THE
DOWNFALL OF KHRUSHCHEV |
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A New Stage | Opens _in the Crisis of the Soviet Bureaucracy
“Tone: following is the text of. a: declaration issued October 19° by the United Secretariat of the Fourth. Iriternational, the world” party of socialist révolution founded by Leon Trotsky in. 1938. ]
The sudden removal of. Khrushchev as head of. the Communist party ‘of. the Soviet: Union [CPSU] and head of the Soviet government offers fresh and striking proof of the deep. contradiction between. the progressive character of the economic structure of the Soviet |
The launohing of the space shi'p Voskhod. was the most tangible. evidence of the immense advances achieved by Soviet science and in- | dustry. Three days later came the downfall -of:..Khrushchev, offering . a completely opposite spectacle of political weakness and confusion.
The new Kremlin chiefs at once hastened to assure the world that the sudden change-over did not signify any alteration at all _ of a major character in either domestic or foreign policy. They propose to follow substantially the same course as Khrushchev.
Why: then did: the bureaucracy dump Khrushchev?
‘If the top bureaucrats display: little. concern over Khrushchev' s general line; it is because they, like him and Stalin before them, are utter empiricists. They became worried over what they consider ~. to be Khrushchev's excesses and blunders in applying the line.
“ithe truth is that Khrushchev ended. up in blind alleys in —— various. fields, increasing tensions and-sharpening contradictions, ~~~ Seeking a way out, the bureaucracy decided to make a start by offering him up as a scapegoat.
In the field of domestic. economic policy, Khrushchev was associated with the grandiose promises about raising the standard of living: of the Soviet masses. For nine years, things did improve for Soviet icansumers..-- Khrushchev's paopulerity during this period was... .based on this, But the situation changed radically when, due to-the stagnation of agricultural production for five years, he was obliged to iricrease the price of meat and butter and to import large quantities of grain from the capitalist countries, -The long queues in front of bakeries last winter dealt a mortal blow to his popularity. The ~ good harvest this year. could not save the situation. |
Khrushchev's virgin lands" project likewise ended in failure.
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pravda's sudden allusion to “harebrained schemes" that disregard the advice of scientific specialists refers to the “virgin lands" project which was undertaken against the advice of the Academy of Sciences.
The bankruptcy of Khrushchev's agricultural policy -- which the Fourth International has pointed to since 1955 as decisive for Khrushchev's leadership of the CPSU -- is all the more serious in view of the fact that the belated turn toward intensive agriculture cannot give immediate large-scale results; and the creation of a major chemical industry, required as a.concomitant, demands time.
“The plans for establishing a chemical industry, which were launched with great publicity, have been considerably slowed down due to a general lowering of the rate of industrial growth in the USSR. It was impossible at one and the same time to maintain a rapid improvement in the standard of living for the masses, to keep. up with the imperialist powers in an armaments race, grant increasing aid to the colonial bourgeoisie, undertake feverish construction of homes, and increase the volume of investment on the colossal scale needed to..maintain a constant high rate of industrial expansion.
It must also be emphasized that the economic reforms introduced by Khrushchev, which succeeded in overcoming the difficulties created by the hyper centralization and grossly oversize scale of’ approach in Stalin's time, began to decline in effectiveness, The present economic discussion in the USSR is symptomatic of this new economic impasse, a
Khrushchev was not ready to take the "big leap forward" that would have been possible with the introduction of democratic planning and workers self-management,
The bureaucracy sacrificed Khrushchev, holding him responsible for the agricultural and industrial difficulties, hoping in this way to gain time for experimenting with new solutions. However, possible reforms can prove only. of limited efficacy; what is needed is a radical transformation of the whole system of management.
dn the field of foreign policy, Khrushchev became the scapegoat for a series of blunders that gravely lowered Soviet prestige. These included the miscalculation involved in putting rockets in Cuba, the unkept promise of an imminent solution of the problem of West Berlin; the vote in the UN to send the "blue helmets" to the Congo where the operation onded in the murder of Lumumba, It was above all the way in which he handled the Chinese question that aroused the most resentment and opposition.
