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The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Faction and Party — or Sect-Faction?

· translated for this archive from Parti ou fraction/secte, Quatrième Internationale, 3rd series, no. 1, July–September 1980 · 16,476 words

In Brazilian Portuguese: Fração e partido — ou fração-seita?

A new translation, made for this archive with the help of AI and checked against the French and against Ross’s own 1976 English; the note at the end says how. It has not yet been checked by a second reader: report an error.

Quatrième Internationale, 3rd series, no. 1, July–September 1980, as “Parti ou fraction/secte”, incorporating “Faction and Party”, Red Weekly nos. 139–142, February–March 1976, and “The Bolshevik Faction and the fight for the Party”, Battle of Ideas no. 2, November 1976.

With an introduction. A note on the provenance of the text and on how it was reconstructed is at the end.

Introduction

A question every revolutionary current meets

Revolutionaries who agree on a great deal often belong to separate organisations. When should they unite, and when is separation justified? And if they unite, what must they agree on, and how should they handle what they do not agree on?

John Ross’s essay is one of the clearest answers to the first question in the Trotskyist tradition. It is much weaker on the second. That combination explains why it is still read, and why it should be read with care.

The text and its setting

Ross was a leader of the International Marxist Group (IMG), the British section of the Fourth International. In internal documents he wrote as “Alan Jones”. The essay began as a four-part series in the IMG’s paper Red Weekly in February and March 1976, signed “James Francis”. It was addressed to a new group, the Workers Socialist League (WSL). Gerry Healy had expelled its founders, around the car-factory militant Alan Thornett, from the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP), an organisation notorious for expulsions and slander. A second article followed in November 1976 to answer the WSL’s reply. In 1980 Ross combined the two into “Parti ou fraction/secte” for Quatrième Internationale, the Fourth International’s French-language review. That is the version reconstructed here. Its targets had become international: Healy, and the current led by Pierre Lambert in France (the OCI). Its examples now included the split of 1979, when Nahuel Moreno’s Bolshevik Faction left the Fourth International.

The argument

Ross’s case rests on history. On his account, Lenin did not create a separate Bolshevik party in 1903. He led a faction inside one party, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, and fought the Mensheviks inside it. When the party finally divided in 1912, the cause was that one group refused the party’s discipline, not its opinions. Lenin called for a complete break only in 1914, when the leaders of the Second International supported their own governments in the war. Trotsky likewise worked as a faction inside the Communist International until 1933, when its policy allowed Hitler to take power without a fight.

From this Ross draws a test. Separate organisations are justified only by a betrayal on the scale of 1914 or 1933. Anything less is a disagreement to be fought out inside one party. In a real party, he writes, differences “are many and inevitable”; “only a faction can be ‘monolithic’ — and even then only for a short time”. He also shows what happens to an organisation that treats every disagreement as a betrayal. It has to prove the betrayal, so it lies about its opponents. Then it must stop its members from finding out, so it censors them. In the end it uses violence. This analysis of the sect is the essay’s most lasting achievement.

What the essay leaves out

The essay explains what should not divide revolutionaries. It says very little about what must unite them. Programme appears only as a set of references: the Transitional Programme, the first congresses of the Communist International, the Left Opposition. Every difference short of 1914 is treated as a matter of tactics. In 1979, two IMG leaders, Dave Packer and Phil Hearse, applied the test to Moreno’s split: unity was possible “no matter what positions are held on secondary questions or on tactics.”

The British organisation that first replied to Ross saw the problem straight away. The WSL lost most of the historical argument; it was wrong, for example, to date a separate Bolshevik party to 1903. But on the main point it was right. If Ross were correct, its paper Socialist Press wrote on 24 March 1976, “people would obviously need no agreement on programme, strategy or tactics — just as long as they adhered to some form of ‘organisational unity’.”

Hearse reached the same conclusion from inside the IMG, in two internal documents. In 1984 he argued that a proposal by Ross on the rights of minorities treated the party as “a federation of factions”, each with “absolute rights”. He added: “my own opinion is that this notion of the party derives from the series of articles entitled ‘Faction and Party’.” In 1985 he wrote that the essay

“reduced the questions of dispute among revolutionaries or organisations of the far left, to that of tactics, forgetting that between abstract programmatic references and written positions, there are crucial questions of strategy and programme in practice.”

Unity “on the sole guarantee of internal democracy”, he wrote, “skipped over the crucial questions of defining the correct strategy and tactics for building a revolutionary party”. Examples are how to relate to a mass reformist party, how to apply the united front, and how to work in the unions. These decide what members do every day, and they cannot be set aside as tactics.

A party of permanent factions?

This is the danger in the text. Ross’s main historical model is the Russian party before 1912, in which two organised factions existed side by side, each with its own press and its own discipline. A reader can easily conclude that a revolutionary party is a set of organised factions. Then unity means bringing groups together as they are, each keeping its own line, with democratic rules as the only common ground. Ross himself rejected that conclusion. Following Trotsky, he called permanent factions “an absolutely abnormal and unacceptable practice” in a revolutionary party. But the only remedy he offers is time: differences will be “finally settled in the light of common practice”. He does not explain how factions stop being factions. That requires joint analysis, testing the programme against events, extending it where it says nothing, and building a leadership that belongs to the whole organisation rather than one divided in shares between groups.

The IMG’s own history shows the cost. The right to form tendencies and factions kept it from splitting in the early 1970s. But in Hearse’s account it was left with years of “factional warfare”. Political differences were settled by fights over seats on the leadership rather than by open discussion, and there was no “collective team”.

What the unity campaigns achieved

Faction and Party drove two unity offensives: towards the WSL in 1976, and towards the largest group on the British far left, the Socialist Workers Party, which came from Tony Cliff’s state-capitalist tradition outside the Fourth International, for several years after. Neither produced a merger. The only gain, Hearse noted in 1985, was a small group of SWP dissidents. Looking back, it is doubtful that a merger on these terms would have lasted. When organisations unite on agreed references alone, each keeps its own strategy, and the first serious test reopens the division.

The international record points the same way. At the end of 1980, the year of Ross’s essay, the currents of Lambert and Moreno merged into a new international committee. The basis was a set of general theses. They split within a year, over the attitude to the Mitterrand government in France.

How unity was finally built

The WSL drew its own lessons, through its own failures. Its document The Poisoned Well (1978) required prior agreement on its view of the Fourth International’s history, which made one group’s diagnosis a condition of unity. Its fusion in 1981 with another British group, the International-Communist League, failed more harshly. It began to come apart within weeks. A brutal factional war followed, and the fused organisation of some 300 members ended as two smaller groups with fewer than 150 between them. Instead of adding the two groups together, the fusion left them with half their combined strength.

In 1987 Thornett’s current, then the Socialist Group, merged with the International Group (which had left the IMG’s successor in 1985) to form the International Socialist Group. Their Fusion Text combined Ross’s test with what his essay lacked:

  • seven programmatic points, stated clearly enough that the new organisation could be held to them;
  • disagreements named in the text itself: three theories of post-war Stalinism that “may be combined” in one organisation, and a debate on Cuba that would be needed;
  • a timetable for discussion, with Central America scheduled for the first conference;
  • tactics left to perspectives documents that a conference could change;
  • a commitment to “an unremitting struggle for theoretical clarity”, and a rejection of “unprincipled political combinations” designed to keep a leadership in place.

The new organisation held together, later drew in other groups, and became a section of the Fourth International.

Reading the essay today

Ross’s test against splitting remains sound, and its account of the sect is still accurate. What the essay does not offer is a method for unity. It does not say what a fused organisation must agree on, how its unresolved questions will be discussed, or how separate groups become one. Read alone, it can justify merging organisations that agree on principles in general while differing on the strategy that governs their daily work. That is unity without foundations, and the history recorded here suggests that it does not last.

There is a final irony. In 1985 the International Group left Socialist Action, the paper of the IMG’s successor. It gave as reasons “programme and strategy in international politics”, above all the theory of permanent revolution, and “unprincipled manouvres and blocs” in the leadership. By the 1976 test those grounds would not have been enough. By the test Hearse set out in the same year, they were the grounds that mattered.

Duncan Chapel, November 2026


Faction and Party — or Sect-Faction?

John Ross

I. Introduction

The existence of different revolutionary organisations undeniably bewilders many militants, above all when some of them claim to stand on Leon Trotsky and the Transitional Programme of the Fourth International while declaring their wish to “rebuild” or “reorganise” the Fourth International — despite the fact that it very much exists. The road to unifying all these groups within the Fourth International is strewn with obstacles. One of the chief of these is precisely the confusion introduced by sectarian organisations such as the one led by Gerry Healy in Britain or the OCI in France, which erase all the distinctions that Lenin and Trotsky clearly drew between parties, factions and tendencies. They have thus established a veritable tradition of irresponsible splits on the basis of organisational sectarianism or of mere conjunctural or tactical differences. They justify these practices by appealing to “Bolshevism”. These appeals have no foundation whatever. In theory and in practice alike, Lenin and Trotsky behaved in diametrically the opposite way.

Other groups which still stand outside the Fourth International, and which reject the extreme practices of physical violence, arbitrary expulsions and the characterisation of other revolutionary tendencies as “accomplices” of the GPU (or of the FBI) or as “crypto-Stalinists”, have not yet broken with the theoretical roots of these Healy-Just aberrations. In particular they repeat the gross confusion between the methods of building a revolutionary party and the methods of building a faction or a tendency — appealing each time to the example of Lenin, in the face of all the historical evidence.

