(The following is an interview with Commander Daniel Ortega, the coordinator of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua. It is taken from the July 18 English-language edition of Barricada International, published weekly in Managua. Footnotes are from the original text.]
Question. Some of the political groups that supported the Revolution at the time of its triumph are now among the opposition or have joined the counterrevolution. To what extent might this situation be due to a shift from the original program of the Sandinista Popular Revolution, which everyone supported in one way or another?
Answer. At the time of the triumph, we had at hand a program which had been proposed, drafted, developed, and then made public and guaranteed by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). It's important to make clear that the program which we are calling the "original" program was entirely prepared, discussed, and approved by the FSLN. This completely refutes the maneuvers made by some groups to give the impression that the original program was the result of pacts and agreements made with other political groups and in the presence of foreign heads of state.
That is to say, at no time was any agreement or political pact made with another political force; even the composition of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction was not decided as the result of any pact or agreement made with another political group.
Rather, we called upon persons who were well-known nationally, and naturally they were involved in some political activity.
In this way, we called upon Violeta Barrios de Chamorro as well as Alfonso Robelo, Sergio Ramirez, and Moisés Hassan. In the case of Sergio Ramirez and Moisés Hassan, they were representing social and political groups which adhered directly to the FSLN line.
Sergio Ramirez was the head of the Group of 12 and Hassan was one of the leading figures of the United People's Movement. They were asked: "This is the Sandinista Front's program, do you support it?" It was the same program which was later applied immediately after the revolutionary triumph on July 19.
Of course, in the application of a program the interests of different sectors participating in the country's political life come into play. And the FSLN, in this case, was going to apply a program which had the national interest at heart, the people's interests, the Revolution's interests. This clashed with the interests of people such as Mr. Robelo, who tried to steer the government in a direction which was more in line with his own interests.
When we began confiscating all of
Somoza's properties and those of his associates, as outlined in the program, contradictions emerged. There was no problem with Somoza's personal properties, but among the Somocistas there were people closely linked to Mr. Robelo, who had a personal relationship with him; when the application of the specific provisions contained in the program were discussed, Robelo's personal economic interests came to the fore.
This conflict arose on repeated occasions, in relation to different matters. When the nationalization of the banks was put forth, which was a significant measure, and the nationalization of exports, they prompted heated discussions.
From that moment on, conflicts arose within the Government Junta. And Mr. Robelo, above all, was the most belligerent. There was a time when he opposed a whole series of measures but always accepted the Junta's majority decision in the end.
The minutes of the Junta's meetings show that from the very beginning, when the revolutionary program went into effect, Robelo opposed it. And this had to do with his economic interests, with his understanding of political pluralism and mixed economy, since he actually wasn't viewing the program as a means to transform, to change the existing structures of the country, to improve it substantially, and to seek justice in the distribution of wealth.
He was fighting to maintain the existing forms of exploitation, and this totally violated the spirit of the revolutionary program. We mention Robelo because he was the prototype of this kind within the country's highest governmental body, and he represented - although not formally nor as a result of any alliance or agreement — the interests of the sector of Nicaraguan society which refuses to accept revolutionary change which benefits the majority. On the contrary, he was in favor of getting rid of Somoza but controlling the Revolution.
From that point on, Robelo did nothing more than gather that sector's criticisms, which were logically in complete agreement with the criteria of the Revolution's external enemies. In other words, the arguments Robelo raised within the Junta were those of the political and economic groups here in the country and were the same arguments used by the ousted Somocistas residing outside the country. They were also the same arguments echoed by the Revolution's enemies in the U.S., Latin America, and other places.
A campaign was developed to portray the Revolution as betrayed, as having cast aside the spirit of the original program, and as having radicalized the process to its own detriment.