Was it necessary to carry the dispute between the CPSU and the Chinese Communist party onto the government level? To abruptly halt Soviet aid to China? To grant military aid to Nehru in a war involving the People's Republic of China? To go back on the agreement to help China in setting up a nuclear industry? Such questions
undoubtedly worried a growing numbér of Soviet leaders. Above.all, was it wise to schedule the preconference-of twenty-six Communist parties for December 15, 1964, without assurances in advance that a big majority of these parties would accept the invitation and support the Soviet theses?
In truth, the manner in which Khrushchev handled the Sino- Soviet conflict added up to a disastrous balance in the eyes of the Soviet bureaucracy. The unity of the Communist international move-— ment was destroyed, the authority of the Soviet party brought toa new low everywhere. Its directives were no longer followed even among parties backing the Kremlin against Peking. The conflict set up enormous centrifugal forces, not only among parties, as shown in Italy, but among governments, as shown in Rumania. Should Eastern Germany tomorrow protest against the projected rapprochement with Bonn and take the road being followed by Rumania, Kremlin control over more than half of the buffer countries would be in a state of disintegration. *
‘Again, by sacrificing Khrushchev, the Soviet bureaucracy sought to halt the steady deterioration in its relations with Peking. The main obstacle to resumption of the dialogue having been eliminated, Peking can in turn make its own concesstons without losing face.
If the December preconference now takes place, its meaning may be completely altered. The unbridled polemics, the irresponsible acts that have characterized both sides may cease. If reconciliation is not reached, the conflict is at least taken out of the gutter and returned to the green baize tables of the diplomats and “theoreticians.”
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Khrushchev'!s years in office will become known as the period of "de-Stalinization." Under national and international conditions completely different from those that made it possible for the Soviet bureaucracy to usurp power in the Soviet Union and for Stalin to convert this power into a personal autocracy wielded with increasing arbitrariness, the Soviet masses are no longer willing to endure a ruthless police regime, the complete subordination of their standard of living to spectacular-sounding projects that involve enormous waste. To avoid an impending explosion such as occurred in Hastern Germany in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and to save their special privileges and their grip on power, the leaders of the Soviet bureaucracy deliberately sacrificed the Stalin cult and liberalized their regime, In doing so, they also eliminated some of the most arbitrary and obnoxious methods of leadership and administration that Stalin introduced into Soviet economy, government, science and culture and which increasingly blocked progress. , ,
Khrushchev, often pictured as the most typical representative of this "de-Stalinization, " was neither its principal initiator nor its most resolute protagonist. ‘Many times, in various fields, younger
and more dynamic forces sought to press "de-Stalinization" further. - The ‘logic of. this: would have been the rehabilitation of Leon Trotsky and his generation of Bolsheviks. The advocates of further "dewStalinization" were called to order or even silenced.
"De-Stalinization" was not Khrushchev's fundamental orienta- — tion nor his personal policy. It was a course of half measures, of doled-out concessions, approved by the immense majority of the bureaucracy which gained from it a higher degree of personal security as'” well as a popular response from the masses, The objective factors that determined this course will-coritinue to operate after Khrushchev's downfall,
The years of progressive improvement in their standard of. ©. living lessened the fear that paralyzed wide sectors in Stalin's. time, The Soviet masses, their self-confidence on the rise because of the concessions they won, will never tolerate a return to the regime of misery and terror. Any attempt to return to the methods . of Stalin would be met with a violent popular reaction.
It is highly significant that the new leaders hastened to de~ clare, in the first issue of Pravda after Khrushchev's downfall, that the tine of the Twentieth and Twenty-second congresses of the CPSU: will be continued, In this way they promised the masses that what- — ever else may occur: and whatever the appearances in secondary fields, the esséntial gains of "deé=Stalinization" will be maintained. There will be no going back to an all-powerful police, to ferocious repressive laws in the plants, to the low standard of living of Stalin's time. The effort to raise the standard of living of the masses will be kept up. These concessions to the masses will in the long run only reinforce their self-confidence and further undermine the rule of the bureaucracy.