II. The Bolshevik Precedent

Thus in the paper of one of these British groups, Socialist Press (14 January 1976), we read: “Although the Bolshevik Party did not arise until the 1903 split in Social Democracy the foundations on which it was built were laid in the preceding years.” But this is factual nonsense. No Bolshevik party was created in 1903. What was created was the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP). Furthermore, not merely was no Bolshevik party formed at this time, but Lenin was relentlessly against any split into two parties. His struggle after 1903 was a political and ideological faction struggle against the Mensheviks and simultaneously a struggle for a unified Party against what he termed the ‘anarchistic’ actions of the Mensheviks, which threatened the Party with a split. Indeed Lenin, far from taking the initiative for a split in the Party, was very clear that it was the actions of the Mensheviks which threatened a split:

‘The refusal of Martov to serve on the editorial board [of Iskra], his refusal and that of other Party writers to collaborate, the refusal of a number of persons to work on the Central Committee, and the propaganda of a boycott or passive resistance are bound to lead, even if against the wishes of Martov and his friends, to a split in the Party.’[1]

Lenin declared his complete opposition to a split of the Party, and carried on his campaign for a new Party congress, including Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, under a clear banner:

‘We must try to find the framework within which the ideological struggle can proceed more or less normally; a new congress is needed … To think that a congress could lead only to a split would mean to admit that we haven’t got a Party at all, that Party feeling is so poorly developed among all of us that it cannot overcome the old circle spirit … Of course, it is impossible to guarantee anything, but an attempt to settle the conflict in a Party manner, and to find a way out, must be made. The Majority, at any rate, does not want a split.’[2]

The confusion of party and faction appears again in the same Socialist Press article when it states: ‘Although the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democracy ended in a split, and its forces halved, it was the faction fight waged by Lenin which defended the political and organisational independence of the party against the Mensheviks.’ Everything here is confused from top to bottom. It is correctly stated that Lenin waged a faction fight. But a faction is not a party; a faction is a formation within a party. As Lenin defined it:

‘A faction is an organisation within a party, united, not by its place of work, language or other objective conditions, but by a particular platform of views on party questions.’[3]

Indeed, the very terms Bolshevik faction and Menshevik faction meant that they were members of the same party. It is then ridiculous to say that the Party ‘lost half its forces’. What occurred is that the faction fight within the Party revealed that the Menshevik opportunists enjoyed the support of half the Party and the Bolshevik faction half, and an intense factional struggle developed. The article in Socialist Press completely removes the dialectically linked aspects of Lenin’s struggle at that time — against all those who were for political and ideological conciliation, and for a faction struggle; while simultaneously against those who were splitting the Party, and for the unity of the Party.

This point becomes even more obvious when we look at the first real split into two parties, as opposed to two factions — in January 1912, at the Sixth Congress of the RSDLP. Not merely was this nine years after the date given in Socialist Press, but it is important to note that even then Lenin did not call for a political split with the Mensheviks and a division of the Party along Bolshevik/Menshevik lines, but instead for a split on organisational grounds. In line with this all factions were invited to the Congress. As Lenin pointed out:

‘The Russian Organising Commission which called the present Conference … notified all Social-Democrats of its convocation and invited to the Conference all, without a single exception, organisations of our Party; furthermore, all organisations were given an opportunity to take part in the Conference.’[4]

Furthermore, the actual split into two different parties through the expulsion of various elements did not take place because of the Mensheviks’ political views but because of a rejection and violation of the organisational principles of the Party: the carrying out of acts incompatible with Party membership by these particular elements. The resolution of the Conference stated clearly:

’The former members of the Central Committee, Mikhail, Yuri, and Roman, refused not only to join the Central Committee in the spring of 1910, but even to attend a single meeting to co-opt new members, and bluntly declared that they considered the very existence of the Party Central Committee to be “harmful”. It was precisely after the Plenary Meeting of 1910 that the above-mentioned chief publications of the liquidators, Nasha Zarya and Dyelo Zhizni, definitely turned to liquidationism all along the line, not only “belittling [contrary to the decisions of the Plenary Meeting] the importance of the illegal Party”, but openly renouncing it, declaring that the Party was “extinct”, that the Party was already liquidated, that the idea of reviving the illegal Party was “a reactionary utopia”, using the columns of legally published magazines to heap slander and abuse on the illegal Party, calling upon the workers to regard the nuclei of the Party and its hierarchy as “dead”, etc.

‘At a time when throughout Russia the members of the Party, irrespective of factions, united to promote the immediate task of convening a Party conference, the liquidators, banded together in entirely independent small groups, split away from the local organisations even where the pro-Party Mensheviks predominated (Ekaterinoslav, Kiev) and definitely refused to maintain any Party relations with the local organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. The Conference declares that by its conduct the Nasha Zarya and Dyelo Zhizni group has definitely placed itself outside the Party.’[5]

Furthermore, so clearly did this split of the Party not arise from the political grounds of the incompatibility of Menshevism with the Party, but instead on the organisational basis of the refusal of various elements to submit to the discipline of the Party, that the Mensheviks who accepted this discipline (the so-called ‘pro-Party Mensheviks’) remained full members of the Party — a fact acknowledged in later Socialist Press articles, but whose significance has not been grasped.

So this was in no way some nifty manoeuvre thought up by Lenin to justify a political split on organisational grounds — which is naturally Healy’s conception of Lenin as a practiser of crude realpolitik. On the contrary, Lenin clearly explained — and not merely on a Russian but on an international level — his position on whether Mensheviks should be within the Party at that time. When asked why liquidationism, just like Bernsteinism, could not be fought within the Party, he replied not on the grounds of their political incompatibility but on the organisational principle that the Russian Bernsteinians refused to accept the discipline of the Party:

‘There are not many people among the adherents of the R.S.D.L.P. capable of sincerely defending the liquidationist trend. Unfortunately, there are still quite a number of people who are sincerely opposed to liquidationism, but do not understand the conditions under which the struggle against it has to be waged. Of course, they say, liquidationism is a bourgeois trend in the Social-Democratic movement; but why not fight it in the ranks of a single party, just as the Germans fight the Bernsteinians?’[6]

For the Healy school this is out of the question — the Bernsteins would all have been expelled for their views even at that time. Lenin gives a totally different answer:

‘Our champions of “agreement” fail to understand a very important and very simple thing: the liquidators are not only opportunists (like Bernstein and Co.); they are also trying to build a separate party of their own, they have issued the slogan that the R.S.D.L.P. does not exist; they pay no heed whatever to the decisions of the R.S.D.L.P. That is the difference between us and “Europe” …. In Europe, an opportunist guilty of but one-tenth of what the Potresovs, Igorevs, Bers, Martovs, Dans, and their like have done and are doing against their Party and in defiance of its decisions would not be tolerated in the ranks of the party a single month.’[7]

Furthermore, during the earlier period when the Mensheviks were in fact participating in a correct organisational fashion in the party, and had a properly constituted majority, Lenin was so far from advocating a split that he demanded that the Bolshevik faction accept Party discipline even on such crucial questions as voting for bourgeois candidates: ‘After the competent bodies have decided, all of us, as members of the Party, must act as one man. A Bolshevik in Odessa must cast into the ballot box a ballot paper bearing a Cadet’s name even if it sickens him.’[8]

It was only when the Mensheviks violated the discipline of the Party through anarchistic boycotts of its organisations, attempting to overturn Congress decisions through votes of the Central Committee, rejection of the authority of leading bodies, etc., that Lenin refused to accept this. All this of course does not mean that Lenin was some sort of organisational eclectic. On the contrary, as we shall see, in 1914 Lenin carried out an absolutely ruthless, final and definitive split into two parties along strictly political, and not organisational, grounds. But what the experience prior to 1914 shows is that Lenin, and later Trotsky, was absolutely clear in his distinction between a party and a faction.

Unfortunately some sectarian comrades have as yet made no serious study of the history of the Bolsheviks. They cannot explain why Lenin formed a faction in 1903, expelled Mensheviks in 1912 on organisational and not political grounds, and only came out for a political split in the Party in 1914.[9]

III. 1914 and the Final Break

If we consider the history of Lenin’s organisational positions prior to 1914, we see that in neither of the major cases of ‘splits’ in which he was involved did he favour a split of the Party on political grounds. In 1903 he carried through a faction struggle against the Mensheviks but opposed any split in the Party. In 1912 he supported expelling Mensheviks from the Party — but because they refused to submit to Party discipline. At this point in time, advocacy of the political line of Menshevism within the Party was perfectly permissible provided that it accepted organisation and discipline — hence the faction of pro-Party Mensheviks within the Party. None of this should lead to the view that Lenin (of all people!) was unprincipled or ‘soft’ on questions of organisational principle or political struggle. It means merely that he considered the differences at this period as differences within the Party — objects of a faction struggle but not a split in the Party.

When it comes to 1914, however, we find Lenin demanding an absolute split into separate parties. What had previously been deviations within the Party over Menshevism, Bernsteinism, etc., were now definitely shown in the greatest events of the class struggle to be outside, and hostile to, the working class and its Party.

Lenin’s reaction was immediate. His very first statement on the war declared: ‘The betrayal of socialism by most leaders of the Second International (1889–1914) signifies the ideological and political bankruptcy of the International … It must be the task of the future International resolutely and irrevocably to rid itself of this bourgeois trend in socialism.’[10]

He declared that international Menshevism had definitively passed to the historical camp of the bourgeoisie, and that their parties, although composed of workers, were now politically bourgeois parties — a position from which Communists have never shifted. He commented: ‘The collapse of the International is clearly the collapse of opportunism, which is now captive to the bourgeoisie … Down with opportunism, and long live the Third International …’[11]

Lenin, in a whole series of articles written between 1914 and 1917, described the long quantitative development of opportunism. But he was also absolutely precise on the qualitative turning point: ‘Having for decades to mature in conditions of “peaceful” capitalism, opportunism was so mature by 1914–15 that it proved an open ally of the bourgeoisie’ (our emphasis).[12] It was, of course, this precise transformation of quantity into quality which meant the turn from a faction struggle within the Party to a situation where a split and the formation of a new Party was necessary.

