Paris
Some months have passed since the May events rocked France and it might seem that everything is back in order. The crisis has in fact momentarily subsided but it will well up again. In the meantime the political formations have been greatly affected by what happened.
I will leave aside the Gaullists and the other right or center-right bourgeois formations. In spite of their electoral victories, they have not succeeded in moving an inch closer toward any kind of stability; and the government has been compelled to apply against the Gaullists as a whole the "bloc vote" procedure (that is, rejection of all amendments) which it used to apply against the Giscard d'Estaing group. *
On the left, as a first consequence of the defeat of the FGDS [Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste -- Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left -- an electoral combination of Social Democrats and petty-bourgeois liberals, principally the Radical party], the Radicals are no longer ready, if they ever were, to merge with the Socialist party and the Convention des Institutions Républicaines [Republican Institutions Convention] into a new "Democratic and Socialist" party. And, moreover, while Mitterrand has agreed to a Socialist-CIR fusion, he has turned down taking part in the leadership, thus keeping his options open.
But more important than this obviously is what is going on in the PCF [Parti Communiste Français -- French Communist party]. In the four months from May to August, this party, which had the majority of the working class under its control, underwent a series of highly damaging mishaps. During the student struggle and general strike in May, it was outflanked to the left by large strata of youth, who have now escaped its authority. In June this electoralist and parliamentary formation suffered a stinging defeat in the elections. And in August this party which had always been loyal to the Kremlin was forced to disapprove the military occupation of Czechoslovakia.
A Central Committee meeting was held on October 20-21, the first since August 22, that is, two months since the beginning of the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Two months is a long time. During this period, differences flared in the Political Bureau and also among the rank and file in the cells and sections. Only the body which is supposed to lead the party between congresses was not called upon to take a stand.
Immediately after the Soviet troops entered Prague, the CC disapproved the Soviet government's action. When an "accord" was signed a few days later, the Political Bureau viewed it as a "positive" step but without taking any stand, however, on the content of the agreement, without saying a word about the conditions under which it was drawn up.
Since that time certain things have come to light on the situation inside the PCF. Among the rank and file and the lower-level cadres, a sizeable sector did not approve of the position taken by the PCF leadership. This current thought that the Soviet leadership ought to know the reasons for its action better than anyone else and that the position of the French leadership was dictated by tactical considerations flowing from the policy of seeking an entente with the non-Communist left (FGDS, the Socialist party), which was true.
We heard a member of the Political Bureau, Garaudy, come out in strong terms. He saw "a relapse into Stalinism" in the Kremlin's action and told the Soviet leadership that the best thing they could do for the cause of Communism was to resign. The Political Bureau disavowed his statements, seeing them as "interference" in the internal affairs of the Soviet Communist party.
And finally we learned that Jeannette Vermeersch, a member of the Political Bureau and Thorez's widow, was also a dissenter but in an opposite way from Garaudy. She did not expressly support the military occupation, but she thought that the Soviets had every reason to engage in it.
If two months had to go by before the CC met, it was because the leadership, Waldeck Rochet most of all, went to extraordinary lengths to find a solution that would meet with unanimous approval. But in vain. Thus, the CC was confronted with the reality as it was reflected in the Political Bureau.
Finally, "to the regret" of her comrades, Jeannette Vermeersch resigned from the Political Bureau and even from the CC and Garaudy was publicly censured for his public statements contrary to the line. He accepted the censure, stating he held to his views but from now on would advocate them only within the party framework, according to the rules and regulations. Despite the censure, Garaudy remained a member of the Political Bureau.
In accordance with the custom of the PCF, no summary report of the CC meeting was provided other than a sentence uttered by Duclos and quoted by Waldeck Rochet which we will return to later on. The only available materials consist of the report by Plissonnier, a Political Bureau member charged up to now with policing the party, who was assigned by the Political Bureau to report on the question; Waldeck Rochet's speech, and the resolution that was adopted. This time they also published in l'Humanité Jeannette Vermeersch's letter of resignation and Garaudy's statement, the essence of which I have indicated.
There was no difference whatsoever between Plissonnier's report, Waldeck Rochet's speech, and the resolution. All of them consisted of self-approval of the positions the leadership has taken since August 20. Not a word about the continuation of the occupation nor any characterization of the "accord."
The only point of clarification was greater stress on the fact that although there was "uncertainty" in the Czech policy, the Dubcek leadership was capable of solving the difficulties because there was no counterrevolutionary danger that the Czechoslovak people themselves could not handle.
On this point it can be said that the PCF leadership has defined its position more clearly, especially on the eve of the meeting it is supposed to have with the Soviet CP leadership on November 4. From this standpoint, while seeming to take a middle-of-the-road position, the Waldeck Rochet leadership has leaned slightly more to the side of the Czechoslovaks than the Soviets. Likewise, there is no equality between Jeannette Vermeersch's departure from the Political Committee and Garaudy's retention, even if he was censured.