Just as objective conditions permit no fundamental retrogression in "de-Stalinization," so they permit no fundamental alteration — in the field of foreign policy. The Soviet bureaucracy has never headed toward world war -- the opposite contention is simply one of the lying themes of imperialist propaganda. On the other hand it has never deliberately fostered socialist revolution, the only road to a world of enduring peace, Both courses, in quite different ways, involve destruction of bureaucratic rule. What the men who ousted: Khrushchev {will do is follow his policy of so-called “peaceful Om existence. This policy did not originate with Khrushchev -=" parentage aaa to Stalin.’ Khrushchev's policy of ‘economic compétition
with the United States" was only the application under new conditions of ‘Stalin's old thesis about “building socialism in one country."
The new leaders of the bureaucracy may use stronger language than has been Khrushchev's habit.for the past two years, if only to: facilitate resumption of conversations with the Chinese and to camouflage their own uncertainty and lack of assurance until their positions have been consolidated. It is possible that they will .
modify some ‘of the. more scandalous ways in which Khrushchev has lately collaborated with American imperialism, his course, for instance, of joining with the Pentagon in arming the Indian bourgeoiste (against the Indian masses as well as the People's Republic ‘of China) and giving American imperialism a free hand in the Gulf of Tonkin and in the Congo.: Without doubt any spectacular softening of relations between. Moscow and: Bonn has now been ruled out, a perspective that had caused uneasiness in Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, particularly since the West German bourgeoisie refuse to recognize the new borders of Germany and continue to seek nuclear arms within the framework of a NATO multilateral nuclear force,
As under Khrushchev and Stalin, the Soviet bureaucracy will continue to seek an over-all arrangement with Washington based essentially on joint defense of the status quo. It will continue to oppose the dissemination of nuclear arms, faithfully doing its best to keep = them from other workers states, no matter what Washington does in: : giving countries like Canada stockpiles of nuclear weapons, It will propose slowing down the arms race and. advocate disarmament. It. will continue to seek economic collaboration with the colonial bourgeoisie as an alternative to fostering socialist revolutions in the colonial. area which could radically alter the relationship of forces to the disadvantage of bureaucratic rule in the USSR however advantageous it might. turn out forthe workers states as a whole. It will continue. to do what it can to. confine working-class struggles inthe imperialist countries ‘within the limits of capitalist rules and regulations, postponing any bids for power there until after per capita production in the USA has fallen behind that of the USSR.
Under these conditions, ‘any sudden liquidation of the Sino- Soviet: conflict through both states and both parties coming to com= plete agreement on a common line is as improbable as a reversal of "de-Stalinization" and the policy of “peaceful coexistence." The Sino-Soviet dispute is not the product of any "blunders" by Khrushchev. It expresses the deep differences in interests of two 'bureaueracies differently situated with regard to imperialism, the international revolution and the masses of their own countries.
The success of the first Chinese nuclear test has profoundly affected the international situation of the People's Republic of China. It could accelerate its admission to the United Nations, a possibility already improved by the recognition of China among many African countries following the recognition granted by France. But. Johnson will not withdraw the Seventh Fleet from the Far East, giveup Taiwan or approve the dissolution of SEATO. ' So long as Washing-. ton maintains its pressure, China faces the possibility of imperialist aggression and suffers a partial economic blockade. This situation has long been sufficient to compel Peking to pursue a course that is quite aifferent from Moscowts.
a By continuing to follow the main lines of policy advanced. by Stalin and developed by Khrushchev, the new Kremlin chiefs will find
themselves caught in the same profound difficulties that led to political disaster for their predecessor,
Tift.
