The congress of the Chinese Commanist party to be held this year will provide a useful opportunity to take general stock of the last three years' vicissitudes in China. However, on the basis of the documents made available in the official publications over the past two or three months we can already grasp a series of significant elements in the overall balance sheet.* Let me try to sum these up a bit schematically:
(1) The movement which began in November 1965 and which shortly thereafter adopted the name "cultural revolucion" seems now, aiter a succession oI often dramatic i turns, to have reached its concluding phase. Its essential achievements have been to shake the entire party and state apparatus from top to bottom and defeat various groups or tendencies that did not accept the Mao-Lin Piao line.
It is clear that the opposition to the Mao line did not come from a single tendency, or even perhaps one dominant tendency, but manifold tendencies which were directly counterposed to each other in certain respects. On various occasions, in particular, men who had played a leading role in the first phase of the cultural revolution and who had become spokesmen ior extreme positions or demands that arose from sectors of the masses whose mobilization had assumed its own dynamic, going beyond the objectives of the Mao tendency, were attacked or ousted. Liu Shao-chi himself was accused of both right and left deviations.**
an agent of the Kuomintang and imperialism from the start of his political activity. Liu is blamed for attitudes adopted by the party and by Mao himself which the Chinese leaders now consider it opportune to criticize. And he is still being denied all opportunity to make known his point of view and his version of the events. I might add that an article on the incoming year cast fresh light on the methods used during the cultural revolution. A paragraph includes a recommen-
With the shattering of the old apparatus and the defeat of the tendency which presumably most represented its demands -- that is Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping (who was removed without much stir and without his expulsion even being announced so far) -- Mao and Lin Piao have begun rebuilding. Ihe scheduled congress is supposed to mark the culmination of this work.
Controverting all the fanciful interpretations of some Maoists -- which were at times not unlike those of certain bourgeois journalists -- Mao intends to reestablish fully the central role of the party. It is significant in this regard that in a recent polemic Liu was accused of spontaneity-worshipping tendencies. These accusations were in contradiction to preceding ones and to his real orientation which was that of an apparatus man.* It is significant, moreover, that an important article defined the cultural revolution as "a movement to consolidate the party."** This formula is difficult to reconcile with the other theses of the last two years.
Simultaneous with the restoration o1 the party, rigorous centralization 01 the leadership has been reafiirmed whIch, besides the party, is supposed to embrace the army, the state, and the mass movement. Ihis leadership in turn identifies with Mao and his thought, which are being presented more than ever as the fundamental element of unity in the system and as the first and indisputable source of ideology. As a further element of stability, Lin Piao has now been designated as Mao's successor and this will be confirmed even in the new party statutes.***
Judging from the indications that have appeared up till now, it does not seem that substantial changes will be indation not "to extort confessions."
troduced in the structures of the party itself. For example, it does not seem that there will be more frequent congresses, which would facilitate the circulation of ideas and criticisms and turnover in party personnel.
If we can give a strict interpretation to an article published last October, it would have to be assumed that the elective system itself will be challenged and that cadres will be appointed by the leadership, although after discussions among the "revolutionary masses."* I can agree with the authors of this article that we must not have "a blind faith in elections." However, for a party that wants to be revolutionary, I confess that I still prefer elections to appointment from the top.
The new apparatus which emerged in the country out of the long struggles is embodied at the present stage in the revolutionary committees. As is known, these have been instituted in about thirty provinces and include about 4,000 members. Their composition corresponds to what has been demanded ad infinitum -- spokesmen of the revolutionary masses, of the cadres, and of the army.
The first category is supposed to be the most mumerous (about 2,000 or half the total). But that does not automatically mean that it has the greater specific weight. If we consider the developments of the first months of 1967 and certain events of last year, as reported by the official sources themselves, we must assume that the army instead has the decisive weight. Since the crisis of late 1965 and the first months of 1966, it has acted as a cohesive force. It has intervened decisively both to settle accounts with the non-Maoist currents and to counter all the centrifugal tendencies developing among the masses and among Mao's supporters themselves.
Also in line with the stabilization is the apparent elimination of the Red Guards (which are not even mentioned in the most recent major documents and articles). The dismissal of the Red Guards has been accompanied by a campaign of disciplining the students. Entrusted to the workers according to official statements, this campaign has, more concretely, been in the hands of elements trusted by the Mao-Lin Piao leading group.
I do not propose to examine the erspectives of the reorganization of the regime that has been carried out or is
Robert Guilcording to some, 1or example, lain in Le Monde of January 12-13, the delegates to the congress will also be appointed.
being carried out in China. It is sufficient to say here that in my opinion definite factors of instability are present, beginning with the central element of the authority and thought of Mao. In a vast society caught up in the whirlwind of the international crisis of our times, resorting to invoking a charismatic leader will reveal all its limitations.
