Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

French politics after March elections

· Intercontinental Press/Inprecor vol. 23 no. 9, 13 May 1985 · pp 276-278 · 3,767 words

France Ecology and environment

[On March 10 and 17, elections were held in French cantons for representatives to provincial assemblies. The Socialist Party of President François Mitterrand received 24.25 percent of the vote, down from the 29.8 percent it won in the last cantonal elections, in 1982. In June 1984 the SP vote had reached its lowest point since 1973, attracting only 20.9 percent in the election for European parliament.

[Rightist parties received nearly 58 percent of the vote in March, with the extreme-right National Front (FN) led by Jean-Marie Le Pen accounting for 8.6 percent of the total. The FN had polled 11 percent in the European parliament elections last year.

[In the following interview, Alain Krivine, a leader of the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), French section of the Fourth International, explains the views of the LCR on these elections results. The interview appeared in the April 8 issue of International Viewpoint, a fortnightly review published in Paris under the auspices of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

Question. Was the scale of the defeat suffered by the parties of the left in the cantonal elections expected?

Answer. There are two ballots involved in the cantonal elections.* The first ballot is perhaps more important in that half the French electorate cast a vote. In the first round all the parties of the left taken together got 42 percent of the vote. The parties of the right, including the far right, got 58 percent.

The rate of abstention was 2 percent less than in the elections to the European parliament last year. There is still a high rate of "left abstention." In some workers' areas there was an abstention rate of up to 40 percent, in the bourgeois areas it was much smaller. But even taking this into account we have to say that there has been a small shift to the right since the Euro-elections.

In both the ballots, but especially in the second ballot, you have a very small remobilization of the left, in the sense that the left got 1 percent more than in the European elections and in the second ballot 2 percent more than in the first ballot. This is due to the fear of victory for the right and especially the development of the fascist right. You have what Lionel Jospin, a leader of the Socialist Party, called a small "shudder." It was therefore not a movement for the government, but against the fascist right.

Q. About the fascist right. Does Le Pen's score mark a stabilization of the vote of the National Front (FN)?

A. Before the victory of the left in 1981 Le Pen got less votes than that of the far left, Lutte Ouvrière [Workers Struggle] and the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), a very small vote in other words. Today their vote is 10 to 11 percent, the same as during the Euroelections. Officially. Le Pen received 8 percent, but he did not put forward candidates throughout the whole country. There were 600 areas where there were no FN candidates, but where they supported the official candidates of the right. So the fact is today you have 10 percent of the French electorate voting for racist candidates.

Perhaps even more significant is that this support comes from the towns, not the country. In fact, in the country there has been a small decline in FN support. But in the big towns and in those workers' suburbs where there are a lot of immigrants and which are traditionally strong Communist areas, Le Pen got a lot of votes. For example, in both Montreuil and St. Denis on the outskirts of Paris, Le Pen got 17 percent of the vote. This is a change from the right-wing populism of the 1950s, which was called Poujadism.

Poujadism was the reaction of one section of the population - shopkeepers and small business people.

But with Le Pen you have, in embryo, much of the traditional content of a fascist movement in a period of crisis. Of course, Le Pen has a traditional base of support amongst the pieds noirs, those who left Algeria after independence, especially in Marseille where he got 25 percent and sometimes 30 percent of the vote. And on the national level the main layers supporting him are amongst the middle classes, amongst small business people and the liberal professions.

But the new and disquieting thing is that he got small but significant support from among the popular classes, who are completely disillusioned by unemployment and the incapacity of the left to solve this burning problem.

Q. The right failed to get a majority on the first ballot without Le Pen. Does this mean they will make some kind of rapprochement with him in the lead up to the legislative elections in 1986?

A. The right on the first ballot got 49 percent without Le Pen. This heightened the debate amongst them about whether or not to make agreements with him. Of course, the Mitterrand government used this card to make further divisions among the right, asking if they were really prepared to make alliances with fascists. After much hesitation and discussion, the main leaders decided not to make any official agreement, even if there was an unofficial agreement. At the last minute Le Pen decided to withdraw his candidates where this would prevent a victory for the left. Officially this was a unilateral move by Le Pen, but there were many local leaders of the right who did come to some agreement with the FN.

