[The following article appeared in the September 18-24 issue of the French socialist weekly Rouge. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
On September 8 Abderrahim Bouabid, the first-secretary of the Socialist Union of People's Forces (USFP) of Morocco and Mohamed Monsour, the Socialist parliamentary deputy from Casablanca, were both jailed by the Moroccan monarchy. Their arrests mark a new stage in the crisis that has beset the Moroccan regime, a crisis that began with the general strikes and social upheavals of last June.
[See Intercontinental Press, July 27, page 784.]
The arrests mark the end of the "national unity" that King Hassan II established in 1977 around his policy of reconquering and annexing the Western Sahara, a phosphate-rich former Spanish colony.
The jailings also show that the so-called democratization in which this "national unity" was cloaked was artificial and illusory.
But the way the split between the king and the country's main opposition force took place also indicates the deepgoing confusion that exists on the Moroccan left and in the workers movement.
When, in 1975, King Hassan embarked upon his quest to "regain the Saharan provinces" by waging war against the Saharan fighters of the Polisario Front,* there was a real consensus within Morocco behind that policy. The cement that held this consensus together was nationalism and national chauvinism. The USFP and the Party of Progress and Socialism [PPSthe Moroccan Communist Party], and even those small groupings that considered themselves part of the revolutionary far left, supported Hassan's policy.
Later, the mild measures granting a small degree of democratic rights that accompanied
*People's Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el- Hamra and Río de Oro
KING HASSAN II
the 1977 legislative elections provided nothing but advantages for the monarchy: they institutionalized the consensus without challenging the absolute power of the king and his immediate entourage.
But as the war effort in the Sahara bogged down and it became clear that it was impossible to win a decisive victory over the Polisario Front, the regime began to face growing difficulties, despite this favorable political context. Military stalemate, social explosion
The growing cost of the war, and the 40 percent of the budget that went to the military became too great a burden for the Moroccan economy to bear. The economy, dominated by foreign capital, has been hit by the full force of the international economic crisis.
The sharp decline in export income, especially income from the sale of phosphates, and the growing cost of imported products, particularly arms, led to heavy Moroccan indebtedness to the imperialist powers and their international financial institutions. These institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), became nervous and forced the Moroccan government to impose drastic austerity measures. These measures rapidly led to a social crisis, capped off by the June 20 social explosion in Casablanca.
The Democratic Workers Confederation (CDT), which is the most militant union federation and is tied to the USFP, called a general strike for that day to protest the sharp increases in the prices of basic foodstuffs. The workers and the masses of the poor neighborhoods of Casablanca, which is the economic if not political capital of the country, turned out in massive numbers on the day of the strike.
Repression and 'national unity'
The scope of the repression during and after the June events shows how brutal the monarchy can be. According to a commission of inquiry sent to the scene by the League for the Rights of Man, 637 people were killed, 2,000 were charged with crimes, and more than 8,000 people were taken in for questioning.
Both outside and inside the country, Hassan Il still had means to mask the depth of the crisis and the brutality of the repression. Although the French Socialist Party did issue a communiqué and complained about the "arbitrariness of the judicial repression," several weeks later Mitterrand's Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson went to Rabat for a "friendly get acquainted visit" with Hassan II.
Inside Morocco, the leaders of the USFP and PPS stepped up their criticisms of what they described as an "unjust" economic and social policy and denounced the "excesses" of the repression against their own members. But they did not break with the regime. Worse yet, several days later they agreed to take part in the Moroccan delegation to the Nairobi summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a delegation headed up by Hassan II himself.
On the highest political levels, the policies of "national unity" continued.
Nonetheless, at the Nairobi summit Hassan Il announced a major turn in his Saharan policy.
New Saharan policy
The combination of the military stalemate, the economic stagnation, and the social explosions could spell the death of the monarchy. But none of those involved in the Saharan conflict, especially the Algerian government, wished for that outcome, which could have major unforeseen consequences within their own countries. Knowing this, Hassan II saw the possibility of an "honorable outcome."
He therefore proposed holding a referendum to consult "the Saharan population." This referendum would take place under the control of an interim administration established jointly by the OAU and the United Nations. The Moroccan administration and armed forces would remain in place until then.
Although the recent split between Hassan II and his "socialist" opposition took place against the backdrop of the social crisis and the repression, the direct cause of the split was the content of the king's new Saharan policy. The USFP, caught up in the nationalist and chauvinist logic of its adherence to "national unity," opposed the king's new orientation as "pacifist."
'Left' chauvinism
The USFP opposes the presence of an interim international administration and giving Saharan refugees in Algeria and Mauritania the right to vote in the referendum. It feels that the only way to preserve Morocco's national integrity and territorial unity is through a referendum in which "the whole Moroccan people" would be consulted and whose "democratic" character would be guaranteed in the Saharan provinces by the presence of the Moroccan army and administration.
Abderrahim Bouabid, the main spokesman for the Moroccan "socialist" left and the local figure with the closest ties to the leaders of the Socialist International, was arrested specifically because he raised these criticisms of Hassan's plan, in this way breaking up the "national unity."
In the short run, paradoxically, Bouabid is again doing a service for his king: the person responsible for the Casablanca massacres can now portray himself as an enlightened monarch fighting his leftist opposition's chauvinist obscurantism on the Saharan question. But despite his talents as a political contortionist, Hassan II cannot sing in this key for very long. Abderrahim Bouabid's international reputation and ties force the social democracy and numerous governments to protest his arrest and demand his freedom. Through this vehicle the whole repressive policy of the Moroccan monarchy can, and must, be vigorously denounced.
More fundamentally, the conditions under which the "national unity" broke up highlight the stunning bankruptcy of the nationalism and chauvinism in which the Moroccan left wallows, and in the name of which it has committed and justified the worst betrayals betrayals of the struggles of the exploited masses of Morocco as well as the fight of the Saharan people for their national independence.
The bankruptcy of this policy must lead all organizations claiming to be part of the workers movement to carry out a radical turn. They must break all collaboration with Hassan Il and his regime. This is a prerequisite for any policy that really defends the interests of the exploited. It is also the precondition for insuring that there is no repetition of massacres like in Casablanca where the masses went into the streets to demand the right to have enough to eat.