As was to be expected, Che's Bolivian diary is a document of very great value which will be an inexhaustible subject for study and reflection.
It is first of all a document of historical interest. All those who want to study the vicissitudes of the revolutionary struggle in Latin America will have to draw on this source; it provides the most valuable information both on the technical preparation and military operations of one of the most courageous undertakings in the history of the continent as well as on the elements, the men, and the implications involved in the conflicts shaking the anti-imperialist revolutionary movement.
It is also a gripping document for its human value, all the more remarkable since the author did not conceive it as a piece of literature but as an aid in his work. Che Guevara paints a vivid and totally realistic portrait of his comrades in struggle, whom he observes on a day-today basis with a penetrating eye and without the least idealization. He does not hide their faults or their weaknesses, nor even their petty side. That is why his guerrillas appear before our eyes as real men whose courage and devotion spontaneously compel our admiration.
No reader will ever forget this community of fighters of different nationalities(1), who worked with the perspective of armed struggle on a multinational scale. They did not feel themselves bound by frontiers or national sovereignty. How different they were from the miserable opportunists of the Monje clique (2), of whom Fidel justly wrote that their level of internationalism would never surpass that of the Indian tribes in the epoch of the Spanish conquest!
And finally this book is a document of unquestionable political importance which enables us to comprehend better certain of Che's conceptions and perspectives. It is also a document posing the fundamental problems of the revolution in Bolivia in very clear terms. It is this aspect, moreover, that will arouse most interest at this time, foi quite obvious reasons.
(1) Besides Bolivians there were Peruvians, Argentinians, and Cubans.
(2) The secretary of the Bolivian Communist party.
The publication of Che's diary will probably have the same consequences as his death: it will give rise to polemics questioning not only this or that tactical or technical detail but an entire revolutionary strategy. It is inevitable that a new barrage will be opened up by the same people who launched a counterattack last October, the Communist parties of Latin America and their patrons in the pro- Soviet front. In fact, the most directlJ interested, the CP of Monje, has already taken a position; by its own statements the justice of Fidel's it has confirmed and Che's criticisms. These entrenched opportunists will not hesitate to resort to arbitrary interpretations and dishonest extrapolations to show that Che's endeavor was only an adventure condemned to failure and that OLAS's entire strategy has been shown to be incorrect.
The assessment of revolutionists, nowever, is that what 1s said in the diary does not at all change the terms of the problem as it was posed immediately after the destruction of Che's nucleus. The essential questions posed at that time were: Was Che's action an artificial attempt to impose a "Cuba" schema on Bolivia? Dia the objective situation in the country justify the commencement of armed struggle? Dio the guerrilla movement have favorable repercussions among the masses? The ques-". tions are the same today and the Bolivian revolutionists give the same answers.
They recall that Bolivia was shaken for several Jears by an extremely grave economic, social, and political crisis, that the regime was incapable of finding solutions of any viability whatever, that it could only maintain itself by appealing to imperialism and by systematic violence, that the broad worker, petty-bourgeois, urban, and even peasant masses had been driven to desperation and seized every opportunity to express their hatred of the ruling military and imperialist clique.
Therefore, even if the initiative came from outside, the guerrilla struggle was the logical culmination of the political and social situation in the country and could not be characterized as an adventure except by opportunists hostile to the armed struggle (3). The unleashing of
(3) For an analysis of the Bolivian situation in 1967, see the documents ana articles published by World Outlook Lnow Intercontinental Pressl, especially the documents of the Bolivian POR [Partido Obrero the guerrilla struggle, moreover, had immediate repercussions, deepening the political crisis on all levels and unleashing a wave of sympathy and solidarity especially in the mine regions and among the radicalized petty bourgeoisie. (I exclude here the international repercussions about which some remarks could be made.)
As for the balance sheet which emerges Irom the diary, it is clear that in spite of all the difficulties and the very limited duration of the experience, Che's nucleus was able to win far from negligible military successes, as Fidel does not fail to stress in his preface. Fidel also stresses another gain of the guerrilla movement, that is the training of a number, though small, of cadres who have already demonstrated their qualities.