It is interesting to note that all those who voted for the FN on the first round voted for the official right-wing candidates on the second round. But in the areas where Le Pen retained his candidates the supporters of the right-wing party either abstained or cast their votes for the SP candidates, which is an indication that the majority of people who voted for the right wing are not willing to vote for fascist candidates.

Q. So how are the right forming themselves up for the 1986 legislative elections?

A. There are three main figures who are fighting for the leadership of the right wing as a whole, Jacques Chirac, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and Raymond Barre. This shows that even if the right has a majority electorally in France today there are big divisions concerning tactics and strategy toward the left.

Their really major problem is that they do not have an alternative economic strategy to offer to that of the government. Chirac and Giscard are fighting on behalf of their respective parties, the Assembly for the Republic (RPR) and the Union for French Democracy (UDF) to lead the right in the legislative elections. The other, Barre, who has his eye on the presidential elections in 1988, is playing a sort of Bonapartist game, keeping out of the official right parties.

In any event, they will try to make a common agreement for 1986, but it's not guaranteed. The major problem they will face will be the decision of Mitterrand on a proposed new electoral law. This law will introduce a small measure of proportional representation. The present system always favors the majority. Given that the left are in the minority today, they have an interest in changing it.

But the official right parties say if there is a move towards proportional representation they will make a fantastic fight. Mitterrand will then hesitate, as he hesitated over the reform of the educational system in the face of a determined right-wing offensive. Mitterrand is frightened of this type of showdown with the right. So he will probably introduce a law at the last minute. But it will fall short of a system completely based on proportional representation.

The LCR is in favor of a complete reform of the electoral system based on proportional representation, so we have participated in a campaign along with other forces such as the United Socialist Party (PSU), the Greens, and others to launch a national petition to demand this.

Q. The project of a "republican front" government, which would include a section of the right, has been floated by some Socialist Party leaders. What is the idea behind this?

A. For twenty years Mitterrand has had a very definite and intelligent strategy which I think we can now see clearly. After 1968 Mitterrand responded to the hope for unity and change of the population with the Common Program with the French Communist Party (PCF). That was the way he chose to reinforce and strengthen the SP which was possible only on the basis of the unity of the left organizations.

The second step was the taking of governmental power. The third step was to limit the PCF in this alliance, because obviously it was not possible for two large reformist parties to coexist within such an alliance. The more credible of the two parties was the SP. The final step was to move towards an alliance with a section of the bourgeoisie, what we call in France a government of the "left-center." That is Mitterrand's project today. Not only because he wants to stay in power, that's true, but that's a conjunctural problem, strategically a "left-center" government has been his aim for a long time.

His main weapon in bringing this about is to propose unity of all those who are against the National Front and the extreme right. In this way Mitterrand can avoid speaking about austerity and the real responsibility of the Socialist government for the rise of the right. So the SP is making a very big campaign on the question of Le Pen, because he is rather useful to thern. That's why Le Pen is allowed to appear so much on the television. They need him to provide a motive for a "republican front" government which extends from the SP to the "republican" right-wing parties.

So far they have not succeeded with this campaign. But some significant bourgeois figures, ex-ministers like Olivier Stirn, have declared themselves ready to support such a project. But it won't happen before 1986 because the main leaders of the bourgeois parties want to pay back Mitterrand for his victory in 1981. They might respond after that on the condition that the SP gets a high score, say 30 percent. Under those conditions the SP would be useful for the bourgeoisie. If not, if the SP gets a small vote, the bourgeois parties will take the power directly for themselves.

There is also a debate within the SP on the role of the PCF. For some figures like the education minister, Jean Pierre Chevenement, the PCF should be included in a "republican front" government. Of course, Mitterrand is completely opposed to such a suggestion. He is joined by the press, which tries to present the question as the French people rejecting two extremes — on the one hand the extreme right of Le Pen, on the other hand the extreme left, which for them is the PCF.

