[The following article has been scheduled for publication in a coming issue of Quatrième Internationale (Fourth International) to which the author refers from time to time in the text. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
The Latin-American revolutionary movement is once again being shaken by polemics and stormy conflicts. The old debates over the nature of the Latin-American revolution and on the attitude to be taken toward the socalled national bourgeoisie have been resuscitated by the spectacular measures adopted by Velasco in Peru and Ovando in Bolivia. Tensions are increasing even among the forces that opted for armed struggle and OLAS. The Cuban leadership itself is becoming the object of public denunciations by the guerrilla leaders which it had enthusiastically supported. The strategy followed by revolutionary groups and movements in many countries is being subjected to close critical analysis, often on the initiative of participants in heroic struggles.
The Peruvian and Bolivian events and the orientation adopted by Velasco Alvarado and Ovando Candiawho are trying to give the impression that they are the initiators of a revolutionary-democratic renewal and a struggle against the imperialist grip on their countries- deserve attention not only for their intrinsic importance but also because they express a tendency which might materialize in other countries as well. In fact "Peruvian" currents are taking form increasingly in other places and it is symptomatic that in the ranks of the revolutionary movement itself some are predicting and even hoping that these currents will come to power.
e in Latin America
In general the three fundamental questions posed are the following: (1) What is the significance of the new course of the military regime in Peru and the turn attempted by Ovando in Bolivia? (2) What is the real portent of the international orientation Cuba has adopted and especially of the change in the relations between Cuba and the USSR? (3) What is the situation of the Latin-American revolutionary movement? What lessons must it draw from the experience of the last years and on what principles must its strategy be based in the future?
It is impossible to make an exhaustive examination of all these problems in the context of a single article. So I will have to compress and simplify as much as possible, referring my readers for a whole series of questions both to the [Latin-American] document adopted by the world congress of the Fourth International in April 1969 and to the more detailed analyses that our magazine has already published or is publishing in this same issue.
In order to understand the origins and nature of the new "military reformism" (I will use this general term in order to simplify the discussion), the question must first be answered whether new economic and social tendencies have emerged in the recent period in Latin America as a whole. In other words, is a new "reformism" possible owing to the existence of objective margins for concessions to the masses and important changes occurring in the stratification of social classes and in the relationship of forces between them?
Once the terms of the question are posed, the answer follows automatically. No one can claim that the new course in Peru and the turn in Bolivia are the result of an economic boom, even of the most modest dimensions, which would permit concessions to the popular strata; or of any substantial change in the composition and dynamic of the ruling classes. In Peru Velasco's coup d'etat occurred in the midst of an extremely serious political and economic situation, emerging as an extreme solution for heading off a rapidly ripening major crisis of the system as such. In Bolivia the situation-from the standpoint of the defenders of the system — was still more alarming. Despite the blows suffered by the revolutionary movement and the long wave of repressions, the hostility of the masses toward the regime was mounting steadily.1 The defeats suffered by the revolutionary movement had left the ruling classes a respite, but every attempt at achieving a reorganization and some kind of stabilization of the government had failed miserably. The groups in power were without any popular base. The imperialist vise was tightening unbearably. In this situation the logic of both experiments was an attempt to find a "new" solution - in fact, a daring, and in the Bolivian case almost desperate, attempt.
In Bolivia, with the fall of Paz Estenssoro, it became clear that the army was now operating as the only party able with the least effectiveness to guarantee the survival and mini-
1. For a more detailed analysis on Peru see the article "Une annee de reformisme militaire au Perou," Quatrieme Internationale, November 1969 (an English translation appeared in Intercontinental Press, November 24, 1969, page 1044, under the title "A Year of Military Reformism"). For Bolivia see the analysis in the document voted by the November 1969 conference of the POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario - Revolutionary Workers party, the Bolivian section of the Fourth International] in Intercontinental Press, April 13, page 328. (See also the text of Adolfo Siles's report of August 7, 1969.)
What Do the Velasco and Ovando Regimes Signify? What Do the Velasco and Ovando Regimes Signify?
mum functioning of the system. After the coup of late September 1969 the group around Ovando made an attempt to utilize this instrument not only for repressive or strictly defensive objectives but also for a more ambitious policy. The aims of this policy were, on the one hand, to enable the native possessing classes to appropriate a less ridiculously small share of the pie; and, on the other, to establish relations with the masses, primarily the petty-bourgeois masses, by means of a campaign of nationalistic and socialist-sounding demagogy. In Peru the new military team could link up with the traditions of currents that had already appeared in the army in the past. Such currents had manifested themselves especially in the first period of Pérez Godoy's government. There was the difference, however, that Pérez Godoy only promoted the rise to power of a political current which he considered more representative of the national bourgeoisie (Belaúnde). But as Velasco saw it the "civilista" [civilian] political apparatus was totally incapable of acting to achieve a renewal and the only viable instrument was the army. Only the army could impose discipline on the different sectors of the ruling class and at the same time bring pressure to bear. on imperialism, as well as contain or repress the mass movements. To complete the picture, American imperialism - burnt by its Cuban experience, preoccupied with events in Asia, and conscious of the reality of the relationship of forces in Latin America - adopted a cautious waitand-see attitude toward the Peruvian regime and, in spite of everything, toward Ovando as well. The outline of a more flexible line for Latin America was, moreover, presented in the Rockefeller report. Its conclusion was, better this new breed of military officers than guerrillas!
