"CHAOS" IN SAIGON
The attempt at another coup dtétat in South Vietnam September 13 is fresh evidence -~- if any were needed -- of the extreme deterioration of the position of American imperialism in Saigon, The Johnson’ administration is now down to praying for a "moratorium on attempted coups d'état. . . just until the November election in the United States,
Bits of the truth about the tenuousness of the U.S. beachhead in the strife-torn land are now appearing in the American press, Thus C,L.Sulzberger, the New York Times expert on foreign affairs, declares in the September 16 issue [International Edition] tthe situation in South:Vietnam seems irreparable...
"The best to be hoped," he continues, "is that chaos may be frozen another eight weeks so that, after our elections, some patch-
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work settlement may be attempted and accepted, if not relished, by this country as well as the war-weary Vietnamese,"
Sulzberger offers a rather graphic image of the U.S, puppet government: "The Government of Maj. Gen. Khanh balances in power like the pingpong ball on a shooting gallery fountain,"
Even the possibility of negotiating something out of the sol lapse seems rather slim to Sulzberger in view of the fact that "guerrilla strength swells; Government strength diminishes." He thinks it doubtful even that the Johnson administration will succeed in freezing the chaos for another eight weeks: co
"Anarchy cannot be institutionalized, All we can hope is to fight for time, If a neutralist coup d'état can be prevented until after our elections, perhaps slender room will remain for exploratory talks,"
Meanwhile the radio of the FNL [Front National de Libération], which the Saigon puppet government calls the "Vietcong," has begun appealing to the people of South Vietnam "to take advantage of the critical situation and the extreme disarray as a good occasion to pass to the offensive,"
It is calling on "the people of the cities to oppose the dictatorial regime and gain the departure of the Americans and the end of the war of aggression." The appeals are being made "in the name of an independent, democratic and neutral South Vietnam."
These appeals can now have great impact, The South Vietnamese bourgeoisie is in a state of acute crisis, manifestly incapable for the moment of rule. The various civilian groupings are either involved in the political gambles of the generals, who seem to be rolling dice to see which one comes up as the puppet "most favored" by the foreign imperialist power, or they have withdrawn, paralyzed with fear over Washington!s course, which was finally to risk their future in an election campaign in the United States,
An increasing number of reports are now appearing in the world press, indicating the collapse of discipline among the troops at the disposal of the puppet government, Undoubtedly many soldiers are now going over to the side of the FLN and others are preparing to do so if the freedom fighters move in their direction,
If the FLN proves capable of moving vigorously, it could, with a few well directed blows, bring down what remains of the rotted structure of the American-backed South Vietnam government.
While dictator Khanh was bouncing like a pingpong ball ona shooting gallery fountain, Henry Cabot Lodge, the former U.S, ambassador who served as puppet master in Saigon, toured Europe, seeking
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support and sympathy for the American “burden" in trying to "pacify" the rebellious natives in Southeast Asia. In Paris, the Boston aristocrat created something of a sensation when he outlined what the U.S. was seeking to do in South Vietnam,
- American forces are in that distant country, he said, to prevent a . "Communist victory," However, Washington is not seeking a military victory, "We want a political solution,'
Enlarging on this theme, he said that American troops were in South Vietnam for "security® reasons and "to contribute. to the main aim, that is, to win popular support for the government,
_. "Asked about the means to achieve this," continued Le Monde [august 20], "we, Cabot Lodge said he favored a method of dividing up areas in accordance with the procedures utilized by the French authorities and which were applied and described by Colonel Roger Trinquier. These methods,.according to him, had brilliant results and enabled the French authorities to combat terrorism,"
The final "brilliant result, " which Lodge did not mention, of course, was the ultimate victory of the Algerian freedom fighters over the French imperialist armies.
Le Monde observed. dryly in an editorial note: "In applauding the ideas of Colonel Trinquier, the methods used to block the Casbah in Algiers and to condition the population during the war-in Algeria, M. Cabot Lodge is astonishingly frank, .His declaration permits one to suppose everything about the policy of General Khanh and his American: tadvisors, 'Tt is necessary to organize the population from top to bottom, You can say I ama fascist, but we must make the population docile, easy to lead," Colonel Trinquier once said It was also he who declared at the trial of Salan: ‘The 0,A.S. Lthe. reactionary terrorist Secret Army Organization] is a people defending -itself.' Mr. Cabot Lodge ought to know that the 'structuration! .of the population by the paratroopers contributed powerfully to regroup the Algerian masses around the FLN [the Front de Libération National which eventually won the war and established the Ben Bella. government]. . The same tactic applied in Saigon will rally the Vietnamese ‘masses around the FNL,"
In 1957, when the use of torture in Algeria by the French army was sickening the entire world, -its use was defended by the most brazen and hardened "ultras." .One of the documents, ascribed to Colonel Trinquier, can be found in a book La Raison dtEtat [Les Editions de Minuit, i961]. An argument used by this sadist in support of torture was thata membcr of the FLN must be captured alive and forced to talk, to reveal the names of his comrades, his leaders, "Tt is necessary. - . in the interests of society, to convert him..." Lodgets admission tells us something about the methods used by the U.S. in South Vietnam. .