Q. What is the line of the PCF following their departure from the government and the holding of their 25th congress?

A. To a certain extent we can say that the PCF lacks any line. After they left the government they began to attack the SP verbally, in practice they didn't do anything. But it's different from 1978 when there was a rupture with the Common Program. There is still a big sentiment for unity in the working class. The cantonal elections provided some proof of this. In the second round 90 percent of those who voted for the PCF voted for the Socialist candidate when that was the only left candidate. Secondly, the PCF leaders withdrew their candidates on the second ballot at the last moment to prevent victories from the right.

This is because they have no alternative. After breaking with the Union of the Left and leaving the government they developed what they call the "Rassemblement Populaire" [People's Assembly]. This is very typical of the PCF when they are in a sectarian phase. They say that they are in favor of unity, not with the SP, but with the "people." This in fact means unity with themselves.

Even this is a problem given the divisions within the party today. This party has changed its policy five times in five years, unity-rupture-unity-rupture and so on. It's really a question of credibility. This is really a historic crisis of the Communist Party, with a fantastic debate inside the party.

Q. The far left in Europe finds itself in a complicated situation today. What is the position of the French far left? Has there been some discussion about the possibility of a Green-type development in French politics?

A. It's true that the situation today for us is very difficult. Amongst the working class there has been a climate of demoralization and passivity because they did not see any credible alternative, politically or organizationally, to the left of the left. But for some months now there has started to be a shift among trade unionists and among the youth, especially against Le Pen.

There is also a shift amongst members of the SP and the PCF. Some middle ranking leaders of the PCF, even some elected councillors, come to discuss with us. Some have even applied to join us. It's a small thing, but it's an indication of the way things are going.

In the trade unions there is a great debate. To give an example of the change which is going on, there was a Paris conference of the second-largest trade union confederation, the CFDT (French Democratic Confederation of Labor), representing some 80,000 members in the Paris region. The left got the majority. They removed the leadership of the region and elected a three-person secretariat, one of whom is a member of the LCR.

This was widely reported in the press and seen as an indication of the move to the left that exists amongst a minority in the working class, a significant minority. Given that shift to the left we have to make every effort to organize an anticapitalist united front for the elections.

Our hope is to be able to organize a coalition which includes forces ranging from the Greens over to the extreme left. We call this an "anticapitalist alternative," but we want this alternative to be very broad, to try to get an agreement on some fundamental points, not on the whole program. This would include being against austerity, against the right, against racism, against colonialism. These points would provide a common rubric for all the organizations, while each would retain its own separate identity. We would aim for this coalition to have committees at the local level and to try to present a united list in all areas in France in 1986.

This would correspond to the hope of many people today who prefer to abstain rather than vote for one of the two, three, or four lists of the far left organizations. They are ready to be remobilized within that type of united framework. We are pushing this idea forward, having discussions with many people on a national level. On a local level there are a number of public calls initiated by ecologists, the far left, peasant leaders, and so on. The response of the ecologists nationally to this type of appeal is complicated. They represent perhaps 5 to 6 percent electorally speaking. But you have very different sorts of ecologists, some are anticapitalists, some are nothing.

We have a Green party. They wanted to copy the German Greens, but they only have 300 members nationally. But they could get a lot of votes. They want to keep their identity, and up to now they have refused any agreement on the national level with the organized far left. But all the other tendencies locally are making a campaign to convince them that they have to make this coalition with the revolutionary left.

Locally some of them have agreed. For example in the cantonal elections we presented very few candidates, because we are conserving our forces for 1986. We stood in about 15 towns and we got a very small vote, about l percent. But there were some exceptions. In some areas we were able to organize the beginning of small coalitions, where very often, although the candidate was a member of the League, the coalition was larger. In these cases we sometimes got up to 5 or 6 percent and in one exceptional case 16 percent, where the local SP voted for us.

But this is some indication that when you have even the beginning of a regroupment it totally changes the type of support that you get. So that will be the main project of the LCR in the coming year to try to build the "anticapitalist left," the anticapitalist alternative." "a left which refuses to capitulate" — the name is not important, but we have launched the idea publicly and today it's getting discussed amongst a broad layer of people.