The two experiments in military reformism, and most of all the "cleaner" one by the Peruvian team, were to produce reactions very rapidly in all circles and stimulate hopes. As for the ruling classes themselves, there were fears that people like Velasco and Ovando would play the role of apprentice sorcerers, and there was reluctance to pay the price necessary for such operations. However, these feelings were counterbalanced, at least in the more clear-sighted sectors, by an understanding that it was impos- April 20, 1970
sible to base relationships with the masses on repression and terror alone; as well as by a desire to win concessions from imperialism and eliminate or limit particularly scandalous forms of exploitation and alienation of national sovereignty. After the crushing of the guerrilla nuclei in several countries and after it became evident that it was difficult if not impossible for mass movements by themselves to lead to substantial changes, it was inevitable that illusions would arise in the popular strata and that an expectant attitude or even hope would take form. In political circles a whole sector of the traditional left influenced by the Communist parties and by centrist currents could only rejoice. Their old schemes of revolution by stages and their strategy of an anti-imperialist and antioligarchical alliance with the so-called national bourgeoisie regained ground and their policy seemed to recover an objective basis. Even in revolutionary sectors the moves of Velasco and Ovando were sometimes followed with a sympathetic eye. 2
Moreover, Fidel Castro himself gave the green light for such positions by his estimations of the new Peruvian regime. In his speeches of July 14 and November 4 he expressed a positive evaluation of the confiscation of the IPC and of the agrarian reform. But he went on from this basis to accepting the idea of a Peruvian exceptionalism, explaining flatly that in Peru the army was playing a revolutionary role. As of this writing the Cubans are keeping their distance from the Bolivian officers; the political reasons for this inconsistent attitude are
2. See, for example, the articles and interviews published by the Montevideo weekly Marcha, which it would be wrong to think represent the views of only their authors; the pro-Velasco attitude of the Peruvian group inspired by I. Frias; the attitude expressed in Rico Galan's letter to the Mexican students. As for the Posadista groups, which broke from the Fourth International on the pretext that it was opportunist, they are shamelessly supporting both Velasco and Ovando. It is true that in this whole Posadas game, besides political delirium there are some very suspicious elements. How can it be explained, for example, that at a time when revolutionists are still outlawed and many POR and
ELN [Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional - National Liberation Army] activists are in prison or being hunted that the reactionary daily Jornada serialized in several issues one of the interminable documents of Juan Posadas?
no secret to anybody. However, if the Cubans applied the same criteria to Bolivia as to Peru, they could not in good logic reach qualitatively different conclusions.
All of this confirms the fact that there are important forces, and forces of a different nature, which have a stake in a positive development of the experiments in progress in Peru and in Bolivia. This implies also that in certain conditions similar experiments might be undertaken in other countries. Once again it is necessary to avoid a careless and impressionistic application of abstract schemata. In countries where the army does not yet have an important influence (e.g., Uruguay), where "Nasserite" tendencies have not existed for some time, or where "
civilista" traditions are still firm, an attempt at military reformism - at least at this stage - would pose insoluble problems. Similar considerations hold for countries where the image of the army as a whole has long been that of ultrareactionary "gorillas." There are, however, countries, including some decisive ones, where neither the most farsighted groups in the ruling class nor the most influential imperialist circles can allow an indefinite protraction of situations that might lead to explosions seriously threatening the survival and functioning of the system (e.g., Brazil, and, mutatis mutandis, Mexico). In these cases we cannot rule out deepgoing differentiation in the army itself-indeed such differentiation often already exists. And here we cannot exclude, finally, the possibility that the "Peruvian" path will be chosen as the only even slightly viable solution. Let me repeat, I am considering potential tendencies which may or may not crystallize. However, the important thing is that these tendencies exist, are operating, and already constitute one of the elements in the political interaction in Latin America.
In this sense the analysis which I made at the congress of the Fourth International on the tendency toward a universalization of military regimes retains its essential validity.3 However, more attention must be drawn to the fact that there are different variants of a military regime. Moreover, to the extent that the army tends to become a political party and to function as the instrument of leadership in societies where all sorts of conflicts and contradictions are developing, political differentiations arise or are reflected within the armed forces. However, this does not put the army's primordial role in question. In its reactionary variant, a military regime appears as the only kind of government capable of suppressing mass movements and blocking their rise, arising because more or less classical fascist dictatorships -that is, enjoying a certain popular base- prove impossible or extremely problematical. In the "progressive variant," as a result of the failure of "democratic" experiments in the style of Frei and Belaúnde, it is military reformism that is prescribed as the only real way out.
What then is the nature of the regimes that exist now in Peru and Bolivia?
We do not minimize the importance of some measures such as the expropriation of imperialist companies or the agrarian reform. Revolutionists have no fear of declaring themselves in favor of these measures. But this does not necessarily imply that they consider the regimes that adopt them revolutionary. Over and above the intrinsic importance of such measures, we must consider the general framework they fit into and the objective dynamic of the process initiated. Unfortunately, Fidel Castro did not do this in his speeches. If the expropriation of a few foreign companies were a first step toward complete expropriation of imperialist property, which would be followed up by the expropriation of native-owned property (at least the decisive sectors) - as was the case in Cuba - then this measure would in fact mark the commencement of a revolutionary regime. The same thing would hold in the case of an agrarian reform capable of developing in accordance with an anti-imperialist and anticapitalist logic and actively mobilizing the great masses of the peasantry. But, as all the Peruvian revolutionists say and as we have shown in the analyses in our magazine, there is nothing to support the postulation of such a variant.4 To of the FIR
dea, and some documents [Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario- Front of the Revolutionary Left, the Peru- 354
the contrary, everything indicates that Velasco wants to eliminate certain forms of imperialist exploitation and intervene in some very limited sectors, but not to eliminate imperialist ownership entirely - American, European, or any other kind. Still less does he want to strike a blow at national capitalism, which in reality he is trying to promote, including through the mechanism of the agrarian reform. As for the masses, Velasco assigns them at most an auxiliary role and he is ready to brutally strangle any attempt to organize and mobilize the masses independently and on a class basis.