As the resolution of the First Congress of the Communist International on the Second International put it: ‘At the first shot in the mass slaughter the chief parties of the Second International betrayed the working class, and each of them, on the pretext of “defence of the fatherland”, went over to the side of “its” bourgeoisie. It was at that moment that the Second International finally reached bankruptcy and perished.’[13]

It is important to note the method which Lenin employed, however, as against the Healy school of falsification. Prior to 1914 he did not call for a Party split on political grounds with the Mensheviks, despite their advocacy of voting for Cadets, their revisions of Marxism, etc.; nor did he call for a split in the Second International against Bernstein et al. He only called for a split when it was conclusively shown, in the greatest event of the class struggle, that international Menshevism had in practice, through its actions, sided with the camp of the counter-revolution. Then, of course, Lenin drew all the conclusions. The split was final and for ever. The views which had previously been considered positions to polemicise against in a faction struggle within the Party were now views which must be excluded from the Party.

But for the Healy-Just school this is doubtless all ‘empiricism’. Imagine only splitting when actions had shown a world historic betrayal! Healy and Just, of course, would have split years before on ‘method’ — and doubtless expelled the vacillating, conciliationist centrist Lenin as well.

IV. The Experience of the Left Opposition

As if the record of Lenin’s struggle were not sufficient to illustrate this difference of principle between party and faction, however, we have a second great experience — Trotsky’s struggle within the Communist International, and then his split from it.

Here we find that Trotsky pursued an identical method and course to Lenin. Trotsky refused to split from the Communist International simply because theoretical revisionism developed — the theory of socialism in one country, the ‘Third Period’, the idea of ‘social fascism’, etc. He refused to split even on such gigantic errors as Germany in 1923, Britain in 1926, and China in 1927. Trotsky replied to each of these events by building and consolidating a faction, but he rejected a split of the Party until the Comintern showed that it had crossed to the camp of counter-revolution in the greatest conceivable event of the class struggle — the coming to power of Hitler without a fight, through Stalinist betrayal, in 1933.

Healyism, of course, doubtless understands this all as some manoeuvre by Trotsky. He refused a split because the Comintern was big and it was the best way to gain members. Trotsky as crude manoeuvrer and realpolitiker — that is the real Healyite view of Trotsky. They reduce him to their own miserable stature.

In fact, however, Trotsky explained his position very clearly and very differently: ‘The degree of degeneration of a revolutionary party cannot as a rule be established “a priori” on the basis of symptoms alone. The living verification of events is indispensable. Theoretically it was still impermissible last year (1932) to have considered as absolutely excluded that the Bolshevik-Leninists, basing themselves on the sharpening of the class struggle, could succeed in impelling the Comintern to take the road of actual struggle against fascism.’[14]

Furthermore, clearly flowing from this, he carefully distinguished in the period prior to 1933 between the policy and leadership of the Communist Parties, which he described as centrist, and the class character of the parties themselves, which remained proletarian. ‘The Communist Party is a proletarian, anti-bourgeois party, even if erroneously led. The Social Democracy, though entirely composed of workers, is entirely a bourgeois party.’[15] The question of being a faction and not a party was therefore not one of manoeuvre but of real analysis and principle.

‘The slogan of the “reform” of the Comintern was, for us, never a hollow phrase. We counted on reform as a reality. Developments followed the worst road. That is precisely why we are compelled to declare that the policy of reform is exhausted to the very end.’[16] Of course once this was done then the issue was fought through to the end. In 1924 defence of ‘socialism in one country’ was a trend within the Party. In 1934 it was outside the Party through the fact of one of the greatest events of history.

Finally, just to complete the picture, we may refute the Deutscherite view on this question, which amounts to saying that in 1933 Trotsky got carried away and took an unjustifiable decision to split from the Comintern. On the contrary, Trotsky outlined quite clearly in advance that the question of Germany — the most important working class movement in the world, with the largest Communist Party outside the Soviet Union — was precisely a test of the same qualitative character as 1914. Thus he wrote in November 1931:

‘One of those decisive moments in history is closely approaching, when the Comintern, after a series of big but still “partial” mistakes which have undermined and shaken up the forces accumulated in the first five years, risks committing the capital, fatal error which may erase the Comintern as a revolutionary factor from the political map for an entire historical epoch.’[17]

The consequence was clear: ‘The seizure of power by the fascists would … most probably signify the necessity of creating a new revolutionary party, and in all likelihood also a new International.’[18]

Trotsky also pointed out: ‘In conducting the policy of a faction and educating its cadres on the experience of this policy, the Left Opposition, however, did not hide from itself nor from others that a new defeat of the proletariat, resulting from the policy of centrism, would inevitably acquire a decisive character and would demand a drastic review of our position on the question: faction or party?’[19]

The 1939–40 Factional Struggle in the SWP

As a final check on Trotsky’s method, consider the last great political struggle of his life — against the Burnham-Shachtman-Abern opposition in the SWP. This was a tendency whose leading members carried through open revisions of Marxism in their rejection of dialectical materialism and their characterisation of the Soviet Union as “bureaucratic collectivist”; and Trotsky characterised the opposition as a whole as petty-bourgeois. On the sectarian method there is no doubt what to do with such a tendency — split with it.

Cliff Slaughter, in his introduction to the WRP’s edition of In Defence of Marxism, states: ‘Cannon and the SWP majority leadership fought tenaciously to defend and build the Party and to drive out the opposition, once they had proved intractable to every attempt to win them to revolutionary positions’ (p. xi). Once again, Healyism decides to render Trotsky more profound! Here is what Trotsky, as opposed to Slaughter, had to say on this question:

‘Dear Friend [John G. Wright — a leader of the SWP] … I endorse completely your opinion about the necessity for a firm, even implacable theoretical and political fight against the petty-bourgeois tendencies of the opposition. You will see from my last article that I characterise the divergencies of the opposition even more sharply than has the majority. But at the same time I believe that this implacable ideological fight should go parallel with very cautious and very wise organisational tactics. You have not the slightest interest in a split even if the opposition should become, accidentally, a majority at the next convention … Even as an eventual minority, you should in my opinion remain disciplined and loyal towards the party as a whole.’[20]

Later he commented: ‘If someone should propose, for example, to expel comrade Burnham I would oppose it energetically. But at the same time I find it necessary to conduct the most strenuous ideological fight against his anti-Marxist conceptions.’[21]

He even went further: ‘I heard for example that comrade Gould [a supporter of Abern] proclaimed in a membership meeting — “You wish to expel us” … If it happens that someone of the majority launches such threats I for my part would vote for censure or severe warning.’[22]

In short, far from Trotsky or Cannon ‘driving out’ the petty-bourgeois tendency and splitting the organisation, Trotsky would have supported disciplinary action against anyone who advocated such a course! That is a measure of the gulf between Healy and Trotskyism and Leninism.

The fight in 1940 is precisely one of the greatest examples of a struggle in the real tradition of Lenin’s faction fights — a simultaneous and dialectically linked implacable ideological and political faction fight and a relentless struggle for the unity of the party. By its open rejection of these lessons, Healyism shows once again its complete break with Lenin and Trotsky on the question of the distinction between a party and a faction.

Finally, of course, 1940 should settle the ridiculous charge that Trotsky earlier opposed a split with the Comintern because it was ‘big’. In 1940 the SWP had a thousand members. Trotsky’s fight against a split was not for numbers but for principle. Trotsky, as Lenin, split the party only on the grounds of the historical betrayal of the working class and advocacy of views which had been demonstrated by these gigantic events to represent the camp of counter-revolution. He refused a split on differences of lesser scope just as much in 1940 as in 1923 or 1927. In the tradition of Lenin his distinction between party and faction was not formalism but a historic class line.

V. The 1953 Split in the Fourth International

Lenin and Trotsky after 1917 both taught the absolute necessity, against all forms of opportunism and conciliation, of relentless political and ideological struggle against wrong positions within the party. At the same time however they also held the position that political splits of the party, as opposed to faction fights within the party, become justified only with a crossing of class lines in the greatest events of the class struggle, events intelligible to broad masses.

If we approach the 1953 split from this principle, then the chief organisational question which has to be decided is whether this was a split into two different world parties, into two different Internationals, or a split into two factions within the same International.

The implication of this question, and the basis for deciding it, are clear. To justify a split into two separate world parties on a Leninist basis, not merely must wrong theories have developed and wrong positions on questions have been taken, but these must have culminated, in action, in historic betrayals of a character qualitatively the same as those of August 1914 at the outbreak of the imperialist war or those leading to January 1933 and the capitulation without a fight to Hitler.

Furthermore, if such a decisive historic transformation had taken place, with the transfer of one faction to the class camp of the counter-revolution, its future evolution was clear — just as the betrayals of the Social Democrats after 1914 and the Stalinists after 1933 grew progressively worse, then so clearly the degeneration of these new betrayers would intensify. Under these circumstances the course to be followed was precisely that of Lenin in 1914 and Trotsky in 1933 — absolute and complete break; contemptuous rejection of ‘unity’ with the agents of an enemy class; any ‘reunification’ totally out of the question; and the only correct attitude towards these traitors being that of merciless exposure of the growing betrayals of those who falsely claimed to be Trotskyists.

This was for a long time the position of the supporters of Lambert. Thus the British supporters of the Organising Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International (CORQI) write: ‘Pabloism destroyed the Fourth International as a world party through an adaptation to Stalinism in 1953, when Pablo and Co. supported the Kremlin against the uprising of the East German workers.’[23]

Apart from the fact that this is an outrageous lie — in 1953 nobody in the Fourth International supported the Kremlin against the East German workers — this position at least has the virtue of consistency. If revisionist theories had not been merely advanced but had indeed culminated in support of counter-revolution in such a decisive event as the first attempted political revolution against the Stalinist bureaucracy, then a split on a principled Leninist basis was perfectly justified. One would then have expected the ‘Pabloites’ to consummate this split with new and still deeper betrayals — as Just, indeed, long maintained.

Healy, of course, in his central positions advanced the same conclusion — that the support for Stalinism in 1953 in East Germany, and in France in the General Strike of the same year, was the qualitative turn which was then followed by the deepening betrayals in 1956 in Hungary, 1960 on Cuba, 1964 in Ceylon, in relation to Vietnam etc. Finally, as ‘revealed’ in the series “Security and the Fourth International”, the revisionists degenerated to the level of accomplices and agents of imperialism, the GPU, the police etc. — or, more precisely, the layer which had always been GPU agents attained a dominant and unchallenged place among the ‘Pabloites’.