Q. What is the place of youth in this alternative? There have been some very important mobilizations against Le Pen and racism.

A. The biggest demonstrations have been organized by the immigrant youth themselves. It was a product of their self organization supported by a lot of left and far left organizations. In many French cities today you have coalitions of all the anti-racist organizations who organize demonstrations when Le Pen comes.

But the big problem is that with all these demonstrations you have a mass of young people, but very few organized workers. So you have a separation between the organized working class, which is anti-Le Pen, but is not mobilized, and this new generation of people coming out onto the street who are not demoralized and who want to fight against racism. It's from this point of view that we can understand the success of the campaign "SOS- racism."

This campaign was initiated by some people in the SP who produced this badge "Touche pas a mon pote" (Hands off my mate). More and more people are wearing this badge. People wear it on the Metro in Paris, even some TV announcers have taken to wearing it.

Q. Has the campaign in defense of the Kanaks in New Caledonia found an echo in this movement?

A. Yes. The meetings organized in defense of the Kanaks have probably been the most important since 1981. Not only because people are in solidarity with the fight of a small people and so on. It's also a way for a lot of people to get back into activity against the policy of the government, against Le Pen, and so on.

In this question of New Caledonia you are confronted with all the problems of French politics: the capitulation of the SP, the left language of the PCF who do nothing for the Kanaks, the role of the fascists and the right who mobilize to defend what they call French New Caledonia.

When Jean-Marie Tjibaou, the Kanak leader, came to Paris there was an enormous meeting of 5,000 people. Nobody expected such a turnout. It was an incredibly spirited and enthusiastic response. We have helped to build a national campaign with local committees in solidarity with the Kanaks which has been able to regroup part of the far left, the ecologists, some individual trade union leaders around this issue. Everybody knows we play a big role in this campaign, but nevertheless the PCF and the trade unions are forced to recognize this campaign as the authoritative one. It's the only committee recognized by the FLNKS [Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front] themselves.

We are organizing a big demonstration on April 20 on the international day of solidarity called by the FLNKS, and we hope that in all the other European countries, even if they are not as involved as us, they could organize pickets and delegations to French embassies on that day.

Q. So how would you summarize the prospects up to 1986 and beyond for the workingclass struggle against austerity? Will the retreat continue or will there be a rallying against these attacks?

A. Today locally you either get no resistance at all, or when you do get resistance it tends to be very strong and very prolonged. The trouble is, however, you have no such movement on the national scale. The struggles are totally fragmented. The more they are fragmented, the more people are demoralized, because they realize that without national organization there can be no victory.

That was one of the lessons drawn here from the miners' strike in Britain. The strike has been widely discussed, partly because the CGT (General Confederation of Labor), the largest union confederation, organized a very big campaign of propaganda and solidarity. But the balance sheet is contradictory. On the one hand it showed that it is possible to fight, that the miners fought a tremendous battle, and that we should have such unions in France. All that was progressive. What was negative was, of course, their defeat. The balance sheet that was drawn was that, even given such an exemplary struggle, without the support of the rest of the working class, the strug gle will fail.

The leader of the CGT, Henri Krasucki, has now been talking about a general strike against austerity for the last six months. Only speaking about it of course, but nevertheless it is a sign that people are beginning to understand the need for that sort of response.

But having said that, the record of the left parties has had a disastrous effect on the level of consciousness and organization of the working class, the weakening of trade unionism, the fact that more and more people are leaving the PCF and SP. The combination of that and the impact of austerity in terms of the structural division of the working class between the employed and the unemployed, with migrants, women, and so on contributes towards certain elements of disintegration of working-class consciousness.

So this results in a contradictory process; a very bad impact on the majority of the working class, but at the same time a big politicization of a significant fraction of the working class. The result is that we can organize and develop the activity of this minority on the basis of all the experiences they have had up to this point. That's our aim.

Notes

* If no candidate receives an absolute majority of the vote on the first round, a second ballot is held a week later between the top two contenders. - IP

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