[The article below has been translated by Intercontinental Press from the November 1 issue of the Belgian revolutionary-socialist weekly La Gauche.]
East of the Congo are two of the smallest countries in Africa - Burundi and Rwanda. The population of the two countries added together reaches six million.
The history of these people, who have the same culture, is well known. A few centuries ago two feudal dynasties were established in Burundi and Rwanda, topping a social pyramid in which the ruling class was Tutsi and the subjugated peasant class Hutu. The Tutsi, who are of a different ethnic origin, imposed a system of racial segregation on the Hutus.
With the establishment of a mandate over the two countries, the system hardened and social and racial segregation worsened. The Europeans saw the cruel feudal customs of the ruling caste as an ideal system of "indirect administration" for keeping nine-tenths of the population, the Hutus, in the double subjugation of the feudal-colonialist system.
With the Belgian mandate,* the life of Burundi and Rwanda was politically, economically, and militarily integrated with that of the Congo. Nothing has changed since.
These two overpopulated countries, suffocating in a subsistence economy, serve as a manpower reserve for the mines in Katanga and to some extent in Uganda.
In 1959 a Hutu antifeudal revolution erupted in Rwanda. But, thanks to the skillful maneuvering of the Christian trade unions, which managed to get rid of those militants whose popularity was too great, this revolution was unable to go beyond the bourgeois stage. Taking advantage of the confusion involved in a too spontaneous and badly organized revolution, the Christian unions succeeded in convincing the mandate authorities, who until then had backed the Tutsi feudalists, to reverse themselves and install an extremely moderate Hutu government. Above all, this regime was extremely compliant toward the Belgian colonialists.
By a subtle operation, what Belgium had considered "the territory of Ruanda-Urundi" became two independent countries, the Kingdom of Burundi and the Republic of Rwanda. The sole motive was to block the antifeudal revolution from spreading over the entire territory.
In Burundi an unstable monarchy stumbled along through chronic political crises until 1965. After that, the United States, which is closely linked to Belgium and greatly interested in Burundi for strategic reasons, established a Tutsi military regime in three stages.
The first stage consisted of organizing, with the assistance of the Belgian technical assistance personnel [Assistance Technique], the physical liquidation of all those Hutus "inclined" to harm the security of the state and the royal person.
It is interesting to note that the reinforcements and bombs intended for intimidating and repressing an insurgent peasantry were brought in through private enterprises located in the Congo.
On the Tutsi side, the man who took responsibility for protecting the threatened monarchy was Captain Micombero. The "trials" were carried out at night, the executions as well. The bodies were discreetly disposed of. The foreign press referred to these incidents with reserve. Little by little, Captain Micombero pushed the king out of the way and then put the crown prince on the throne. After that, Micombero's eyes turned enviously toward the man he considers his political model - Mobutu.
The new king was invited to tour the Congo. As if by chance, at that moment Micombero became president of the new republic of Burundi. Following the example of his spiritual brother Mobutu, he called himself revolutionary. There is nothing surprising about this, since the CIA advisers in Bujumbura are the same as in Kinshasa.
As was done in the Congo, Micombero established a one-party system. The single party, UPRONA [Unité et Progrès National party], was formed by a fascist-type "revolutionary" youth serving as a parallel police force with the right to kill anyone they chose.
Since 1966 a military pact has linked Burundi, the Congo, and Rwanda. Its essential objective is mutual assistance in dealing with internal rebellion and the extradition of subversive elements. The Rwanda government, which enjoys the reputation of having carried out a revolution against the Tutsi feudalists, has avoided informing its people of the implications of this military pact.
This September and October a wave of preventive repressions similar to those of 1965 has again hit the Hutus. The arrests are always carried out arbitrarily, by preference in secrecy, and death under torture usually follows before there is any thought of a trial. The objective is not to identify offenders but to prevent the formation of any political groups so as to purge the country totally of any possibility of subversion. In order to prevent the possible formation of dozens of militants or cadres, hundreds are being massacred.
The military pact has functioned admirably. Obviously such pacts are signed to be made use of... The Congolese arranged to be present in Bujumbura before the arrests, on the pretext of training Burundi officers. They carried their discreet intervention, however, to the point of taking over responsibility for guarding the regime's most important personalities. They chartered planes to transport themselves and others at the disposition of the Burundi military chiefs "to give instruction in maintaining order in the interior."
Thus, to protect their holdings in the Congo, the CIA and Belgium are setting up the most reliable kind of strategic hinterland from which it will be possible to check "a Congolese rebellion."
Rwanda has an airport equipped for instrument landings, a facility quite rare in Africa, which the meager air traffic in and out of this rather unimportant country by no means justifies. An air navigational system of this type is obviously indispensable for military airplanes, which cannot be permitted to lose any time because of weather. Repressive operations require precise timing. The intervention of the paratroopers at Kisangani provides an example of this. The success of the action depended on its lightning character.
Thus everywhere the risk of revolution appears, imperialism creates a little Thailand.
This does not mean that the imperialists strictly prohibit the installation of revolutionaries in foreign countries, especially if they think they can corrupt them.
During the entire Mulelist phase of the Congolese revolution, the United States allowed a backward monarchical regime like the one in Burundi to play a progressive role internationally.
They did so in order to entice progressives into relying heavily on Burundi. The result was that left-wing movements and socialist powers received extreme rightist Tutsis who concealed the real situation in their country and deceived the world by revolutionary tirades.
By this means also the Tutsis could test the degree of interest a certain power or a certain movement might have in their country. For example, voting to admit China to the UN was, in part, a bid to see if China might be interested in Burundi and the Congolese revolution.
The game they played with the Mulelists was also a subtle one. Relying on a secure base in Burundi, the Mulelists were led to orient their strategy on the basis of having this avenue of retreat. They forgot to be wary and to rely on themselves. They who were outlawed fighters let themselves betaken in by capitalist legality. Their lives and travel were made easier, thus the corruptible elements were won over without difficulty, made accustomed to more open activities, and more easily kept under surveillance.
When everyone had taken the bait, all the imperialists had to do on the day set for the antiguerrilla operation was to get Burundi to change its policy within a few seconds, and then seize the arms and arrest or drive out the troublemakers. If a revolution, seduced by such a hospitable country, stakes its success in this way on the possibility of a coordinated struggle or aid organized from a foreign base, it runs great risk of losing the battle.
In the eyes of the Belgian and American capitalists, Burundi, the Congo, and Rwanda have never ceased being a single economic and political unit. For them the borders are only academic and their strategy is formulated for the three countries as a whole. In the face of such a reality, a revolutionary movement that wants to be effective will likewise have to think of projecting its strategy on a commensurable scale.
In any case, Burundi and Rwanda cannot improve their situation in the context of a narrow and outmoded nationalism. That would be a suicidal policy.
Notes
* The former territory of Ruanda-Urundi was part of German East Africa before the first world war. During the war, it became a British mandate and was assigned to Belgium at the war's end. Belgium assumed administration of the area in 1922. - IP.