On the other side in 1953, there were those who considered that at some point the US Socialist Workers Party had succumbed to American imperialism and become an organisation dominated by reformism, pacifism, the pressure of the white petty bourgeoisie, etc., etc.

All these positions at least have the virtue of being consistent. But in contrast to them, and despite undoubted wild statements made at the time — there is no point in disguising the fact that Cannon did say in 1953 that the split with Pablo was more definitive than that with Burnham and Shachtman,[24] or that Pablo wrote that ‘the faction of Cannon is a group condemned by history’[25] — the chief forces on both sides rapidly concluded that such a world historic betrayal, such a break from Trotskyism and from the interests of the proletariat, had not occurred.

Furthermore, despite all his lying and bluffing to the contrary, Healy is quite aware of this fact. Indeed the definitive proof is to be found in the documents of his own organisation. Thus in January 1961 the National Committee of the Socialist Labour League (forerunner of the Workers Revolutionary Party) sent a letter to the National Committee of the SWP which declared: ‘It is time to draw to a close the period in which Pabloite revisionism was considered a trend within Trotskyism.’[26] This position makes no sense unless at that time ‘Pabloite revisionism’, the line of the International Secretariat of the Fourth International, was considered a trend within Trotskyism.

Furthermore, as actions speak louder than words, consider what would have been the necessary course if world historic betrayals sufficient to justify not merely a faction but a new party had taken place. Under these circumstances there could be no talk whatever of ‘reunification’. It would never even have occurred to Lenin and Trotsky to even talk of, let alone propose, ‘reunification’ with the Social Democrats after 1914 or the Stalinists after 1933.

However this was not at all the policy pursued by Healy. When reunification between the International Secretariat and the International Committee was proposed in 1957, Healy did not oppose it on the correct grounds of principle that would have followed from his analysis of ‘Pabloite revisionism’. On the contrary, he agreed to parity commissions and a whole series of things which should have been out of the question on any principled application of his position.

Even worse, in 1960 Healy invited Ernest Mandel to address the SLL summer school — the same Mandel who on Healy’s analysis was a counter-revolutionary traitor. Just imagine Lenin inviting Kautsky in 1915 to a Bolshevik school, or Trotsky asking Stalin to address the Fourth International!

Finally, this sect recently gave, in its inimitable style, fresh proof of its inconsistency, probably without understanding the implications of what it was doing. In July 1970, Healy approached the Fourth International ‘for informal talks around the possibility of joint discussion centred on outstanding political differences and directed towards the holding of a joint international conference’.[27]

Again, on the view that the ‘Pabloites’ were a current outside Trotskyism who had carried out an historic betrayal of the working class, this must be counted as a vile capitulation.[28] The problem for Healy, of course, is that if this latter position is the correct one then the appropriate organisational conclusions have to be drawn. If there have been no historic betrayals justifying new parties and a new International, then it is clearly the task of revolutionaries to unify their forces. If not, then what is occurring is that people are attempting to build organisations on the basis of tactical differences, analyses of particular events, theories whose class content has not been fully demonstrated in the class struggle — all of which are formulas for building a sect, but absolutely not for building a revolutionary party. These practices have nothing to do with the conceptions of Lenin and Trotsky.

Consider, for example, Trotsky’s position in the period from 1923–1933 i.e. until the Communist International had definitively shown that it had passed to the camp of counter-revolution. The Communist International was an organisation which actually did betray the Chinese Revolution of 1927. For much of this period Trotsky and his supporters were forced to function as a public faction of the International — not through choice but through their expulsion. Trotsky, however, didn’t accept this existence as a public faction but on the contrary demanded his faction’s re-admission to the Party. Even in December 1932 he stated categorically: ‘The entire responsibility for the splitting of communism lies on the Stalinist bureaucracy. The Bolshevik-Leninists are prepared, at any moment, to return to the ranks of the Comintern and to observe strict discipline in action.’[29]

Furthermore, as a faction and not a party, the demand which Trotsky advanced for ceasing to be a public faction was not a political one — such as the abandonment of the line on China or of the Third Period — but the organisational one of the right to put forward his faction’s views within the Party: ‘We cannot refuse to criticise (Stalinist) centrism … But mutual criticism, in itself unavoidable and fruitful, may have a different character, depending on the extent to which it is consciously prepared by both sides and in what organisational framework it takes place. In this field, the importance of which does not require proof, the Left Opposition is prepared at any moment to come to an agreement in which it will ask for itself only the restoration of its right to fight in the common ranks.’[30]

Trotsky, right until the end, was absolutely rigorous in his distinction between party and faction and the conclusions which flowed from the two positions — as a faction there must be a continuous struggle for reintegration into the party, but once the conditions justifying a new party had been established then this meant a total and complete split, rejecting for all time any traitorous talk of ‘reunification’ with the counter-revolutionaries.

What you can’t do, however, is to have your cake and eat it. You can’t simultaneously maintain that there are ‘Pabloite revisionists’ who have historically betrayed the working class and that there is a ‘World Trotskyist Movement’ of which they are a part. Whatever dose of pseudo-dialectics Healy applies, these two contradictory ideas can never be reconciled.[31]

Having drawn the historical lessons of Lenin’s struggle against the revisionists in the Second International and of Trotsky’s struggle against Stalinism, we find that what emerges in both cases is that neither launched a new party until the Social Democrats and the Stalinists respectively had passed definitively into the camp of the counter-revolution — the first by supporting the imperialist First World War, the second by the capitulation of 1933 which allowed Hitler to come to power without a single shot being fired.

VI. The Bitter Fruits of Fractional Sectarianism

Until these historic class betrayals had actually taken place, Lenin and Trotsky fought for the existence of factions within the same party in order to work out and debate political differences.

In the same way the 1953 split in the Fourth International was not a split into two world parties but into two public factions. Since there had been no historic betrayal of the interests of the working class, it was possible to envisage a reunification of these two factions on principled bases in 1963 — a reunification which took in the majority of the International Committee and the majority of the International Secretariat.

Gerry Healy and the so-called CORQI chose to remain outside the reunified International in 1963. They maintained and developed the myth that ‘Pabloite revisionism’ had destroyed the International in 1953.

Healy’s total lack of understanding of the difference between a faction and a party, revealed in his attitude to the 1953 split, inevitably contributed to the internal disintegration of what remained of his own International Committee.[32]

The first result of Healy’s allegation that the ‘Pabloites’ crossed the class Rubicon in 1953 was the systematic lying and misrepresentation of his opponents’ views. For if the Pabloites were responsible for world historic betrayals, then Healy had to prove it — and, inevitably, show that such betrayals would continue and get worse. This is something very different from arguing that gross errors have been developed and revisionist ideas advanced. Even if true, these would justify a division into no more than two tendencies or factions, not a split of the Party and of the International.

Lacking the necessary facts, Healy was forced to justify his position through systematic lying. To lie that the International Secretariat did not support the 1956 Hungarian revolution; to lie that Cuba is not a workers’ state; to lie that the United Secretariat did not intervene in and even publicly attack the line of the Ceylonese section before a majority of it joined a bourgeois coalition government in 1964; to lie concerning the line of the French comrades in the May 1968 General Strike; to lie today on virtually every major issue of the world revolution.

To justify the creation of a separate party from the ‘Pabloites’, when in fact the conditions for such a definitive split did not exist, the SLL/WRP was forced to turn its organisation and publications into one of the greatest storehouses of falsehood and dishonesty in the labour movement. Lying and falsification is not accidental, an ‘excess’ of Healyism, but something which became a necessary part of its political line in order to maintain its separation from the Fourth International.

But such a sustained campaign of falsehood has its own inevitable effects. Firstly, there is a deadly danger that the membership may encounter reality and see that these statements are lies. So the membership must be censored. Hence such terrible practices as taking away leaflets handed out to WRP members, of printing the documents of only one side in disputes and so on — practices culled from the Stalinist tradition.

The members must be kept from anything and anyone who challenges Healy’s ‘truth’. United fronts are rejected not simply because of the WRP’s wrong political positions, but because they lead to ‘contamination’. Sectarianism deepens. Finally even physical violence is used to keep any ‘alien’ influence away. But clinical isolation cannot be achieved; even an innocent question might lead to the demand for wider answers and reality creeping in. Complete cessation of internal democracy is the only way to prevent this. A sectarian organisation, which has made organisational sectarianism a principle, always and inevitably tends to the suppression of internal democracy.

Finally, when the danger of the truth striking looks ever more likely, the members of the WRP must be inoculated against Healy’s political opponents by vile personal attacks. To maintain their position it wasn’t enough for the Stalinists to attempt to prove Trotsky politically wrong, they had to make him a conscious agent of the counter-revolution and the fascists. So also must Healy make the leaders of the SWP and of the Fourth International not merely political opponents but actual accomplices of the GPU and the FBI, common police informers and narks, and so on. Although the leaders of the CORQI have not followed this infernal logic to the end, they have been obliged to adopt the first forms of the same method. Systematic lying; the charge that Varga or Lora were agents of the CIA or of fascism; the claim that Krivine’s candidacy was a ‘crypto-Stalinist candidacy propelled by the bourgeoisie’; the occasional resort to physical violence; the suppression of all internal democracy — all these are in the same line as Healy’s methods. They are the inevitable product of the stubborn attempt to build a sect-faction confused with the building of the party.

Ironically enough, the internal regime of Healy’s organisation does resemble that of a faction. The totally correct acceptance of diverse political views within a party is unacceptable within a faction — it would make it an unprincipled combination. If the organisation is not conceived as a party-type organisation but as a faction, then it is a principled position not to tolerate divergent views. Internal party democracy is one thing; the regime of a faction, which is not governed by democratic centralism, is another. Once again, the consequence of the confusion between party and faction is the production of a sect with its appropriate ‘regime’.