But the PCF leadership did not conceal the fact that while it had a "difference" with the leadership of the Soviet CP, it held it a "principle" to maintain its ties and its solidarity with the Soviet party. It declared its readiness to do everything possible to restore conditions which would permit a conference of Communist parties to be held at a later date. It had nothing whatsoever to say about the factional work conducted in the party through the heavy flow of "papers and pamphlets into France from the socialist countries." (Plissonnier.)
It thus indicated that its disapproval of the Soviet operation was purely tactical and that it could not defend this action as it had defended the intervention in Hungary in 1956. It considered itself too deeply involved in its "union of the left" ploy to take a position which would signify assuming responsibility for ending this policy.
While the leadership presents its orientation as a sign of great maturity for the international Communist movement, the PCF, and itself, it reveals some symptoms of worry. "The situation in the international Communist movement is disturbing. Since 1958-59, it has deteriorated in a distressing way," Plissonier declared with Waldeck Rochet's approval. And in this field the sermon on "proletarian internationalism" given by the general secretary of the PCF in the style of a left Social Democrat, will not help matters any.
But both of them -- the reporter and the general secretary -- ended their speeches with an appeal for party unity. "Any breach of party unity would gravely compromise our cause and our work; we must not allow it." (Waldeck Rochet.) "It's a question of the unity of the party and its leadership in thought and action." (Plissonnier.)
Why this nervousness if, for example, "In the Département of Hauts-de-Seine, out of 1,150 section committee members, twenty-six comrades approved of the military intervention and thirty-three expressed misgivings"? Why did Waldeck Rochet stress this single sentence in Duclos' speech, "We must close ranks"? The following words in the report point the way to the explanation:
"The Political Bureau calls on the CC to draw up a major document in its next meeting to explain our program of advanced political and economic democracy and our perspectives for accomplishing the socialist ideal through democratic mobilization of the entire nation of working people."
Is there then a link between the Czechoslovak affair and the party's domestic policy? Yes, because more than one opponent of the Political Bureau's position on Czechoslovakia has said, "Our leadership is taking an opportunist line today to curry favor with the FGDS just as it did in May for the same reason." The opposition to the leadership includes not only case-hardened old Stalinists like Jeannette Vermeersch, but politically confused "leftists" as well.
The crisis in the PCF must be placed against the recent background. In the two years preceding May, its policy seemed to be paying off. Mitterrand forced de Gaulle to a run-off in the presidential elections. The FGDS and the PCF together needed only a half dozen more deputies for a majority in parliament and their votes were growing in the by-elections. Advances had been made toward an FGDS-PCF "common program." What more was needed to justify their parliamentary line?
Then came May with 10,000,000 strikers. And after that came the setback of the elections, the breakup of the FGDS, and the indefinite postponement of the "common program." Fundamentally, the PCF's entire perspective collapsed after the greatest mobilization the French working class has ever engaged in.
The PCF has known difficult moments in its history. But its cadres have been brought up on the idea that whatever might be the situation at this or that time there was a firm bastion which held fast and which in the long run would make it possible to overcome any difficulties. Now with the Czechoslovak affair this has been broken.
So where is the party going? Is it possible after May 1968 to revive the "union of the left" policy? How is a "common program" to be arrived at? Before the elections, foreign policy was the stumbling block and the Czechoslovak affair has added a few other obstacles in this respect. The FGDS deputies, contrary to the Communists, recently voted for the fiscal measures proposed by the Gaullist government to aid the capitalists and encourage them to invest.
For the electoralists the vote losses were particularly acute. Electoral agreements between the FGDS and the PCF are no longer so easily arrived at. The PCF leadership has nothing else to offer as a policy or as a perspective. In the near future it is going to prepare a "major document" in which it will repeat its old song. This is not the sort of thing that will counter the doubts becoming rife among many members.
One can be certain that the Czechoslovak affair will not only put the May events, which are still quite fresh, on the PCF's agenda but also several other disagreeable questions which arose during the postwar period and which the party leadership settled bureaucratically. In fact, more than the policy of the party, Stalinism itself has been put in the dock.
The differences which have existed for some time were only partly revealed at the CC meeting just held. The cracks in the leadership's monolithism have become evident. The general secretary of the party noted in his speech that tendencies are forbidden in the organization. It is not very likely that they will develop quickly, since they represent a new departure in the party. But the crisis is there and it can only worsen.
"We must close ranks" is the slogan of a leadership without any alternative policy in a party becoming more and more heterogeneous politically. They will not be able to close ranks for very long.
October 24.
Notes
* "Left" Gaullists.