Furthermore, incipiently favorable reactions sometimes developed among peasant spite of the very serious lack of information, the impact which the opening of the struggle had in the country did not escape Che. On June 13, he noted the catalytic effect of the guerrilla moveand on July 14, the breakup of the ment Barrientos government. (5)
The events which have followed the defeat of the guerrillas have also, in the last analysis, confirmed Guevara's fundamental option. In spite of his military success, Barrientos has not succeeded in resolving any of the regime's social, and problems, and the economic crisis persists(6). Reports arpolitical
Revolucionario -- Revolutionary Workers party - the Bolivian section oi the Fourth International] published in July the article "The
1967 (July 14, p. 658), Struggle Continues in Bolivia" (November l0, p. 901), and the article "In Reply to the Bolivian CP" (December 8, p. 1014). In one of the POR documents, it says for example: "The guerrilla movement emerged in Bolivia as the natural culmination of the country's internal political development."
riving from militants forced to operate in the strictest secrecy reveal that the miners, despite the raging repression. nave not given up the struggle, impellec forward as they are by literally tragic material needs, and that petty-bourgeois layers have also mobilized in economic clashes with the government (as for the students, they did not hesitate to express their solidarity with Che and the guerrilla movement even right in the wake of its defeat). Significant episodes have shown, moreover, that Che's legend has spread even among the peasant strata. Courageous demonstrations have occurred on several occasions. Finally, the demonstrations which took place in a whole series of cities on May 1 of this jear have again confirmed the combative spirit of the masses and the enormous prestige of Che and the Cuban revolution. (7)
This is why the Bolivian revolutionists not only defend the concepts which inspired Che's action against opportunists of all stripes but they also consider that the perspective of new armed clashes in Bolivia remains fundamental.
Given the economic and social situation within the country, the capitalist regime -- whether it is led by Barrientos or any of his possible successors -- will only be able to survive through violence of the most systematic sort. This implies that more or less legal preparatory and organizational work will be impossible for the workers and peasants movement. And, in this also excludes che present context.
any perspective of the struggle taking the form of an urban insurrection at the outset. The explosive contradictions remain in the country and dramatic conflicts are still possible.
In fact, we must start from the reality that a civil war situation exists in Bolivia. All actions by the revolutionary movement must strive to achieve a dual objective: to deal hard blows against the adversary by raising the level of combativity and of political consciousness of the masses, or at least broad sectors of the masses, and at the same time to avoid exposing the revolutionary movement itself to counterattacks and reprisals which could destroy precious work and cause very
Fidel's preface May, a piece of news noted on July 3, the analysis of the month of July, where Che makes the following re-
"The legend of the guerrilla is acquiring continental dimensions; Onganía the border and Peru takes precaucloses tions."
(5) Fidel draws attention to these notes, adding that all this shows how real the possibilities were for success.
(6) The case of Arguedas, the minister of the interior who announced that he transpainful losses.
This means, more concretely, that the method of guerrilla warfare beginning in the rural areas is still the correct mitted Che's diary to the Cuban leadership, is a symptom of this breakdown of the regime.
(7) See in this regard the report "New Revolutionary Ferment in Bolivia" published by Intercontinental Press, June 10, p. 543.
method. Once guerrilla warfare is unleashed, even under conditions which are in several ways less favorable than was the case last year, the possibilities for political and military initiatives will multiply very rapidly.
It is on this terrain, taking as the point of departure Che's analysis and reports (which coincide moreover almost entirely with the reports and analyses of the revolutionary Marxists in Bolivia), that urgent questions arise which we must seek to answer. There is no question -- that goes without saying -- of wanting or seeking to provoke academic discussions, or still less giving grist to the mill of the opponents of revolutionary strategy in Latin America. But we must understand the need of rearming the Bolivian movement on the basis of the crucial guerrilla warfare experience of 1967. Resolute defense of this fundamental strategic option does not automatically entail a positive assessment of every tactical option and particular policy pursuant to it.
For his part, Fidel speaks in his "incredible series of negapreface of an tive factors." In fact, the prolonged separation of a group of guerrillas -- which unfortunately proved to be an irretrievable one —- the state of Che's health as well as the discovery of the Loyola Guzman (8) network at a critical moment by the repressive forces weighed in the balance very negatively. And it must be taken into account that all this occurred at a stage when the initial nucleus still had to consolidate itself. Nonetheless, other questions arise.
First: On the basis of the experience gained, can the choice of the area for the initial operations be considered correct, from a geographical and above all political and social point of view? I am not forgetting that the needs of security necessarily get priority in the first the diary reveals that phase. However, the knowledge of the terrain on the part of the Bolivian fighters themselves was their maps often totally inadequate and proved to be incorrect. As for the social and political aspect, it is significant cnat, according to the reports of the survivors cited by Fidel, the guerrillas decided shortly before their defeat to move to a politically more advanced area. The problem of this shift in the zone of operations is posed precisely in the final analysis in the diary. (9)
(8) A guerrilla liaison agent murdered by the Bolivian police.
