DOWNFALL AND THS IRAQ COMUNIST PARTY
| By A. Said
_ For all those who have attentively folloved politioal developnents in the Arab world, the event which occurred in Iraq on : Yebruary © cane as no surprise. Overyone was well aware of the weakness of the Kascon recime which had already lost its masa support within a year after the July 14, 1950, revolution.
The July 14 revolt was a peneral popular uprising based on all the onti~imperiolist and antifeudal forces. iorers, peasants, intelleatuals, petty bourgeoisie and the national bourreoisie all participated in it. It received ceneral acclain everywhere.
The nev Kassen rocime bocan at first to carry out social changes. Anong these the agrarian roform was the most inportant. Since it supported itself on the nass of the people, it had to grant broad democratic freedoms.
The workers ond peasants started to organize and to fight for their own demands, In the same way, orcanizetion began amen the intellectuals; i.e., journalists, writers, lawyers, students Dehra In addition an armed people's militia was ereated in which bread * * layers of the nasses participated. . «ge
All these organisations were led by the Iraq Comrunist party. The masses dominated the strects, the cities, the countryside. Dual power became visible. Nevertheless, the CF faithfully follewed a polisy of "national frontiom™ and co-operation with the bourgeoisie. It didn't so much as droom of orientatin; the strucclie of the workers and other popular masses toward the conguest of power.
This "popular front," which was tho most procious of all possessions to the Otalinists, didn't last lon*, The first dif}- “ferences occurred over the question of Arab unity, ree
fhe followers of the "Baath" (Socialist Party of Arab Renaissance) and the lasseritos led by Abdel Salem Aref -— at that time vice mier -- demanded immediste unification with the United Arab Republie (IDgypt and Syria). Kassen, the Stalinists and seotions of the bourgeoisie opposed immediate unity.
Irom that time on, the CF went further in its support of Kassem, helped him to suppreas the advocates of Arab unity, elevated him to tho status of a popular hero and gave hin the title “exclusive leader of the Iraqi people." ben the insurreotion of the pro-Nasserite el-Chuaf broke out, the Stalinists were the main foroe that rushed to Kassem's aid and nobilized the mosses . in order to liquidate the insurrection and the Daathists.
ole
iven after the surpression of the el-Chuaf insurrection, when the CI had bocone the only organized political force in Iraq, the party did not start oa strugcle for power. It limited itself to demandin:. participation in the government. Lven this demanc wos soon dropped on the insistence of the Soviet bureaueracy which considered it too "leftist."
In their ficht against Nasser and the Nasserites, the Iraqi Stalinists, like the Stalinists in 011 the Arab countries, became the main and most resolute opponents of Arab unity. Instead of opposing the undemocratic way in which Nasser sought to achieve unity between Opypt and Syria and explainin;; to the masses what — great harm the Kasserite methods worked on tho real goals of Arab unification, they besan to opnose unity as such,
Te explain this they resorted to the absurd ‘argument that the various rab countrios are unevenly developed, as if the — . . prerequisite of national unification of tho people is even dovelop~ nent. iLven worse, thoy startod dissoninatin; the theory of "Arab peoples," and gave up speaking of a sincle jrab nation. In doing tris, they lost t*eir influence with creat sectors of the masses ' to whom Arab unity is a main demand. -
Having liquidated the Nasserites onc Jaathists, Kassen turned on the Connunists,. Just ao he had supported himself on the Conmmunist porty against tho lasserites, so he now supported hinself on. the antisCom-unist struccle of the richt ving..,
The counterrevolution hed: startod.
Communists and other lcftists wero persecuted and arrested; the left press was banned; te popular militia vas disarned; a ‘reactionary leadership was inposed on the trade unions an¢c the orcpeanisations of the pocsants, youth, wonen, students anc intellestuolis; all Comnuniat influonce in such orgcnizations wes banned. Agents of imperialism, who had beon con‘enned to prison bv ponular courts, were freed. Under pressure from tho foudal londowners, the governnent halted the acrarian roform, In the industrial centers, trade-union activists were fired.
