their enemies no longer have any support, and they will feel that an immense. weight has been: lifted. from their shoulders."
Gilly adds that "Perhaps this thesis is not very inspiring for a resident.of New York." We can agree with him on that.
; Peking, itself practicing "peaceful coexistence" with Sukarno, covered up Aidit's opportunism if not. directly fostering and encouraging it. _Neither- before, during, nor since the great mass slaughter of Communists in Indonesia, have the virtuosos in. the thought of Maoprovided the: world revolutionary movement with a Marxist analysis of the disaster which the policy of peaceful coexistence led: ‘to in Indonesia.
Coming still closer to home, we note Gilly's silence about Peking's open rejection of a united-front policy in defending Vietnam against imperialist aggression. Mao publicly rejects.a united front with revisionists and opportunists -- as if Lenin's united front: pdelicy were designed for anything. else: except opening up. “the. possibility for common action with revisionists and opportunists against a common enemy and thus proving in practice the superiority of Bolshevik policies and methods of struggle.
Mao's rejection of a united front policy has done immense harm to the international defense of Vietnam, making it much easier, for instance, for Brezhnev—Kosygin to reduce the flow of material aid to Hanoi to proportions far below what the situation calls for. One of the consequences was to block establishment of a common governmental front of all the workers states that would have widened the opportunity for the Cuban: government to play an _independent role in relation to both Moscow ‘and Peking.
The end result, given Cuba! s geographical position and — China's incapacity to substitute for the Soviet Union as a source of material aid, was to compel Havana to move closer to Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute than it may. have wished to.» It is absurd and ridiculous to equate Mao's error on this level: with his position on the legal ins and outs of the protocol for exchanging rice and sugar. Behind the absurdity is the’ assumption that China with its 650 million people and Cuba with only 7 million (just off the coast of Florida) stand in equal relation to the threat of American imperialisn.
In view of these facts is there not some justice to Castro's bitter accusations about Peking seeking to use economic blackmail in search of political concessions from Havana?
*Last November 15 General Secretary Saturnino Paredes gave a report at the fifth national conference of the pro- ~Peking Peruvian Communist party, the line of which did not differ in essentials from the | line folklowed by Aidit although it did stress the need for a long armed struggle. Paredes called for the formation of a "patriotic liberation front" that would include the "national bourgeoisie." The "strategic objective of the revolution is anti-imperialist and anti-feudal," said Paredes, and its objective is to "establish a new people's regime." Paredes warned that the prospective. bourgeois ally "may" betray the revolution. Not a word about socialist revolution! (See the report in the March 9 bulletin issued by the His inhua News Agency.
In this whole complex situation no greater error could be made than to lose sight of the correct stand taken by the Cubans in . favor of an effective united front against the American: imperialist aggression. in Vietnam. Castro took an open public stand on this. immediately after Johnson: ordered the bombing of north Vietnam in. February 1965. Castro called for vigorous defensive action and, as . a token of what was meant, the Cuban government sent a shipment of sugar to Hanoi. Moreover the Cubans have repeatedly said they are willing to send volunteers to. ‘fight in Vietnan.
The Cubans. made. this one of the main themes at the Tricontin— ental Conference. Castro repeated. it in a speech March 13, calling for sufficient "conventional" arms for the Democratic Republic of. Vietnam to.stop.the American bombings. The: Cuban delegation at: the twenty-third congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. : proposed that material aid be sent to the battlefront in such quantities as to convert north Vietnam into a cemetery for American planes.
“How strange that Gilly, who has given considerable evidence of genuine perceptiveness, should. see none of: this! Freconceived notions indeed have power to blind one to real facts.
“Finally let us note another remarkable oversight in Gilly's. article. He does not make even passing reference to the Cuban- - Yugoslav dispute. Yet this is so sharp that the Cubans exercised their influence to exclude the. Yugoslav delegation from the Tricontinental Conference while voting to seat the Chinese!
The differences between: Belgrade and Havana should be of: concern to Gilly if he is really interested in substantiating his. notion that Castro has committed. himself to advancing the line of. peaceful coexistence. This is precisely the key. issue in dispute between the two sides. The Titoists condemn the Cubans. for maintaining the position that the road to power lies through armed struggle;. the Cubans score the Titoists for their opportunism and their : friendly relations with bourgeois forces in Latin America, particutarly the Betancourt and Leoni regimes in Venezuela.
