GUERRILLA FIGHTERS AND MILITIA
By Hugo Blanco
[The following letter by Hugo Blanco Galdos ‘tin reply to a comrade™ was written from the Central Prison of Arequipa, where the Peruvian peasant leader is being held without trial. Dated April 7, 1964, it has been included in a pamphlet entitled The Road of Our Revolution, published by Ediciones Revolucién Peruana. In the discussion now occurring among radical circles in Latin America on the role of guerrilla warfare, Hugo Blanco offers in this letter some conclusions drawn from his own experience in organizing peasants in the Cuzco region. The footnotes have been supplied by the editors of the pamphlet, ]
In Reply to a Comrade:
In Cuba, China, etc., the situation was characterized by the absence of advance formation of fighting mass, organizations. It was completely to be expected that at first the masses felt very distrustful of the armed group; this determined their nomadic, guerrilla character. But when they gained the confidence and support of the masses they settled down. Under all these conditions, the guerrilla force becomes the axis of the people's struggle, the polarizing and organizing nucleus, the political vanguard... It is an armed group, organized ' and prepared independently of the mass movement, since this hardly exists, having yet to be organized as the offspring of the guerrilla force. oe ; ,
In Peru big mass organizations already exist and in the zones they cover there are few who do not belong to them.
What is fundamental is the following: Do you consider that Dual Power(1) exists at present in the countryside? If not, you will lean
(tn “a previous letter, dated February ‘7, Hugo Blanco refers to dual power arising in Peru in an atomized, unconscious form, without cen-
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toward organizing guerrilla fighters (2) but if you are convinced it exists you will favor organizing a militia.(3):
After April, '62, although separated from my comrades and with my thinking still affected by the strong fumes of putschism, the heavy pressure of reality was reflected in a report I wrote: "Zone Liberated before an Insurrection." Although I believe it contains some erroneous concepts, the title alone shows how impressive was the development of Dual Power.(4) You also know what I have written on. the Peasant Unions. tp It seems needless to recall these things to a member of the FIR Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario -- Front.:of the Revolutionary Left], "conscious factor of the awakening of: the + Quechua peasantry," as you put it. I do it because I suspect that your opinions on armed. struggle are the fruit of your lack of Know) 2dge . and your separation. from work among the ranks of the FIR, LN :
rf, in the armed struggle, we begin with premises so different from those in Cuba and China, its initiation must be different; -this
t is the "dialectical process.
. The guerrilla fighter, as you say, must “attract the sympathy" of the peasantry. .
A militia is the product of the rise of the peasantry; the masses understand the necessity for armed struggle and create a militia; the peasantry gives birth to the militia and.as such it enjoys its love and care from the very beginning. Don't forget that the peasantry. has already come to organize Defense Committees; it is already eonscious of their necessity and knows that it must set them up.
In place of your sentence: "There the mass movement is being linked with the embryonic forms of the armed struggle for power," I tralization or program, but tending necessarily to develop and gain conscious form through the action of the vanguard, (2) Independently of the development of the mass movement. Separate and apart from this is the fact'that Trade Union Defense Committees, as the fighting arm of the peasantry, are compelled to use guerrilla methods Guring the struggie. (3)onis is the best designation we can give to the Defense Cormittées | that arise and develop among the peasant masses, aside from the skills and technique they. apply in combat, (4)onis - ‘report on dual power was approved by the national leadership of the FIR. (5 published in the mimeographed Revolucién Peruana and approved by the national leadership of the. PIR.
prefer: "There the mass movement is reaching the special forms of the. armed struggle for power" (although this aim is not conscious in the. beginning).
You ask: "What organism will prepare and organize the armed struggle? The peasants! union? The party?’ Some other questions. will help us find an answer: Who led the oceupation of the land in €uzco? The unions or the party? Who took power in Russia? The ~— soviets or the party? The answer to your three questions is: the party through the mass organizations, in our case, the peasant unions, ~ There is agreement -on the peasant unions now; all’ that is lacking is. to put it into practice, ~
", . . this type of struggle is’ 5 brought to its conclusion by
organisms skilled and disciplined in the science and art of revolutionary war. Consequently a trade union cannot organize or lead the armed struggle." These organisms are precisely the revolutionary Trade Union Defense Committees led by the party.