VII. Tasks and Conclusions

For all Trotskyists outside the Fourth International, the task is clear. Certainly discuss the issues of the 1953 split. Take your positions on the theoretical and political questions involved. We for our part will certainly do this. But also address yourselves to one fundamental and prior question, and draw all the practical conclusions from it:

In the period leading up to 1953 and since, have the International Secretariat and later the United Secretariat of the Fourth International betrayed the world revolution and the proletariat by acts comparable to those of 1914 and 1933? If so, your task is clear. Maintain a separate organisation, and cease once and for all your talk of a ‘world Trotskyist movement’. Your task is then solely to expose those who usurp the name of Trotskyists, and to try to destroy their organisation.

Alternatively adopt the course taken by all the main sections of world Trotskyism after 1953, which led to reunification in 1963. Conclude, perhaps, that great errors were committed. Conclude, even, that these are maintained today. But if that is the case your duty is to fight inside the International to correct these errors. Split only if your fight fails and the errors of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International do actually culminate in a betrayal of historic dimensions. We obviously do not share your view of our supposed ‘revisionism’. But if you conclude that no historic betrayal justifying a division into two Internationals has taken place, then your task as revolutionaries is to follow the road of unification without exclusions, respecting the organisational rules that govern a single party and a single International: the rules of democratic centralism, of a minority which submits in action to the decisions of the majority while keeping unrestricted freedom of discussion and criticism in print.

To refuse to choose clearly between these two roads — to use at one and the same time the language appropriate to counter-revolutionary enemies, with whom one organises a split to the knife, and the language of unity towards revolutionaries with whom one seeks to build a common party — can only give a lamentable impression of hypocrisy and duplicity, which makes any constructive discussion difficult if not impossible.

In 1963, when the International Secretariat and the International Committee overcame the division into two public factions by uniting within the Fourth International, they noted that the only forces who held out against reunification were the Posadas group in Latin America, the Lambertists in France and the SLL in Britain. They expressed the hope that these groups would rejoin the unified International at a later date on a principled basis.

Seventeen years later, the balance sheet of where the rejection of principled organisational methods leads should be clear. It was by no means the only element causing Healy’s degeneration into a sect, but it was the one which, in Healy’s case, made that degeneration insurpassable. It shows the future of all who follow this logic. The return of the CORQI to some of the most sectarian of these methods, since it put an end to its course of principled rapprochement with the Fourth International and replaced it with attempts to split the Fourth International, shows once again the logic of the sect-faction as opposed to the building of the party.

VIII. The Historical Roots of the Party and of the Sect-Faction

The proletarian vanguard party is a product of the real class struggle in a threefold sense. Its programme is the synthesis of the lessons of all the class struggles. Its cadres are militants recognised as leaders of struggles by at least a significant minority sector of the real working class (the class of wage-earners). Its political initiatives influence — if only partially — the real course of the class struggle.

In this sense the Fourth International (like the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party of 1903) is only the nucleus of a party; it is not yet a party in the real sense of the term.

But it is precisely in the phase of party-building that the risks of confusing party and sect-faction are greatest and most serious in their consequences. For small organisations bear the full weight of the ills of essentially propagandist circle life, with its accompanying phenomena — such as what Lenin rightly called “intellectual hysteria” — which tends to confuse tactical or conjunctural differences with programmatic ones, and errors of formulation with actual betrayals of real struggles (that is, with acts which in fact cause disastrous defeats for the working class).

When a genuine vanguard party exists, the differences are no fewer than when only the nucleus of a party exists. They are many and inevitable. Only a faction can be ‘monolithic’ — and even then only for a short time. But real ties with the class impose on the militants and cadres of the party an elementary proletarian discipline, which makes it possible to avoid irresponsible splits, or to confine their effects to grouplets which marginalise themselves from the real movement — provided that strict respect for internal democracy (the right of tendency and the non-prohibition of factions) creates the indispensable conditions for every difference to be finally settled in the light of common practice.

At the stage of the ‘nucleus of a party’ (or in periods of reaction, when an already existing party is considerably weakened), this healthy proletarian constraint, which comes from the class struggle itself, grows weaker — and the risks of irresponsible splits multiply. The harmful effects of these splits — that of 1953 as much as that of 1979 — are plain. They slow down the accumulation of cadres and militants which is indispensable if the ‘nucleus of a party’ is to serve as a credible pole of attraction for vanguard workers. They weaken the capacity for intervention in the class. By postponing the possibility of settling differences by the test of practice, they slow down the process of political clarification and programmatic enrichment.

Above all, they take place outside the real course of the class struggle, and so have no impact at all on the raising of proletarian class consciousness.

It is particularly necessary to distinguish between the methods of organisation and behaviour of factions within a party already far advanced on the road of reformist class collaboration, where internal democracy is severely restricted, and those acceptable within a fundamentally healthy and democratic revolutionary party, even one charged with serious political errors. Trotsky took great pains to draw this distinction, and to explain that permanent factions are an absolutely abnormal and unacceptable practice within a revolutionary party:

‘In a factional struggle against the reformists, revolutionaries frequently resort to extreme measures, although as a rule the reformists conduct themselves much more brutally in factional struggles. But in both cases, for both camps, the point is to prepare for the break to take place under the most advantageous conditions. Those who transfer such methods of work into a revolutionary organisation reveal either their own political immaturity and lack of a sense of responsibility, or an anarchist individualism, most often concealed behind sectarian principles, or finally that they are altogether foreign to the revolutionary organisation.’[33]

IX. The Struggle and Unity of the Bolsheviks

The decisive element in the building of the Bolsheviks on the organisational level was not, as the sects claim, the method of rapid and premature splits but, on the contrary, the prolonged struggle for political clarification combined with the fight for the unity of the party. It was only by demonstrating conclusively to the working class in Russia both that the ideas of the Bolsheviks were correct — and that they had to be defended inside the party in order to prove their correctness in the light of the real class struggle — and that they fought for proletarian discipline and unity against irresponsible splitters, that the Bolsheviks built the really solid nucleus and cadres they had in the working class: a nucleus of a few hundred people supporting their faction in 1903, which by 1914 had won the support of the majority of the organised Russian working class. If, on the contrary, Lenin had acted between 1903 and 1914 as today’s sectarians would have wished — that is, if he had consciously split the party politically to form his own sect-faction — then in 1914 and 1917 the Bolsheviks would have had not a mass party but a tiny grouplet set on the road to internal degeneration. As always, a principled policy is the only effective one in any matter of importance.

It is in studying the long history of the Bolshevik faction that one acquires a sense of the historical perspective of what Lenin called “the Party principle”, as opposed to the spirit of the circle or the sect. It shows too the need for a sense of proportion in internal struggles, and for education against the spirit of permanent factionalism. The detailed study of how Lenin acted in these battles offers a clear and positive alternative to the methods and conceptions of Healy-Just.

The immediate historical origins of Bolshevism, and therefore of Leninism, are to be found at the time of the creation of the Russian Social Democratic and Labour Party. Although the RSDLP had been formally founded in 1898, its first Congress amounted to very little — almost all the participants were immediately arrested and the whole organisation broken up. Until the Second Congress of 1903, Russian Marxism remained split up into a number of individual groups or ‘circles’.

The real foundation of the RSDLP in 1903 however, while a gigantic step forward, had brought into existence a Party very far removed from one with a correct Marxist position on every question. Lenin had been involved with Plekhanov in a long struggle over the Party programme in which by no means all of Lenin’s positions had been accepted; Lenin had been engaged in a fight before the Congress with Martov on the organisation of working class self-defence; an opportunist resolution on relations with bourgeois forces proposed by Potresov (Starover) was passed by the Congress itself; and finally Lenin was defeated by Martov on the famous question of the Party rules.[34]

Despite these differences, however, Lenin was emphatic that all the positions defended at the Second Congress were trends within the political camp of the working class and therefore within the Party. He stated that the factions:

‘are only divided by shades, about which we may and should argue, but over which it would be absurd and childish to part company …. a struggle of shades in the Party is inevitable and essential, as long as it does not lead to anarchy and splits, as long as it is confined within bounds approved by the common consent of all comrades and Party members. And our struggle against the Right wing of the Party at the Congress, against Akimov and Axelrod, Martynov and Martov, in no way exceeded those bounds.’[35]

Thus the representatives of every position which had emerged in the groups before the Second Congress were included in the Party. Thus far from being excluded from the RSDLP through a split by Lenin, even the most outspoken Economists, Akimov and Martynov, were explicitly members of the newly created Party. Lenin analysed the differences within the RSDLP at that time as being inevitably due to its rapid expansion, and that positions calling for splits and expulsions reflected hangovers from the sectarian ‘circle spirit’.[36]

While the founding of the Party was a great step forward, it therefore gave rise to faction struggles. Out of the disputes over the composition of the Central Committee of the Party and the Editorial Board of Iskra the two factions of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks crystallised. Lenin had been defeated at the Second Congress on the Party Rules, but he had gained a majority on the question of the composition of the Central Committee and Editorial Board. However, while he and the Bolsheviks, acting on party principles, accepted discipline on their defeat on the Party Rules, the Mensheviks refused to accept discipline on their defeat on the composition of the leading bodies. Starting with Martov, the Mensheviks began a policy of boycotts and resignations which rapidly brought the Party to the point of a split.

