Fourth International calls attention to the great signifi- ‘cance of the diplomatic recognition won by the People's Republic of China from the French government, whatever de Gaulle's motives may — have been,
"France!s diplomatic move testifies to the growing stature of China as a result of the transformations following the victory of the socialist revolution, France's resumption of relations under present conditions constitutes a decisive breakthrough in the imperialist diplomatic blockade which has been maintained against the People's Republic of China since 1950, It will serve as the point of departure | for widening economic relations between China and the capitalist world ‘at a time when trade between China and the other workers! states has dropped dangerously low.
"Chinats diplomatic victory also helps in an indirect way to further counteract the slanders which were spread in connection with the Sino-Soviet conflict concerning - the alleged "belligerenoy! of the Chinese leadership.
"Tt also testifies to the progress ‘pegistered by the colonial revolution in the world as a whole,
"But this big diplomatic gain, which is a victory primarily at the expense of American imperialism, should not be taken as an indi-~ cation of any weakening of the Atlantic coalition or any abandonment . -by the imperialists of their plots and designs against the colonial revolution, above all in those areas where it is developing toward a socialist revolution.
"It by no means justifies a policy of so-called t peaceful coexistence! aiming at maintenance of the status quo on a world scale. For the mass movement of the workers, peasants and oppressed peoples, above all in the colonial countries, "China's great gain in the diplomatic arena will serve as a stimulus in revolutionary struggles point= ing towards the overthrow of capitalism on a world scale,
"The diplomatic victory implies no relaxation of the struggle against bourgeois governments everywhere, above all the Gaullist government, which finally decided to grant recognition to China."
CASTRO'S TRIP TO MOSCOW
The results of Fidel Castro'ts trip to the Soviet Union and his prolonged talks with Khrushchev were made public in a joint statement in Moscow January 22 the day before the Cuban leader's return to Havana,
The long-term economic agreement provides for the purchase by the
Re
te
ade
Soviet Union of an increasing amount. of sugar from Cuba each year up to 1970 at six cents a pound,
On the political plane, the joint statement expressed adherence to the two Moscow conferences of 1957 and 1960, and condemed "factional and sectarian activities in the ranks of the Communist and workerst parties and in the international Communist movement."
Castro also put his name to statements approving measures "taken py the Central Committee of the CPSU [Communist party of the Soviet Union] aimed at liquidating the differences in the ranks of the inter-. national Communist movement" and declaring that "the Cuban government holds that the success obtained by the Soviet Union in the struggle for the banning of nuclear tests, as well as the agreement reached banning the launching of missiles in outer space armed with nuclear warheads, constitutes a step toward peace and disarmament,'
As many commentators have noted, the price to be paid by the Soviet Union is considerably under the current world market quotation (10.84 cents in New York), which has led. some of them to conclude that the economic agreement was to the disadvantage of the Cubans.
It should be observed, however, that as Cuban sugar resumes its normal place in the world market, the price will inevitably go down. One of tho big advantages to: the Cubans, as Castro emphasized, is that the agreement guarantees the Cubans a’ stable price at’ an attractive quotation for a number of years, This is particularly important at the present moment as a stabilizing influence in economic construction in the Cuban workers! state.
It was actually on the political level that Castro felt compelled to pay a certain price demanded by Khrushchev who is quite evidently interested in neutralizing and if possible utilizing Castro's prestige and influence in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus, for the first time, the Cuban leader went further than he has previously in lending himself to public declarations that could be used for this purpose, This was particularly noticeable in the strictures against “factional and sec~ tarian activities" and to the approval of certain aspects of Khrushchev's foreign policy on which the Cubans had previously maintained conspicuous reserve,
Some of the statements do not square with the Cuban revolutionary experience, especially its basic conclusions as expressed in the Second Declaration of Havana,
There are, nevertheless, strong indications that Castro did not make all the concessions that Khrushchev would have liked to have, Perhaps this is the significance of Castrots remarks on returning to Havana, that he turned down an offer of an even higher price for Cuba's sugar from Khrushchev.
In addition, there is striking restraint in rolation to the Chinese. In none of the statements does the gross, open condemnation
os >
-5e
of the Chinese appear which Khrushchev has demanded up to now from those who have capitulated to his pressure. The allusions to the Chinese are veiled and up to now Castro has not indicated that he will sign the Moscow treaty banning all cxcept underground nuclear weapons tests, which became a point of sharp difference between Poking and Moscow,
Even if Castro were to eventually concede on the treaty, the pro= _ longed delay constitutes a remarkable demonstration of the wish. of the Cuban government to pursue an independent course. .
The outcome of Castro's trip shows that he was acutely conscious *. of thé relation of forces and Cuba's dependency on economic aid from the Soviet Union. He can scarcely be reproached for giving Cubats — vital economic needs top priority. As a fortress under siége from the world's mightiest. imperialist power, a bare ninety miles from her shores, Cuba is in an especially vulnerable position,
The most ardent supporters of the Cuban Revolution should therefore continue, as they have in the past, to judge the consequences of the new agreement by what actually occurs rather than by the logical implications of some of the statements. And if any blame is to be placed, a sense of proportion should be shown in fixing primary respon-~ sibility, which is not at Havana's door,
Thoro is little: likelihood that the revolutionary Pidelistag throughout Latin America will alter their present course in order to adopt the’ one advocated by such Khrushchevists as Codovilla of Argentina and Prestes of Brazil who insist on an alliance with tho national bourgeoisio at any cost,