(The following article on the end of the Belgian miners' strike has been translated from the February 20 issue of Rood (Red), the biweekly Flemish-language organ, published in Antwerp, of the Revolutionaire Socialisten (RS- Revolutionary Socialists). The RS is the Flemish affiliate of the Confédération Socialiste des Travailleurs (CST- Socialist Workers Confederation). The JGS-SJW (Jeune Garde Socialiste/Socialistische Jonge Wacht- Socialist Young Guard), the Belgiumwide Trotskyist youth organization, has fraternal ties with the RS-CST.]
In the sixth week of the strike in the Campine Basin, the majority of the strikers gave a resounding answer to the referendum maneuver*- they continued their strike with greater determination than ever. The press had to admit that the demonstration on Thursday [February 19] of 3,000 miners from Winterslag and Waterschei was the most combative of the entire strike. De Standaard, in fact, conceded the same day that the referendum was rigged.
The proposal for an "underground action," in fact, an occupation of the mines, came forward on Friday during the meetings of miners at the various pits. They saw this as the only possible response to the bosses' policy of starving them out. This was supposed to make it possible to restore the strike front - which had broken through especially in Beringen —in the mines themselves and in that way the strike was supposed to become more active.
This mine occupation was, however, not really successful. In Winterslag the occupation was complete; the first shift stayed down to occupy the mine and the following shifts could not descend. In Waterschei, Zolder, and Eisden, the occupation was only partially successful and only for a very short time. And in Beringen the occupation failed. What reason could there be for this?
Black Thursday had, however, been a success in all the mines. Along with the big march there were several additional demonstrations by the miners in the other pits; in various parts of Limbourg, high-school students came out on the streets; and in Antwerp 2,000 university students demonstrated against Eyskens.* The day afterward, the idea of occupying the mines as an underground strike was advanced everywhere. Everywhere general assemblies were organized to prepare the action.
These assemblies were the best that came off. About 100 miners in Beringen and 360 to 700 in the other mines adopted the occupation plan enthusiastically and the practical aspects of carrying out the action were discussed.
What exactly happened, then?
On Monday morning when the first shift went down, all potential organizers of an occupation were pulled out by foremen surrounded by a heavy guard of police. At the same time agents of the mine management went down into the pits to warn the workers that any strikers would be fired on the spot. Despite this the overwhelming majority struck in Winterslag, Waterschei, and Zolder; and in Eisden about forty miners maintained a partial occupation of the mine for the entire day.
By Tuesday afternoon, however, it had to be recognized that-with the exception of Winterslag - the action was stalled, despite the enthusiasm that the idea of an occupation had orig inally inspired. It was decided then to suspend the action temporarily and to set about immediately planning a later action.
We must ask ourselves how the miners could go back to work after they had held firm for more than six weeks against all kinds of intimidation, against the lies in the press, radio, and TV, against the brutal repression by the police, against the lure of partial concessions, against the pressure from the union leadership, against threats of being fired, etc.
* The Belgian premier. - IP
We cannot, therefore, attribute the end of the action to intimidation alone. Otherwise the strike wouldn't havelasted three hours. There was of course the policy of starving out the strikers carried out by the bosses and their government, as well as the trade-union
These forces used every leadership.
possible means to prevent the miners from getting together the material resources to continue their strike.
In this respect, the time was a rather unfavorable one for the miners. Many families had gone into debt in expectation of the year-end bonuses the workers were supposed to receive. But now, that money had to be used for the basic necessities, for food. A thin wallet and the family pressure that goes along with it unquestionably forced some workers back to the pits when it became obvious that the strike leadership could not give sufficient material support to the strikers. Solidarity actions, of course, were blocked by every means, such as banning collections (for example, in Mechelen and in various towns in Limbourg).
But this starving-out policy by itself is not a sufficient explanation for the failure of the strike. A high percentage of the miners could have held out materially for a good while longer; for example, the bulk of the union members, who had received 5,000 francs [about US$100] as an advance on strike pay.
There were some other reasons why the occupation was only partially successful and had to be given up after two days. The first was that it came too late, that is, during a defensive phase. The Socialistische Jonge Wacht had called for an occupation at the end of the third week, when the strike was still on the upswing.
This measure could certainly have been applied with greater success before a break appeared in the strike front, that is, before Wednesday of the sixth week, when a section of the miners went back to work, especially in Beringen. After that point an occupation was, to be sure, still the most serious alternative; but it was seen more as a defensive move to close the breach in the strike front.
If the occupation had been launched earlier, however, it would unquestionably have given the strike a much more active character and won greater results. Now it appeared more as the only possible way out of the impasse that followed the successes of Black Thursday.
Another cause of the failure was the lack of adequate organization. This was a result of the strike's spontaneous character. Despite the organization of the workers in mine committees, the structure of the strike was still too weak for the extent of the action. This is in no way a reproach, simply the recognition of a fact.
Everything possible was done during the strike to organize the workers with a view toward the further development of the strike and the continuation of the struggle afterwards. But these efforts did not measure up to the kind of organization needed to carry through an occupation successfully in a defensive phase. In most pits all that had to be done to break the organization of the occupation was to keep about twenty workers from descending.
A further reason for the return to work is that adequate solidarity actions were not organized. Aside from the actions on Black Thursday, the solidarity campaign left something to be desired, especially in the other mines and plants. Outside of the strikes in the Walloon mines and Cockerill- Ougrée, and outside of collections in various plants and offices, these actions got underway much too slowly.
It is clear that support actions could have been carried out on a large scale. However, except for the actions of the SJW and the Louvain students, attempts were made only by individuals. It is very noteworthy that it was precisely on the last day of the strike that the biggest solidarity actions took place.
The SJW - sometimes in collaboration with others- took the initiative for the solidarity strikes and demonstrations in Liege, Ghent, Antwerp, and in Limbourg itself. Along with the SDS Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund - Socialist German Student Union), the SJW organized various mass meetings and other actions March 16, 1970
in West Germany. But organized solidarity on a mass scale did not come in time to make it possible to win the strike, although it showed the miners that they could count on broader support in subsequent actions.
For six weeks the SJW activists have stood in the breach. Are they going to abandon the miners now, wash their hands of the matter, and put the blame for the movement's weaknesses on others? We think that now also, after the strike has ended, very important work is to be done. During the strike we helped very actively in promoting independent organization of the workers in committees. Now these committees must be built up further in the perspective of reconquering the unions.
Together with the workers we must try to find the exact weaknesses of the strike and see what more can be done in the way of action. Therefore, we must inject into the committees in concrete ways the idea of building an opposition to oust the present tradeunion leaders. If it is planned to resume the actions in a few months, we must progress both in the level and in the kind of organization we have.
Another objective came to the fore during the strike - workers control. The next time most workers will not struggle only for percentage raises but for control over subsidies, work tempos, and investments. They will challenge the authority of the bosses in a more conscious way (as thousands of them have already done). They will say: "The mines are ours," and they will also say that "the unions are ours," which is what the committees must fight for now so that the next time the strike cannot be sobotaged by the trade-union bosses as it was this time.
Therefore, the SJW activists, both the new local activists and those who have established themselves in the Campine Basin, will continue their work there. In this perspective, the Limbourg SJW has been built up and work will be continued to achieve a firmly rooted Permanent Committee of the miners.
Notes
* A referendum on whether or not to continue the strike was organized by the Catholic union which has traditionally been dominant in the area. The workers were to fill out ballots at home, in isolation from the struggle. - IP 220