RESPONDS. TO" Moscow's OVERTURES
Chou En-laits trip to Moscow, “the first visit there bys a ma jor Chinese Communist figure in three years, is Peking's response to the olive branch held out by the Kremlin after the ouster of Khrushchev. Although Chou En-lai went to Moscow formally _to represent the Chinese Communist party at the November 7 celebration of the Russian Revolution, the evident real reason is to open negotiations with the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Mikoyan group now at the head. of the Sovict | bureaucracy.
The last time Chou En~lai was: in Moscow, he attended the Twenty~second Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union where the Sino-Soviet conflict broke into the open, Khrushchev publicly attacking the Albanians and Chou En-lai publicly stating that he disagreed with such public. attacks. ..
One of the aims of the leaders -of. the Communist. parties now assembled in Moscow.will be to end the public dispute. The Soviet press has already stopped the worst slanders, no longer calling Mao Tse-tung a "disciple of Genghis Khan'and Hitler." The Chinese press has just as suddenly stopped referring to a wrevisionist clique which is restoring capitaliam in the Soviet Union."
Putting an end to the vituperative public dispute would facilitate preparation of an international conference of Communist parties in which the Chinese would participate but with the concession that all decisions must be unanimous.
Easing of Sino-Soviet tension would make possible immediate resumption of normal state relations between the two countries despite the deep differences over policies and ideology now dividing the two leaderships. A public call to resume friendly relations on the state level has been made by the Polish.CP leader Gomulka, who, since the death.of Togliatti, might be called the "elder statesman" of the international Communist movement and certainly the government chief enjoying greatest personal prestige outside the Chinese CP leaders... He will no doubt do his utmost to get quick results in this area during Chou En-lai's stay in Moscow.
Various significant statements have also been made by Khrushchev's sudden heirs. In the October 26 Izvestia, official. journal of the Soviet. government, an article states that "the Communist party of the Soviet Union fights with all its energy for the consolidation
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of the Communist ranks on the basis of the principles of proletarian internationalism and the historical documents which. have been collectively elaborated by the fraternal. parties -- the declarations of 1957 and 1960." Such a statement could be signed by the Chinese, as they have often declared: that: these documents should conatitute the basis for ' ‘unity of the world Communist movement,
In his speech commemorating the forty-seventh anniversary of the October Revolution, Brezhnev, the new first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, reiterated the need to take "urgent concrete steps" to. consolidate the unity of the world Communist movement. This has. been taken to mean that the Soviet leaders intend to go ahead with the plans for a world ‘conference of Communist parties. However, the context in which the preparatory meeting for the conference would be held, has drastically altered. The original author has been removed from the political. scene, ;
The changed context was stressed by the East German CP leader ‘Ulbricht, The November 4 issue of Neues Deutschland, the party paper, quotes him as saying: “We are convinced that the meeting of the -.. editorial commission [preparatory meeting of twenty-six parties]. is” in the interest of preparing the great gathering of representatives of Communist and workers parties. The editorial commission could, however, evidently fulfill a fruitful job only if previously. .an atmosphere. of mutual understanding, an atmosphere of sober. approach to problems, has been created,'
Ulbricht, who is undoubtedly well aware of opinion. ‘in ‘top. a Kremlin circles, thus seems to confirm the interpretation that. while: preparations will continue on the preparatory conference, the new ; Soviet leaders will at all cost avoid getting entangled in a dog | fight, working instead for a compromise. Khrushchev's incapacity. , to veer toward at least a formal compromise was undoubtedly one of the main reasons for his downfall. =
It tis significant in ‘this respect that various -Communist. |; . party leaders -- from both the former pro-Khrushchev.camp and the pro-Chinese -- have now stated that Khrushchev's removal was. a "good thing" in paving the way for re-establishment of some kind of public "unity" in the world Communist movement.
“At a press conference, Paul De ‘Groot, “general secretary of the Dutch CP, said: "TIT believe that Khrushchev! s removal from office will prove helpful ‘to ending the differences in views [be~ tween the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China]."
De N. ‘Aidit, chairman of the Indonesian cP, who in contrast to. Paul De. Groot used to follow the Moscow line in servile fashion until internal party pressures forced him to line up with Peking, was quoted in the October 17 issue of Harian Rakjat, the Indonesian CP paper, as saying: "N.S.Khrushchev's resignation from office as first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of the Soviet Union and chairman
of the council of ministers was a good thing for the Communist party -of the Soviet Union and for the international Communist movement, and could not be interpreted in any other way." 7
Outside of the cheers of the Albanians, these two statements are the most outspoken to date in the world Communist movement. They indicate the thinking going on among CP leaders about the possibility that has opened of putting a stop to the Soviet and Chinese leaders engaging in a public slanging match,
Besides sending Chou En-lai to Moscow, the Chinese leaders sent an appeal to Moscow to re-establish unity in face of the’ ‘common imperialist foe. This appeal will find wide echo among the Communist ranks , especially after the disgraceful way in which the rift between the workers’ states permitted U.S. imperialism to get away with an” — open act of aggression against the People's Republic of North Vietnam last summer.