Al] this, however, was not sufficient to win the confidence of the reaction, Kassen-refused the support or the left but didn't win the support of the richt.. .
The bonapartist police rocime alienated even the hurd people who were strurclinc:: for their national rights. It decided to follow o policy of diserinination arainst the Nurds in ol1 fields: ‘the procram of industrialization, the creation of cultural and medical institutions, tho adnission of stvdents at the universities ond in the distribution of scholarships. In view of such diserimination, tho insurrostion of the Kurd people besare inevitable.
The Kassem resimo was now completely isolated, It had lost its mass baso. It lacked: the support of any political force, of
“> ‘any popular layer, It rested exclusively on the police and the arny, Dut inasmuch as the arny.is an uncertain factor ~~ tis is true today in all the Arab countries -= a bic question mark was preoee gree the destiny. of the Kassen regime. Its days vere — numbered « é
fron: all this, the Iraqi cP leorned nothing. It continued to pursue its Khrushchevist line, the line of tho "popular: front," of co-operation with the bourceoisie, of defense of t status. quo of the capitalist recime, of rejection. of proletarian revoiusion and of posnponeuent of socialisn to the distant future...
Instead of mobilizinc the masses through class struggle means in order to win leadership of the proletariat in the national liberation movement, the cry of the Communist party was "Back to the way of July 14" and "A democratic parlianentary vi blies® They ever tried to convince themsclvos and.the masses "that the — objective conditions are not ripe to roplace tho Kassem rogime by a popular denocratic recime.” In accordance with the Khrushchey line of “peaceful coexistence," they hold that “to heave such an ein could. favor foreign inperialion and donestic reactionary forces,"
Instead of backinrc the richt of the Kurd ‘people to netional selfedetervination and advocating the national unity of the Arab people, they called for autonomy for the Furds within the framework of the Iraqi republic. Although they admitted that "autonory cannot replace the richt of self-deternination of the Kurd nation, inoluding the richt to create an independent state brinring tocether the whole of Kurdistan," they declared that this aim could only be attained in the distant future,
Shey learned nothin ina Sl exrertance vt with Chien Kai-shek and ‘the: defeat of the Chinese Re m in 1627, lotwithstanding @ll the. experiences since then, hers still did not loarn that the
national bo oinie in undordovelored countries is unable in the present period to carry out even the tasks of the bourgeois deno= oratica rovolution and that the revolution in these countries sannot - gtop half way. ‘tere can bo no "national dcderocratic revolution" suchas. they ‘eall for.. A revolution th:t does not deepen inte a - She.” revolution docpenerates and paves tho way for counterreve-~ - lution,
Tre tasks of the bourgoois donibesatite revolution, inotuding
. the unification of o11 the Arab countries, which is pesed today | before the Arab people, cannot be realised under the lecders Ps -.of the national bourgeoisie. Only the ERelengesae revolution realise them on the road: to socialisn.
The two essential Genands under which the masses of the — countries are mobilizing today ore national unification and sociale fem. The national bourgeoisie is noving forvard by utilising these - two slegans under Masser's leaderstip. ‘le Stalinists turned their | backs te both slocans and thereby lest contact with the masses,
%,
mm Fa ; a : pi x abanéonin;: tke field to Vasserisn: which is winning then.
Behind the latest upheaval in Iraq arc all the anti-Communist elerents: Tlasserites, Baathists, agents of Arierioan and Dritish inperialism, supporters of the late iluri es Said, eto. The only ‘Goal which binds thom torether is the attempt to block the workers fron coming: to power and the effort to liquidate the Communist party. On everythine olse they are divided and there is no. question of then enjoying any ~7s5 surport. Their rerp-ime is ' gstill eshaelky and doos not civo the inpression of being able to last. The Iraqi masses, toated in struggle, will not crant it a lence life. Dut theso masscs still lack adequate leadership. Cath the Cr, aside from which no alternctive leadership hrs been res leoern. sonet*inc fror the events?
Horch C, 1963.
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