And this is all the more true because Mao's thought 1s mostly summed up In very general formulas, or interpreted in varying, if not contradictory ways, in accordance with narrowly immediate needs. Already during the cultural revolution the common general appeal to Mao's thought did not prevent continual struggles in the ranks of the Maoists themselves and the formation of differing groups both among the Red Guards and among the workers. Moreover, these dillerences are Iar Irom naving been overcome. Otherwise, there would be no explanation for the appeals and admonitions to unity and discipline and against anarchy which still frequently occur.
In the more or less long run, the problems which Maoism raised in its own fashion and for which it now claims to have found the solution will reemerge in acute forms, creating new crises. It is quite probable that this will occur in the context of a relationship of forces between the masses and the bureaucratic apparatuses more favorable to the former than ever before.
(2) The Chinese leadership finds itself now and will continue to find itself faced with a series of economic and social problems. Among the fundamental themes in the cultural revolution was the Maoist group's refusal to try to solve the crucial problems of the transitional phase - which have been enormously aggravated by bureaucratic management -- in the manner adopted by the USSR after Khrushcher and, although with notable variations, by the people's democracies, especially in recent years. But up to now the Maoists have not counterposed any real alternative to the "reformist," technocratic right-wing bureaucratic olution. Ineir response has been primarily olemical and moralistic-propagandistic. practice, this has been expressed in their attempt to contain some strata and some groups in which they claimed to perceive the seeds of Khrushchevite revisionisn.
It is difficult if not impossible to get a clear idea of the situation of the Chinese economy and the real Chinese economic growth rates, since for more than a decade the indispensable general indexes have not been supplied. And the more recent reports, which boast of successes in certain sectors, remain extremely fragmentary.
It may be that a rather regular process of growth is starting up again. However, especially if we keep in mind the rate of increase of the population, it is obvious that the objective of industrializing and modernizing China and substantially rising the stand of living of the people is still remote. It is obvious that there will not fail to be a whole series of contradictions and difficulties which must have major political repercussions.
A statement by Mao which has been popularized recently gives a clear idea of at least one of these difficulties, which was certainly among the objective factors contributing to the cultural revolution. And it is clear that after three years this difficulty still persists and retains its full importance. "It is very necessary, " Mao_said (see Peking Review, cated Januapeople to go to the "cor ery-
1969, p. 14)
"for eduside to be reeducated by the poor and lower-middle peasants. Cadres and other people in the cities should be persuaded to send their sons and daughters who have finished junior or senior middle school, college or university to the countryside. Let us mobilize. Comrades throughout the countryside should welcome them."*
Above and beyond its political and propagandistic aspects, the meaning of the campaign promoted by this quotation from Mao is that the industrial economy and the urban economy in general cannot provide the needed jobs. It cannot meet the demand for jobs created by the entry of mounting numbers of youth into the work Iorce, an exodus from the countryside, and the general increase in education.
Io judge from Mao's own statement, the problem must be particularly acute with regard to placing educated and trained youth. In accordance with a phenomenon present more or less everywhere, although taking different forms, these youth tend to enter the urban economy. Moreover, certain tendencies have appeared among the peasants not to welcome newcomers or those returning to the countryside. This is all the more understandable since the population engaged in agriculture is still quite high and inasmuch as the regime has tried to utilize underemployed manpower more rationally.**
"for a period of toration of capitalism a hundred if not a thousand years." (See the publication already cited.)
** Especially in their initial phase the people's communes were supposed, among other things, to meet this need,
which is a vital one in all the economically
(3) The line on international policy reveals the pull of contradictory elements. Ihe violent polemic against the Soviet leaders, who are now accused of having completed a full restoration of capitalism and of systematic collusion with the United States; the tactical demands of the factional struggle in the communist movement; and the real necessity, in a country which continues to face direct threats, Ior an unceasing campaigı of anti-imperialist propaganda impel the Chinese to continually denounce the American leaders. Nixon himself was made the target of violent attacks as he assumed office.
On the other hand, it is quite clear that the leading group wants to maneuver to prevent the materialization of new agreements between the USSR and the USA from increasing China's military and diplomatic problems. This is probably how we should interpret the note published In November on the resumption of Chinese- American talks in Warsaw (which evoked the theme of coexistence) that caught the attention of the American leaders and the international press commentators.*
It should not be forgotten that the Chinese are not entirely indifferent to the question of trade with the capitalist countries. Such trade has in fact increased in the course of the last years and the terms of trade have tended to improve.
The Maoist leaders' position in regard to the Vietnam negotiations is another manifestation of their difficulty in establishing a consistent line of international policy.
Ineir silences, reticence, their only fugitive allusions to the problem indicate a clearly critical attitude (which Is further promoted by the needs of their factional polemic against the USSR).
But, on the other hand, they hesitate to take an open position and not only because this would lead to a direct polemic with the Vietnamese themselves. Their hesitations probably stem also from the fact that in order not to seem empty propaganda, a declaration that the war must be continued to a complete military victory would have to be accompanied by a series of concrete steps which would increase the danger of imperialist attacks on China itself.