How then could Fidel Castro make the suppositions he did, speaking flatly of a "revolutionary role"? Was he, at bottom, making an implicit analogy with the course of the Cuban revolution, which made its radical, anticapitalist choice empirically, under the pressure of events, and on the initiative of a leadership which at first was neither proletarian nor Marxist? Such an analogy would be entirely without foundation. The individual subjective factors are obviously quite different. No one could seriously compare men like Fidel and Guevarawho had prior connections with mass movements and revolutionary experiences, political and even Marxist training, and an acute awareness of the role played by different social forces in the revolutionary processwith Velasco's team of brass hats. But even leaving aside this question, the Cuban leadership was the direct expression of the masses, which had already waged a revolutionary strug vian section of the Fourth International]. (Unfortunately some Cuban journals published documents by Hugo Blanco with cuts that changed the meaning.) See also my article already cited. The analyses which have appeared in certain bourgeois journals, including those by Marcel Niedergang in Le Monde of F'ebruary 20, 21, and 22, 1969, confirm the fact that these estimations do not arise from a sectarian or schematic attitude. it is also worth noting that on the occasion of the first anniversary of his rise to power Velasco said among other things: "The government offers confidence and support for investment that stimulates economic development within the bounds of respect for the legitimate expectations of capital and the legitimate rights of labor. ... From the beginning, the government has stated that it was supporting and encouraging private investment, including foreign investment which accepts the laws of the country."
gle arms in hand. The Peruvian officers, to the contrary, advocate a "revolution" from above, under the strict control of an army that retains all its traditional structures and conceptions.
In regard to Bolivia, the terms of the problem should be still clearer since the measures adopted so farhave been much more limited and the objective margin for maneuver is markedly narrower. To the extent that a revolutionary-democratic program could be carried out within the framework of the capitalist bourgeois system, this was done in the first years of the Paz Estenssoro regime. This regime nationalized the mines - the country's crucial industry - and adopted a quite radical agrarian reform with respect to the general run of such measures in other countries. This situation requires that any government that wanted to undertake a revolutionary policy would have to move, from the beginning, onto the ground of anticapitalist and socialist achievements. For my part, I leave to others the privilege of devoting themselves to variations on the theme of a so-called socialist option by Ovando and a military team which remains bound by a thousand ties to the imperialism that trained it and which has to its credit the massacre of thousands of workers and the murder of Che.5
It is not possible here to analyze the objective possibilities for reformist operations in the different countries of Latin America. I can say, in any case, that in most of these countries, the adoption of substantial anticapitalist measures would threaten to quickly generate a dynamic that would challenge the framework of the system as a whole. This is why even the least conservative strata of the ruling classes will hesitate to attempt any spectacular turns. But most of all the following question must be answered: What social strata would be the beneficiaries of a reformist course? Clearly - the Peruvian model shows it unmistakably - the ones to profit would be the national bourgeoisie of the most dynamic, most "modern" industrial sectors. This does not imply that the national bourgeoisie could touch off a radical, anti-imperialist movement, in which the working class and the poor peasantry could ally themselves with it. This bourgeoisie is intimately linked to imperialism, often associated with mixed companies in the last analysis controlled by big international concerns or trusts. It is absolutely impossible to envisage any ruptures between this section of the national bourgeoisie and imperialism, which would inevitably mean disaster for the native capitalists themselves. Moreover, from a broader standpoint, in a time of feverish capital concentration and the emergence of ever more powerful capitalist combinations, the hypothesis of the development on a large scale of a national industrial economy seems simply utopian. Any possible reform would, therefore, not go beyond an internal restructuring of the ruling classes, a change in the relationship of forces between these classes, and a more extensive association of the na-
The International Context and
I have already mentioned the attitude of American imperialism toward the Bolivian and Peruvian events. The Soviet Union also has a word to say, and it has already entered into a game where it clearly holds some important cards.
In February the Moscow correspondent of the organ of the Italian CP wrote an article commenting on the visit of Carlos Raphael Rodriguez. It might be interesting to quote a few passages since this author has certainly drawn on Soviet sources. After notthe Policy of the Cuban Leadership the Policy of the Cuban Leadership tive bourgeoisie with imperialist concerns. The mass movement would be no more than an auxiliary force, with the workers and peasants regimented in unions or official political organizations under the strict and direct control of the elements in power.