“Leaving aside the problem of bringing Belgrade into a united front against American imperialism (which is not easily solved in view of Tito's softness toward Washington and the failure of Moscow and Peking to set up an actual united front), the dispute. between | the Cubans and the Yugoslavs is of particular interest to revolu-: tionary Marxists in gauging the limits of Castro's political con- . cessions to the Kremlin. Since the dispute is a public one, it can |. easily be followed. Up to now the ultralefts have not commented on it, preferring to ignore it out of concern for " maintaining their preconceived pattern. Psy The _Tricontinental Conference
| The Tricontinental Conference should be judged against this background. Gilly labels it "a conference without glory and without program." In this judgment he comes close to the extreme sectarian
view that the "main purpose" of the conference "was to provide a |. safety-valve for middle-class charlatans like Cheddi Jagan and upperclass demagogues like Allende to blow off steam against imperialisn, neocolonialism and what-have-you." (Socialist Labour League theoretician Michael Banda in the February 5 Newsletter.) Posadas offers an _ intriguing variant: It was a "defeat" for Castro.
In a declaration dated January 21 (I do not have it in the original’ Spanish and must rely: on the French version published in the February 25 issue of Lutte: Communiste), Posadas maintains that. the positions taken by the Tricontinental Conference were revolutionary "only in form" but not in substance since it did not issue calls mobilizing the masses against imperialism and did not come out with a revolutionary program. Nevertheless Fidel Castro was "routed." ("C'est une déroute pour Fidel Castro.") The Tricontinental meeting at Havana, we are told, "demonstrated the enormous force of the revolution and the tendency, the objective necessity of unifying the | Colonial Revolution." These forces were so strong that Fidel Castro “was compelled to make his first speech the very opposite ‘of what he had been thinking of giving." Posadas, we must. believe, has very good sources of information!
"Independently of the objectives it had, independently of the revolutionary resolutions, in form not more, independently of the interests and the objectives of the organizations present, it was the influence of the colonial: revolution and that of the Workers State in its highest form -- the Chinese Workers State -- that triumphed," Posadas assures us. The triumph consisted of nine delegations opposed to peaceful coexistence who. succeeded in influencing the other delegations. "It was a defeat for all the conciliatory perspectives sought by Fidel Castro."
Well and good. if there is any sense at all to this word salad, we are forced to conclude that Gilly is more sectarian than Posadas in his judgment of the Tricontinental Conference.
The editors of the Monthly. Review perform a service for their readers, in my opinion, in taking a balanced view of the conference and its meaning, a view much closer to the contradictory reality. The conference did represent a positive achievement. It did strike. a heavy blow against the illusions of "peaceful coexistence." And this was the line of the Cubans, both as hosts of the gathering and as participants in its deliberations.
Nevertheless the editors: of the Monthly Review are fully
justified in taking a reserved view:as to how well the militant tone that characterized the proceedings is reflected in practice. They hold that the test’ will come in Cairo in 1968 when the second Tricontinental Conference is held. The object and goal for Cairo, in their opinion, must be "to take a giant step forward, to go beyond Havana, to proclaim socialism as the necessary and indispensable condition of real national liberation.
This would undoubtedly. be a highly desirable step forward. I think, however, that we will be able to determine much sooner
than that whether or not the Castro. leadership has given up its policy of seeking to extend the Cuban Revolution and: sold out to: the line of peaceful coexistence as practiced by the Kremlin. The. ° continuation of the first Tricontinental Conference and the test of: its real line will be observed in the development of the class struggle in the immediate future, above all in Latin America. is :
In agreeing that the first Tricontinental Conference did score positive achievements, I do not wish to imply that it did not suffer from. serious. limitations. The screening of the delegations was one:: of. ‘then. _ ts _ an
Gilly’ s completely negative reaction to the conference in Cbs.
programmatic aspects is likewise not without an element of truth. If the conference was intended to found an International, it was certainly a prime example of "centrism." But then the sponsors of the : conference, the Cubans in particular, made no claim to.such an-) ambitious undertaking. It was a conference with limited aims. .These included giving a boost to united action in behalf of the Vietnamese freedom fighters and to the concept that the road to power in countries where democracy has been suffocated lies through armed struggle.
Quite evidently the program of revolutionary Marxism ‘encompasses much more ‘than this. But it is evident that at this point the discussion can progress satisfactorily only if we turn to the broad problem of building» mass ‘revolutionary-socialist parties. : When Gilly, for instance, refers: to the: Guatemalan guerrilla fighters as being "Situated in the center of the political battle for the program of the world revolution," he exaggerates. The struggle being conducted by MR-13 is very important, but is there more to be learned from it either by. way of program or example than from the struggle led by the Peruvian Trotskyist leader Hugo Blanco? Internationally, does the situation in Guatemala transcend in significance the situation in Indonesia? And what about Vietnam, which at the moment constitutes the key to. the. entire world . Situation?