In reality, the original program demands a radicalization of the process - that is, a deepening of the process. Measures such as nationalizing exports and banks are radical; striking blows at the large economic holdings of Somocistas and at latifundistas with idle lands, by means of the agrarian reform, are all profound measures which logically come into conflict with the interests of those who had another type of program in mind
The FSLN has consistently applied the original program. It has not been diverted from its course for a moment.
e. The State of Emergency decreed in March of last year imposed a series of restrictions on civilian life. To what extent was this measure really necessary? Don't you think there might be a serious risk involved in maintaining a measure like this?
A. I think the FSLN's great desire to achieve stability in the country immediately was demonstrated a few months after the revolutionary triumph, while there were still barricades in the streets and signs of the insurrection were still fresh; it began to normalize life in the country and suspended all the existing emergency measures; the administration of cities and towns were transferred from the
FSLN military commands to local governments; censorship of the mass media was lifted; and full freedom was given to political parties. Legal requirements were observed, to the degree possible, in the trials of all the detained Somocista criminals captured by the people.
But what happened? That effort to normalize life in the country began to be frustrated almost immediately as armed activity against the revolutionary process was unleashed. The first such actions occurred in 1980 and were directed against the literacy teachers.
With great effort, we launched a literacy campaign. Young Nicaraguans went to the countryside to teach the people to read and write. And they became the first victims of armed counterrevolutionary attacks.
But the situation had not yet become highly dangerous. It began to be so as groups of Somocista guards in exile, already linked to the CIA, developed ties with groups of Nicaraguans inside the country who opposed the Sandinista Revolution and were often members of political parties, trade unions, or coffee growers' associations: for example, businessmen like Jorge Salazar.'
When an administration determined to give open support to these enemies of the Nicaraguan people took office in the U.S., the situation became even more dangerous. This foreign interference began to be evident in the concentration and regroupment of Somocista guards in Honduran territory, the incursions of Somocista bands, and the formation of conspiratorial groups inside the country. These were organized by the CIA to carry out terrorist activity — such as the bombing of two
2 and concrete criminal actions against bridges, the civilian population and production activities.
For that reason, we were obliged to make a series of decisions in order to defend the revolutionary process and with it the people's conquests. And that led us to establish the State of Emergency in the military and economic spheres, since we are suffering both economic and military aggressions from the United States. The Reagan administration's hostilities against Nicaragua are well known.
We are a very small country confronting a truly colossal force - U.S. power - and, honestly, the only way to resist those attacks is to close ranks, strengthening the country's defense at all levels.
Q. Do you think it will really be possible to carry out elections in 1985, since neither a prompt solution to the Central American crisis, nor the possibility of lifting the emergency measures established in Nicaragua is in sight?
A. In spite of the state of aggressions, of the war, we are committed to continue the process of institutionalizing the Revolution. We will have to take into account the immediate conditions at the time of elections in 1985. We believe that the efforts of the Revolution's enemies are aimed at making us say: "Because of the terrorist activities, the destabilizing activities, we will suppress elections. " But we're not going to fall for that provocation.
While conditions permit, we will continue building schools, hospitals, sugar mills, and hydroelectric and geothermal plants in this country, and we will continue defending the Revolution with arms. As the aggressions become more serious, to the extent that they affect all these economic and social efforts, we will have to adapt ourselves to those conditions and confront the difficulties of development and, ultimately, of survival.
Q. To what extent might the decisions made by the revolutionary government be affected by the shortage of certain basic food items? Do the economic problems work in favor of the counterrevolution?
A. In the first place, we have to take into account that the crisis that affects Nicaragua must be seen within the context of world economic problems, the greatest victim of which are poor, third world nations. The contries of Central America are the main victims of the world economic crisis. Large, marketeconomy nations unload the weight of their crisis on countries like ours and make us pay with the blood of our peoples. This is a central element necessary to understand the crisis Central American nations are enduring.
The problems of high prices and scarcity of foods are problems that other countries are feeling acutely. But there is a substantial difference in the case of Nicaragua: here, there is a Revolution, and this has allowed the population to become aware of these problems and familiar with them, to discuss them, and make demands and criticisms.
