interview between a -journalist and Comandante Yong Sosa, a guerrilla leader and head of the "Movimiento. Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre" (MR-13 de Noviembre -- Revolutionary Movement of November 13) was recorded in. the Las Minas mountains of Guatemala, It was published in the March-April. number of the Mexico City magazine Economfa, from which we have translated it.]
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: Question: Is more than one group of guerrilla fighters being organized at present? —_ ; me
Answer: We have various groups in action at present. You will understand that we can't give you their exact location for obvious reasons. However, I can tell you that we have five guer-. rilla groups in different parts of the Republic, although some of them give the appearance of not: being active. But it is in the department of Izdbal that the guérrilla groups are the strongest.
Q: What happened in the town of Guacamayo?
A: It was something that happened August 27 at seven in the evening, approximately. It was an action -- like those I will tell you about later -- which the government has tried hard to keep from the public. In this action, we can inform you that the enemy suffered eighteen killed. This information is from a source that is completely trustworthy, since it was given by a person who is in direct touch with the army. In addition they suffered five seriously wounded and some with light wounds.
Q: Comandante Yong Sosa, could you tell us about how many casualties, both killed _and wounded, the Movement and the army have suffered during the thirty months of guerrilla struggle?
As on our side we have had seventeen killed and. three seriously wounded... On the army side there have been 142 killed and 25 seriously wounded that we know about.
Qs In thirty months of stru le?
A: Yes, in thirty months. The figures have been verified through= information coming from ambulance drivers, sentries, hospital workers, etc. It could be that the figure is “higher. » Among the casualties are chiefs, officers and soldiers of the army as well as of various repressive bodies.
Q: What can you tell us about the encounter at Mixco?
A: Things at Mixco [Iz&bal], happened like this, A group of thugs came up here. The government had recruited them from the worst levels, thieves and murderers. They tried to make their way up the mountain, but they didn't succeed. One of our comrades let them have a shot and that was enough to set them running. There were about thirty of them. However, they passed the information on to the army, telling them about where they could find us. The army came up the mountain,. looking for us, with modern equipment: automatic rifles, grenade launchers, submachine guns, light machine guns and mortars. We discussed what to-do about this and decided to meet them. It was a,contingent of approximately one hundred men. -The combat was one of the longest we have experienced, lasting about three hours, I don't think there was so much shooting since the
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invasion of Europe...but we went on firing away... (Yong Sosa turns to.one of the guerrilla fighters). What time did-the shooting begin? At two? No. In Mixco, when the army came up.
A guerrilla fighter: It began at three and ended about tive
thirty.
Comandante Yong Sosa: Then it was approximately two hours. In this encounter the army had five killed. But we weren't able to discover what they did with the bodies. They took their equipment back, but we don't know if they buried the bodies, threw them in the river or what they did to get rid of them.
In this operation an army major was wounded in the arm and another important thing was that when the combat began, approximately half of the soldiers refused to advance. They retreated, This proves that the soldiers didn't believe in fighting against the rebels. We believe -- to put it better, we are positively certain that they knew perfectly well that the struggle we are committed to is directly in their favor, because the soldiers are peasants. We dontt mean that the soldiers didn't fight because of cowardice. No, by no means. But they knew that they were fighting against their own interests, , SO
Q: Comandante, according to that, you would conclude that
easant ought to be a guerrilla fighter. ae
A: That's what we're doing; we want to mobilize the masses of. the whole country; we want, in other words, the masses of the whole country to participate directly in the revolutionary process. We must be clear about this. It's not a struggle of guerrilla fight ers against the government but a struggle of the entire people of Guatemala against the existing social system.
Q: Comandante, I would like to ask you: in case the government decreed an amnest a complete pardon, vegeed td for you, would. you be willing to accept it?
A: On repeated occasions I have said that we cannot at all accept any kind of amnesty, since we are not struggling for personal advancement, but are struggling to transform nothing less than society. And we know that to transform society requires a struggle to the death against the social system reigning in Guatemala.
Q: Comandante, recently a series of terrorist acts that have occurred in the capital have been attributed 9 you. Did you have anything to do with these?
A: The truth is that none of our people have carried out any terrorist acts. That's not because we are against terrorism, but because we reject terrorism without a concrete political aim: that is, for example, unaccompanied by mass action, strikes, etc. We
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know that terrorism is not the best way to give an impulse to the revolution; terrorism in itself is not going to change the situation. Unless terrorism has a political aim, in place of being supported by the people, it is disapproved and repudiated.
Q: Are there any differences at present between the MR-135 and _ the PGT [Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo]?
A: We have some differences with the Communist party, but principles are at the bottom of the quarrel that has arisen. Perhaps you've read an open letter that our friends of the PGT sent us. The problem is that we are not in agreement on what kind of revolution must be made in Guatemala. The PGT advocates a national democratic revolution and the MR-13 de Noviembre is convinced that conditions do not exist for a national democratic revolution; that is that workers and peasants should be represented in the government along with the bourgeoisie. Because you can't put a dog and a cat: in the same box, They won't get along. How could a government like that function? That is, it would be a coalition between the workers, the. peasants and the bourgeoisie, oo
Q:) Comandante, you said a national democratic revolution.
A: That's what they say, the PGT.