(4) In the struggle within the international Communist and revolutionary movement, the Chinese have been able to underdeveloped countries.
score points in their favor by their support of guerrilla movements in various Asian countries, by their condemnation of the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and by the favorable attitudes they have adopted toward the movements in the capitalist countries -- most of all during the revolutionary May in France. But here also there are two sides to the coin.
The stimulus that movements such as those in Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia have gotten from China must not make us forget that Peking's attitude toward the national bourgeoisies, as expressed both in its statements and in its acts, has not been entirely Iorthright and free from concessions. And this despite the fact that in the present phase of world politics these classes -- necessarily from their point of view -- have become linked tighter than ever to imperialism.
So while the Chinese criticized the attitude of the Indonesian CP toward Sukarno after the fact, * they still 100k with favor on the perspective of collaboration with the national bourgeoisie -- or sectors of it -- in Thailand. Secondly, they continue to maintain good relations with Pakistan, granting interestfree loans precisely at a time when the Ayub Khan regime has unmistakably revealed its reactionary character by resorting to the most massive repressions.**
The British subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company signed the first contract in British history February Il granting equal pay to women employed in industry. Ihe concession was the result of a long struggle by women workers against discriminatory pay scales. Last summer women sewing-machine operators at a Ford plant in Essex struck over this demand.
The hitch comes in a provision that to collect the equal pay, "equal
Regardless of the analysis and arguments which accompanied it, the Chinese condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia has unquestionably opened up possibilities LOI a certain spread oI Maoist influence ir Eastern Europe (such an influence was already present, moreover, in some groups o1 the Czechoslovak anti-Stalinist leit). But their persistent attitude of defending Stalin and their links with discredited groups. of old Stalinists both in the USSR and in some people's democracies (e.g., Poland) who identify with Stalin and his period. still constitute an essentially insurmountable obstacle.
In the USSR today those who want to
With pregner.
rehabilitate stalin line up with Brezhnev. But the forces which oppose the present leading group are certainly not favorable to a return to a past, whose tragic portent they experienced directly.
finally, Maoism unquestionably nas a considerable intluence among the new vanguard in the advanced capitalist countries. And in certain cases this influence is on the upswing. But in France the strongest Maoist group has been, in fact, shattereo by the real experience of revolutionary struggle. And in other countries, the most prominent phenomenon is a diffuse influence of Maoism, which includes not a few elements of spontaneity worship (and mythmaking) -- not the consolidation of orthodox pro- Chinese parties. (In Italy the Pekingbacked party has recently suffered a serious split).
If it wants to face the real problems and not content itself with extolling Mao's thought, the congress of the Chinese CP will have abundant food for thought. In any case, it is certain that dramatic new events lie in store ior China in the coming years.
Hussein in Intercontinental Press, January 13, 1969, p. 18.
work" must be performed, which management has announced means night work and overtime: Both have been illegal since Marx's time under the factory Acts, passed to protect women from superexploitation in industrial sweatshops. The labor movement has long called for the prohibition of the right of the bosses to make night work and overtime mandatory for men. Instead, the Labour government is expected to grant exemptions from the Factory Acts that bar such work for women.
Notes
* It should be said again that analysis of the Chinese situation is made difficult by the scarcity of direct information and by the grossly propagandistic and apologetic character of the official sources.
** The way in which the polemic against Liu Shao-chi is continuing must constitute an important indication. In imitation of the all too well-known schema, Liu 1s presented as a "supertraitor,"
* Liu is supposed to have said "it is necessary and Iundamental to depend on spontaneous movement of the nasses." (See Hsinhua Daily News Release, January 16, p. 10.)
** See Pékin Information [the French edition of the Chinese monthly news bulletin], No. 45, 1968, p. 4.
*** A version of the draft statutes was published by the New York Times on January 4. It must naturally be regarded with caution.
* See Peking Review, No. 43, p. 7. Ac-
* The seriousness of the problem is highlighted by the propagandistic hyperbole that Mao's instruction will be of fundamental importance for preventing the res-
* The note affirmed, among other things, that China still offered the United States an agreement based on the two principles of the withdrawal of American forces from Formosa and "recognition of the five principles of peaceful coexistence." (See Peking Review, No. 48, p. 30.)
* The Chinese policy toward Sukarno is now attributed to the unfortunate Liu Shao-chi, the No. I scapegoat. Among other things, he is accused of having. had his picture displayed too much during his trip to Indonesia. (See Pékin Information [the French edition of the Chinese monthly news bulletin], No. 4, 1969, p. 12.)
** The agreement was signed on December 28, 1968. On the attitude of the Maoist movement in Pakistan, which has stressed the "anti-imperialist nature" of the Ayub Khan regime, and on the silence of the Chinese press regarding the repressions, see the article "Pakistan: The Crisis and Its Origins" by Ghilam