WASHINGT ON'S LAST CARD IN SOUTH VIETNAM
When Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh overthrew the military junta headed by Maj. Gen. Guong Van Minh on January 50, he gave as his reason that _ the junta had proved "soft on Communism! after it overthrew the Diem a ee last November. Khanh also said that the junta had engaged in
plot" that was "backed by the French" to turn toward "neutralism" and end the war in South Vietnam through a negotiated settlement, The U.S. State Department made out that it hed been surprised by the new coup d'état and that it was "uneasy" over the situation,
Circles close to the French government offer a different opinion on the meaning of Khanhts seizure of power, They claim that it was done with the approval of Washington. The French imperialists, of course, are not disinterested observers, They are watching for an - opportunity to make a comeback in their former colony... Nevertheless it serves them, for the time being at least, to bring out certain facts that might otherwise remain concealed,
An interesting analysis. of the Khanh regime, written. by Georges ‘Chaffard and reflecting the French view, appeared in the February 11 Paris daily Le Monde. According to Chaffard, the governmental combin-~ ation announced by Khanh on February 8, "implicitly reveals the difficulties and the limits of the enterprise" undertaken by Khanh in toppling the junta.
“The majority of the traditional political personnel decline to venture any opinion, This is because waiting has again become the order of the day for a big section of the South Vietnam bourgeoisie at a time when the thesis of neutralization is gaining ground even among certain American circles,"
It was the ultranationalist minority, in Chaffards! opinion, that sought the purge of January 30. But they are divided by rivalries between clans and personalities, "The operation advised by the American services, the unification of the two most fiercely anti-Communist formations, the Dai-Vet party (of the 'Grand Vietnam!) and the Vietnam Quoc Don Dang (V.N.Q.D.D., formerly linked with Chiang Kai~shek) © proved to be unfeasible," Because of the failure of. this maneuver, Khanh "had no other recourse but to assume responsibility for .the government himself,"
Two Main Puppets
Chaffard calls attention to the two most important persons in Khanh's regime: Dr, Pham Huy Quat, the minister of foreign affairs, who "is probably the political brains, " and Professor Nguyen Xuan Danh _ the second vice-president, who is in charge of economic and financial affairs,
"Principal leader of the Dai-Vet, Mr. Pham Huy Quat passes for a strong personality, and in any case * proclaims himself to be a determined adversary of neutralism, His nomination at the head of South
Gon
Vietnam diplomacy will reassure Mr, Dean Rusk and Mr. McNamara. In Paris, on the other hand, it will not be forgotten that Dr. Quat, who has presided since December over the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Council of Notables, was one of the principal inspirers of.the motion demanding that diplomatic relations with France be broken,"
Nguyen Xuan Danh "is a pure product of American 'tupbringing.! He recently returned to Saigon after an absence of seventeen years, Bene-=ficiary of a scholarship granted. by the Japanese occupation in 1945, he went to Tokyo to study, from where he went to the United States after the war, A graduate of Harvard, functionary of the International Monetary Fund, he returned to Vietnam in the entourage that accompan= ied Mr, Cabot Lodge in August 1963, He was at once sent by his Ameri-~ can friends to Paris to try, without much hope, to’reunite the antineutralist. opposition in exile, After the fall of the Diem government, he became governor of the National Bank, The United States expects, no doubt, that his nomination will provide stricter control over the. utilization of American aid,!
_ Chaffard notes that none of the figures who were imprisoned under | the regime of the Ngo brothers is part of the new government, Maj. -Gen,. Minh, who headed the overthrown military junta, accepted the post of figurehead president in order "to safeguard the unity of the ATHY « t
"There are few observers in Saigon," declares Chaffard, "who are prepared to predict a long life for the new team, who represent only: a vory small fraction of Vietnamese opinion, and whose chances of — lasting hinge solely on the loyalty of the army. To intensify the war. against the Vietcong, no substitute team remains, If the present regime, in its turn, suffers a setback, no alternative will remain but to cali on the partisans of a negotiated neutrality."