The Soviet bureaucracy dumped Khrushchev in hope -of finding a temporary solution to the contradictions it faces. It will perhaps have gained time, provided that the new team is accepted by the. great majority of the apparatus and the political crisis does not undergo a new sensational turn. But the bureaucracy is incapable of overcoming the contradictions resulting from the very nature of __ its rule. Far from being able to attenuate the contradictions and difficulties, Khrushchev's successors are more likely to exacerbate them,
. To prevent things from becoming highly explosive in the economic field, the plan for agricultural investments must be put through in double-quick order. But Kosygin the technocrat, who is known to have got into a dispute with Khrushchev over the alloca-.. tion of investment funds among the different sectors, will certainly not display greater readiness than Khrushchev to sacrifice heavy industry. The very fact that Kosygin was chosen to share top rank with Brezhnev is evidence of the weight of his sector in the bureaucratic caste. On the other hand, a general slowing down of..the rate of industrial growth would certainly not augur well for the.chemical industry plans and for a qualitative improvement in agriculture. In order to get out of the impasse something has to give -- either the aspirations of the masses, the predilections of the technocratic sector of the bureaucracy, the demands of the managers of plants and trusts, the appetites of the Kolkhozian peasants, or the interests of several layers at once.
Things are not much better in the field of international politics. The new masters in the Kremlin are anxious to demonstrate | their attachment to the cause of "peaceful coexistence" by some spectacular gesture. But how is it possible to win improved relations with Peking and at the same time reassure Washington when the. two aims require moves of diametrically opposite nature?
The same holds true in the international Communist movement. Of course, some improvement in relations with Peking could slow down the Chinese in their drive to set up a new international pro-Chinese Communist movement in competition with Moscow's "official" movement. But how is it possible to avoid seeing that the sudden downfall of Khrushchev has increased the uneasiness, the worry and the confusion affecting all the Communist parties? How. is it possible to avoid seeing that this ouster and the conditions under which it took place, will inevitably strengthen the already skeptical attitude of foreign Communist militants toward Soviet documents and theses, their tendency to stop lining up mechanically with every turn taken by the © Kremlin? Precisely those who ran into the biggest difficulties in explaining "de-Stalinization" and establishing the prestige of the
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unknown Khrushchev may feel the worst foreboding at the prospect of putting a new god on the pedestal, after the transition of “eollective leadership" once again ends in the selection of a new "first secretary" to wear the mantle of power.
Contrary to the intentions of the top bureaucrats, and even the immediate consequences which can prove to be deceptively encouraging to them, the elimination of Khrushchev, instead of arresting the slow disintegration of the Kremlin's sway over the inter~ national Communist movement, can end up by accelerating it. The bureaucracy reproached Khrushchev with having promoted the tendency toward "polycentrism" by his acts. The act of suddenly discarding him can only encourage the growth of this same "polycentrism"’ in the. international Communist movement. Without a single leader of high caliber, with only bureaucrats screened and doubly screened by Stalin in the days of the purges and the liquidation of every single figure who displayed the slightest capacity for independent thought, the bureaucracy will prove less capable than ever of re-establishing its prestige after this new blow to monolithism.,. The Soviet bureaucrats will have to accustom themselves to seeing their moves discussed more and more, their switches subjected to increasingly hard eriticlam in the international’ Communist movement, :
Those parties that have displayed tendencies to fallow an indépendént course, whether to the right as-in Italy or to the left as in Venezuela, will now be all the more inclined to give free rein to this inclination. And those parties that managed up to now to present themselves as models in submissiveness, as in France, may suddenly display a quite new look, “Polycentrism" will tend increasingly to reveal that it has a logic. of its own.
The same logic applies to the workers states. For them, too, the downfall of Khrushchev is both an outcome of a crisis profoundly affecting the whole system of workers states and a new element tend-= ing to deepen that crisis. All:‘of them are well aware of the coincidence, if not causal relation, between the explosion of the first Chinese atom bomb and the downfall of Khrushchev. The abrupt removal of the head of the Soviet Union contributes to a radical modification in the relationship between the USSR and the other workers states,
These states have changed considerably since the days of absolute subordination under Stalin. First they saw the Yugoslav revolt, then the appearance of China as an independent power. The feeling of revolt grew high, flaring in the uprisings in Eastern Germany, Poland and Hungary. The Kremlin regained its grip at the cost of some loosening of control. Years followed of steady erosion of the authority of the Soviet bureaucracy under pressure of the masses as well as the indirect consequences of "de~Stalinization."'§ The collapse of Khrushchev dealt this authority another very hard blow. The result will be fresh impetus to "polycentrism! ‘on this level, too.