As our Bolivian and Peruvian comrades have already explained, this analysis does not imply an attitude of indifference or hostility a prioritoward the new course of military reformism. Even limited measures striking at imperialist property or the power of the oligarchy will have the support of revolutionists. Such support will, however, be critical support. On the one hand, revolutionists will never cover up the class nature and the real objectives of the regime. On the other, they will struggle to involve the masses, demanding, for example, workers control over expropriated enterprises and the creation of peasant committees to enforce the agrarian reform. Fundamentally, revolutionists will defend the class independence of the mass movement and fight intransigently in defense of the essential democratic rights, first of all for the freedom of workers and peasants to organize politically and in trade unions. 6
the object of polemics, and even harsh polemics— of foreign policy and the attitude to be taken toward the situation which is ripening in disregard of all schemata in Latin America. Cuba and the USSR have begun to draw closer on these questions, in fact, since the anti-American coup d'etat in Peru - since this development the repercussions the Peruvian events have had throughout Latin America forced the Communist movement to reexamine the situation and sort out its positions regarding the deepening conflict between the traditional forces, including a part of the South American armies themselves, and the United States. Since then the situation has evolved, although in a contradictory form. It has raised the problem for the socialist countries of developing a policy adequate for the new circumstances and which would take account of the objective need of any political force in South America that wants to struggle against the U.S. enslavement policy of having a base of support in the socialist countries. Thus, reality has quickly outmoded the Cuban polemic against the Soviet policy of economic accords with the South American countries and at the same time certain academic responses to the theories of the 'Tricontinental.' Reality has demanded moreover a bold initiative; for example, an answer to the appeals for collaboration from countries which for years did not even have ambassadors in the socialist countries. ... From the beginning the Soviet Union, responding positively to moves to normalize relations, openly raised the question of Cuba, explaining that the touchstone for judging the new South American regimes was their attitude toward the Cuban revolution. In this way the conditions arose for a Soviet- Cuban initiative of a new type toward South America, the aim of which was to bring about the definitive failure of the economic and political blockade that the Americans chose to mount that the Americans chose to mount against Cuba." (L'Unitá, February 11, 1970.)
Let us disregard everything that stems from the impressionism of the journalist and the centrism of the Italian CP. The quotation is nevertheless useful because it brings out clearly the convergence of interests and pressures favoring and prompting a major political operation. Certain sectors of the Latin-American bourgeoisie want to loosen the stifling hold of American imperialism both by collaboration with other imperialisms and by an opening toward the USSR, and at the
Raúl Castro, "relations today between correspondent wrote: "There is no doubt that the basis for improving relations is not solely the accords achieved in the economic sphere. Between the two parties and the two countries there is certainly a greater unity of views today also on the problems- which for a long period were April 20, 1970
6. I will not take up in this article the problem of the real possibilities of a prolongation and success —in the limits indicated - of the new reformist course. In my article on Peru I stressed all the grave difficulties the Peruvian government must confront. These difficulties are still more considerable in the case of Bolivia. But what I was interested in here was to indicate the objective import of military re formism in the most favorable variant, that is, if it were actually implemented.
same time they envision a détente with Cuba which could have favorable repercussions domestically and might prompt a less intransigent attitude on the part of the Cubans. The USSR has an obvious interest in strengthening its presence in Latin America and in softening up the Cuban leaders as much as possible. As for the Cuban state, it could be interested in having the regimes that confront it, if only for temporary demagogic aims, change their language and rectify their attitude, thereby offering Cuba a larger margin for maneuver and loosening the encirclement imposed by Washington. Finally, the United States itself might regard a temporarily increased involvement of the USSR in the Latin-American game as positive, since in the last analysis it would serve to brake and canalize revolutionary upsurges as well as the Cuban initiative.
It would be all too easy to point out the weak sides and contradictory elements in such design. For example, you need only think of the almost insurmountable difficulties the USSR would have in responding positively to all the demands for substantial trade and economic aid, if such demands came simultaneously from a whole series of Latin-American countries. It would be enough, moreover, to take into account the fact that if the United States might temporarily tolerate increased Soviet intervention, it could not help but react strongly to any spread of Soviet influence even partially challenging its domination in this part of the world. However, what interests us most here is the problem that is ultimately crucial for revolutionists, the attitude of Cuba.
It is unquestionable that a turn has occurred in Cuban policy. The expressions of this turn are, notably, the evolution of Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union, its attitude toward the Peruvian military regime, and the deterioration of its relationships with a series of revolutionary movements in Latin America. Some of these movements have openly accused the Cuban leadership of capitulating to Soviet pressures and ceasing to aid the development of the revolution.7 The essential factors contributing to this turn cannot be forgotten or minimized. On the one hand, Cuba remains a besieged fortress for which the economic and military collaboration of the Soviet Union is an elementary necessity. On the other hand, the setbacks suffered by the revolutionary movement in several countries over the past years impel the Cuban leadership, in this stage, to rely primarily on domestic gains, notably the achievement of spectacular economic objectives - that is, to give priority to strengthening the foundations of the workers state, even by an international policy of a détente with some Latin-American countries.
But the question is whether Fidel Castro and his collaborators have already accepted or are getting ready to accept a new strategy involving the following: abandonment of stimulating and aiding the Latin-American revolutionary processes; acceptance in general of the international policy framework of the Soviet bureaucracy; normalization of relations with sectors of the Latin-American bourgeoisie; and even at the outermost limit, a modus vivendi with the United States. American imperialism could swallow the Cuban affront, if the infection were limited to that island alone. It was not, perhaps, altogether coincidental that a few weeks ago bourgeois sources drew attention to some littleknown events that occurred at the time of the first Punta del Este meeting, more precisely to the relations between Ernesto Guevara and representatives of the Kennedy team, in which members of the Argentinian government participated. On this occasion the possibility was supposed to have been sounded out of an agreement based on a de facto elimination of the imperialist blockade and an abandonment on the Cuban side of "exporting revolution." This attempt fell flat. However, it may be that even in Washington someone considers that the time has come to make another push in this direction. 8
But such an extensive deterioration of Cuban policy would only be possible if the leadership of the Cuban state had undergone a qualitative change. In other words, such a shift would be a corollary of a bureaucratic degeneration similar to that which has distinguished the Soviet Union and the other workers states born since the second world war. In the last analysis, this is the frame of the debate.
