party [pst], held here January 11-12 and attended by some 850 delegates, each representing approximately 250 members, decided to split and form the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity LPSIUP]. .
Tullio Vecchietti, leader of the Socialist left wing, made the main report and at the end of the congress was elected national secre~ tary of the new party of some 212,000 members. A national committee of 120 members was elected which in furn elected a political bureau of © nineteen, The party will have a weekly paper, This may be Mondo Nuovo, at present the weekly organ of the Socialist left wing. A decision was made to hold a national congress. Some delegates demanded that this be scheduled in the immediate future but the leaders of the new party decided to convene it “in one yearts time,"
Lelio Basso, one of the most popular leaders of the Socialist left wing, said during a speech to the delegates that he will retire from political activities for at least two years due to ill health.
With this congress the long-drawn-out struggle between Nenni'ts rightist tendency and the left wing came to a close, This fight began . after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union when the PSI started to loosen its ties with the Italian Communist Party [Pcl] to which it was linked through a united front pact,
_ Nenni began his shift toward the right by declaring the "autonomy" of the PSI with respect to the PCI. In accordance with this, he labeled his tendency “autonomist." His ultimate aim was to ‘accommodate his forces to the Social Democratic turn that. was to culminate in the. govern- — ment coalition with the Christian Democratic party [oc], the majority party of the bourgeoisie, -
Didntt Plan to Split
The decision of the Socialist left wing to abandon the PSI and form a new party was preceded by considerable turning and twisting. At the last national congress of the party there is no doubt that the left wing had no intention of | carrying ‘things so far as to end ina split. Instead of decisively pressing the fight against Nenni'ts aim of joining» the government and clearly denouncing the dangers of such a policy to the rank and file, the left wing tried to influence Nenni by seeking a bloc with the moderate wing of his tendency. —
Before the national congress, when the PSI decided to abstain in parliament in a vote of confidence at the time the first "center-left" government was formed, the left wing did not vote against the party leadership!s policy even in the central committee,
After the national congress, when the majority of the PSI decided
in a shameful capitulation to join the government, the leadership of the left wing was faced with the following alternative: It could seek. to stay in the party, while lodging a protest, or it could begin actions against the decision of the party leadership which would lead to violations of discipline and set the stage for the split. To have followed the policy of seeking to remain in the party would have led to gradual loss of support as the left-wing ranks walked out either individually or in small groups. To avoid suicide, the left wing had to follow the second course,
P6L Against It ~
This was done, but not without hesitation, A big obstacle lay in the road, The PCI, out of opportunism [see World Outlook November 8], and tactical considerations, opposed a split in the PSI, The main. | reason was that an opposite attitude would have embarrassed relations with the PSI leaders, For instance in the CGIL [General Confederation of Italian Labor; i.e., the main trade-union organization in Italy], to keep Socialist left-wing unionists in the leading posts they hold, after a split, would sharpen. things with the PSI, On the other hand, the PCI could not refuse to defend Socialist unionists who stand closer. to them than do the right-wing leaders of the PSI.
Another worry was that a new Socialist party could outflank the PCI to the left.
These views influenced the leaders of the Socialist left wing, most of whom are closely. linked to the PCI.
After long discussions and meetings with rank-and-file supporters, the Socialist left-wing leadership decided to abstain from.voting when the confidence vote for the government came up. They did this by simply leaving the chamber and making their position known through a declaration, They thought this would leave the door open for future reconciliation or at least a compromise.
Nenni Cracks the Whip
They left out of consideration one fact -= Nenni. Under various pressures (the need to get rid of an uncomfortable opposition, to meet demands from the Social Democratic party and perhaps the government as a whole), Nenni cut off the possibility for the left wing to retreat. Heavy disciplinary measures were taken against the twenty-five left-wing members of parliament and against seven of the thirteen senators who broke discipline, They were suspended from party activity for one year, This was too much for even as hesitant a leadership as that in the Socialist leit wing. The split could not be avoided.