“and what will be the ultimate consequences in Soviet soctety
of Khrushchev's downfall? The masses are ripe for a radical change in the political regime. After.the shock of surprise at the abruvt disappearance of Khrushchev from the political scene, the masses will: feel inclined: for many reasons to demand of the new Kremlin chiefs that they carry out the promises, repeatedly made by: Khrushchev.
The list of these promises is a long one, ranging from erect-= ing a statue to commemorate the victims of Stalin's terror to assuring-a standard of living within a few years equal to that of the workers in the United States. New demands, suggested by the nature of the change-over itself, will be added.
: The downfall of Khrushchev will. give new and powerful impulsion to critical thought among the masses of the Soviet Union and therefore new and powerful impulsion to further dislocations in the bureaucratic regime, After the liquidation of the cult of Stalin, after the sudden removal of Khrushchev, the-Communists in the Soviet Union, in the workers states and throughout the world can better appreciate the historic scale of the crisis shaking the rule of the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union. They can better understand that far from constituting a threat to the stability of the Soviet state and the “socialist camp," the establishment of the norms of proletarian democracy is a primary condition for achieving stability. Trotsky's analysis is being proved to the hilt. . t :
‘IV.
- .-The main lesson to be drawn from the downfall of Khrushchev is the need for a thoroughgoing change in: the political structure of the Soviet Union.
Khrushchev was ousted by a decision of strange nature, Neither the Soviet Communists in their vast majority nor the members of the international Communist movement know who made it, who carried it out, the reasons for it, the arguments advanced. They do not know the views of the victim nor his defense against the secret accusations, Clearly genuine socialist democracy, proletarian democracy, does not exist in the Soviet Union.
‘The official propaganda assures us that.a communist society is being constructed; that is, a society in which the state and all forms of constraint associated with the state have disappeared. The official propaganda assures us that "the entire people" holds power (the new program adopted by the CPSU at the Twenty-second Congress solemnly baptized the Soviet state as the "state of the entire people" and the. Communist party as the "party of the entire people"). The people, supposedly in power, saw the government abruptly changed without even knowing what members of the Central Committee were present at the October 14 meeting that made the decision, how they voted, or what the motions were they voted on. It does not know in what respect the program of the new government differs from that of the
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old. The state belongs to the “entire people" but the “entire. people" remain in ignorance of the state's business, .
Government power in the Soviet Union is exercised by a force much broader than a single man, even one as dictatorial as Stalin. But clearly it is not the “entire people” nor the proletariat, What is this force? Is it the "Communist party of the Soviet Union" wielding power in. the name of the people? The millions of party members heard the news for the first time over. the radio October 15 or read it in Pravda the next day. What about the "Central Committee" of the CPSU? This body displayed its real social base when it’ assembled hundreds of top bureaucrats from all over the-country in - 1957 to give Khrushchev his mandate. Whether the meeting that deposed Khrushchev was of this character or much smaller, it, too, represented only the bureaucratic caste which has monopolized political power in the Soviet Union for more than thirty-five years.” .
~ In his "testament" -- which unquestionably played a role in the downfall of Khrushchev -- Palmiro Togliatti declared that the Soviet Union has not yet returned to Leninist norms and has not yet established freedom of ‘opinion and discussion in political questions, This is correct, if but a pale reflection of the truth, The way in. which Khrushchev was replaced shows how distant the Soviet Union is . from the ‘norms established in Lenin's time when the USSR was much poorer, weaker and under far greater imperialist .pressure.than today.
The norms of Soviet democracy call for workers and peasants councils (soviets), within which all groupings and persons who respect the country's constitution are guaranteed freedom of expression. Under these norms, a congress of all the councils (congress of soviets) designates the head of the government .on the basis of a stated program and after full public discussion. In the Communist party, Lenin's concept of democratic centralism meant full discussion’ among the ranks before decisions were taken by leading bodies, it meant freedom to form tendencies on the basis of publicly declared platforms and with full right to debate the issues before the membership, delegates to decision-making bodies being elected on the basis of such documents and after a democratic discussion throughout the party. Under the conditions of today a.system of multiple working-class parties to strengthen the process of proletarian democracy would be quite feasible.
