[The following excerpts from a letter by Hugo Gonzalez M. appeared in the October 16 issue of Rouge, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, published in Paris. González is the general secretary of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Revolutionary Workers party, the Bolivian section of the Fourth International).
[The translation from French is by Intercontinental Press.]
(...) The fascist coup d'etat, which we have consistently denounced, was directed more against the revolutionary masses and their vanguard than against Torres and his regime. Once again the army has made a sharp turn, abandoning reformism in favor of pure and simple armed violence aimed at checking the revolutionary process. This time, on the basis of previous experiences, the army obtained the prior consent of the two bourgeois parties: the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria — Revolutionary Nationalist Movement] and the ultraright FSB (Falange Socialista Boliviana— Bolivian Socialist Phalanx). The army, not these parties, is in control.
It is interesting to note how the different sectors of the bourgeoisie mobilized in support of the coup. The Brazilian, Argentinian, and
Paraguayan armed forces all intervened. Troops from these countries crossed the Bolivian border, ready to partition the country and declare an autonomous region in eastern Bolivia (the departments of Beni, Santa Cruz, and Tarija) if the Bolivian army proved incapable of handling the situation in the Altiplano.
The centers of violent struggle were La Paz and Santa Cruz. The rapid mobilization of the entire army, 30,000 troops with all their arms, was the factor determining the fate of the rest of the country.
In Santa Cruz the punitive actions carried out by the Rangers were sav- 936
age. The number of dead and wounded is not known; on this, the regime has maintained silence. But a reasonable estimate would be more than 500 deaths among students, workers, and peasants. The repression was typically fascist. The chief of the Rangers, Colonel Selich, who is now minister of the interior, believes that the only good Communist is a dead Communist, and he adds that all those who don't agree with him are themselves Communists. In Santa Cruz people were massacred, shot, and are still being shot, for the "crime" of belonging to our party, to the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria - Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the pro-Chinese CP, or the ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional- National Liberation Army].
A leader of the MIR told me that all the cadres of their Santa Cruz regional organization were executed. It seems that the fate of our regional leadership has been the same.
We have not been able to contact anyone in Santa Cruz, because the means of communication are under army control. Party commissions are engaged in reorganizing our ranks to continue our work in this region.
Prisoners and wounded are numbered by the hundreds. For all intents and purposes, Santa Cruz is in the hands of the most reactionary sectors of the army and the falangists.
In La Paz, when confronted by the coup, we did everything possible to contain the army by organizing the masses for war on the highest possible level. Our party was the armed motor force of the left and of the COB [Confederación Obrera Boliviana- Bolivian Workers Federation].
The armchair socialists, who relied on Torres's army to overthrow the capitalist machine, the spontanéists, the insurrectionists of all stripes, saw their theories belied by the realities of war. The people took to the streets seeking arms, and we stood in the forefront.
We could not do otherwise at such a moment. The whole left came to fight at our side, and a de facto alliance was formed among the pro- Chinese, the comrades of the MIR, and the workers of the PRIN [Partido Revolucionario de Izquierda Nacionalista - Revolutionary Left Nationalist party]. Later, small groups from the pro-Moscow CP and some students of Lora's little group arrived.
The struggle was fierce and heroic: more than 5,000 fighters - but 90 percent of them unarmed.
At the last moment an assault on an army depot captured 1,300 old Mauser rifles left over from the Chaco war (1928-35], some serviceable, others not. We fought with those and with whatever else we could find.
We tried to take the military fortress of Miraflores, which contained the biggest supplies of modern arms. The army defended this position with all the force at its disposal: planes, tanks, infantry, etc.
But war is not something that can be improvised. If the revolutionary army is lacking, it cannot be constructed solely by the heroism of the masses. The military apparatuses of political parties, of which ours was the most important, could not lead this type of struggle. Defeat was inevitable, but it was necessary to fight; and this we did, together with the workers, students, and peasants.
From Radio Illimani our party and the ELN directed the fighting and the mobilization.
The result of this military confrontation was approximately 400 deaths and a slightly smaller number wounded in the gorilla army. In the ranks of the people, there were 150 dead and 600 wounded. Subsequent reprisals are increasing the death toll, but the total remains unknown.
As soon as victorious fascism controlled the government, a ferocious repression was organized. The country's eight universities were occupied by the army; university autonomy was violated; courses were suspended until February 1972; professors and administrative personnel were discharged.
The University of Santa Cruz was assaulted by the Rangers. All students caught in the vicinity were raked with machine-gun fire. The University of La Paz was bombarded by planes, attacked by cannon fire from tanks, and by bazookas. All this occurred after the fighting ended.
Hatred for the universities and all they stand for was well expressed by the fascists. The local offices of the COB, the Federation of Miners, and the Federation of Millworkers were sacked. The government organized ad hoc committees to bring the union organizations under the control of fascist agents.
The high schools and elementary schools are not functioning; classes are suspended. The government is afraid to allow students to meet and discuss. It is possible that schools will remain shut for the whole academic year.
Union leaders at all levels are being imprisoned.
There is a strong repression against the left in general, but the parties hounded to death are our own, the pro-Chinese CP, the MIR, and the ELN. In Santa Cruz the repressive forces have drawn up a complete list of all persons who, according to them, might have worked with us. It may be that these people have already been spotted and marked for death. It is the same for the comrades of the other groups.
In La Paz the army has put a price of several thousand dollars on the heads of the leaders of our party. The orders are to kill them, not take them prisoner.
As for the militants who have fallen into army hands, they are being sent to the forests, to the worst concentration camps, like Madidi.
The civilian groups of the MNR and the Falangists are taking part in the repression against us and the other groups favoring armed struggle. Because of this it is difficult to escape the repression. The civilian commandos, unlike the usual security forfamiliar with political circles. ces, are
(...) At the moment there is an alliance between us, the pro-Chinese, the MIR, and the ELN. The ascension to power of the fascists means the accentuation of all forms of combat. To direct this, we intend to form a November 1, 1971
command-front of the four organizations.
The party's situation is as follows:
In La Paz we had fifteen workers and peasants killed. Comrade Tomás Chambi, secretary of defense of the Bolivian Independent Federation of Peasants, was killed in combat. He had been imprisoned during the 1969 repression.
He commanded a detachment of peasants, all of whom fell in the fighting. Chambi died like a Trotskyist, thinking of his party and International. As if he had had a presentiment of his death, he carried a letter saying that he was proud to be a Trotskyist, that it was in the party that he developed as a revolutionist and made the decision to fight to the end. There was also a group of wounded, (...) some of whom were deported to Madidi (... )
In Santa Cruz we suffered twenty deaths. Some escaped to the mountains.
In Oruro we had three taken prisoner; we still do not know their fate.
Our miners are continuing their work as union leaders. The army has not penetrated the mining zones, but it is preparing to do so. We are also preparing ourselves. The forms of struggle will be different. Our leaders have been condemned to death, and we must fight, both to save their lives and for the revolution.
Despite the attacks it has suffered, the party is still functioning. (...) There is a military and political leadership, united in the Executive Committee, which directs all activity on a national scale. We lost some stocks of arms, but during the struggle we captured some modern weapons.
We have decided to go forward, and I think that at present we are in a better position to do it than we have been in the past.
We experienced a numerical growth during the past period, leadership cadres have emerged, and much work is being done. The confidence accorded us by sectors of the vanguard is most gratifying. This is nọt to say that our situation is not difficult, but revolutionists cannot expect the bourgeoisie to smooth the way for them. It is necessary to fight, and we will fight. It is for this that we have been ourselves up preparing to now.
(... )
With warmest greetings, Hugo