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THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION MARKS TIME
The fresh impetus which the congress of the FLN LFront de Libération Nationale] and the adoption of the Charter of Algiers was to have given the Algerian Revolution [see World Outlook May 1], did not become concretized during the following months. “The Revolution, in fact, is undergoing a difficult period characterized by disparate and, to a certain degree, contradictory tendencies, developments and symptoms,
First of all, the compromise with the conservative, even feudalistic forces, which led to including Chabaani not only in the Central Committee but also in the Political Bureau, proved to be ephemeral, Chabaani, for the second time, took to the mountains. He was quiokly arrested and finally fell before a firing squad, In itself, the confrontation with the reactionary tendency represented by Chabaani was all to the.good and no one who stands on the side of the Revolution will condemn it for defending itself with the utmost energy against its enemies, particularly when they resort to armed struggle and call for rebellion against the regime, Many firm supporters of the Revolution are, however, convinced that the defense would stand firmer in the eyes of the masses if trials such as was given Chabaani were held publicly instead of secretly and if the rights of the defendants were fully guaranteed. Nevertheless, what is most important to note in this is the rapidity with which an attempt at oollaboration ended in a decisive break. This demonstrates the instability of the situation and the incontestable wavering in the orientation of the government,
As for the economic and social measures projected at the congress, especially in Ben Bellats opening report, the balance sheet is quite modest to say the least, Certainly no one would seek to impose a timetable on a revolution, But the situation is not one in which hasty and abstract demands have been placed, What the Revolution faces is multiple pressures which are blocking the adoption and application of essential measures,
In recent weeks, it is true, new nationalizations have beon put into effect (movies and other minor enterprises), But these do not involve anything sweeping. What is primary is the delay in adopting the new agrarian reform that has been announced so many times. It is said now that this will be undertaken before the end of the year, however not until after the elections. Although this reform faces many real difficulties, its importance has been repeatedly © stressed, Broad layers of the peasantry, perhaps the majority, have not yet gained direct economic benefits from the Revolution. It is necessary to link them with the Revolution through concrete measures, and very shortly, If not, this very important sector of the Algerian population. can be alienated from the regime and undergo. demoralization and complete passivity and even become ripe for counterrevolutionary maneuvers and adventures, Thus a delay can prove costly. It is for .
this reason == and not because of impatient radicalism -- that early adoption and application of the new agrarian reform is urgent,
The Algiers congress also emphasized the necessity for reconstructing the state apparatus and the party. Some changes have actually been undertaken in the administration. Reactionary elements have been replaced or eliminated, but the projected purge has not been applied consistently, and, more important, questionable criteria have been used, In the party, too, changes have been made at different levels in leading personnel. But it seems that the results have proved contradictory, In some places opportunist, ambitious, proimperialist clements were eliminated, In other places, contrariwise, militants of the left were victimized by the rightist apparatus,
The decision to create a militia could only be hailed in principle by the revolutionary Algerian left. Unfortunately, up to now, nothing effective has been organized, In the one case where militia have actually been put into operation (Kabylie), it involved contingents of the unemployed who were formed into brigades and paid a regular salary. Such a measure could be justified in an emergency where it was necessary to counteract actual military operations of counterrevolutionaries, But it is clear that this has little in common with a genuine popular militia.
With regard to the conflict of groups and tendencies in the. FLN, the extreme right suffered a sharp setback with the climination of Ghabaani, In addition the development of the UGTA [Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens] has been positive -- a resolution on the agrarian reform was adopted at a recent congress and some of the most bureaucratic leaders seem to have been ousted. (Boudissa was not present at the congress and rumors have been circulating in Algiers that he is under arrest.) The change in the editorship of Révolution Africaine, on the other hand, constitutes a certain setback for the eft. .
An effort was made to minimize the import of removing Mohamed Harbi by designating Omar Ouzegane to replace him, Ouzegane!s record could appear reassuring. But there is no doubt that Harbi was regarded as the spokesman of the Marxist left. (Among other things he played an important role in preparing the Charter of Algiers and in some of the commissions of the congress which were in charge of preparing the political resolutions.) The editorial announcing the change affirmed that Révolution Afrioaine would continue the same policy. This could only be judged in relation to the reasons for the shift in personnel, and , in fact, a week later Ouzegane published an editorial making concessions to the partisans of Arabic Islamic socialism, emphasizing his criticism of a certain left, the "revolu~ tionaries of phrases. . . of France or elsewhere,"
Algiers and the other Algerian cities are now tne scene of an
electoral campaign in which the government is again emphasizing its
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commitments. The way in which these elections were prepared and are taking place deprives them of any real political significance, They constitute a formality which no one takes seriously. That is why, if the government seeks to become strongly consolidated by assuring the forward march of the Revolution, it should not be satisfied with the antisipated results of the ballot, but should carry out vital | measures, above all the new agrarian reform, so as to give confidence to the masses and prevent the current marking of time from beooming. prolonged and paving the way for a dangerous demobilization,
THE SPLIT IN THE ANGOLAN MOVEMENT
By Livio Maitan
Within recent months a somewhat new situation has been developing in the Angolan national liberation movement. Internal as well as international factors have caused some changes that can shortly lead to others. if
The most important fact is the grave split which has occurred in Holden Roberto'ts GRAE [Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile] and which has already had repercussions in the FLNA [Angolan National Liberation Front] and the