(9) The preface and analysis of the month
"The most of September, where che writes: important tasks are to escape and 1o0k for more propitious zones." As an example
Second: Did the choice of the political forces which were to support the guerrilla struggle prove correct?
The diary confirms the fact that the initial nucleus was based essentially on militants who had been and in part still were linked to the Communist party (to its pro-Soviet tendency following the pro-Chinese split). The aid of the CP or certain groups within it was relied on above all to broaden the original nucleus and create what could be called the infrastructure of the guerrilla movement. I am by no means unaware of the enormous difficulties Guevara had to overcome when this undertaking entered into the phase of concrete execution. And the choice of forces with which he could collaborate was necessarily limited -- all the more because he had to confine himself to the framework of certain orientations adopted by the Cuban leadership at the time of the Tricontinental Congress (violent criticisn of a part of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement, an attack on the Trotskyist movement).
In any case, this choice had a certain number of repercussions. For a time at least, Che was compelled to accept: political compromises which hampered his work and to lose precious time in negotiations which did not (because it could not be otherwise) lead to anything fruitful. What is worse is that even after the break with Monje the CP could still interfere with the urban contact and support network, engaging in obstructive and sabotaging maneuvers (10). Though of course Guevara expressed critical judgments of the CP and its leaders on several occasions, even months after the Monje affair he still evoked the perspective of collabof the use CP opportunists have made of the diary, in a revoltingly hypocritical article, 1'Unità, the organ of the Italian CP, gave this distorted quotation: "The most important task is to get out." The words immediately following were left out. This is a base falsification attempting to show that Guevara himself no longer had any hope.
(10) In his analysis of the month of De-
Guevara says explicitly that the cember, break with Monje freed him from certain political compromises. On November 27 he gives an example implicitly of what sort of compromises could have been involved. Che stresses the difficulty presented by "internationalizing the struggle without naving taken Estanislao into consideration" (Estanislao was the surname giver to the secretary of the Bolivian CP).
On the CP's sabotage, see the preface and the note for January 21 where it is written for example that the secretary Of the Bolivian CP "spoke to three who came from Cuba and persuaded them not to enter the guerrilla."
oration with the party (11).
Among the other political forces in Bolivia, the guerrilla rely on the support of Moises Get cal group which had broken with both the pro- Soviet CP and the pro-Chinese CP. The results oi this collaboration were not great. Moises Guevara fell heroically in combat but Che's assessment of his group seems negative.
Finally, the diary twice mentions Lechin, the former leader of the miners and lieutenant of Paz Estenssoro. Lechin, however, did not go any further than a vague expression of sympathy for the guerrilla movement, as moreover should have been expected of a man who had already given so many proofs of his centrist and profoundly opportunist character(12).
Third: Guevara explains many times that the number of guerrillas was very limited, that the nucleus was isolated, and that liaison with the cities was lacking. The need to enlarge the nucleus is constantly stressed as an essential condition for exploiting the favorable situation which was ripening (13).
An operation such as Guevara conceived, in a specific context, could only begin with a very small number of fighters. But was the almost complete isolation of this nucleus inevitable? Was the prolonged breakoff of all liaison with
(11) See on this subject the analysis for the month of May. It must be pointed out specifically that some of the Bolivians were more pessimistic from the outset about the attitude the CP leaders might take (cf. the note for November 27).
(12) Ihis detail should be stressed: even before being totally cut off from the cities, Guevara makes no mention of the repression unleashed as early as the beginning of 1967 against many Bolivian revolutionary cadres and leaders, nor of the measures which the government took against the workers organizations in connection with the development of the guerrilla movement (however, certain militants were explicitly accused of having taken part in the preparation of the operations). Furthermore, he seems unaware of all the positions taken in sympathy with the guerrilla movement and all the demonstrations of support for it. Knowledge of these would have enabled him to draw up a more complete general balance sheet.
(13) See in particular the analysis for the month of June and the note for July 14 where Che makes this remark: "The government is disintegrating rapidly; it is too bad that we do not have 100 more men at this moment." See also the analysis for the months of July and August.
the towns inevitable? Was it objectively impossible to recruit a few dozen additional fighters in time?
The Bolivian revolutionists who know the conditions in their country and have pondered over the 1967 experience give a negative answer. Bolivia has a long and still vital revolutionary tradition. Ihere was a situation of acute social and political crisis impelling the miners yet again into struggle despite the ferocious repression. The commencement of guerrilla warfare had gotten an immediate and very considerable response.
