SHOCK OVER. KHRUSHCHEV'S DOWNFALL
BY Ernest. Germain
While the mystery over the. causes of Khrushchev' s downfall is: slowly unraveled, the new masters in the Kremlin, far from reversing ‘'de-Stalinization," are frantically seeking to curry favor with all important layers of Soviet society. They have granted increased rights to factory managers, solidarized with the protests of the artists over Khrushchev's manhandling of the abstractionists, distributed the first white flour in a year to Moscow's housewives, and.promised' a sensational twenty-five per cent slash in the price ‘of. meat and butter. Meanwhile the. uproar set off in the world Com= “manist movement by the olrounstances around the ouster of Khrushchev -~is* still gathering momentum, =.
The monolithism of the various Communist parties was broken by the sudden destruction of the Stalin cult in 1956. The. deve lopment:of: the:Sino-Soviet conflict further shattered it. The blindallegiance: tovall’ turns and twists of Kremlin policy, so long characteristic: of «Communist parties in the capitalist countries, was dealt .a new! powerful blow as Nikita S, Khrushchev, first: secretary of the -Communist' party of the Soviet Union and premier of the government, went down in a secret session of the CPSU's Central Committee.
~The blow. came as a complete surprise. Of course, there were many indications during the past year that Khrushchev!s position had become weakened, due in particular to the series of obvious failures of his policies. domestically (agriculture!) and abroad (relations with China-and.the cohesiveness of the world Communist movement), Nevertheless no Communist party in the world had been prepared or forewarned. .And if the surprise over the October 14 action was bad, the complete: lack of serious explanation was still worse. The ate tempt: to cover up: the real.cause <- if only for twenty-four hours -eaught’ the leaders of the various Communist parties in one of their most vulnerable spots; namely, the continual accusation leveled. against them by nearly all layers of public opinion in their own countries that they, simply play the sedulous ape and blindly raise their hands to any “new turn" ordered by the Kremlin.
And how were they to explain things to their own members? The ‘ranks had found it hard enough to swallow a number of events in the: past. eight years --. the shocking revelations of the Twentieth: Corigress, the brutal suppression of the Hungarian political revolu~ tion;° the conflict with China, the Kremlin's attitude during the. crisis: in the Caribbean in 1962, the Kremlin's attitude. toward the... Sino-Indian hostilities, the sudden revelation of the, crisis: in’ s:. agriculture in the Soviet Union, etc., etc. How could they" now:be.: asked to take something that plays havoc with the official party .line’on-a most important question? How explain:-that the theory actording. to which development of the "personality..cult" was:a unique phenoménon, due to Stalin himself, which could never be repeated,
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turned out to be wrong? Khrushchev himself began to reintroduce it!
The leaders of the Communist parties felt compelled to put up at least a show of questioning Khrushchev's dismissal. For the first time. since: Stalin converted the world Communist movement into a subservient instrument of the Soviet bureaucracy, Communist parties openly. refused to accept an official statement of policy issued by the CPSU and. publicly demanded at léast supplementary explana-. tions from the Kremlin, in some instances expressing doubts about | the correctness of its policy. soo The most striking reaction, the easiest to understand, came from. the Communist party of Italy. Long discussion over the problem of “de-Stalinization" and Togliatti's so-called "testament" paved the way for the party to publicly question the "degree of socialist demo~cracy" inside the Soviet Union.
Alicata, . editor of the daily Unita, official organ of the. party, wrote: -"Our position is very clear and can be summarized as: follows:.: We-hold open reservations, are even in disagreement, :on: the methods employed in replacing Comrade Khrushchev. We recall. the : fact that it was’ not today that we posed to the Communist: and‘labor. movement a series of problems concerning first of all the necessity of overcoming ‘the obvious delay in continuing the process of :renova= tion and democratization initiated by the Twentieth Congress. Fresh evidenee on this is provided byt ‘he way ‘the latest crisis in the USSR « developed. wo. coast
The Italian CP at once. ‘sent a “delegation to Moscow ‘to , gather additional information on Khrushchev's ‘ouster. The delegation was headed by a member of the Secretariat, Berlinguer. In Moscow it met delegations of various West:.European Communist parties which were. there for the same purpose and which had likewise publicly questioned the circumstances of the leader's removal. Among them were repre~ — sented the Austrians, the Dutch, the Swedish and even the Luxemburg= tans. eS :
“The: French Communist party hesitated several days, then fins: ally. joined those who questioned the "démocratic" nature of Khrush~- -
chev's Gismissal, also sending a delegation to Moscow.
“The Danish, Norwegian, Swiss and Belgian parties joined in the chorus. Land og Folk, the organ of the Denish Communist party, published a series of Tetters from readers scandalized over Khrushchev's ouster, Party Secretary Noerlund wrote: "What was missing lin the official communiqué] was a word of gratitude to the: leader» who is leaving, a word which, in this instance, would have: Beer - 12 natural. " BR nas
“One of. the leaders of the Belgian Communist party, Jean - Blume, wrote: “in. the ‘official daily Le Drapeau Rouge that the conclusion to be drawn fromthe latest: events in the Soviet Union is that<the..: ~
Belgian CP can react differently from the Soviet CP, not only with respect to events in Belgium, but. with respect to events in the Soviet Union.
The Central Committee of the Swiss Parti du Travail [the cP] adopted a resolution, stating among other things:
"The departure of Comrade Khrushchev and his replacement have taken place under conditions which, ten days after the event, are still insufficiently explained. . . One can only regret at the same time the methods used for arriving at a change, even if it was deemed necessary; the sudden aspect of the change, and the absence of clar-— ity on the motives that dictated the change."