I will not repeat here the arguments that I have advanced elsewhere on the exceptional subjective qualities of the Fidelista team, whose historical role no one can underestimate. These qualities have not ceased to constitute a favorable factor. However, in the long run the question will inevitably be decided by the processes governed by social forces and economic and political structures.
In the first place, economic development is playing and will play a role. If the growth rate is inadequate and difficulties persist for a prolonged period, especially in the area of food supply and consumption in general; if objectives considered essential such as harvesting ten million tons of sugar are not attained, or are attained at the cost of an exertion too great to be repeated, or at the expense of other vital branches of the economy -then bad consequences will result. Relations with the masses will deteriorate. The grip of the Soviet bureaucracy will tighten. And income distribution will still be conditioned for a long time by a situation of scarcity. But even in the case of the most positive variant, the dangers of bureaucratization will not necessarily be eliminated.
Up until now bureaucratictendencies have been held in check. There is no privileged bureaucratic layer separated from the masses. The methods of political leadership remain qualitatively different from those adopted in the degenerated workers states (a symptomatic feature is that the circulation of ideas is incomparably freer in Cuba than anywhere else). Revolution in Latin America is still considered a necessary condition for the survival and development of the Cuban state itself. There is indisputably a turning inward on domestic problems and a pause for reflection. It is also probable that no initiative similar to Che's Bolivian campaign nor even like those previously in Venezuela will be attempted in the present stage. But there is nothing to support the assumption that in the event of the outbreak of a new wave of revolutionary struggle and armed struggle in a Latin-American country the Cuban leadership would adopt a reserved attitude or try to cool things down. Once again its active solidarity would be assured.
However, there are some facts which cannot be ignored. Since I cannot develop a detailed analysis in this article,
I will limit myself to raising two questions. The first concerns the differentiation that already exists, or is even growing, between the living standards of the professional strata and the mass of the workers and the people in general. This is a matter of still relatively modest privileges which are most often seen as a kind of compensation for very devoted people who are doing a killing job and playing a vital role. Nonetheless, this could mark the beginning of the crystallization of a social stratum which in the long run would inevitably and even unconsciously be impelled to consider these conditions as normal and thus to defend them and consolidate them by means of political and administrative power. The second problem - to which the first is obviously linked-is that of the lack of political structures and the growing role of the army.
From the beginning of the "growing over" of the Cuban revolution into a socialist revolution, we have stressed the absence in Cuba of political organs of the soviet type which would make possible an organized and interlocking expression from below of the will of the masses as well as real mass participation in the administration of the state at the different levels.9 This lack is made more serious by the fact that eleven years after the seizure of power and eight years since the attack against Escalante, the construction of the party itself has not been completed and it has yet to hold its first congress. Moreover, the unions - which were under the control of a Stalinist team for long years-have not experienced a real revival, having only a very limited function. The leadership has endeavored to fill this vacuum by a direct relationship between Fidel and his small nucleus and the masses, as well as by periodic mass mobilizations. It has used and is using the army more and more. The armed forces are being assigned increasing tasks in all areas. Fidel's speech of November 4, 1969, represented an attempt to give a theoretical justification of this practice.
I do not underestimate the subjective role of Fidel Castro and his nucleus; they are indisputably inspired by antibureaucratic feelings and have proved it on several occasions. Nor do I forget the class nature and the historical origin of the Cuban army. However, an approach based on these two ele ments of direct contact between the leadership and the masses and using the army as an organizational instrument are more likely in the long run to promote than to counteract tendencies toward bureaucratization. In the last analysis it will be the broad social processes that will be decisive. And in this area the framework for a victorious struggle against the bureaucracy can only be provided by the creation of actually functioning, interlocking, and stable democratic workers' structures. Only such organization can make possible direct participation by the masses in running the state at all levels. The danger of bureaucratization is all the greater because the USSR is using and will use to the fullest every means at its disposal to
It is precisely in this area where polemics and differentiations are taking form in the Latin-American movements. The movements are debating continental strategy and the means used to apply it, the balance sheet of the past, and the orientations to be adopted in the period opening up.
First of all, it must be noted that not only has the OLAS, as an organization, failed lamentably but also that the role of the Cuban leadership in the Latin-American revolution is being increasingly disputed. I already mentioned the public attack on the Cuban leadership by Douglas Bravo's movement. But others are also expressing criticisms that follow more or less the same lines. In fact, most of the groups linked to Castroism are increasingly taking their distance from Havana, accentuating their independence. They now have a tendency to consider the relations they establish among themselves more important than their relations with the Cubans and what remains of OLAS - more properly speaking, of the preliminary moves to establish this organization.
This evolution may have been favored by errors of method or inadequacies in orientation on the part of the Cubans (who, however, on their side were doubtless disappointed by the instability and adventuristic diletintegrate Cuba into an international system in which the Kremlin holds leadership and which is governed fundamentally by the interests of bureaucratic self-preservation.
Here then in a sketchy way are the terms of the questions. It goes without saying that the revolutionary movement cannot limit itself to discerning the tendencies that are taking form or to drawing attention to mounting dangers. Its task is to act, utilizing all its potential to bring about conditions favorable for the defense and development of the Cuban workers state. Concretely, this means giving a positive response to the problems which are posed in this stage in Latin America as a whole by promoting a strategy capable of producing a favorable outcome of the struggles that are developing and the revolutionary explosions that are building up.
tantism rampant in sectors of the far left in Latin America also). However, the development of this critical attitude will have positive results only if it facilitates the formulation and application of a more effective strategy and the formation of a broader revolutionary united front.