_Q: That's what the letter said, then, Right?-
A
: The letter, all their documents, like Nuestras Ideas (Our Ideas), and their journals Verdad (Truth), El Militante (The Militant), Vanguardia Obrera (Workers! Vanguard). In all of them they say the same thing. We believe that in these circumstances the bourgeoisie can no longer play any role (pause). Imagine a case like this: if the Padilla brothers were revolutionists -- let's say of the PNR 44 ~- and as a real joke they were given representation in the Frente Unico de Resistencia [FUR] which would be in charge of all the politics of the struggle, and we here would have to adjust ourselves to the Padillas against: the peasants, This is a concrete case to bring out the thesis that the bourgeoisie...
Q: Cannot play any role.
A: Exactly.
Q: In a workers and peasants government, what role would the arm lay?
A: As an institution the army would have to disappears That's Logical.
Q: Total abolition. Right?
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:. I believe that this question can make the army jump out
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of its skin. We have to bring some clarity into this, because that's -the way it's going to be. I know that when I answer that question, the high command is going to get out a circular with copies for all the officers. "Look, ,bhey're going to kill you; they're going to liquidate all of you."' So we have to clear it up.
Q: They're going to exploit this in their way, certainly.
A: It has to be cleared up so that ‘the enemy can't ‘exploit it. For example, to answer the question, we must first examine the role played by the army in Guatemala. I can remember when they said here that the army existed to defend our "territorial integrity" and to defend our “legally constituted government." And they repeated this every day in the barracks. Does the army carry out this role? It does not. Fifty years have passed without a war with anyone, and the possibilities for a small country to wage war are constantly diminishing. There's no reason to believe there'll be wars with Central America and still less with Latin America. In addition, imagine the case of an international war. It won't be the army that will do the fighting. What they'll do is decree general mobiliza~ tion and it will be the peasants, the workers and the students who will really be sent to the front.
Q: They will recruit people. Right?
A: That's right. In addition” the army. injures the country's economy, taking men away from the fields to put them in barracks. To defend the country and to defend the government, it is sufficient to have workers and peasants militia. Consequently we won't try to liquidate the army phystealty, but as an institution, with the aim of saving the millions of quetzales that are spent in the national defense budget and using the money in a better way, for schools, highways, public health, etc. In order to definitively resolve Guatemala'ts problems, we must clearly understand that the present army must be demobilized, so it can disappear as an institution. Because what would happen in the event of genuinely free elections? Why the president would remain as president and would stop ending up as a refugee (general laughter). I would also like to say this, since we're talking about the army: that every soldier, every officer, and every chief should start thinking over the fact that what is developing in Guatemala is not a military struggle, but a social struggle, and we don't believe that we're going to defeat them only with guerrillas. No. The guerrilla fighters are only a kind of exponent of the mobilization of the masses, of the workers and peas-~ ants.
Q: Is there sympathy in the army for the Movement?
A: Among the young officers there is a certain uneasiness and I am sure that we will win them as individuals to the Movement. A lot of uneasiness has been noted among them. I wouldn't say that about the soldiers, since it's the families of the soldiers who are
sending them all the news about how the Movement is doing and raising their consciousness. We are already organizing soldiers' committees. The organization of soldiers! committees is not a move to take over the barracks. It's to raise the consciousness of the soldiers themselves, mo
- Q: Apropos of that, I'd like to ask another question about what we were discussing last night on the support of the population. You referred to support by the families?
A: I would be interested -- I would very much like to have you hear the. tapes we have taken at meetings with the peasants in many villages that we have visited.
Q: That would be interesting!
A: Youtre going to hear the discussions. All that we have talked about here is on tape. It's the same, the proposals about struggle, etc.
Q: That you have to take power to make radical changes, to transform the economic and social life of the country?
A: Yes, that's right. Because if you don't make radical changes it's better not to do anything.
Qt Is this a struggle for a caudillo [leader]?
A: It has nothing to do with advancing any single man. We are trying to form a homogeneous team as the basis for a government. and the organs of dual power of the workers and peasants, like we speak about in our program. This is the aim... Also that the peasants _ themselves, the workers themselves, should govern -- govern themselves, Is this clear about the government? You asked me if it was for a caudillo? That doesn't work. Perhaps forty or fifty years ago this business of one man might have worked. Today it's a question of a team,
3: What do you think of the candidate of the URD Pancho Villa rdn Kramer?
A: Look, he's my friend. But I don't think ten Panchos could resolve the problems the way things are. In case he did win out, Villagrdn Kramer would try very courageously to resolve the problems, and the next day he would be in Costa Rica. They would throw him out of the country.
Q: And if he gets the right group to support him?
_ A: That's the way those who are for the legal road think. It. won't solve anything. For example, perhaps no one has ever come to the presidency with-as much popular support as Juan Bosch in
Santo Domingo. Overnight, they gave him the boot -- the same as. Goulart. He had good intentions and he tried to’ solve the problems, but he couldn!t., He ran up against the interests of imperialism and imperialism said, "Give this devil a kick," and, wham! It was to Puerto Rico I believe they expelled him. Goulart, in Brazil, carried out some agrarian reforms and then this Castello Branco in the. army gave him the boot. In short, you can't settle anything with © elections.
Q: A socialist regime is needed, then?
A: Yes, that's it exactly.