Nevertheless, . through - an editorial in the November 6 People's Dail Peking has announced that it retains all the basic political positions: ‘developed during the Sino-Soviet dispute. , a
In the samé way, Brezhnev, in his speech November 7, held to the basic points in Soviet policy which have been under attack from the Chinese. a
Thus the two sides, as they move toward negotiations, state publicly that neither will change anything in principle. It remains to be seen what will be whittled down and who will give way in private. But it would at least seem possible that the two sides could agree to stop making a public spectacle of themselves and to reestablish friendly relations on the state level.
It would seem that Khrushchev's successors, who are greatly concerned about winning popularity with the Soviet people, will be little inclined to relinquish the basic "de-Stalinization" line of the Twentieth and Twenty-second congresses, Brezhnev indicated this rather forcefully in his November 7 speech, —
It is to be noted that: the éditorial in the People's Daily, which restates the Chinese case in the ideological conflict, while hailing "the memory of Stalin," said nothing about the line of the Twentieth Congress in the Soviet Union. It concentrates instead on ~ the incorrectness of “peaceful coexistence" as the basic line for — the world Communist movement. (The Chinese make a distinction between "peaceful coexistence" in defining the attitude of workers states toward bourgeois states, and "peaceful coexistence" as a . strategic line for Communist parties and the toiling masses, where: it signifies class collaboration. The distinction is fundamentally correct. ) Also stressed in the editorial is the issue of an alleged “peaceful road to, socialism, "
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In the same way a long official statement by the Japanese (pro-Chinese)} Communist party enumerates the reasons for opposing "Khrushchevite revisionism" but says nothing about Stalin or the Twentieth congress. (In the October 17 Akahata. )
The Albanians, on the contrary, continue to demand the complete elimination "of the revisionist and capitulationist line worked out by the Twentieth and Twenty-second congresses of the CPSU." (Speech made by Spiro Koleka, reported in the November 3 Hsinhua News Agency.)
Chou En-laits presence in Moscow, combined with the absence of the Albanians -- the only Communist party not to be invited -may indicate that the Chinese leaders find it advisable to move away from the "extremist" pro<Stalinist position of the Albanian bureaucrats in opening negotiations with Khrushchev's heirs.
Another significant move by the Chinese has been the publication in their press of all the statements by CP leaders in the world on Khrushchev's ouster == those favorable to him as well as those openly hostile. Italian CP General Secretary Luigi Longo's statement as well as Alicata's editorial in the Italian CP's daily paper L'Unita were quoted in full, although they contain references both to Khrushchev's "positive contributions" and to the "defects in democracy" in the Soviet Union. This contrasts with the attitude of the Soviet press which more than three weeks after Khrushchev's "resignation," has still not published a-single line on the reaction in the world Communist movement or given the Soviet workers and peas~ ants a rational explanation of the turnover in regime.
Among the statements printed in the Chinese press, Gomulka's [see World Outlook November 6] was given top billings. Besides those already mentioned, statements by the British CP were published. These noted "the big’ positive part played by Comrade Khrushchev in initiating and developing the policies of the 20th Congress of the USSR" and stated that "the explanation of the changes so far given does not remove the natural concern felt by Communists abroad about this developrient. " ~ > The article by British GP Secretary. John Gollan in the London Daily Worker of October 24 was printed. Others included the resolution’ of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP and the state-~ ment by.the presidium of the Czechoslovak Central Committee (which, while approving the Kremlin's decision, states that "our party and our. -people have appreciated Comrade Khrushchev's activities in implementing the general line of the CPSU in the struggle for the application of the policy of peaceful coexistence and in exposing the wrong methods .used in the period of the personality cult").
A speech by Janos Kadar, first secretary of the Hungarian CP, was ‘published as was the statement of Hermansson, chairman of the Swedish CP. ("It is difficult for us to accept that a person is one
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day the country's leading politician and the next day has disappeared, An open discussion would. help form better. understanding." ) me
Also statements and answers at a press conference by leaders of the Japanese CP, thé French CP's communiqué on Khrushchev's removal, the Moroccan Communi st leader. Ali Yata's statement. ("We understand the anxiety which has arisen in numerous circles, But we do not. share this feeling. . ..We remain. . .:convinced that the most tenacious efforts will be made for overcoming divergences splitting. the international Communist movement. ..
Also an article by the general secretary of the New Zealand Cp,. the (Bast German) SED Political Bureau!s statement; the statement of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian CP; the resolution. of the Hungarian CP's Central: Committee; the speech made in Warsaw . by Tsedenbal, first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Outer Mongolia, etc., etc.
THE. FRENCH oP DELUGAT ION