POSTPONED
By Francesco Marchi
ROME -- Relations between the Italian.Communist party and the youth reached an uneasy level with rumors that the national congress of the youth would not be held this year. [See World Outlook March 5]. The rumors were confirmed by an official decision of the National Council of the Italian Communist Youth at its meeting on ' March 1le-13. ee
As its reason for requesting the FGCI [Italian Communist Youth Federation] to postpone their congress, the party. bureaucracy adduced that the basic documents which had been drafted in preparation reflected a line deviating too far from the official party line, A compromise was then reached, .the substance being that the FGCI is to participate in the next party’ congress with delegates having both voice and vote.
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This was included in the report of Achille Occhetto, National Secretary of the FGCI, who openly stated that the proposal-to- postpone the congress came from the party leadership who had proposed "a more intensive and engaged participation of the FGCI militants in the preparations and debates of the Ninth Congress of the PCI than in the past."
After disposing of this question in an impersonal and almost detached way, Occhetto went on to some political questions, once again taking up positions he had already expressed in speeches and articles published in Citta Futura (the monthly review of the FGCI). Despite its uncertainties and ambiguities, Occhetto's report hewed, as in his previous declarations, to a line to the left of the party' s official line.
Most of the National Council members who took the floor spoke about the congress. Quite a number were against postponing it. Some prominent figures of the national FGCI leadership did not. speak, in this way indicating their disagreement with the proposal made by the party bureaucracy.
Some of the speakers took up the question of Vietnam, criticizing the Soviet Union for not providing substantial -aid to the Democracic Republic of Vietnam. During one of these speeches, Luigi Longo, national secretary of the Italian Communist party, interrupted to say that there were difficulties which could not be imputed to the Soviet Union. Asked what they were, he said, in a vague way, that the Soviet Union had offered aid to North Vietnam but that China had apparently denied transit permission for such supplies across her territory and that further details could not be given for "obvious military reasons." Although Longo's statement made a certain impression, the majority of those present remained skeptical.
Occhetto's report was put to a vote as a whole instead of on its political aspects and on the postponement of the congress. The left wing was embarrassed. If they voted-against the report because of their views on the congress postponement it would weaken a leftist (although limited) position with regard to the party's léadership. A small group of right oppositionists were also embarrassed. If they voted against the report because of their views on its political content, this could be interpreted as a criticism of the proposal of the pared popeaucracy to postpone the congress. With a few abstentions, Occhetto's report was therefore carried by a large ma jority and the existing differences were hidden.
By a unanimous vote, the National Council protested the ‘removal of issues of Clarté from the headquarters of the French student union containing documents written by the opposition an other "subversive" literature. [See World Outlook March 12, ] was reported at the meeting-of the National Council that ‘this’ ‘tates
ature had been dumped in the Seine! This so shocked the party
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leadership that they sent a letter of protest to the leadership of the French Communist party.
The postponement of the FGCI congress has only postponed an open political confrontation. Meanwhile, in spite of threats, the FGCI is maintaining Citta Futura. Its contributions can enliven the discussion in preparation for the next congress of the Italian Communist party.
NATIONALIZATIONS IN SYRIA REMAIN UNCERTAIN
DAMASCUS -- The nationalization decrees* touched off a strong capitalist reaction in Syria which was reflected in this city by a long strike of merchants that was finally crushed by the army. Among the workers and peasants, on the other hand, the decrees inspired a revolutionary mood,
The Communist party supported the nationalization measures and its members took part in the demonstrations in support of the government during the merchants! strike. There has been talk of a front between the Baath party and the Communist party.
The following observations can be made about the situation.
(1) The nationalization decrees were undertaken in reply to capitalist preparations for a coup d'état against the- ruling Baath party.
(2) The regime in Syria is now under the control of the lower officers who led the March 8, 1963, coup d'état that brought the Baath to power. In the majority, they are of peasant origin.
Qn January 3, 1965, the Presidency Council nationalized 107 industrial enterprises comprising the country's main industries. One. decree established full state control over 22 factories in Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Homs, A second decree established 90 per cent nationalization of 24 enterprises in the same areas, leaving 10 per cent in private hands. The same decree nationalized 75 per cent of holdings in 61 private industrial firms, leaving 25 per cent to private stockholders. A third decree provided for immediate compensation to small stockholders whose livelihood depended entirely on their investment in the affected firms. A fourth decree warned that "obstructionist attempts of any kind" are punishable by life imprisonment and even death. The nationalized fields include building materials, textiles, production of edible oils and synthetic rubber. Two breweries were included. Compensation was promised within 15 years at. 3 per cent interest.
At the moment they are in conflict. with the “civilian" leadership, especially the right wing led by Aflak and Bitar. They represent the more resolute and fierce elements of the ruling class but are decidedly erratic in behavior. Like all the Baathis they lack a _ clear doctrine and strategic line. At best they believe in a kind of state capitalism with a strong military and bureaucratic grip on the people. .
(3) As regards the nationalization decrees themselves, the situation is still very confused. The decrees provide for selfmanagement by the workers in the nationalized industries; but up to now all that has been done is to appoint students, teachers and party men as managers. The confusion is pointed up by the nationalization of many very small shops. These come close to the artisan level; i.e., enterprises run by a man and his family and undertakings, the shares of which are held by people of quite limited incomes. This has tended to alienate wide sectors of the petty bourgeoisie, turning them away from socialism and the Baath and in the direction of semifascist and strongly religious organizations, especially the Moslem Brethren. Such people are numerous in the urban areas, particularly Damascus.
The government also issued a. decree forbidding former managers to work in the nationalized industries. This could be disastrous in some industries. (In leather-making, for instance, the owner was often also the manager and the only one who knew the process of tanning.)
It should also be noted that the nationalization decrees stand in isolation; i.e., they are not part of a socialist or even broadly democratic plan to reconstruct Syria's economy on a new basis. That the decrees warrant critical support is beyond doubt. But the price Syria's workers and peasants are paying for the Baath's erratic policies cannot be compensated for by these nationalization decrees alone. With regard to the required main course, the Baath lacks everything -- a clear ideology, definite planning, an efficient, strong party dedicated to socialism, and, most important of all, the determination to take the road of socialism without look~ ing back.
(4) At the Baath congress these issues will be up for discussion but not much should be expected to come from it. The prospects for a coalition with the Communist party do not appear to be high. While the rank and file are not against it, they are not prepared to go beyond representation in the cabinet and Revolutionary Council and are at the same time against granting the Communist party the right to independent political action. |. But the rank and file of the Baath is the last thing that counts with the Syrian government in determining policy.
On the other hand, the Communist party is not enthusiastic about granting this kind of support. Both leaders and rank and
file have had unhappy experiences. They lent both Nasser and Aref full support and in. return were served with repressive measures, -In Iraq the attack mounted by the Baath took barbaric dimensions. In Egypt, after fierce persecution, Nasser relented; but recently another campaign was opened against them in Cairo under the joint auspices of Hassanein Haikal, Nasser's press adviser, and the Egyptian police.
JOHN BAIRD
We learned with sadness of the death of John