Independently of the present positions, the problem arises whether the partial turn of the Cubans and the relative cooling of the relationships between them and a series of revolutionary tendencies might not create a more favorable situation for a strengthening of Chinese influence. The Chinese might, in fact, try to fill a certain vacuum that exists. In this they would naturally be favored by the need for material aid that most of the organizations feel cruelly. However, there are two major obstacles to such a development. The first is that China will have many hesitations about making moves in Latin America similar to those it is making in the Asian countries. American imperialism would unquestionably respond to the fullest extent of its energies and on every level to any active Chinese intervention in the game in its vital rampart south of the Rio Grande. The second obstacle lies in the conceptions and methods of Maoism. Most of the movements that take a position in
Orientation and Methods of Revolutionary Struggle Orientation and Methods of Revolutionary Struggle favor of revolutionary struggle are in nowise inclined to accept the theses that the Chinese continue to advance on the nature of the Latin-American revolution or the strict bureaucratic control Peking imposes on its faithful.
The danger is greater on the other hand, insofar as the power of the Cuban pole of attraction should diminish or vanish, that manifold centrifugal tendencies would develop among the groups or organizations linked up to now to Castroism, which a united front could not automatically counterbalance. In fact most of these organizations and groups are confronted with very difficult and serious problems of analysis and perspectives, which have their inevitable organizational reflections. If the leading nucleuses are unable in a relatively short time to give clear answers to these questions and take effective initiatives, splits are inevitable; and the possibility of a further fragmentation of forces, accompanied also by manifestations of passivity and demoralization, could not be excluded. The line of the organizations of the Fourth International is still that of a united front with all the revolutionary movements that rallied around OLAS. A united front involves agreement on certain fundamental orientations and common action on a nonexclusionary basis. It means that every organization participates as it is, in full political and organizational independence. A united front also involves the concept that, far from being fuzzed over, confrontations on all the major questions of the world revolution must be seen as a necessity for the growth of the movement as a whole.
As for the problems of analysis and perspective that arise in this stage, they are evident from
• many articles and discussions among the different revolutionary currents. In this same issue of our magazine there is an interview with Héctor Béjar, Ricardo Gadea, and Hugo Blanco, which gives a strikingly clear idea of the current disputes. Furthermore, this interview merits consideration all the more be cause these three activists played a role in crucial episodes of revolutionary struggle in their country. It is on four points primarily that polemics have sprung up again. Therefore, it is imperative for revolutionists to state 358
their positions on these questions with the maximum clarity.
The first point concerns once again the nature of the Latin-American revolution and more concretely relations with the national bourgeoisie or certain of its layers. After the evolution of the conceptions of the Cuban leaders, which culminated in Che's message of April 1967 and the OLAS documents, one would have supposed that debate among revolutionists on this question had been closed. Unfortunately certain positions taken toward the Peruvian military regime-including by Fidel Castro, as we have seen - and the resumption of some old themes by representatives of the traditional left in Bolivia require a directly opposite conclusion. Obviously some theoretical formulations were marked by empiricism. All that was needed was for somewhat sensational and unforeseen events to come along to reopen the question and inspire assumptions essentially impressionistic, lacking any analytical foundation. Above and beyond even the illusions that have developed in Peru and in Bolivia, the possibility of an alliance with currents in the national bourgeoisie is envisaged, for example, in some Brazilian revolutionary circles (I am leaving aside, here, the second wind the Peruvian and Bolivian events have given those who hold ideas about an antioligarchical and anti-imperialist revolution). I have already talked about what is happening in Peru and Bolivia in the first part of this article, pointing out the social content and the dynamics of the Velasco and Ovando regimes.. Every analysis of the most recent structural tendencies in the Latin-American economy and society only confirms that the so-called national bourgeoisie including its most modern layers is strictly dependent on imperialism and cannot be regarded as a force capable of waging a real struggle against it and playing a leading role by itself or in collaboration with other forces in the Latin- American revolutionary process. It would be naive, moreover, to think that an orientation leaving the way open to collaboration with bourgeois strata could be fruitful as a tactical ruse to gain their support during a whole stage of the struggle without in the last analysis preventing a settling of accounts with capitalism. The Latin-American bourgeoisie has a sufficiently developed class consciousness and political sense not to forget the lesson of the Cuban revolution so quickly and fall into such "snares."
The second question to be clarified is the relationship between guerrilla warfare, as well as armed struggle more generally, and the mass movement. Already in the period of the first OLAS conference, attempts to apply the "foco" theory expressed most symptomatically in Régis Debray's famous book were beginning to result in setbacks. After painful experiences in a series of countries, these conceptions - which inspired actions as heroic as they were inexorably condemned to failure - have been abandoned by most of the revolutionary movements in Latin America. 10 The idea is now very widely accepted that armed struggle cannot develop and be successful without real ties with the masses both in the countryside and in the cities. Likewise, it is widely accepted that viable connections with the masses cannot develop almost automatically as the consequence of courageous initiatives by small vanguard groups but can only be established by systematic organizational and political work. Therefore, a polemic centering on an opposition between partisans of guerrilla warfare on one side and of mass work on the other would be misplaced today. There would be the danger in such a polemic ofrehashing arguments that are now largely superfluous and of failing to concentrate on the decisive points.11
To the contrary, it is the question of the party that must be given more stress. This necessity is demonstrated once again, among other things, by the statements of Héctor Béjar who seems to be content for an indefinite period with a pathetic substitute both for a party and an international, thereby making concessions to spontanéism. Permit me to recall here a passage
11. 1 am referring to the situation in this stage without excluding the possibility that in the future "foquista" tendencies may redevelop and force us to shift the axis of our argument.