In reply to the threat to Party unity created by the Mensheviks, Lenin applied the same principles as in the fight against circle sectarianism. He rejected under any circumstances giving up the fight for Bolshevik political positions. At the same time however he rejected the concept that political events, and the struggle over organisation, had already definitively demonstrated the need for a split. Whereas Lenin declared in 1914 that the gigantic event of the reaction of the Second International to the First World War had proved conclusively that not merely Russian but international Menshevism were enemies of socialism, in 1903 he was clear that no such decisive historic test had occurred. He stated unambiguously:

‘Are the new-Iskrists [Mensheviks] traitors to the proletarian cause? No. But they are inconsistent, wavering, opportunist champions of the cause (and of the organisational and tactical principles illumining the cause). That is why their position is opposed by the revolutionary Social-Democrats.’[37]

In consequence Lenin rejected the position that there was a principled basis for a split between the two factions:

‘The differences in principle between Vperyod [the Bolshevik paper] and the new Iskra are essentially the same as those between the old Iskra and Rabocheye Dyelo [the paper of the Economists]. We consider these differences important, but, given the opportunity fully to defend our views, the views of the old Iskra, we would not consider these differences of themselves to be a bar to working together in one Party.’[38]

Faced with such a situation the task was not to split but to continue the fight for party unity:

‘We have already won a great deal, and we must go on fighting, undismayed by reverses, fighting steadfastly, scorning the philistine methods of circle wrangling, doing our very utmost to preserve the hard-won single Party tie linking all Russian Social-Democrats ….’[39]

Indeed, far from advocating a split himself, Lenin considered that the Mensheviks’ split moves revealed clearly the contrast between their anarchistic acts and the proletarian discipline of the Bolsheviks. The culmination of this attempt of the Bolsheviks to carry on the struggle against the Mensheviks within the confines of a united party was the call for the Third Party Congress. As Lenin put it:

‘I think that precisely with a view to the free clarification of differences of principle it is necessary to eliminate the crisis, to clear the atmosphere of squabbles, and for that we need a congress. Not in order to cut short the struggle, but to bring it within normal bounds, a Third Congress is required.’[40]

He considered that a new congress, the real alternative to the policy of boycotts and splits of the Mensheviks, was the only way to safeguard the unity of the Party:

‘The practical way out of the crisis, we consider, is the immediate summoning of the Third Party Congress. It alone can clarify the situation, settle the disputes, and confine the struggle within proper bounds …. We are told that a congress would lead to a split. But why? If the minority are irreconcilable in their anarchistic leanings, if they are prepared to have a split rather than submit to the Party, then they have already virtually seceded from it …. But we do not grant the possibility of a split. In face of the real strength of the organised Party, the anarchistically minded elements are bound to, and we think will, bow in submission.’[41]

By the beginning of 1905 the Bolsheviks had gained the support of the majority of the local party committees for a congress, and under the constitution of the Party the leading bodies controlled by the Mensheviks should have been compelled to call one. It was at this point that the Mensheviks took the initiative to overturn the Party Constitution altogether and refused to convene the Congress, in spite of their obligation under the Rules. If there had been the slightest element of sectarianism in Lenin’s position, if he had in the slightest favoured a split in the Party, there is no doubt that the Third Congress, finally summoned in spring 1905, would have broken definitely with the Mensheviks. However, far from doing this, every single section and faction of the RSDLP, including the Mensheviks, were invited.

Even when the Mensheviks held their own conference alongside the Third Congress, and thereby a de facto split in the Party was created, Lenin clearly came out in favour of the reunification of the Party. The sole condition for that unification was acceptance of the organisational framework and discipline of the Party. The Third Congress made a number of revisions to the Party Rules — guaranteeing the right of distribution of minority literature to all Party members, increasing the power of local committees — which created constitutional guarantees for the right of the Mensheviks to fight for their positions within the Party. In summarising the results of the Congress Lenin wrote:

‘Despite the absence of the Minority, the Third Congress took every measure to enable the Minority to work with the Majority in one party. The Congress held the reversion to the antiquated and superseded views of Economism discernible in our Party to be incorrect; at the same time, it provided precise and definite guarantees of the rights of every minority, guarantees embodied in the Rules of the Party and binding on all its members. The Minority now has the unconditional right, guaranteed by the Party Rules, to advocate its views and to carry on an ideological struggle, so long as the disputes and differences do not lead to disorganisation, so long as they do not impede constructive work, split our forces, or hinder the concerted struggle against the autocracy and the capitalists.’[42]

Far from the Congress rounding off a split with the Mensheviks, Lenin spoke of ‘the inevitable future restoration of the Party’s unity’.[43] The work which was to culminate in the restoration of the unity of the RSDLP a year later was already being prepared by the Bolsheviks at the Third Congress. Far from being a ‘manoeuvre’ on Lenin’s part, this restoration of unity was the culmination of the fight for party unity combined with the fight for his political ideas which he had been waging since 1903.

The ‘inevitable unification’ of the Party which Lenin had fought for in April 1905 came into existence at the Fourth (Unity) Party Congress in April 1906. Lenin acclaimed this unification, to which the Bolsheviks had oriented since 1903, as a tremendous achievement. He stated:

‘…. both at the [Third] Congress and at the Conference we created the “drab theory” of Party unity. Comrade workers, help us to transform this drab theory into living reality! Join the Party organisations in huge numbers! Turn our Fourth Congress and the Second Menshevik Conference into a grand and imposing Congress of Social-Democratic workers. Join with us in settling this practical question of fusion; let this question be the exception (it is an exception that proves the opposite rule!) in which we shall have one-tenth theory and nine-tenths practice. Such a wish is surely legitimate, historically necessary, and psychologically comprehensible …. Let us, then, unite also to make this revolution!’[44]

He violently attacked all those who declared that unification in one party with the Mensheviks was a manoeuvre — stating at the Congress itself, for example, to make an authoritative record, that:

‘It is not true that I “supported” Comrade Vorobyov’s statement that the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks cannot work together in one party. I did not in any way “support” such an assertion, and do not share that opinion at all.’[45]

Once again the dialectical relation of Lenin’s struggle for political clarification and organisational unity is clear. He posed the political struggle in the sharpest possible terms and simultaneously called for strict party discipline on the part of the Bolsheviks even though they were now a minority.

The first real test of ‘party unity’ followed soon after the 1906 Congress when the RSDLP turned its attention to the elections for the Duma. The Mensheviks, convinced of the leading role of the bourgeoisie in the revolution, advocated an electoral agreement with the capitalist Cadet Party. Lenin stated on this:

‘The sanction of blocs with the Cadets is the finishing touch that definitely marks the Mensheviks as the opportunist wing of the workers’ party.’[46]

Did Lenin now propose a split? On the contrary, he posed the question entirely as a principled faction struggle in which he demanded of the Bolsheviks strict observance of the Party’s discipline even when they were in a minority. He wrote:

‘We are waging a ruthless ideological struggle against the formation of blocs with the Cadets, and this struggle must be developed to the widest possible extent …. The question is how to combine this ruthless ideological struggle with proletarian party discipline …. We have more than once already enunciated our theoretical views on the importance of discipline and on how this concept is to be understood in the party of the working class. We defined it as: unity of action, freedom of discussion and criticism. Only such discipline is worthy of the democratic party of the advanced class …. After the competent bodies have decided, all of us, as members of the Party, must act as one man. A Bolshevik in Odessa must cast into the ballot box a ballot paper bearing a Cadet’s name even if it sickens him ….’[47]

We could not wish for a clearer definition of Leninist principles on organisation. Not for Lenin the split at the drop of a revisionist hat, or the split based on ‘logically’ projected results of present positions. What was necessary was to struggle against such thoroughly wrong positions within the party until either the comrades had been won from their incorrect positions or the working out of this line definitively placed them, in action, outside the camp of the proletariat altogether, in events of historic scope — as in 1914. It was exactly the line which Trotsky was to follow in his struggle in the Comintern between 1923 and 1933. It demanded political struggle within the party but simultaneously absolute discipline in action to preserve party unity.

Disciplined proletarian policy triumphed. At the Fifth Party Congress in 1907 the Bolsheviks gained the majority from the Mensheviks. Then, as it became clear that the Bolsheviks were gaining a majority, it was the Mensheviks who began to split once more. Once again, just as after 1903, Lenin contrasted the Bolsheviks’ proletarian discipline and acceptance of party unity with the splitting activities of the Mensheviks.

The dispute over elections which broke out in 1906 was the prelude to the final great struggle which was to culminate in the real split of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks into separate parties. The background to this struggle was the terrible period of reaction in Russia which was inaugurated by the Stolypin ‘coup d’état’ of 3 June 1907 — a blow which dissolved the Duma, arrested the Social Democratic deputies on conspiracy charges and established a totally reactionary electoral law. Labour organisations were dispersed, anti-semitic pogroms unleashed, the press stifled and a mass wave of arrests and torture launched. Terrible demoralisation set in among the working class and the revolutionaries. The attitude to take to this situation was first debated at the Fifth RSDLP Congress in July 1907. While the Bolsheviks had by now a clear majority for their fundamental positions within the party — analysis of the leading role of the working class in the revolution, rejection of electoral blocs with the Cadets, call for a revolutionary provisional government, etc. — nevertheless an important tactical difference emerged among them on the question of whether to participate in elections for the new Third Duma. The Congress voted finally to participate in the elections, but this was carried on the basis of a bloc of the Mensheviks, the Jewish Bund, the Poles (the party of Rosa Luxemburg), one of the Lettish votes, and one Bolshevik vote — Lenin’s. Following the Party Congress it became clearer and clearer that the division among the Bolsheviks represented not a minor tactical difference, which could be contained within a faction in a principled fashion, but involved a totally different analysis of the situation in Russia and of the Party. Although such differences were containable within a party, they were impermissible in a faction. In the course of the struggle Lenin outlined with classic precision the difference between a party and a faction:

‘In our Party Bolshevism is represented by the Bolshevik faction. But a faction is not a party. A party can contain a whole gamut of opinions and shades of opinion, the extremes of which may be sharply contradictory …. That is not the case within a faction. A faction in a party is a group of like-minded persons formed for the purpose primarily of influencing the party in a definite direction, for the purpose of securing acceptance for their principles in the party in the purest possible form. For this, real unanimity of opinion is necessary. The different standards we set for party unity and factional unity must be grasped by everyone who wants to know how the question of the internal discord in the Bolshevik faction really stands.’[48]

The result was clear — the boycotter Bogdanov was expelled from the Bolshevik faction. But the expulsion clearly illustrated the difference between a party and a faction, and that there was no Bolshevik Party at this time. The Bolsheviks were absolutely clear that Bogdanov remained a member, with all his positions, in the RSDLP:

‘No one is encroaching on your Party post and there is no point in bringing it in. We do not have a split in the Party, but in the faction. The writ of our conference does not run to Party posts.’[49]

Throughout this whole struggle the Bolsheviks, far from seeking to split the RSDLP, demanded an end to all irresponsible attempts in that direction. Indeed one of the chief accusations made against Bogdanov was that he was seeking to split the Party. Lenin recalled the long history of struggle of the Bolsheviks against a split since 1903:

‘There is no question whatever of sinking our tactical differences with the Mensheviks. We are fighting and shall continue to fight most strenuously against Menshevik deviations from the policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Nor, needless to say, is there any question of the Bolshevik faction dissolving its identity in the Party …. The Bolshevik faction as a definite ideological trend in the Party must exist as before …. And to them [the Bolsheviks], as firm and consistent guardians of Party principle, now falls a highly important task. They must enlist in the cause of building up the Party all elements who are fitted to serve it …. Our main task is to preserve and consolidate the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and everything else must be subordinated to it.’[50]

Far from urging a split with the Mensheviks, Lenin urged a bloc with all those Mensheviks prepared to support the Party. He called for Party members to support: ‘a rapprochement of pro-Party members of all factions and sections of the Party, above all a rapprochement between the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks.’[51] This policy provided the axis for the Bolsheviks in the fight up to 1912.

