Paris
MAY 31 -- What is the meaning of de Gaulle's May 30 coup and what does it do to the perspectives of the movement that has been developing in France?
The first phase of the socialist revolution, which began May 3, has developed with remarkable regularity and logic through its own forces, in the absence of a revolutionary leadership recognized by the rather broad masses and despite the fearful, superreformist policy of the leadership of the PCF [Parti Communiste Français] and the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail]. First came the struggle of the students, lasting up to the 24-hour strike of May 13; then the general strike, accompanied by the occupation of the plants, culminating in the agreement on a "protocol" of concessions to be granted which was reached after thirty hours of negotiations between the government, the employers organizations and representatives of the trade unions.
A new stage opened Monday morning, May 27, two hours after the "protocol" was worked out. When Georges Séguy presented it to the Renault workers, he was unable to reach that part of his speech where he would have echoed the justly famous words of Maurice Thorez in June 1936: "You've got to know when to end a strike."
The workers interrupted him with cries of "Don't sign!" and Séguy had to make a turn in mid-speech. To the immense surprise of both the bourgeoisie and the trade-union officials, the strike went on with still greater vigor.
The government was pushed aside and negotiations began directly between the bosses and the trade unions at various levels. The question of political power was posed by the situation itself without the leaders of the workers having done anything themselves to pose it. A maneuver to the left that had been rumored for several days was publicly unveiled -- a transition government was being cooked up by someone [Pierre Mendès France or François Mitterrand] who was at bottom a "de Gaulle of the left," although this, of course, is denied by the candidate.
The Communist party did not take to this combination in which, while not being excluded, it could only play a minor role as in 1945-47 under de Gaulle. It put up a de facto opposition, advancing the formula of a "people's government and a democratic union" [gouvernement populaire et d'union démocratique]. For the first time in twenty-five days, the Waldeck Rochet leadership seemed to have given up chasing after the movement, trying to stop it, and to have moved to its head in order to give it a governmental objective.
If the situation is viewed from the government angle, it can be said that it, too, had been unsuccessfully trying to catch up with events since May 3. The concessions granted to the students May 11 came too late; the "protocol" granted to Séguy in the Rue de Grenelle negotiations was not accepted by the workers; de Gaulle's decision to stage a referendum June 16 was just as unrealistic as was his decision to conscript the miners at the time of their strike in March 1963. Bourgeois circles both of the right and the left not only talked about de Gaulle resigning, everywhere they openly discussed proposals on who was to succeed him.
This was the situation when de Gaulle, his back to the wall, decided to strike. He stated that he was going to stay in power and that he was keeping Pompidou at his side. He dissolved the National Assembly. Temporarily giving up the referendum, he decided to hold new elections. In all these decisions he remained within the "legal" framework. But in announcing his decisions, he attacked the upsurge in terms worthy of a nineteenth-century bourgeois talking about socialism, appealing to all the forces of reaction to save "law and order," declaring without any possibility of being misinterpreted that he was ready to use armed force. This speech divided the country along social lines and threatened civil war.
Nevertheless de Gaulle's plan is much less of a gamble, so far as the immediate future is concerned, than might appear at first glance. De Gaulle understands the true worth of his leftist opponents, including the Communist party and the Social Democratic Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste [FGDS] -- they don't have much character. He knows that they want to come to power through an electoral majority, not on a revolutionary wave. He offers them the appearance of elections, but intends to break the strike beforehand. This is his primary objective.
Since the political and trade-union leaders separated the strike or rather strikes, as they see it (they don't admit the existence of a general strike), along with the immediate strike demands, from their governmental slogan, de Gaulle moved into this terrain, which is favorable for him. He is letting each sector of workers negotiate, here with a single boss, there with a boss's organization, or with a minister in charge of a nationalized industry.
It is certain that he will seek to use bribery and repression to divide the movement to the utmost in an effort to get work resumed in the sectors most vitally involved in keeping the country going (means of communication, etc.), letting the strike be prolonged in other sectors, essential to production but in a less immediate way (mines, metallurgy, etc.).
Can this plan succeed? The situation is completely unstable and can develop quite quickly (in a few days, at the maximum within two weeks) either in the direction sought by de Gaulle or, contrariwise, in a direction opened by a new thrust forward by the masses.
Once again during this month of May, the Union Nationale des Etudiants de France [UNEF] has moved into the vanguard, appealing to all the trade-union organizations to stage a giant mass demonstration in Paris and in every town and city in France. Will this proposal meet with a favorable response?
The Communist party leadership was happy to announce its decision, immediately following de Gaulle's speech, that it was going to participate in the general elections. This indicates that the CGT will not respond to the UNEF appeal.
The mass movement has shown itself since the beginning to be resourceful, very militant and inspired by an ardent youth. But it lacks an alternative leadership in the plants; it lacks even the beginnings of such a leadership. If the regime commits a mistake this could touch off a new upsurge, but the movement had already reached the level where spontaneity and rank-and-file initiative no longer sufficed.
Will the movement reach new levels or will it recede? Everything seems genuinely in flux. But whatever the immediate outcome, the working class has already taken a giant stride along the road of socialist revolution. French capitalism has been hit in the vitals. Throughout the country spontaneous experiments are being made in which capitalist private property and the capitalist government are challenged. The embryonic elements of dual power have appeared at various levels.
The general political level has been raised considerably. A vanguard is shaping up in consonance with revolutionary Marxist slogans and it is gaining in experience with each day.
De Gaulle's coup can have an adverse immediate effect, but it will nevertheless prove to be only an episode in the history of the French socialist revolution.