from the document adopted by our last world congress:
"While it is necessary to reject the schematic and paralyzing conception according to which everything hinges on the preliminary existence of a genuine party with all its traditional structures... the two following fundamental facts must, however, never be lost sight of:
"(a) The existence and functioning of a revolutionary party, far from being an outworn schema of outmoded Marxists, corresponds to the concrete and ineluctable needs of the development of the armed struggle itself (this, among other things, is the lesson of Hugo Blanco's experience in Peru).
"(b) The revolutionists must struggle for the most favorable variant: acting in such a way that when the armed struggle begins, if there is not already a genuine party, completely structured, with a large mass influence (a very unrealistic perspective in almost all of the Latin-American countries) in existence, there be at least solid nuclei of a political organization, coordinated on a national scale."
If these necessities are not really understood and the practical conclusions are not drawn, in fact, the need for preliminary political and organizational work will be lost sight of. And without such preparation any attempt at armed struggle will be condemned to isolation and failure. There would also be the danger of forgetting that there are periods when an effort to develop mass work and to create the instruments for this must have absolute priority. For example, it would be absurd in Peru today to rely primarily on preparing a new wave of guerrilla warfare, failing to understand the need for a deepgoing activity of political clarification and to exploit all the possibilities which, despite everything, the new situation offers for stimulating mass movements and establishing links with them. This is also true on a different scale and probably for a markedly shorter period for Bolivia.
But it is above all on the question of the possible forms of armed struggle and especially the role of guerrilla warfare in the Latin-American revolution that clarification is once more necessary. Let us recall, first of all, the conceptions that were approved by a large majority of our International and by virtually all of our movement in Latin America:
"The fundamental perspective, the only realistic perspective for Latin America is that of an armed struggle which may last for long years.... Even in the case of countries where large mobilizations and class conflicts in the cities may occur first, civil war will take manifold forms of armed struggle, in which the principal axis for a whole period will be rural guerrilla warfare, the term having primarily a geographical-military meaning and not necessarily implying an exclusively peasant composition of the fighting detachments (or even necessarily preponderantly peasant composition). In this sense, armed struggle in Latin America means fundamentally guerrilla warfare."
The document tried immediately atterward to explain that it would be wrong to draw any one-sided generalizations from these premises, specifying as follows:
"The strict selection of this central axis must be complemented by a very precise understanding that there will inevitably be a whole gamut of variants and that the different factors at work will combine in different forms according to the different countries and conjunctural situations. The two extreme possibilities can be indicated almost symbolically by taking on the one hand the case of a country like Uruguay where the armed struggle will be essentially urban and where the regime could have already been overthrown on the basis of a powerful urban mass movement if it had been technically and politically armed with such a perspective, and on the other hand by taking the case of a country of overwhelmingly peasant composition, without large urban concentrations, where the guerrilla war will be almost exclusively rural and peasant until the very eve of the enemy's final defeat.".
When Comrade
Hugo Blanco reaffirms that the real opposition is between revolution and opportunism, he reminds us of an elementary truth that no one can dispute. However, what is vital for the Latin-American movement, once there has been a clarification of the relationship between armed struggle and the masses and the need for a party as the instrument of revolution, is to sketch the concrete forms armed struggle will take. As we have just seen, our congress foresaw manifold variants. But above and beyond specific or conjunctural combinations, the general hypotheses can be defined rather clearly.
Armed struggle for the conquest of power might take the form it took in Russia in 1917, where it was the culmination of a powerful mass movement which threw up armed detachments from within itself. Even leaving aside the civil war which followed and in which there was a combination of manifold forms of armed struggle, it must not be forgotten for an instant that the emergence of armed units directly from the mass struggle was possible notably because of the breakup of the army resulting from its defeats in the world war. Secondly, armed struggle might take the form of an actual civil war, the most acute and dramatic form of class struggle, with the confrontation of two full-fledged armies and where dual power would be expressed even as a geographical partition of the country. There is, finally, a third variant which occurs when the class struggle has already reached the level of armed confrontation but not yet in the generalized form of a civil war- the guerrilla warfare variant. As we have seen, this variant may assume very different concrete forms. Guerrilla warfare has proved at the same time necessary and effective in all kinds of experiences over the past fifty years in Asia and Africa, as well as in Europe itself during the Nazi occupation (above all in Yugoslavia, in Italy; and in France).