The situation is totally different in other countries where the people are not aware of those problems, and government policy is not aimed at resolving them. Rather, the people are sacrificed to safeguard the interests of those who enjoy better economic conditions.
So, in Nicaragua there is a different situation, where criticism and even discontent produced by shortages are expressed within the Revolution.
Here, there are very concrete factors that have worked to worsen this situation. This year, above all, climatic problems have taken their toll. We suffered a drought that seriously affected the production of basic grains, plantains, and other products which are needed by the population. On top of this, demand increased automatically, given the government's decision to guarantee the consumption of basic foods to large sectors of the population which previously did not have access to them. We are speaking of the high percentage of our population who are campesinos, farmworkers, and rural workers who previously lacked the benefits of basic nutrition.
Then, we must add the aggressions and the mobilization of the country in order to confront them. Human resources are involved in defense activities. Many join reserve battalions and often have to leave their lands for several months.
On the other hand, all these thousands of mobilized men and women must eat, and there goes another large amount of resources. The economic crisis is compounded by the U.S. government's determination to damage the Nicaraguan economy, to affect the Nicaraguan people's possibilities of consumption in order to turn the population against the Revolution.
The aggressive economic pressures the United States has unleashed against the Nicaraguan people are common knowledge. They decided to cut off our wheat and cooking oil supplies, then they reduced the sugar quota, which, at its advantageous price, was a source of foreign exchange for the country.
On the other hand, the United States decided to block all loans and aid to Nicaragua in international bodies and it has cut all forms of economic support it had maintained in the past for the Somocista regime.
On top of this complex situation, there is another destabilizing factor: trade. This plays a negative role in terms of price increases, and, logically, this provokes discontent within the population. But, as I said before, what is important is that this population criticizes, shouts, complains, and expresses discontent, but within the Revolution.
Only a minority is shouting in discontent outside of the Revolution and against the Revolution. A superficial viewer might speak of discontent upon observing this active population that criticizes and makes demands, but the Revolution also teaches that one must criticize and make demands, and organize to do so.
Yes, there is discontent with this situation, and we are all discontented. But this is a nation which, faced with Somocista guards and the United States' hostile military and economic policy, in the face of all this, responds as one clenched fist. It supports the Revolution.
Q. Also in the framework of the economic situation, there are those who refer to the Nicaraguan Revolution as state-controlled. Others, however, speak of the need for a larger state participation in the economy. What is the future of the Nicaraguan economy. of the economic sectors which today exist in the country: the private sector, the mixed sector, and the state sector? What role will these be given in the future?
A. The guidelines that the Revolution has set in that sense are aimed at achieving a unified direction for the economy. We cannot function here with a fragmented economy, acting anarchically and responding to the interests of merely utilitarian factors, which were what carried the most weight in the past, instead of development factors, which are the most important.
So, there are some guidelines that have the purpose of setting the bases for an economic take-off in the country. This means transforming the bases of the economy and mobilizing all sectors to carry out transformations in agriculture, in industry, in construction, in all areas required for the country's development.
This, of course, to a certain degree affects the false freedom that these groups had — and here, we're speaking of the private sector — to get involved in any business, without concern for whether it might be detrimental to the country's future, to development, without thinking about popular sectors, the working class. In the past, there really wasn't even an economic policy that favored strengthening a truly national bourgeoisie; that sector was totally neutralized, splintered, anarchic, and served as a mere instrument of foreign economic interests.
Now the Revolution proposes to drastically change this situation. It proposes to develop a planned economy that will respond to the need for change and development in the country. There is a place in these plans for small, medium, and large-scale producers, industrialists, artisans, etc. The private sector at large has the opportunity to play an active role in the development of this economic model.
e. Exactly what kind of role? One of their main complaints is that they are denied the opportunity to participate in decision-making.
A. That complaint must be viewed from a political perspective. Some private producers are linked to political groups which oppose the Sandinista Front, and it often becomes hard to tell whether they are speaking as producers or as politicians. They generally speak as politicians. They say they're excluded, but in reality a series of mechanisms has been established here in the various sectors of production, particularly in the agricultural and commercial sectors, in which they all participate directly.