As for the new party, it was a gain for the working class that a considerable part of the PSI refused to follow Nenni in his capitula~ tion to the bourgeois government, Nenni's base among the workers and peasants has been narrowed, However, it should be pointed out that the PSIUP most likely could have been launched with a larger membership had
~ Loe
not the indecisiveness. of the Socialist left-wing leadership given Nenni time to undertake measures to soften the blow. It should also be observed that the parliamentary strength of the new party is probably out of proportion to its actual influence in the country. -
However, the PSIUP has an important channel for making its voice heard among the masses; its strength in the trade unions is considerable (even though it can be expected that it will lose some of its posts in the CGIL). This is cause for worry not only to Nenni but even to Tog= liatti, the head of the PCI. However limited it may be, a new pole of | attraction now exists. Further differentiation now faces Italy's work~_ ing~class movement. This will at least complicate life for the bureaucratic leaderships.. Two Main Possibilities
With regard to prospects, two main possibilities, with obvious secondary variations, face the new party, It could continue developing its criticism of the "center-left" and of reformism, Eventually this would mean criticizing the policy of the Italian Communist party. from a. class point of view,
The other possibility was indicated by. one of the leaders at the congress, who held that the PSIUP should fill the vacuum left by the PSI, This would doom the PSIUP to playing the role of mere mediator or liason between the PSI and the PCI. In this case, aside from a formal split, the objective role of the PSIUP would remain substantially the same as that of the Socialist left wing during the past few years.
Elements favoring the first possibility are the antagonism: felt by the rank and file toward the PSI in the light of their experience; the existence of differences among the leaders of the new party; the possi-~_ bility of new trade- -union struggles affecting the political arena.
A big factor pointing toward the less favorable outcome is the pro- Khrushchevist orientation of most of the new party's leaders, Their outlook is quite similar to that of the Communist party leadership.._....
In estimating the immediate repercussions in Italian politics of the formation of the PSIUP, two symptomatic reactions are worth noting. The Social Democratic party hailed the split as a helpful factor in . bringing the PSI closer, The PCI displayed embarrassment,
On the. day of the split, l'Unita, the official Communist party daily paper, gave the news secondary treatment. Both the main headling and editorial were devoted to the évents in Panama.
On January 14 LtUnita finally published an editorial, It explained away its three-day Silence by saying that the PCI did not want "to interfere, in one way or the other, in the internal affairs of another working-class party"(!). After placing blame for: the split on Nenni, and. conceding that the split is a positive development, the editors wrote: "It remains a painful. fact, and must be so judged, because it also poses
not. a few far from easy problems for the working-class movement as a . whole," ‘
THE ITALIAN CP TRIES TO HOOK ONTO THE AIGERIAN REVOLUTION
By Livio Maitan
ROME -- A feeling of relief was evident in the way the press of | the Italian Communist party [PCI] handled its report of a trip which an official delegation of the organization, headed by Assistant General Secretary Luigi Longo, just made to Algeria. . The turn which the Togli-« ‘atti leadership outlined three or four months ago. is now explicit -the PCI holds that Algeria has started the process of socialist construction and warmly greets certain major accomplishments of the Revolution, self-management in the first place, This is clear in the official press release published after discussions between the Italian delegation and an Algerian delegation as well as in a whole series of conmentaries in the press wnich have appeared recently.
