BOUMEDIENNE UNVEILS HIS "COUNCIL"
By Pierre Frank >
JULY 6 -- From June 19, the day Boumedienne pulled his coup d'état, it was necessary to wait until July 5 -- more than two weeks -- to jearn” over’ Radio-Algiers: the composition of the "National Council of the Revolution" that carried out the operation, and ‘the ' program which Boumedienne intends to follow as head of the govern= ment.
Two weeks for their names! The list reveals a combination of military chiefs under Boumedienne's command and some former military ministers belonging to Boumedienne's clan, This leads to the conclusion that the coup d'état was organized solely by the army and that the later attempt to give a certain political coloration to the "National Council of the Revolution" came to ‘nothing after two weeks of- discussions ° in the corridors.
“It is to be noted likewise that on july’! 5, ‘the third” anfiiversary ‘of Algeria's independence, the new regime, which claims to represent the will of the masses, did not dare call them out for demonstrations in the streets. The new leaders did not even appear at a sports | festival organized for the holiday.” a
What are: the claims made in the June ‘19 proclamation and in the speeches of the spokesmen of the new regime?
According to them, everything was going badly, above all on the economic level, The situation in Algeria is certainly far from brilliant. But instead of proposing a new policy, the organizers of the coup d'état claim that they are holding to the policy followed previously -- to the Algiers Charter, to self-management, ete, All” the bad things were due to Ben Bella’ personally, to his personal ; power, The personal accusations are topped with "financial" charges.
' “During past months we have criticized many aspects of the political situation in Algeria, particularly the Bonapartist character of: Ben Bella's power, the recourse to combinations at the top which. the masses could not understand, the equivocations, particularly in carrying out the agrarian reform, the absence of a real party functioning democratically. But Boumedienne is not entitled to the least confidence if he voices similar criticisms, or a part of them, today. Quite the contrary. a a
In place of Ben Bella's personal power; Boumédienne is’ not offering democracy but a still narrower personal power, without. Links with the masses, resting solely on the army or on a part of it. What kind of democracy is this in which these men, even after their names have been revealed, remain anonymous politicians afraid to stand up
publicly before the masses! As for the lessons in morality which these men claim to offer, one cannot overlook that among the "Council" are a Mohammed Said, a Colonel Mohand Ou El Hadj,. whose outlooks are known to everyone. nee
It is true that Boumedienne's asceticism can be pointed to. But operations like that of June 19 do not occur in a political vacuum and do not follow the logic of the views of a single indivi-+ dual. What happened after June 19, the positions taken, the con+. frontations, had considerable significance. Social forces, group~ ings, individuals do not interpret such an event arbitrarily. On this level, things could not be clearer, .
The first to support the coup d'état were the Ulemas [Muslim theologians], and with them all those oriented toward the past. They _ were followed almost immediately by a series of ambassadors -including some with a leftist past which they promptly forgot -- who sought to, reassure the conservative powers throughout the world, Immediately behind them trooped the opportunists, those who had shined Ben Bellats shoes and who are prepared to do as much for his. Successors, Behind them, with more or less prudence -- for completely tactical reasons -~ came those who believe that "Algeria needs them"; the Rabah Bitats, the Boussoufs, the Khiders, the Fehrat Abbas's, who hope that their turn will come but who don't want to show too much eagerness about it.*
The coup d'état saw the youth, the students, in immediate opposition. In Algiers itself, demonstrations broke out in the following days. Elsewhere -- in Oran, Annaba, Philippeville, Tlemcen, the demonstrations were more powerful and the repression very severe. Outside of Algeria, the Algerian students of the Amicale des Algériens en France strongly condemned the coup d'état.
But perhaps nothing illustrates the situation in Algeria after the coup d'état better than the attitude of the Algerian trade unions. It was not until a week after the coup d'état that the leadership of . the UGTA [Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens] adopted a resolution which has not yet been published in Algeria and of which only extracts have been published abroad. [In Le Monde June 29.]—
This resolution does not mention the name of Ben Bella at all. It notes "the extreme weakness of the party in organizational structure," the "failure to apply democratic centralism and the absence of a collective leadership" which permitted "the reinforcement of personal power, the practice of antidemocratic methods," but it also |
*A Clown was required in the tragedy. Messali Hadj undertook to fill the bill: "The PPA [Parti du Péuple Algérion} refuses to choose...When the French were still in Algeria, there was a certain freedom of expression..." .
observed that "despite the obstacles consisting of the negative aspects of the former regime, the workers gained victories, repre= sented in particular by the decrees on self-management, the Algiers Charter, and the trade-union charter," that “only the workers and the disinherited masses of the towns and countryside have borne the weight of the pretended policy of austerity."