The struggle against the boycotters was relatively limited in scope — by the spring of 1908 the boycotters had already become minorities in Moscow and St Petersburg and thereafter declined rapidly. However taking place simultaneously, and much more seriously, was a fight concerning the trends among the Mensheviks themselves. While not at all differing on the chief political positions of Menshevism — such as belief in the leading role of the bourgeoisie in the revolution, and support for electoral alliances with the Cadets — the Mensheviks were divided over the question of the maintenance of the illegal Party. The so-called ‘pro-Party Mensheviks’, led by Plekhanov, stood for the maintenance of the RSDLP. The so-called ‘Menshevik liquidators’ were for the winding up of the illegal RSDLP and the maintenance of legality at all costs.

Confronted with this division over the question of the very existence of the Party, Lenin acted once again on his distinction between party and faction. There could be no political rapprochement with any section of the Mensheviks. However, organisationally, the pro-Party Mensheviks were within the Party. Against the liquidators’ threat to the very existence of the RSDLP, Lenin fought for a principled bloc with them:

‘Plekhanov was never a Bolshevik. We do not and never will consider him a Bolshevik. But we do consider him a pro-Party Menshevik … We regard it as the absolute duty of all Bolsheviks … to exert every effort to arrive at a rapprochement with such Social-Democrats.’[52]

Lenin summarised the situation when he said that in 1910 the Party had seen ‘the pro-Party Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks work in harmony for a whole year’.[53]

The task of the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks in reconsolidating the illegal RSDLP had been accomplished by the end of 1911. This reconsolidation was formally completed at the Sixth Party Congress held in Prague in January 1912. At this congress there was not a political split with Menshevism as such — on the contrary, as we have seen, Lenin worked for the Congress to bring Bolsheviks together with a section of the Mensheviks. The split was not with those who defended the political positions of Menshevism but with those who refused to accept the illegal existence of the RSDLP.

X. Trotsky’s Conclusions

Although the conditions for the building of revolutionary parties were enormously changed following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the study of the history of Bolshevism nevertheless remained the classic laboratory of such building, from which all tendencies have since tried to draw conclusions. The question of whether Bolshevism had emerged as a Party in 1903 at the time of the Second Party Congress, or whether on the contrary it had been a faction of the RSDLP in the period prior to 1912, came to occupy a real role in the struggle between Trotsky and the rising Stalinist bureaucracy.

In order to carry on their campaign against ‘Trotskyism’, the bureaucracy had to portray Trotsky as the most pronounced possible opponent of Lenin. In addition to endlessly reprinting every criticism Lenin had made of Trotsky in the period prior to 1917, the bureaucracy invented the myth that, in the period following 1903, Lenin and Trotsky had been not merely members of different factions but members of different parties. Starting with the distortions of Zinoviev’s History of the Bolshevik Party, and passing through the more straightforward falsifications of Stalin’s History of the CPSU(B) (Short Course), the myth was invented that the Bolsheviks had already formed an independent party in 1903. To create this myth the entire history of Bolshevism had to be perverted and falsified in the campaign against Trotsky. It is both paradoxical and sad that sectarian so-called ‘Trotskyists’ today draw their arguments from these same anti-Trotskyist sources of the Soviet bureaucracy.

For his part, Trotsky also turned to the history of Bolshevism for a dual purpose. In the first place he exposed the Stalinist falsifications of history, notably in The Stalin School of Falsification and in his testimony to the Dewey Commission. Secondly, however, and more importantly, he utilised the experience of Bolshevism to develop his own position in the struggle with Stalinism within the Communist International and then in the building of the Fourth International. He adopted entirely Lenin’s position of combining the intransigent struggle for his political positions with the fight for the unity of the International, so long as it had not definitively passed over to positions hostile to the proletariat in events of historic scope comparable to 4 August 1914. The document adopted at the first conference of the International Left Opposition stated:

’The International Left Opposition regards itself as a faction of the Comintern and its separate national sections as factions of the national Communist Parties. This means that the Left Opposition does not regard the organisational regime created by the Stalinist bureaucracy as final …. That such a policy is the only correct one under the given conditions is proven both by theoretical analysis and historical experience. Although the special conditions of Russian development had brought Bolshevism to a final break with Menshevism as early as 1912, the Bolshevik Party remained in the Second International until the end of the year 1914. The lesson of world war was necessary to pose the question of a new International; the October Revolution was necessary to constitute that new International.

Such a historical catastrophe as the collapse of the Soviet state would, of course, sweep away with it the Third International too. Similarly the victory of fascism in Germany and the smashing of the German proletariat would hardly allow the Comintern to survive the consequences of its disastrous policies. But who in the camp of revolution will today dare to say that the collapse of the Soviet power or the victory of fascism in Germany cannot be avoided or prevented? Not the Left Opposition in any event …. Standing on the foundation of the October Revolution and of the Third International, the Left Opposition rejects the idea of parallel Communist Parties.’[54]

When in 1933 the Communist International did carry through its historic betrayal of the German and international working class, Trotsky — again following the example of Lenin, this time of August 1914 — came out definitively for a split with the Comintern and the formation of a new International. The method he used, both to reject a split with the Communist International before such a betrayal and to come out firmly for one afterwards, shows how fully he had absorbed the organisational lessons of Bolshevism. We defend the same principles of organisation today.

It is of course impossible to mechanically apply the conclusions and positions of one situation to another. Nevertheless, historical analysis does provide one of the vital elements of the raw material on which revolutionary theory and practice is based. The very concrete analysis of the concrete situation is made through concepts which in large part are forged from historical experience.

To show that the differences which separate revolutionaries today are qualitatively smaller than those which Lenin and Trotsky considered compatible with membership of a single organisation is to show that the organisational divisions founded on, or justified by, such differences reflect no ‘Bolshevik political firmness’ whatever, but on the contrary a sectarian organisational weakness. A study of the history of Bolshevism is an integral part of the struggle to ensure that revolutionaries overcome their infantile organisational sectarianism and bring their practice into line with the political reality of the class struggle and with Marxist theory.

Notes

1. Lenin, Collected Works (CW), Vol. 7, p. 351.

2. Lenin, CW, Vol. 34, p. 246.

3. Lenin, CW, Vol. 17, p. 265.

4. Lenin, CW, Vol. 17, p. 453.

5. Lenin, CW, Vol. 17, p. 481 (1976, Red Weekly 139, n. 6); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 17, p. 487.

6. Lenin, CW, Vol. 17, p. 227; 1980: Œuvres, vol. 17, p. 228. In 1976 this passage carries no separate note.

7. Lenin, CW, Vol. 17, p. 227. 1980: Œuvres, vol. 17, p. 228.

8. Lenin, CW, Vol. 13, p. 323. 1980: Œuvres, vol. 11, pp. 332–3.

9. In 1976 (Red Weekly 139) this paragraph was addressed to the WSL, and ran: ‘Unfortunately, through their quite wrong factual account of the history of the Bolshevik Party, the WSL shows that it has as yet made no serious study on these issues. It cannot explain why Lenin formed a faction in 1903, expelled Mensheviks in 1912 on organisational and not political grounds, and only came out for a political split in the Party in 1914. Similarly, to jump ahead, it cannot say why Trotsky formed a faction in 1923, only advocated a new party in 1933, and was for example opposed to a split with Burnham and Shachtman in the Socialist Workers Party in 1940. On these questions the comrades of the WSL have not as yet consciously fought through their break with Healyism and tend to take as good coin what they received from the WRP.’

10. Lenin, CW, Vol. 21, p. 16.

11. Lenin, CW, Vol. 21, p. 38.

12. Lenin, CW, Vol. 21, p. 444.

13. Resolution of the First Congress of the Communist International on the Berne Conference of the parties of the Second International.

14. Trotsky, ‘It is necessary to build Communist Parties and an International anew’.

15. Trotsky, ‘What Next?’

16. Trotsky, ‘It is impossible to Remain in the Same International with Stalin’.

17. Trotsky, ‘Germany the Key to the International Situation’.

18. Trotsky, ‘For a Workers United Front Against Fascism’.

19. Trotsky, ‘It is necessary to build Communist Parties and an International anew’.

20. Trotsky, In Defence of Marxism, p. 11.

21. Trotsky, ibid., p. 122.

22. Trotsky, ibid., p. 145.

23. Marxist Bulletin, Winter 1976, p. 26.

24. Cannon, ‘Factional Struggle and Party Leadership’.

25. Pablo, ‘They Desert, We go Forward’.

26. SLL National Committee, 2 January 1961.

27. Workers Press, 7 July 1970.

28. At this point the 1976 text (Red Weekly 141) continued with a paragraph that Ross dropped in 1980: ‘Finally, in the series “Hansen and Novack — Accomplices of the GPU” in Workers Press, the WRP goes even further. It discovers that there is some “World Trotskyist Movement” which not merely must be defended against “GPU accomplice” Hansen, but which can actually set up a commission to investigate this said “accomplice”. But the whole concept of a “World Trotskyist Movement” only makes sense if what is involved is not forces which have carried out world historic betrayals, but instead a whole number of forces which may well justify the formation of tendencies and factions but which do not justify the existence of different parties and a different International.’

