[The following article is from the October 4 issue of the Belgian revolutionary-socialist weekly La Gauche. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
If the very recent spontaneous strikes had not taken place, one would be tempted to conclude from the German elections that nothing has changed in the Federal Republic. Everything went as the pundits predicted, although with some variations hardly as important as most observers thought they might be.
The Social Democracy (SPD) [Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands -- Social Democratic party of Germany] scored some gains but to a lesser extent than had been forecast. The Christian Democrats (CDU-CSU) [Christlich Demokratische Union-Christlich Sozial Union -- Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union] lost, but also less than forecast.
The accompanying table sums up the overall results on the national level. The only source of surprise might be the extent of the defeat of the liberals (FDP) [Freie Demokratische Partei -- Free Democratic party]:
[Table, as printed (columns 1961, 1965, 1969, seats in 1969, gains or losses): CDU-CSU 45.3%, 47.6%, 46.1%, 242, -3; SPD 36.2%, 39.3%, 42.7%, 224, +22; FPD 12.8%, 9.5%, 5.8%, 30, +19; NPD 0.8%, 2.0%, 4.3%, 0, none; ADF 1.9%, 1.3%, 0.6%, 0, none.]
The gains and losses of the various parties locally did not diverge greatly from the national averages.
CDU-CSU kept an absolute majority in two Länder [states], reactionary Bavaria along with Baden-Württemberg (the only state, except for Hesse, where it gained ground slightly).
The SPD "captured" the absolute majority in two states, the North German free cities for Hamburg and Bremen. It was in Hamburg that the SPD made its greatest progress (6.3%). It gained the least in Bavaria (1.5%) and in the Saarland (0.1%). In all ten states of the Federal Republic, the SPD gained. In every state except two, the Christian Democrats lost. Nationally, the SPD has continued its advance almost uninterruptedly since 1949 (29.2%).
The liberal FDP's greatest losses (it lost ground in every German state) did not come in those areas where the SPD made its greatest gains. To the contrary, the FDP's greatest losses were suffered where the CDU-CSU downturn was the least, that is, in the states of Baden-Württemberg and Lower Saxony.
From this, it must be concluded that the FDP's bourgeois electoral following switched its votes to the CDU, abandoning its old party because it anticipated an SPD-FDP "mini coalition." These voters at least -- the exception proves the rule -- demonstrated a certain level of class consciousness in the elections.
The vote for the neo-Nazis of the NPD [Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands -- National Democratic party of Germany] went from 2% to 4.3% of the total. But the number of votes and the percentage they received must be compared primarily with what they got in the state elections between 1966 and 1968. In comparison to what they got then, the NPD vote was cut by as much as one-half. With 4.3% of the vote, the neo-Nazis came below the 5% threshold needed to gain representation in the Bundestag.
Fascism does not wax strong in the fat years. These elections confirm the fact that the fascist vermin can only multiply in the event of a depression or a crisis. In the present period the majority of the extreme right voters themselves demonstrated their attachment to stability, to conservatism, and to "sound" values by voting for the party of Franz-Josef Strauss and not strengthening that of Adolf von Thadden. Furthermore, an appeal in this spirit appeared in the Munich neo-Nazi paper Nationalzeitung [not affiliated to the NPD]. "Sicher ist Sicher" ("A Certainty is a Certainty") was a conservative slogan well suited to the mentality of these electoral cattle.
The NPD was also the object of attacks and warnings from nearly everyone, but this had a lesser importance. The unions (a large number of whose leaders are members of the SPD) were careful not to say who to vote for. They called on their members not to abstain and to vote against the NPD.
The theme of their lamentable campaign was to encourage voting for the three "national" parties and against "the extremists of the right and left."
For example, Otto Brenner, the head of I. G. Metall [Industrie Gewerkschaft Metall - the Metal Workers Union], the most "left" union, wrote in the last issue of the organization's journal: "Not one vote for the NPD. But we also warn the voters against throwing their votes to the Communist groups" (Metall, September 16, 1969).
The Communist party, which was reconstituted under the name DKP [Deutsche Kommunistische Partei -- German Communist party] in order to get around the ban on the KPD [Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands- Communist party of Germany], did not campaign under its own banner. It, or rather its leaders, chose to appear as the vague "Action for Democratic Progress" [Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt- ADF] - without the slightest success.
The results achieved by this formation were lower by half than those attained by the German Peace Union [Deutsche Friedens-Union - DFU], the rubric under which the German Stalinists camouflaged themselves in 1965.
The Stalinist electoral front won 0.6% and 200,000 votes this year as against 1.3% of the vote in 1965. The cast-off radical-democratic clothing, which the CP put on for fear of scaring off the voters, did not arouse any more interest among the electorate than the CP itself.
In its new dress as in its old, the CP is thus continuing to decline (5.7% of the vote in 1949; 2.2% in 1953; 1.9% in 1961; 1.3% in 1965; 0.6% in 1969). Even in a city like Bremen, which was marked by the Klöckner-Werke wildcat strike a few weeks ago, the ADF won only 1.5% as against the DFU's 2.5% in 1965.
Hardly were the elections over than the DKP leaders distinguished themselves by a new bit of buffoonery. They declared in a communiqué issued Monday [September 29] that their setback was owing to the fact that their electoral following showed a strong preference for the SPD and the FDP (this was rather suspected!), and in the same communiqué they advocated the formation of an SPD-FDP government "orienting itself in accordance with the people's will," as a "real" possibility for a new course. Giving themselves two black eyes in this way, they could hardly have given a better confirmation of the perspicacity of the voters in deserting them.
In this context, one can understand the position taken by those who make up what is called the extraparliamentary opposition in Germany, who called for abstention and did not intervene in the electoral campaign except to expose the ties of the traditional parties to the system. This position was correct inasmuch as none of the parties had any of the qualifications which sometimes enable the revolutionary left to call for voting for a workers party. The new voters who cast their ballots for the SPD by no means did so to open up a socialist perspective, even a reformist one. They were no less depoliticized than the other voters.
It could not be said that since the masses harbored illusions about the socialist principles of their leaders, they had to be given an opportunity to see what these leaders were worth. The masses had no such illusions and voted for the Socialist leaders precisely because they had no such illusions.
All the political organizations are part and parcel of the system. Except for the unions and the extraparliamentary opposition, all of these organizations are dependent on the state. In 1965, the SPD had an income of 57,500,000 deutsche marks [4 deutsche marks equal US $1] of which 16,000,000 marks came from dues and 13,900,000 from state subsidies.
Abstention was therefore justified and the contrary would have meant giving a blank check to the old parties. Abstention was the position taken, among others, by the militants grouped around the periodical Was Tun.
Others wanted to go further and talked about a boycott. This proposal was ridiculous because such a tactic would require a special situation, forces that could be mobilized, and the possibility of achieving verifiable results. But all there was in Germany was an ultraleftist attitude, based on arguments that held abstention to be a principle. The figures on participation in the elections (exactly the same proportion as in 1965) and blank ballots (less numerous) show how ridiculous these arguments were.
The conscious political cadres are far too few to wield any real weight in the electoral arena in Germany. The wildcat strikes have shown that at most these cadres can "help" the masses in economic struggles, but nothing more. Where they have attempted to go beyond the purely economic limits of the demands, the militants have isolated themselves completely.
Such are the basic facts of the situation, which were also reflected in the depoliticized atmosphere of the elections.
But the strikes have brought to the surface, feelings of dissatisfaction on the part of the workers that involve much more than economic demands. These diffuse sentiments will be formulated, will take form, to the extent that the revolutionary left breaks out of its isolation. It will be a long march...