Of course, the leaders of the PCI, not wishing to give the impres~ sion that what is involved is a turn, recite in a completely tendentious | .way their list of honor points om the subject of the Algerian Revolution, It is true. that the attitude of the PCI for some years was. noticeably different from that of the French Communist party [PCF]. But it showld not be forgotten that it is always easier to be "revolutionary" against the bourgeoisie of other countries than at home. In addition the criticisms made of the PCF were always timorous and never expressed publicly. Again, the top layer of the PCI, including Longo, always rejected in the sharpest way the criticisms directed by the left wing at the PCF when it voted for granting "special powers" to the French imperialist government, ree oe ne
Fishy Eye on Ben Bella
Moreover, the attitude of the PCI up until very recently was quite cold and reserved with regard to the course taken by the Ben Bella leadership. This led the PCI not only to maintain a waiting posture at the time of the crisis‘of August 1962 but even to ignore almost completely in its press the historic decrees of March 1963, It is true that a dele- _ gation of the PCI, including members of the Central Committee, partici-~ _pated in the European conference at Algiers in June 1963. But at the conference itself the delegation did its best to block any declaration — specifying the socialist orientation of the Algerian Revolution and on its return to Italy it "forgot" to publish the appeal the conference made for aid to Algeria, l'Unita [the official daily newspaper of the PCI] mentioning it only in passing in a completely different context.
‘On July 13, Rinascita [official weekly publication of the PCI] published an article by Rossana Rossanda, a member of the delegation, which, while admitting some things, went so far as to stress "the element of insufficiency and the negative character of the policy of the current
president who already in the crisis that followed the cease-fire divided the leadership of the revolution" and brought about "the concentration of powers and the singling out of the person of the president." The article pointed an accusing finger at "the personal responsibility of Ahmed Ben Bella because of his intolerance with regard to tendencies, not only rightist but also leftist as expressed by his own comrades themselves whom he has successively destroyed since Tlemcen up to now," -
Signal for the Somersault
In reality, the PCI changed its attitude the instant the USSR ~ reached an economic agreement with Algeria and Khrushchev himself indi-~ cated a turn in this field, It is evident, precisely as in. Cuba, that — the bureaucracy has little hope of capturing or controlling the leader= ship.of the revolution by means of the skeleton-like, discredited — national Communist parties. That is why they seek to exploit economic — aid -- a necessary vital contribution emanating not from the bureaucracy as such but from the workers states as a whole ~-- in order to exercise indirect influence to an increasing degree. Some of the big Communist _ parties can help in this and in the concrete case it is clear that the PCI is in an excellent position,
‘It should be noted in addition that the Togliatti leadership is _ utilizing the turn also to take a weapon away from its critics of the: left both within and outside the party, showing that it is ready to recognize conquests of the revolution anywhere, while forgetting rather conspicuously that it is one thing to help a revolutionary struggle in the decisive hours and something else again to run to the help of a victory in order to exploit it.
Finally, it is piquant that the enthusiastic commentaries on the Algerian Revolution, including self-management, emanate in the first place from Luigi Longo, a Stalinist of many chevrons, who -- until the turn of 1955, of course -- covered Yugoslavia and its workers councils with mud, who has sung praises to the plurality of parties in Ulbrichtts "democracy," and who was one of the main partisans of the theses in the 1960 Moscow Declaration that ignored the socialist character of the Cuban Revolution and whose formulas could not but block any understand= ing of- the Algerian revolutionary developments. ~Shange Greeted by Left Wing
It goes without saying that the Italian Communist left greets the fact that the PCI is ready to organize practical aid for Algeria. In this the Algerian leaders are completely correct in extending a fraternal welcome to the delegations of the workers movement from all countries fo this. adl orientations, It is in the interests of the Revolution to
But the aims of certain turns should not be forgotten nor should it be overlooked that Longo & Co. -are.also. seeking a certain surety from “the Algerian Revolution for: their own politics, That is why they wanted to include in the final press release of the meetings passages like
these: "The activists of the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale] have expressed to their Italian brothers all their sympathy and esteem not only for the decisive role played by the PCI during the resistance and the armed struggle against fascism, but for the contribution of the PCI to the big labor and democratic struggles of the Italian people from 1945 up to now, These struggles have permitted the democratic conquests to be widened and consolidated, as well as the standard of living of the workers and the middle classes to be improved against the exploitation of the monopolies, These conquests today permit us to envisage the possibility of a thrust toward socialism in Italy on the same basis of wide popular unity."
‘This is an estimate which the Italian Communist left disputes and which will be exploited by Togliatti against that revolutionary orientation which alone can help the