29. Trotsky, ‘The International Left Oppositionists’ Tasks and Methods’.

30. Trotsky, ‘We Need an Honest Inner Party Agreement’.

31. In 1976 (Red Weekly 141) part 3 ended here with a paragraph addressed to the WSL: ‘Unfortunately, in their theoretical supplement “Trotskyism Today”, the WSL precisely do refer both to the traitorous “Pabloite revisionists” and to the fact that “the USFI leadership and sections cannot be regarded in advance as having placed themselves outside the world Trotskyist movement” (Socialist Press, 10 December 1975). The comrades of the WSL thus show that they still have not thought through the difference between the organisational principles of Lenin and Trotsky and those of Healy. A study of these is one of the most urgent questions confronting them.’

32. The 1976 text (Red Weekly 142, the opening of part 4) went on: ‘In this concluding article we show how Healy’s complete lack of understanding of the difference between a faction and a party as embodied in his attitude to the 1953 split inevitably contributed to the internal degeneration of Healy’s organisation along with the disintegration of his rump International Committee. We do this because we believe that the comrades of the Workers Socialist League, who were themselves the victims of Healy’s bureaucratic regime, have failed as yet to work through the meaning of their own expulsion. They have rejected the methods of lying, falsification, slander and expulsions of the Workers Revolutionary Party. But because of their own confusion about the difference between a faction and a party, they do not understand the SLL/WRP’s degeneration as a result of Healy’s split from the International, and so flounder between a position of saying that “Pabloite revisionism” destroyed the International and calling for serious discussions with the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.’

33. Trotsky, ‘Fractions and the Fourth International’, Writings of Leon Trotsky (1935–36); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 6, p. 271. Translated here from the French, not checked against the English Writings.

34. Lenin, CW, Vol. 6, p. 177; Trotsky, On Lenin, p. 42 (1980). The 1976 text gives separate references: CW 6, pp. 17–79; On Lenin, p. 42; CW 7, p. 330.

35. Lenin, CW, Vol. 7, p. 347 (1976, n. 11); 1980: CW 7, p. 320. The words lost at the foot of the 1976 scan are supplied from the same quotation in Red Weekly no. 139.

36. 1976 note: Lenin stated: ‘The growth and spread of the revolutionary movement, its constantly deeper penetration among the various classes and strata of the people, will inevitably give rise (all to the good) to constantly newer trends and shades’ (CW 6, p. 165). The 1980 note adds Trotsky (‘“Trotskyism” and the PSOP’, Writings 1938–39, p. 129) on the inevitability of factions even in the most mature party, and Lenin (CW 7) on the ‘circle spirit’ as the source of ‘extraordinarily easy’ splits.

37. Lenin, “Osvobozhdeniye-ists and New-Iskrists, Monarchists and Girondists”, CW, Vol. 8, pp. 221–2 (1976, n. 16, gives p. 131, last digit uncertain on the scan); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 8, page not printed.

38. Lenin, CW, Vol. 8 (1976, n. 17; page illegible on the scan); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 8, p. 127.

39. Lenin, CW, Vol. 7, p. 414 (1976, n. 18); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 7, p. 434. The opening of the quotation is lost at the foot of the 1976 scan and is translated from the French.

40. Lenin, CW, Vol. 7, p. 179 (1976, n. 20); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 7, p. 185.

41. Lenin, “To the Party” (August 1904), CW, Vol. 7, pp. 454–61; 1980: Œuvres, vol. 7, p. 477. Not in the 1976 text. (At this point the 1976 text quotes instead the passage given in § II, note 2.)

42. Lenin, CW, Vol. 8, p. 437 (1976, n. 24); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 8, pp. 439–40.

43. Lenin, “The Third Congress”, CW, Vol. 8, p. 444 (1976, n. 25); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 8, p. 447.

44. Lenin, CW, Vol. 10, p. 38 (1976, n. 28; uncertain on the scan); 1980: Werke, vol. 10, p. 23. The 1976 note adds that this ‘completely refutes the view that the unification was for Lenin some sort of variant of entryism’.

45. Lenin, CW, Vol. 10, p. 309 (1976, n. 29); 1980: Werke, vol. 10, p. 310.

46. Lenin, CW, Vol. 11, p. 320 (1976, n. 32; uncertain on the scan); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 11, p. 329.

47. Lenin, CW, Vol. 11, pp. 320–23 (1976, nn. 33 and 36); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 11, pp. 329–30, 332–3. The 1976 text quotes the first and last sentences separately; the middle passage, from ‘As for principle’ to ‘the advanced class’, is translated from the French.

48. Lenin, CW, Vol. 15, p. 430 (1976, n. 42); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 15, pp. 460–61. The opening of the quotation is lost at the foot of the 1976 scan and is translated from the French.

49. Lenin, CW, Vol. 41, p. 226 (1976, n. 43; uncertain on the scan); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 41, p. 220. The first sentence is not in the 1976 quotation and is translated from the French.

50. Lenin, CW, Vol. 15, pp. 433, 436 (1976, nn. 46–47; uncertain on the scan); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 15, pp. 464, 466. The opening words are lost at the foot of the 1976 scan; the passage from ‘As consistent and staunch champions’ is translated from the French.

51. Lenin, CW, Vol. 16, p. 101 (1976, n. 48; volume uncertain on the scan); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 16, p. 102.

52. Lenin, CW, Vol. 16, p. 258 (1976, n. 49; uncertain on the scan); 1980: Œuvres, vol. 16, p. 272.

53. Lenin, “The State of Affairs in the Party” (December 1910), CW, Vol. 17, pp. 23–38; 1980: Œuvres, vol. 17, p. 29. The 1976 text quotes instead a passage from “The Climax of the Party Crisis” (1911), CW, Vol. 17, p. 348; the 1980 passage is followed here.

54. Trotsky, ‘The International Left Opposition, Its Tasks and Methods’, Writings 1932–33, p. 54, and Documents of the Fourth International 1933–40, p. 19 (1976, n. 56); 1980: Les Congrès de la IVe Internationale, vol. 1: Naissance de la IVe Internationale 1930–1940, Paris: La Brèche, 1978, pp. 63–64. The sentence beginning ‘This means’ and the closing words of the first paragraph, lost at the foot of the 1976 scan, are translated from the French.

Note on the text

About this edition. The text follows the reconstruction described below, with three kinds of exception. Two passages of Ross’s own prose follow his 1980 French: the pro-Party Mensheviks “remained full members of the Party” (§ II), and the sect’s regime, where the 1976 “not undemocratic” is dropped (§ VI). Lenin’s quotations follow the French for what is quoted, and are given in the wording of the Collected Works (Progress Publishers, Moscow), translated from the Russian; where the French departs from Lenin’s original, the original is followed. In the quotations at notes 48 and 50, “faction” replaces the Collected Works’ “section” for Lenin’s фракция, as in the French. In notes 8 and 51 the Collected Works volume has been corrected or supplied; notes 37, 41, 43 and 53 now name the work quoted; the date Ross gives the quotation at note 44 (a text of November 1905, presented as the 1906 Unity Congress) remains to be checked. The other quotations follow the reconstruction.

This document reconstructs in English John Ross’s 1980 essay “Faction and Party — or Sect-Faction?”. The essay was printed in French as “Parti ou fraction/secte” in Quatrième Internationale, 3rd series, no. 1 (July–September 1980), pp. 35–60, signed John Ross, and in Portuguese as “Partido ou fração-seita?” in Perspectiva Internacional, year I, no. 1 (March–April 1982). The Portuguese printing cites “Revista da IV Internacional no. 1”, probably the Spanish-language edition of the same review. The French text is the source used here.

The 1980 essay was assembled from two earlier English texts. The first is the four-part series “Faction and Party”, Red Weekly nos. 139–142 (26 February – 18 March 1976), signed James Francis and addressed to the newly formed Workers Socialist League. The second is “The Bolshevik Faction and the fight for the Party”, Battle of Ideas no. 2 (monthly supplement to Red Weekly, November 1976), signed Adrian Yeeles and John Marshall. It answers the Socialist Press article “IMG attacks Bolshevism” (24 March 1976). §§ II–VII derive from the first; §§ IX–X derive from the second, which supplies the Bolshevik history from 1903 to 1912 and the conclusion on Trotsky. Only § I and § VIII are wholly new in 1980; §§ VI and VII are partly so.

Method. The 1980 text governs what is included and in what order. Where Ross kept a 1976 passage, its original English is used, lightly corrected. Where he cut it, it is left out; where he added or reworded, the French is translated. Some lines at the foot of each column of the Battle of Ideas scan are lost; these too are supplied from the French, and the notes record where this falls inside a quotation. Quotations from Lenin and Trotsky are given as they were printed in English in 1976, which are not necessarily the current Progress texts. The notes give the 1976 reference, and the 1980 one where it is printed and differs, since the 1980 notes cite the French Œuvres or the German Werke, whose pagination is not that of the English Collected Works. The references in §§ II–VI have been checked against the footnotes printed with the 1976 series (Red Weekly 139, 140 and 141) and agree with them; the title in note 29 is corrected to the 1976 form. Section numbers and headings are editorial; the French text has crossheads only at “Le précédent des bolcheviks”, “L’expérience de l’Opposition de gauche”, “L’exemple de la lutte fractionnelle de 1939–1940 au sein du SWP”, “La scission de 1953”, “Les fruits amers du sectarisme fractionnel”, “Les racines historiques du Parti, et celles des fractions/sectes” and “Les conclusions de Trotsky”. The 1976 newspaper crossheads (“Clear Distinction”, “Method”, “Statements and Actions”, “Conclusions on the 1953 Split”) are not used. As in 1980, the call to Trotskyists outside the Fourth International (§ VII) comes before the historical sections, not at the end.