_ It is very good. that. MR=13 opposes the line of peaceful » coexistence with'the Guatemalan representatives of Yankee imperialism and adheres. to the program of socialist revolution. This .progran,. however, can be discussed in relation to many situations besides the one in Guatemala where considerable: factional heat has been gener-. ated. Thus without losing sight of the specific situation there or the intérests of the Guatemalan freedom fighters, it might prove profitable to take a more general view.
For example , the editors of the: Monthly Review refrain from
*Posadas bears down heavily on this in his January 21 declaration. "Who elected the delegates to this. Congress? Who designated. them?" he asks cuttingly. The questions, pertinent as they are, do not lack in irony coming from the organizer of a rump congress. that founded a counterfeit "Fourth International.
getting involved in the specific dispute as to whether or not there > are "Trotskyites" in the MR-13 and whether or not it has a "Trotskyist program." Instead they pose the issue on a broader basis: "After visiting South America in 1964 we stated our opinion in these pages that there is no such thing as feudalism in Latin America and that © it therefore makes no sense to talk about a bourgeois revolution." And again: "But if Fidel Castro and the Latin American Communist Parties duck the question of socialism, and still more if they attack as Trotskyites all those who openly struggle for a specifically socialist revolution, thén:the prospects for Latin American. Trotskyism will be vastly improved. For the necessity, and indeed the inevitability, of socialist revolution, not-in some vague future =. _ but as the next historical stage in Latin America is rooted in the. underdeveloped, imperialist- -enforced reality of that region."
‘Heré we reach the root of the question. The specific contri-: bution to revolutionary theory that has become labelled:as "Trotsky-— ism," is not merely unyielding recognition of the necessity for socialist revolution on a world: scale -- the ultraleft sectarians do this in all sincerity and they should be given credit for it.
What Trotskyism offers is a transitional political approach, the methodical search for points of contact with masses of workers and peasants who may have a backward outlook, who may be under the influence of conservative or demagogic leaders or-opportunist par-ties. The approach consists of finding slogans, aims,. or suggested measures that are acceptable to the masses at their given level of political development but which nevertheless correspond to objective necessities and which, once undertaken, tend to carry them toward socialist revolution and full political consciousness.
This transitional approach is applicable and required in the imperialist countries but has special meaning in the underdeveloped areas of the world where feudal conditions do exist, where the bourgeoisie have failed to carry out the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution, or where the struggle against imperialist domination leads to nationalist moods.
In tribute to Marx, who formulated the germinal idea, Trotsky named this theory, which permeates his writings and which guided all his political activities from 1905 on, the theory of "permanent revolution." The theory of permanent revolution is not at all something exotic. It was applied for the first time in the Russian Revolution of 1917 where it provided the guidelines for taking the struggle against feudalistic Czarism into the socialistic phase that culminated in the establishment of the first workers state in history.
It provides an incomparable key to understanding the inner logic of the revolutionary events of our time. It is very much involved in the problem under discussion -- the question of extending the Cuban Revolution. The Cubans, in. fact, really owe it to themselves to become acquainted with the theory. They will be surprised to discover how well Trotsky foresaw the logic of the revolution they carried out by feeling their way through the more costly method
of trial and error.
To return to the limitations. ‘of the Tricontinental Conference. If a question mark must be placed on its decisions being carried: out in practice, the primary reason is the absence of mass revolutionary-— socialist parties in Latin Ameri¢éa. They have yet to be organized. The Cuban Revolution gave a great impulse in this direction, particularly by helping to end the authority of the fossilized Communist . and Social-Democratic formations. But.the heavy and sometimes cate-. gorical emphasis on the efficacy of guerrilla warfare to the exclu-sion:of. ether means, promoted by both Havana's and Peking's teach-. ings, has: tended to stand in the road: of organizing parties built in the Leninist. pattern. Perhaps this phase is coming: to an end. cS
The contingents that will form the cadres of these parties are new separated in various formations, from independent revolutionaries to authentic Trotskyists, including the gerrilla movements and | the youth sectors of some of the Communist. parties that were represented at the Tricontinental Conference. If one of the effects of the conference is to bring them together in revolutionary actions the party-building process will be hastened in Latin America. We hope that this: proves to be’ the.case.
-In that event Castro's attack on. “Trotskyism will turn. out to have been an:episodic step backward and not the beginning of.a major betrayal spelling doom for the bright hopes awakened By the Cuban Revolution and its tenders.