I don't deny the great importance of the party. On the contrary, I recognize that the enormous deficiency in '62 was the lack of a party. This weakness fostered the others. .
The party must have cells in the peasant unions; this is a necessity. for correct leadership of the armed struggle. We must learn from experience ~- the outcome would have been different if there had been a well-organized party at least in La Convenci6n and Lares, This — is the negative side of the experience.
But we must also leern from the positive side of the experience. Why did I and my comrades last longer than any other group despite the lack of a party, lack of political clarity, lack of technical knowledge, etc.? _ Because we were a group growing out of the peasant. union, .nourished and cared for by our parent.
There are many characteristics of our reality which a guerrilla fighter would list as coming in the second stage: Complete knowledge of the population -- the three or four "yellow" patches are known (if they have.not already been given the red coloration of the zone as was the case at Qochapampa, Mesada, etc.). Almost the whole population is organized; it will not only economically sustain, protect, inform, feed, etc., the armed groups, but much more, there will be occasions when the whole mass will engage in sabotage and even when the whole mass will fight. Of course, the latter will be sporadic until the mom-. ent of insurrection comes, but they will be ready. This does not mean that we precisely foster this, although it can happen at times that we. must.do so3 I only want to indicate to you what we face and what we will be confronted with, the rich treasures we have at the start, the resources that we must not dissipate. (In the tense period of the Chaupimayo struggle all the union members served sentry duty in rotation.) The creative potentialities of the unions at La Convencidén and Lares could not be developed due to the lack of a party.
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All these characteristics belonging to the "second stage of guerrilla warfare" give the armed group the possibility of establishing itself among an ultrafavorable population. If problems arise due to unusual persecution of a given militia unit, it can be moved toa union in another zone.
One of the fundamental conditions for a militia struggle is the size of the zone in which it develops; there should be many militia units, one for each union body. Without this, a militia takes on guerrilla characteristics, since the enemy concentrates on it and on one union. (This happened to us; nevertheless we were not a classical guerrilla force of the first stage). There will not be a repetition of a case like Chaupimayo where the attention of the enemy was concentrated.
With regard to guerrilla tactics, I:.am in complete agreement that these must be taught to the Defense Committees; they must not be empirical, the vanguard party exists for a reason, All the guerrilla knowledge that can be adapted to our militia stragegy must be utilized.
Now concerning something fundamental: Is it easier to organize guerrilla fighters or a militia? —
A big-part of the peasantry are willing to face death, but not to leave their patch, their home. In this, too, they say: "Tierre o muerte." [Land or death.] The guerrilla fighter leaves his home and does not return until the struggle is over. The militia fighter stays home, continues working and when it is necessary to battle, he does it. For every one hundred peasants ready to join a militia, we find one willing to be a guerrilla fighter; I won't go into the details, but believe me, I know it from experience!
The troops of Manco II [last of the Incas], who had surrounded Cuzco ready to crush it, abandoned the project because it became time, I don't know if it was to plant or to harvest their potatoes.
None of this means being against organizing guerrilla fighters; among those who are willing some can be formed to help the militia.(7) But the fundamental organism of the armed struggle in Peru will be the militia of the union organized by the party.
We should take advantage of all the peculiarities of our reality. Having advanced so far, we do not begin from zero.
You say: "It is on the horse of the peasant movement that the FIR must move toward the armed struggle for power." Agreed; it was that way in Cuba too. The difference is that they first seized arms
(7)But subject to a centralized leadership in the revolutionary mass organization (unions), not outside it. The necessities of the struggies will determine the number and role of the guerrilla groups.
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and then got the horse. We are in the saddle but we still lack arms. Why should we get off the horse?
I am sure that if what I say doesn't convince you, working with the rank and file will; the sooner the better,
Tierra o Muerte! VENCEREMOS. [We will win.]
| HUGO BLANCO GALDOS.
Central Prison of Arequipa, April 7, 1964