They are able to participate as representatives of an economic force in the nation. As politicians, they can go argue and complain in the Council of State, where they have a place. As producers they can form part of the different commissions that have been created.
The private sector is present on all these commissions. This is where their demands for foreign exchange are considered, to see if these demands respond to the country's development needs.
In any case, the underlying problem here is the huge limitations the country faces in its efforts to reactivate the economy. These limitations are imposed, in part, by the continuous U.S. aggressions which affect the economy, as well as the world market structure. While developed nations buy our export products at the prices they choose, we have to buy their prod-
ucts at their ever-increasing prices.
On the other hand, we are vulnerable to powerful U.S. economic aggressions, which include pressures to cut off the loans and aid that constitute an important source of foreign exchange for the country. Distribution of this foreign exchange is a very difficult and complicated matter, but we are just as strict with state enterprises as we are with private businessmen.
We find that those businessmen are manipulated politically or they intentionally act in a negative manner, even though they are aware of these problems, simply because they want to give the impression that the state is denying them foreign exchange and thus is harming private enterprise, seeking to make the private sector disappear.
But the truth is that if someone is harming the private sector here and dealing it a hard blow, for example, by cutting off the sugar quota, that someone is the United States government. It is harming everyone in the country equally, including the private sector.
Q. Nicaragua has declared itself nonaligned nation. However, in international forums as well as in its economic, political, and diplomatic affairs, it has deepened relations with Socialist countries. Nicaragua is accused of having joined the Socialist bloc. To what extent has Nicaragua maintained its original policy of nonalignment? To what extent does government policy respond to that principle?
A. Nicaragua really does sustain and defend the policy of nonalignment. This is so evident, so clear, that Nicaragua has achieved a leading role within the Nonaligned Nations Movement, and is greatly respected among its members.
How else could you explain Nicaragua's election to the United Nations Security Council, in spite of the U.S. opposition and campaign to block that election. The fact that Nicaragua has established relations at various levels with the countries of the Socialist community does no harm to its policy of nonalignment. On the contrary, it reinforces that policy; the past regime was completely aligned with the United States and rejected relations with the Socialist, Arab, and African countries.
When the Revolution triumphed, it never considered breaking relations with the United States, but, at the same time and consistent with its policy of nonalignment, Nicaragua sought to open itself up to all the countries of the world.
The extensive relations with various countries of the world have brought about a diversification in our economic and trade relations. That means we are beginning to break our traditional dependence on the United States and to maintain our own identity on the international level.
Naturally, for a country which in the past could not even imagine having relations with a Socialist country, this step sounds extremely significant, but it is something Nicaragua set out to develop since July 19, 1979.
This fourth anniversary is demonstrating the possibility of establishing and consolidating a revolutionary process in Central America. But we are also celebrating this anniversary at the most critical moment for the Central American region; this moment requires responses soon: responses that will help us overcome the confrontation promoted by the U.S. government. We must develop a new kind of relationship with the United States.
The crisis we mentioned reflects the fact that the policy promoted by the United States in the region is really obsolete and worn-out and should thus be replaced.
The U.S. government is not yet conscious of this. On the contrary, it desperately clings to its policy, trying to revive a corpse, and cannot see the need for a change, which is the only way to save the future relationship between the Central American peoples and the United States. This has been demonstrated in the recent case of the Malvinas Islands, where U.S. policy was made totally clear; it is a policy that does not adapt to the new mentality, to progress, to development.
Notes
1. Jorge Salazar was a leader of a small counterrevolutionary group who was killed in a confrontation with the authorities while he was transporting arms in 1980. At the time of his death, he was president of the Agricultural Producers Union of Nicaragua, an organization of the country's large-scale agriculturalists. His widow is presently one of the heads of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, a counterrevolutionary organization mostly comprised of Somocista ex-guards.
2. On March 14, 1982, two bridges near the Honduran border were blown up by CIA-armed and trained commandos.