The British CP also displayed uneasiness over the circumstances of Khrushchev's. ouster, lagging somewhat compared to other West European Communist parties. The London Daily Worker began printing letters criticizing the ouster, and party leader John Gollan also indicated unhappiness in an article published in the October 24 issue,
As for the Norwegian Communist party, it went so far as to ask whether or not freedom of discussion actually exists in the Soviet Union, [See World Outlook October 23.]
In the capitalist: countries outside Western Europe, the greatest shock was registered by the pro-Khrushchev Indian Communist party. S.A.Dange raised rather strong questions and'also took off for Moscow to get in on the ground floor of the supplementary explanations.
In the workers states outside the Soviet Union, leaders of the Communist parties moved more cautiously, Unrest in their parties © could easily flare into a political crisis for the whole country. = But they clearly implied their criticism by lavishly praising the’ ~ : prostrate first secretary in face of an absolute blackout in the Soviet press over anything favorable. (Khrushchev's portraits have come down from the walls, and his books and pamphlets have vanished — from the book shops.) In general, CP leaders in other workers states expressed "approval" of what the Kremlin did, but at the same time praised Khrushchev, thereby combining submission and ‘rebellion in about the same proportion as in other fields today.
The tone was set by Kadar, Khrushchev's stooge when the Hungarian uprising was suppressed, who literally owes his position to the former first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. ‘The Central Committee of the Hungarian CP met on October 23 (which happened to be- ‘the. eighth anniversary of the 1956 revolution!) and . adopted a resolution drawing attention to the fact that it was Khrushchev'!s merit to have initiated the denunciation of the personality cult and to have elaborated the "historical line ‘of the Twentieth and Twenty-second congresses,"
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This is followed by the statement that "basing itself on the reports received, Comrade Khrushchev. appears to have been unable to. continue the practical work entailed by his post. It is regrettable that he committed errors in his methods of leadership and that these errors became more extensive because of his age and his impaired health."
After the Hungarian CP leaders, the Polish leaders followed suit, but not until they had met a delegation of the new Kremlin bosses headed by Brezhnev and Kosygin at the Polish-Soviet border. On October 29 Polish party leader Gomulka gave the Soviet leaders a clean bill of health for their "respect.for the Leninist norms" in dismissing Khrushchev. Prior to that, the Polish press, too, had praised Khrushchev.
The East German CP organ Neues Deutschland likewise stressed Khrushchev's great merits and the “wise decision of. the CPSU,.not to deviate from the Leninist course of the. Twentieth, Twenty-first and ‘Twenty-second party congresses,"
The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czech Communist party said that “our party and our people have.appreciated the activity of Comrade Khrushchev,. linked with the general. line. of. the Soviet Communist party in. the atruggle. for realizing the policy of peaceful coexistence, as well as with the denunciation of the false methods of the epoch, of. the. Personally. cult. cares
Significantly. the Soviet. press, has. up ‘to. now ‘failed to report all: these declarations in praise of Khrushchev appearing in the press of other workers states, including Cuba. Only the Rumanian press. has published them in. full, This.is only an apparent paradox... (As against. all.the other CP leaders in Eastern Europe, the Rumanian. party leaders openly opposed Khrushchev while he was in power.) . The Rumanian CP. leaders are merely taking the dismissal of Khrushchev as a new occasion for asserting their independence from the Kremlin, established as one of the by-products of the Sino-Soviet conflict.
As for the Chinese and pro-Chinese press, the reactions have been cautious. However, it is noticeable that upon the ouster of Khrushchev, they at once stopped public attacks on Soviet policy and the leadership of the CPSU. As a matter of fact, the official message of congratulations sent to Brezhnev and Kosygin on October 15, signed by the four principal Chinese CP leaders, Mao Tse-tung, Liu’ Chao-shi, Chu-teh and Chou En-lai, contains the following significant words:. "It is our sincere wish that the fraternal Soviet people, under the leadership of the CP of the Soviet. Union and the Soviet overnment, will achieve new successes in their constructive work in all fields and in the struggle for. the defense of world peace.” {Emphasis added.] This is a clear. intimation ‘to. Moscow that Peking is willing to resume an attempt to at least re-establish normal relations on the state level,
Significantly, too, the Polish leaders, who are said to favor the Italian CP thesis of soft-pedaling the Sino-Soviet dispute and avoiding any public excommunication of the Chinese CP, expressed the same wish in the common Polish-Mongolian statement issued when Tsedenbal visited Warsaw October 31:
"The two parties will undertake efforts to surmount, in a spirit of good relations between parties .the differences which have appeared in the international working-class movement. They consider that the ideological differences existing in the ranks of the Communist movement should not be carried to the level of relations between states, Emphasis added,
This implies clear condemnation of such ruthless acts commit-. ted by Khrushchev as the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and Soviet help from China, and the granting of military aid to the Indian bourgeoisie against the Chinese workers state, acts which were condemned by the world Trotskyist movement when they occurred. It is probable that the whole world Communist movement will now adopt the same position in an effort to prevent any further deterioration of the Sino- Soviet conflict and any further disintegration in the so-called "socialist" camp.
It should be noted, in passing, that the Stalinist leaders of the Albanian CP constitute. an exception to the general tendency. While hailing Khrushchev.'s downfall, they have at the same time expressed their determination to pursue the "struggle against revisionism" until "all the revisionists are completely exterminated."
The reasons for this violent tone, although characteristic of. the Albanians, is not clear, It has been speculated that they may again be acting for the Chinese, This, however, is at least a premature deduction. More likely they are alarmed over the tentative gestures toward rapprochement between the two sides. The "alliance" with the Albanians may yet prove awkward and troublesome for Peking.