(The following article was published in the August 30 issue of the Belgian revolutionary-socialist weekly La
Gauche. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
The fire in the Mosque of Al Aksa will probably be the most conspicuous event in a new hot summer in the Near East. This development was notable not only because of its emotionally provocative aspect-arson in one of the great sanctuaries of Islam. It was notable above all for the insight it provided into the evolution of the situation in the Near East, revealing a sharpening in the confrontation.
The most recent months have been marked by the (definitive?) failure of attempts to find a diplomatic compromise that would assure a status quo in the region respecting the existing balance of forces and arresting the rising Arab revolution. The consultations among the great powers are at an impasse. And the intransigence of the Israeli government, which rejects letting the Big Four formulate a solution, does not facilitate unjamming the diplomatic machinery.
Moreover, the prospect of elections is 822
raising the stakes in Israel. The recent debates in the ruling Labor party have testified to this. The Labor party's electoral platform calls for the government to accelerate the development of "permanent Jewish aggregations and security centers" in the occupied territories and for close coordination of the economies of the occupied territories and Israel. Once again the "left socialists" of Mapam have capitulated and aligned themselves with Dayan's theses.
On the other hand, it has been clear since the Karamah victory (March 1968) that the independent Palestinian movement was taking root. It has grown steadily stronger since then, winning the support of the Arab masses, who see it as the vanguard of their revolution. This development has reduced the margin for maneuver of the reactionary petty-bourgeois Arab leaderships which were tempted to capitulate on the terms of the principles laid down in the November 22, 1967, Security Council Resolution.
For these regimes, the Palestinian resistance is only a tactical tool against Israel, a reserve bargaining card which in addition enables the Arab leaders to present themselves to the masses as patriotic heroes and serves as a diversion from the internal contradictions undermining these states.
Nasser was ready for a separate peace with Israel in the months following the 1967 defeat. But he switched toward a harder line June 16 when Gromyko visited Cairo, coming to present the latest American proposals to him. This switch was concretized in his July 23 speech with the proposal for an Arab summit and in the program the Arab Socialist Union adopted at its last congress.
Priority was given to the military aspect of the conflict. Support for negotiations was made conditional. "If the international efforts do not lead to a peaceful settlement of the crisis, the position of the UAR will be that of any country whose territory is occupiedcombat to death or victory," the resolution of the congress of Egypt's sole political party declared.
Nasser's appeals for strengthening the military effort constitute a new tactical turn. In the face of Israel's intransigence, this turn was made under the pressure of the masses and the new wave of young Egyptian officers. Tt confirmed the total failure of Nassi policy since the end of the Six Day War. By this switch Nasser is trying to re store his own luster. But the Egyptian "war of attrition" is still conceived as a means of pressuring Israel, as an instrument of diplomatic compromises for better days.
" In no respect does this turn constifute a strategic or overall revision by a repentant Nasser who, in accord with the Fidayeen, has assumed the task of leading the Palestinian struggle to victory. The Arab summit and the pre paratory contacts for it which preceded the mosque fire (the meeting between Nasser and Atassi, the president of Syria) have the same general significance.
•The dynamic of the Palestinian revolution and of the Arab revolution is being expressed concretely by the guerrilla movement in Iraq, while Palestinian activity is intensifying in Israel itself. This increased activity can be measured by the renewal of commando operations and by the number of resistance networks dismantled by the Israelis.
Today the Palestinian organizations are in between the phase of struggle centered on commando actions and the beginning of guerrilla warfare proper. The essential objective of the commando phase was to toughen the morale of the population in the occupied territories and to win this population over to the resistance (the success of this objective could be tested by the massive strike which followed the mosque fire).
The functions of guerrilla warfare proper are to organize the masses politically and destroy the enemy's economic and financial base. The capacity of the guerrillas in Fatah or under the aegis of the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command to undertake limited confrontations with the Israeli army is shown by a raid of more than three hours which 150 guerrillas carried out against Israeli positions in the northern part of the Jordan Valley August 7.
Dayan's calling up the reserves testifies to a certain disarray on the part of the Israelis. In fact, the engagements on the Suez Canal and above all the Fidayeen operations are throwing Israeli military strategy totally out of kilter, since this strategy is based on blitzkrieg tactics and is ineffective in the long run against a people's war such as is shaping up in the Near East.
King Hussein of Jordan himself seems have now been drawn into the Paltinian game. His appointment of his uncle Sharif Nasser Ben Samil as com- September 22, 1969
mander of the Jordanian troops in early July could be interpreted as evidence of a harder line toward the Palestinian organizations. However, the situation of military dual power which exists in Jordan, the breakdown of the Jordanian army- more and more undermined by the Fidayeen - and above all the massive support of the population for the Palestinians, hamstrings the Hashimite regime.
The regime will find it increasingly difficult to rid itself of a Palestinian movement which is eating more and more into its vitals. Thus Hussein has been led to multiplying his verbal concessions while at the same time trying to maintain his freedom of action toward the Palestinian organizations.
Recognizing the right to self determination of the Palestinian population on the west bank of the Jordan (annexed by King Abdullah of Transjordan in 1948 and now occupied by Israel) did confirm a certain abandoning of Hashimite "rights" to the region. But in reality this was a formality that represented a maneuver aimed at preserving the chances for a peaceful settlement, which Hussein needs to retain his throne and exercise a brake on the process of the Arab revolution.
Hussein's new strategy is to try to coordinate the Palestinian commandos and the Jordanian armed forces in the framework of a plan which seeks to assign the combat organizations the role of an auxiliary, and instrument of the classical Arab armies. These regular armies would again undertake the task lanan of waging the war of liberation "at the opportune moment."
In line with this, Hussein probably used the repercussions of the fire in the Al Aksa Mosque to try to internationalize this plan and get the other Arab leaderships to accept it.
The fire in the mosque, which was taken by the Arab masses as a logical continuation of the Israeli policy, the criminal effects of which they experience daily, seems to have shown that the Arab population's potential for mobilization remained intact. But this arousal of feelings has permitted a new attempt by the discredited Arab leaderships to regain the initiative and resume the political leadership of the struggle.
On the capacity of the Palestinian organizations to avoid being led into a trap by the Arab leaderships depends the future of the Palestinian revolution and also that of the Arab revolution.
In any case, the PDFLP (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), which is the organization most conscious of the dangers that threaten the Palestinian revolution, has warned the commandos against a conference of Arab heads of state, whose objective would be to bring the Palestinian movement under their control.
And the PDFLP has called on the commandos to reject the plan of the Arab leaderships-the Fidayeen must not become a "faction" of the Arab armies but preserve their independence with regard to the Arab governments.
undor
Black Gls Clash with MPs in Okinawa
More than 250 black GIs clashed with military police in the Okinawan town of Koza August 30. The town supplies a U.S. base on the Americanruled island.
At least one black soldier was arrested and scores were injured-including three MPs and two agents of the army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID).
The August 31 Mainichi Daily News said the riot began about midnight when black GIs refused to be searched during a spot check of public bars by CID men looking for narcotics. Black GIs surrounded a seven-man CID squad at one bar. The agents fired blank cartridges into the crowd. They were rescued by a group of MPs.
"Within minutes," the Mainichi Daily News said, "Negroes streamed out of the bars into the street until their number swelled to about 250. The mob overturned two MP patrol cars and set two others on fire, fighting a running battle with military police with stones and bottles."
U.S. military authorities called on the Ryukyu police as reinforcements to suppress the fighting.