In these conditions, there was no an enlargeinexorable fate preventing ment, even at a relatively rapid pace, of the guerrilla nucleus or the maintenance of the necessary liaison. No fate prevented the guerrilla nucleus from reaking out oi isolation, or even creat-
"focos" in a short space of time ing new which would have forced the adversary to disperse his forces. Far from being inevitable, the negative conditions which led in the last analysis to the temporary liquidation of the armed struggle were the result of the direct or indirect machinations of the CP.
I do not minimize the consequences of blows like the fall of Loyola and his network, the circumstances of which moreover should be examined (14). But fundamentally what happened was the result of the fact that the infrastructure which was supposed to provide support and reinforcements for the fighting nucleus remained in the hands of men who were still
Docked the pination tie pe booken revolutionary unity which Guevara advocated (15).
On the basis of the diary, Fidel
(14) The possibility of betrayal cannot be excluded. But there was also the problem of insufficient assimilation of the methods of underground struggle. Recriminations on carelessness and irresponsibility recur in the diary like a leitmotiv. This is a subject for the Latin-American revolutionary militants to ponder, who often have a tendency to underestimate the importance of observing rules of security.
(15) See his report for January I. He
I brought vrote there: "In the afternoon, veryone together and explained Monie's attitude to them, announcing that we would unite with those who wanted to • alI
make the revolution." Everything that is written in the diary on the breakoff of liaison, particularly in the final phase, confirms that Guevara was completely uninformed of certain obstructive and sabotaging maneuvers.
cites an example of sabotage by Monje. Unfortunately this was by no means an exceptional case. In fact, the men Guevara needed, and whom he called for in his diary, existed and asked nothing more than to take part in the struggle: they were blocked by saboteurs and irresponsible sectarians. That is a tragic fact because it means that an objective possibility to save the guerrilla movement and perhaps even Guevara personally was criminally wasted.
It is possible that others would give a different answer to the questions I have raised. A confrontation of views -- on the basis of course of an acceptance of the fundamental strategy of armed struggle and guerrilla warfare -- would be very profitable, even indispensable. The struggle will begin again one day in Bolivia and a clarity of perspectives is a condition sine qua non for its success.
If the general conditions in the country undergo no substantial change -- which is by far the most likely possibility -- the essential perspective remains that of guerrilla warfare organized in the rural areas and launched from there. However, a broader and better ar-
Luigi Longo, the general secretary of the Italian Communist party, was in Moscow at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Returning to Rome immediately after the announcement of the Soviet action, he stopped in Paris on August 21 to meet with Waldeck Rochet, the secretary of the French Communist party. After talking for one hour with the French CP leader, Longo made the following declaration to the press:
"In my meeting with Comrade Waldeck Rochet and other French Communist party leaders, I was able to note substantial areas of agreement between the two parties' views and assessments of the recent events in Czechoslovakia.
"This agreement emerges moreover from the communiqués issued by the political bureaus of each of our parties. In my opinion, our positions are based on a strong feeling of internationalisn, on recognition of every party's independence, and on respect for the independence of all nations.
"Our meeting took place in a spirit of close collaboration between the Italian Communist party and the French Communist party. It was in that spirit, moreover, that a few weeks ago we immediately supported the proposal which the French comrades made for a meeting of the European ticulated strategy than that applied in 1967 is objectively possible.
In the countryside itself, it is possible to solve the crucial problem of linking up with the peasants and achieving the direct participation in the armed struggle of indigenous elements other than by sporadic and improvised individval attempts. Trained peasant militants and cadres still exist in the country despite the repression and the movement's relative stagnation. In the mining centers, special forms of armed struggle could be adopted with the commencement of a new upsurge. In the most important cities, finally, it will be possible to organize spectacular actions capable of demoralizing the adversary and his supporters and thus creating conditions psychologically more favorable to an extension of the struggles and for gaining support for the guerrilla nuclei.
It does without saying that a nonexclusionist policy of unity of all revolutionary forces willing to fight is one of the conditions for a victorious outcome of the future struggles.
Communist parties.
"In conclusion, I think that we had a very useful, although brief, exchange of opinions, and I intend to remain in contact with the comrades in the French Communist party.
initiativers tomeseet, no common or joint
Longo expanded on the above statement in answering the questions of journalists on his arrival in Rome. He declared: "I repeated frankly to the Soviet leaders that it was essential to stand behind the process of democratic development going on in Czechoslovakia. In Paris, together with the Communist party, we have for the moment excluded the proposal for a meeting of European Communist parties which had previously been envisaged."
Finally, pressed by reporters, ongo admitted that there had not been total agreement between him and Waldeck Rochet. "It is obvious that our views could not fully converge, given the different situations of our two parties. However, the important thing is that we agree on the essentials."
As to the reaction of the Soviet people to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Longo said everything seemed calm.