FRENCH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
PARIS «- The municipal elections in France March 14 and 21 were notable in showing the stability of the out-going administrations, whatever their political label. This held true not only for the small rural towns but also for the 159 cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants, including Paris, for which the Gaullist government passed a special electoral law in hope of polarizing the votes in these cities around the UNR [Union pour la Nouvelle République], on the one hand, and the PCF [French Communist party] on the other. Only 24 shifts in administration occurred, the main beneficiary being the PCF, which now counts 34 mayors in place of 25,
Two main questions are nevertheless posed: (1) Were the gov- . ernment's objectives injured? (7) What were the results of the agreements between the PCF and the PS LSocialist party], in which the PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié] and various numerically unimportant bourgeois and petty-bourgeois groupings were involved? ,
On the first question, the answer is quite clear: the hopes of the UNR proved largely illusory. The unconditionally Gaullist formation was beaten in the first round at Lyon, Marseille, Grenoble, Nice, Dijon, etc. Its main objective was to win in Paris where the Gaullists
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took all the seats in the legislative elections in 1962. In Paris, the old bourgeois parties (MRP [Mouvement Républicain Populaire], . independents, ultras), after being beaten in the first round March 14, did not want the UNR to win a crushing majority on March 21. Consequently in several sectors of Paris, they refused to withdraw, permitting the slates of the so-called Democratic Union (that is, the PCF, PS and PSU) to win. The result was a municipal council in which the UNR now holds 39 seats, the Democratic Union 38, and the old bourgeois parties 13,
- The setback dealt to the UNR should not be equated to a defeat for the Gaullist regime. To do so would be a sign of parliamentary cretinism. Under this regime, municipal rights have been considerably reduced along with those of parliament. The regime is not based on political groupings; the apparatus rises above these. The UNR is part of the apparatus; its men are interested first of all in the profits and perquisites associated with office. Already not badly nourished at the level of the state and its associated structures, they are like-~ wise attracted by the material advantages to be derived from the municipal administrations and it was on this that they suffered a setback.
In face of the divisions among the bourgeoisie, the workers! parties, unfortunately, did not present a much better image. The Socialist party left its federations a free hand, in some instances extending this down to the section level, in order to make whatever alliances might retain administrations or gain new ones. Thus some of them made deals with the old bourgeois parties (Mollet in Arras, Defferre in Marseille. . . ) while others joined in a common slate with the PCF and PSU (particularly in Paris and its suburbs), Also in some cases members of the Socialist party went against the deci-~ sions of their federation, those in Marseilles agreeing to a common slate with the Communist party, others (for example in towns of the Paris region) blocking with candidates of the MRP, independents, Radicals, and even in certain instances with the UNR. Even before the first round, there was a series of expulsions from the Socialist party, in Paris for refusing to join in a common slate with the Com= munists, in Marseille for doing precisely the opposite,
This ridiculous aspect of Socialist party policy reflected not only the traditional opportunism of the social democracy but also the existence of layers who have gone beyond this opportunism, now con-= stituting a kind of layer of "socialist" technicians, appreciative of the "efficiency" of the Gaullist government and its institutions and not so distant from the "capable" men of the regime itself.
We turn to the election results. First of all, the out-going Socialist mayors who worked out their slates independently of their party's decisions generally succeeded in getting re-elected, The most flagrant case was Dardel, who won as mayor of Puteaux, a,Paris suburb, thanks to bourgeois votes, and as chairman of the General Council of the Seine, thanks to Communist votes. se
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In Marseille, Defferre won on the second round, following a series of incidents reminiscent of the gangsterism in a Hollywood production, in a struggle against the joint slate of the Communists and a number of candidates in his own party who favored a Communist- Socialist bloc, Defferre won in five sectors out of eight. With practically no candidates opposing him from -the right on the second round, he gained the votes of particularly reactionary elements, especially the "pieds noirs"t who left Algeria following the victory of the Algerian Revolution and who are especially numerous in Marseille. It is also known that the Elysée (that is de Gaulle himself) intervened so that Defferre's slate would not be opposed from the right. Thus Defferre will make an ideal opponent for de Gaulle in the presidential elections at the end of the year. He was re-elected mayor of Marseille thanks to Gaullist votes which rescued him from the bloc of Communist and Socialist votes. The PCF has no choice but to find a candidate with working-class appeal to run against Defferre.
Another observation, perhaps the most important, should be made about the municipal elections -=- the Communist-Socialist agreements did not attract strong support from the peripheries of these two parties, This goes against the usual experience. Municipal administrations were won; but the number of votes remained mediocre, The vote did not always reach what the two parties have previously gained separately.
How is this to be explained? The recantations of, the Social-~ ist party certainly helped to create disgust among many voters who saw in the alliances with the PCF, as in the alliances with the center and the right, nothing but vulgar, unprincipled and unworthy deals. But this is only partially the answer, the part involving the responsibility of the Socialist party. The other part concerns the policy of the PCF. :
The Communist party denounced the unprincipled deals of the Socialists but offered no real perspective for Communist-Socialist agreements,
Although there were common slates with bourgeois and pettybourgeois candidates, and although the bourgeois press dubbed these slates with the name "Popular Front," they were not exactly a new edition of the Popular Front. The bourgeois and petty-bourgeois candidates represented nothing comparable to their predecessors of 1936, They were only individuals standing for nothing but themselves, not being spokesmen of organizations like the Radical party.
Some of the joint slates could be said to represent a united front of working-class parties, but they lacked either vigor or bite, or attraction for the working class. In short they lacked a sociale ist aim, In an atmosphere of sordid electoral deals, these agreements proposing "democracy" sounded like nothing but the small change,in the horse-trading. Who cared one way or the other? Under such conditions, the votes for such slates came from workers who wanted to
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maintain class lines, but the slates themselves aroused no enthusiasm and won no striking victories.