The resolution refers to the coup d'état in ambiguous terms: "The opening provided by the event that occurred on June 19 would be put in question by the return to the political scene of careerist and opportunist elements, who are also responsible for the lack of respect for our institutions...For June 19 to become a genuine open-: ing, it is necessary to also permit the emergence of tested militants, clear about their options, courageous in the expression of their opin-= ions, and who have proved their genuine attachment to soolalism.."
- And the resolution declares that "the flawless attachment of the workers to the gains of their ten years of struggle; namely, national independence, self-management and the construction of demo-~ cratic socialism within the framework of self-management," demands | that "the FLN {Front de Liberation Nationale], party of the vanguard, be composed mainly of workers, of poor peasants and revolutionary...» intellectuals. Today the demystification has been carried out. The | period of individuals has been ended; that of principles must begin.'
It is true that a week later, the national ‘secretariat of the UGTA released a communiqué that retreated from the above resolution that had been adopted by the national executive commission, This communiqué approved."the analysis .contained-in the June 19 proclamation" of the Council of the Revolution, and, while referring to the preceding resolution, only mentioned the Algiers Charter and the defense of the gains of the revolution without explicitly referring to self-management.
. Doesn't this demonstrate that the officials of the tradeinion movement are looking with one eye at the regime and the force at its disposal and with the other at the reactions of the masses? . (It should be remembered that this leadership was restored to office at a recent congress of the UGTA under pressure from the rank and file against the old leadership that had been put at the head of the ‘unions by main force, )
They stated that there were figures they do. not want to see again, and conquests of the revolution which they think it best not to touch. The leadership of the unions displayed a big streak of opportunism, but it is not necessary to read between the lines to see the limits beyond which Boumedienne cannot go at present in wheeling and dealing. The Khiders, Boussoufs, Ferhat Abbas's and ~ Co. should not be moved into the foreground. Boumedienne should also come out for self-management (of which he stands in holy horror).
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After the demonstrations of the first days, the situation became "calm." This is certainly due primarily to the absence of an organization of the vanguard. In the case of Algeria, the single party means in the final analysis that there is no party. And the left wing was an aspiration among many militants but not an organization struggling within the FLN, still less an organization capable of directly addressing the masses, But the calm in the streets does not mean that minds are apathetic. Boumedienne has crossed a bridge over which there is no return. On the one hand, the bourgeois neocolonialist tendencies and the bureaucratic tendencies will await the erosion of Boumedienne, as he awaited that of Ben Bella, in order to seek to force back the revolution still more and even to smother it completely. On the other hand, the militants will seek to draw the lessons in order to start up the revolution again, the forces. for which are far from exhausted, a
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Coming a few days before the scheduled opening of the Afro- Asian conference in Algiers, various demonstrations of a diplomatic order were inevitable, revealing the motives of many governments.
Most of the neocolonialist countries of Africa (former French or British colonies) displayed reservations with regard to Boume- . Gienne's regime, not out of sympathy for Ben Bella or for the Algerian revolution, but because, as they have shown on other occasions, these weak and unstable powers are hostile to anything that could even indirectly encourage a coup d'état at home,
Bourguiba declared that he did not: appreciate coups dt état in general, but in this particular case he saw more advantages than disadvantages. For his own neocolonialist regime naturally.
Nasser was caught in an embarrassing situation. In many respects, Boumedienne has more affinity with his regime than Ben Bella. But Nasser is not without political judgment and it has not failed to occur to him that Boumedienne is playing the role of sorcerer's: apprentice. Thus, with the future in mind, he has-sought to. make the best of Boumedi enne while showing concern over Ben Bella's 7 fates: .
As for Moscow and Peking, they were both operating not on the level of parties facing developments temporarily unfavorable to a revolution but on the level of states preoccupied particularly with the scheduled conference. The Soviet government, fearing that the new. regime might take a hostile position on including the USSR in =~ the conference, maintained its reserve while giving encouragement in the corridors to those favoring Ben Bella,:..On the other hand, the Chinese government, which did not have any other international tribune than the Afro-Asian conference at. which it could express its views at present, thought that in rushing recognition it would gain
Boumedienne's support. during the conference. It only succeeded in taking a stupid step that revealed the ignorance of Chinese: diplow macy in affairs outside the countries. bordering China.
The only intervention on a government level that had a revo~ | lutionary character came once again from Fidel Castro. Brushing —: aside diplomatic fictions, he characterized the business as a "mili-> tary pronunciamento" and, "recalling that Cuba had sent arms to ds Algeria, he said, "We regret that these arms might be used today ina fratricidal combat against the Algerian people." He likewise ~.. expressed his confidence in the Algerian masses.
This is ‘a conclusion in which we can’concur, all :the more so since the Algerian revolution has undergone very difficult times-in : the past, extremely grave situations and bad jolts. Each time it: ° has vigorously recovered. The Algerian revolution, we are sure, will not be long in resuming its forward march.