If we consider the most probable perspective in most of the countries of Latin America in the stage where we are now -after the victory of a socialist revolution in Cuba and the ripening of a revolutionary situation continentwide - we must exclude the variant of: "a progressive rise and broadening of the mass movement and its structuring and reinforcement through traditional organizational forms before it reaches the armed struggle..." The native ruling classes and, if need be, imperialism will block this variant by the most determined and barbaric forms of repression. The experiences not only of Bolivia and Brazil but also of Mexico and Argentina are conclusive in this regard (to say nothing of Santo Domingo). Likewise, we consider that there are not sufficient reasons to count on the possibility of "an explosive crisis involving the breaking up or paralysis of the state apparatus and a mass mobilization so impetuous that it could prevent or neutralize recourse to repression as a decisive measure."12 In the last analysis, moreover, such a hypothesis would fall back on relying on the omnipotence of spontaneous mass movements. As for the perspective of a civil war or an anti-imperialist war in the strict sense, this will very probably be a necessary stage in most of the countries. However, most often it will mark only the final stage before the seizure of power, 13
This is why we share the conclusion of the great majority of Latin-American revolutionists - that is, for a phase of the revolution whose length cannot be predicted a priori but which in general will probably be long, the armed struggle will be fundamentally a guerrilla struggle. It will take over the methods and means suggested by an international tradition now very rich and others which the circumstances might indicate to the ingeniousness of the fighters. If you take account of the geographical facts, the demographical structures of the majority of the population, and the technical and military considerations stressed by Che himself, it follows that the variant of rural guerrilla warfare on a continentwide scale will be the most probable one.
It is, then, necessary and entirely possible to avoid confusing concepts that are quite clear and to eliminate false problems. A false alternative would be that of a choice between working in the mass movement and guerrilla warfare. Unless it is rooted in the masses, guerrilla warfare like any other form of armed struggle would be inexorably condemned to failure. And without guerrilla warfare the mass movement would be condemned to an indefinite succession of precarious attempts or fruitless spontaneous explosions and crushing repressions. Another false problem pressions. snomer laise probieli would be the question of whether guerrilla warfare is a strategy or a tactic. It might be, in fact, either one, and the conceptual or terminological quarrel could drag on in an absolutely sterile way. The essential thing is to clarify whether - in its various forms - guerrilla warfare does or does not correspond to a stage of the revolutionary struggle in Latin America. The essential thing is to analyze in detail, in the case of every country or group of countries, what forms should be preferred. We have already had occasion in the past to specify our movement's conceptions regarding Bolivia, and our Argentinian movement has made a valuable contribution to the strategy of armed struggle in its country. We consider also that revolutionists who do not belong to the Fourth International have developed very pertinent analyses which constitute essential points of departure (e.g., for Guatemala). Moreover, the events of
In Our Next Issue:
We have noted an increase in the recent period of works sponsored by the Kremlin on the subject of "Trotskyism," which apparently remains a burning topic in the Soviet Union. One of the best recent examples is "The Role of Trotskyism in the Modern World"
by M. Basmanov.
A translation of this article has now been made available to the Englishspeaking world by Political Affairs, a publication of the Communist party
U.S. A.
In our next issue we are reprinting this translation in full so as to help bring it to the attention of readers who do not generally follow the Stalinist press. For a better appreciation of Basmanov's production, we are also publishing "A Trotskyist Reply: The Role of Basmanov in the New School of
Stalinist Falsification" by George Saunders.
MEMO
to from:
the last year in countries like Brazil and Uruguay provide valuable indications on the importance and methods of urban guerrilla warfare. In Peru, finally, the problems are more complex and they would merit, therefore, a separate and very detailed analysis.
I have tried by this article to recall and clarify certain conceptions of our movement. I hope that those who believe that we are wrong and that our projections of revolutionary strategy are incorrect will express their criticism in the most concrete way, by showing us with the maximum clarity and precision where our errors lie and what alternative they propose for a strategy of armed struggle.
March 15, 1970.
In addition, George Saunders undertook checking the sources quoted by Basmanov from Lenin, Trotsky, and the Trotskyist publications of today, which are evidently carefully collected and studied by certain Moscow departments. The rich results of this research job provide notes more than three times the length of Basmanov's piece.
Here's a sampling of the headings: The "Second Front" and the Achieve ments of Earl Browder; Youth "Infected with Leftism"; What Is Meant by "World Socialism"?; "Deformed Workers States"; M. Basmanov and J. Posadas;
The
1953-54 Split; Lenin on Guerrilla Struggle; The Outcome of a Nuclear War; Relative Importance of the Colonial Revolution; Guatemala and Fidel Castro's Speech; How a Revolutionary Situation Can Develop; "The Events in Peru".
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Notes
3. See Quatrieme Internationale, May 1969, pages 58-59; and Intercontinental Press, July 14, pages 717-18.
4. See especially several statements by Hugo Blanco, Hector Bejar, Ricardo Ga
5. On the subject of Bolivia see the article "De Siles a Ovando," Quatrieme Internationale, January 1970 (an English translation of this article appeared in Intercontinental Press, December 8, page 1100, under the title "The Replacement of Siles") and the document voted by the November conference of the POR. Regarding General Ovando's views very lively polemics occurred in the Bolivian press in January 1970 following the statements which Uvando made to the Uruguayan journalist Carlos Maria Gutierrez. These statements were later denied or rectified.
7. The rupture between the Cubans and Douglas Bravo was made public a few months ago, but serious tensions also exist with other movements including those with strictly Fidelista origins.
8. The answer that Guevara is supposed to have given on "exporting revolution," according to the version broadcast by Italian television, was absolutely correct. This concept itself was critically analyzed and there was no commitment to abandon solidarity with the Latin-American revolutionists.
9. See especially the document on the Cuban revolution adopted by the World Congress of the Fourth International that took place late in 1960.
10. The author of this article does not believe that any real "foco" theory exists in the contributions of Ernesto Guevara and Fidel Castro. In any case it would be wrong to claim that this theory inspired the practical work of the Cuban revolution and even that of the Bolivia campaign of 1966-67.
12. The quotations are from the worid congress document.
13. This also emerges from the final part of Ernesto Guevara's essay Guerra de guerrillas: un metodo.