The re-establishment of proletarian democracy in the Soviet - Union would greatly strengthen the unity of the proletariat and the peasantry. It would make possible the establishment of popular confidence in the government such as has not existed since the days of °. Lenin. One of its enormous advantages would be the establishment of an orderly institutional mechanism for the normal changes in teadership.
‘Abroad, especially in the imperialist countries, the attractiveness of the Soviet Union to the laboring masses would be greatly ~
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enhanced. The advantages of Soviet democracy for the workers both individually and as a whole would be proved in life.
It is for the establishment of norms of proletarian democracy along such lines -=-. even broader’ and more effective than in Lenin's time -- that the Fourth international has long battled.
The bourgeois journalésts ‘and politicians contrast "Western democracy". with the practices that became established under Stalin. Capitalist democracy, however,:never extended into productive relations, and in the political sphere it has suffered vast erosion, giving way at times to fascism, ~The norms of proletarian democracy | extend right into the factories and farms and throughout the whole structure of society. Proletarian democracy is qualitatively superior to the best ever > developed under the bourgeoisie.
The introduction of socialist democracy in the Soviet Union requires a political revolution to break the monopoly of power now held by the bureaucrats and to return it to the mass of workers in the cities and countryside, The downfall of Khrushchev and the manner in which it was brought about show both how necessary this revolution remains and how its approach is being hastened.
When the Stalin cult was dealt its death blow in the Soviet Union at the Twentieth Congress in 1956, the international Communist movement was shaken to the bottom. In the United States, for instance, it finished the Communist party as an effective organization. Elsewhere it gave rise to big discussions, to changes::in leadership and to splits.,. The Sino-Soviet conflict has had similar.impact, the repercussions going far beyond the ranks of the membership. , The success of the Cuban Revolution, which brought to the fore a new revolutionary leadership originating outside the Communist movement, added further to the ferment. Khrushchev's downfall now brings a new dynamic ingredient into this gigantic process which at bottom involves the breakup of fossilized structures and the construction of a new revolutionary~socialist leadership on a world scale.
Communist militants therefore have a deep interest in drawing all the lessons from this latest event. They should press for full and free discussion of every single issue involved in the ouster of Khrushchev. One of the first requisites is to hear Khrushchev's own defense of his course. The stenographic record of the sessions that ended with Khrushchev in a minority should be made available at once and Khrushchev should be granted space in the Soviet press and an opportunity to appear on television and the radio to explain his side. All working-class tendencies, including the Trotskyists, should be granted the right to participate in the discussion,
In their own parties, Communist militants everywhere should draw one very big obvious lesson; that is, the danger of relying on ~Moscow for leadership, The disastrous nature of Stalin's guidance -was revealed for the blind to see at the Twentieth Congress, Now.
fresh revelations are on the agenda concerning the consequences of Moscow's leadership since Stalin's death,
The Communist parties must learn to work out their own revolutionary Marxist policies independently in the light of the. needs of the revolutionary process in their own countries. The end result of this will be to enormously strengthen the camp of the workers states by hastening the end of capitalism. “ ‘The downfall of Khrushchev underscores once again the fact. 4 that the major problem facing the international working class is the crisis in leadership. . This crisis can be’ resolved only through the construction of a new leadership genuinely capable of carrying out: the program of revolutionary socialism on an international. scale: -~ in the imperialist countries, the colonial world and the sectors that have already won their revolutions and achieved the status of workers states. This is what the Fourth International. has fought for since. its inception.
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SOUTH AFRICA i +> The second part of.the document "south Africa --
A Memorandum Submitted to the Committee of Nine," which
was scheduled for this ‘issue of World. Qui Look will appear
next week. re a Lee eee)
Imprimerie: 21 rue d' Aboukir, Paris 2 (imprimé par les soins de 1!édi- Directeur-Gérant: Pierre FRANK. - teur).