[The following article appeared in the October 14 issue of the French-language fortnightly Inprecor, published in Paris. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
French troops have occupied the Central African Republic for a little over a year. On September 20, 1979, French paratroopers overthrew the "imperial" regime of Emperor Bokassa I and installed David Dacko in his place. Ironically, Dacko himself had been overthrown by the French on the last day of 1965.
Bokassa had become an embarrassment to French President Giscard d'Estaing after dozens of schoolchildren were gunned down during a demonstration against the high price of school uniforms.
But underlying the overthrow of Bokassa was the chaos that had been rampant in that impoverished, landlocked country for several years. Clearly the situation could not go on like that for much longer, and so the French military organized "Operation Barracuda" to get rid of Emperor Bokassa. The operation was designed to wash Paris's hands, and those of its president, of the bloody deeds of its imperial protégé.
However, the banishment of Bokassa, far from making France the liberator of the Central African people, reveals the sordid involvement of three presidents of the Fifth Republic of France, and especially Giscard, in Central African affairs.
There have been a number of recent scandals regarding French involvement in Central Africa. There were the diamonds that Bokassa gave to Giscard and Giscard's family members. Then there was the scandal of the imperial archives, which were seized by the French army and subsequently disappeared. There was the scandal of the overly friendly relations of Giscard and his family members with Bokassa.
Finally, there is the latest scandal-the Roger Delpey affair. Delpey, a secret agent, was arrested leaving the Libyan embassy in Paris and was charged with having links with agents of a foreign power. Actually Delpey was trying to score an extraordinary scoop by collecting Bokassa's reminiscences after his overthrow. Apparently Delpey has in his possession some explosive revelations, and the Bureau of Internal Security (DST) is feverishly trying to find the hidden documents.
Delpey, who has not yet come to trial, had the nerve to want to call Bokassa as a defense witness. One can imagine the embarrassment in high places. There are also reports that Bokassa asked Delpey to give copies of the documents to Giscard's political rival Jacques Chirac!
This imbroglio shows once again that these African countries are the arena for shadowy conflicts between spy networks, which are often reflections of the political divisions within the right-wing parliamentary majority in France.
At the very least, from Central Africa we get a whiff of the sickening odor of the twenty years of slime accumulated by these characters who govern France. Central Africa is a very interesting showcase of how French imperialism operates in fully one-third of the African continent.
We can already conclude that the French military intervention that brought David Dacko back to power-the same man whom the French government had gotten Jean-Bédel Bokassa to overthrow on December 31, 1965, because of his unpopularity-has been a failure in every regard.
The promised democracy still has not arrived. A single party has been set up. Repression is again becoming the norm. The economic crisis is worsening, and there has been no improvement in social conditions. Struggles for higher wages continue to spread. The new "government of public safety," caught in its own contradictions, is in panic and can no longer find temporary measures to appease the discontent. The French government, for its part, is in a blind alley.
The reshuffling of the Central African cabinet last July, and the August visit by Giscard's adviser for African affairs, Martin Kirsch, have not yielded a real solution.
An Occupied Country
When the French soldiers intervened in Central Africa a year ago last September, Paris stated they would be withdrawn after a couple of months. This has not happened. On the contrary, the French paratroopers who struck from the neighboring country of Chad have set themselves up at a base in Bouar in the westcentral part of the country. They had previously occupied Bouar from the time of independence in 1960 to 1968. In July Gen. Bigeard went to Bouar to inspect the progress of the base.
The paratroopers are also spread throughout the border cities in order to maintain better surveillance of the country because no one, not even the French, would really claim that the country is calm and that there is no chance of an uprising. In late September Dacko stated that the troops will remain in Central Africa for a long time, perhaps even ten years.
In the capital city, Bangui, the troops patrol the main arteries. They are also stationed at the airport and next to the university, to better control the student movements. French police and guards are also numerous.
Recolonization
The French presence is not just military. There are French "technical advisers" in the state-owned and state-controlled companies and in the administration. The upper-level Central African administrators, who theoretically "run" these companies, have no freedom to act on their own. The young African general director of a state-controlled transport company, who is a graduate of the prestigeous French École Nationale d'Administration, is surrounded by several French "technicians" and freely admits that he is there simply as window dressing.
At the Treasury and the Finance Ministry French advisers keep their eyes on everyone. They are, they claim, controlling the money that France "gives" the Central African Republic. In reality the country has reverted to the status of a French colony.
Jacques Serres, a former French settler in Central Africa, has become Dacko's main personal adviser. His office is in Dacko's waiting room. It is even rumored that he was the one who removed Alphonse Blagué from his post as Dacko's personal adviser.
The 1980-81 two-year economic plan, an austerity plan, was worked out in Paris. Central Africans have taken to calling it the "Central African Barre Plan."
Some state-controlled companies have been transformed into private firms and handed over to French interests. The Central African Agency for River Transport, for example, is now controlled by the Rothschild group. Some of its Central African employees were fired.
The French stranglehold also extends to the realm of training administrators. For example, this year, out of 2,100 applicants for post-secondary education, only 580 were accepted. A French teacher expressed satisfaction with having reached the point of accepting less than one-third of the applicants for post-secondary schools.
The final straw was when the French minister of cooperation totally did away with 188 scholarships for Central African students in France and renewed another 115 scholarships only until October, pending the September results. Only 255 scholarships were fully renewed. This means that by October nearly half the Central African students in France will have had their scholarships eliminated and will, according to a circular from the minister of cooperation, automatically be returned to their country within two months.
Those affected were mainly graduate students and college students who have not yet finished their studies.
The Union Nationale des Étudiants Centrafricains (UNECA-National Union of Central African Students) in France sent a letter to the Central African government protesting this arbitrary decision by the minister of cooperation. Central African Minister of Education Alphonse Blagué hastily went to Paris last August 10 to settle this problem. But all he was able to accomplish was to get the decision carried over to the next university year.
In fact, the minister of cooperation does not have the right to arbitrarily do away with the scholarships of Central African students. A national scholarship commission that meets in August in Bangui has to make such decisions. By acting in this manner, the French minister puts the Central African Republic (which is theoretically a sovereign state) on the same level as the so-called French Overseas Territories and Overseas Departments (direct colonies).
French technicians freely state that since Paris pays these scholarships it therefore has rights in this area concerning Central African students. The elimination of these scholarships is part of the French policy of trying to block the training of Central African administrators and continuing to send its officials to control the University of Bangui, where they carry out a vicious weeding out process. Each year in the faculties of law and economic sciences, which are totally controlled by French faculty, the passing rate for all years combined is no more than 5 percent. It is the same for the faculty of arts and sciences.
No Democracy
Right after the French intervention, David Dacko proclaimed his support for pluralism. On October 29, 1979, in a speech laying out his program, Dacko specifically stated: "Very soon we will have a law authorizing a multiparty system... But the multiparty system we want would remain an illusion unless accompanied by freedom of the press, freedom of association."
Several days later he issued a decree prohibiting demonstrations. Prime Minister Bernard-Christian Ayandho, in turn, called the Radio Bangui journalists to order, specifically stating that they were there to serve the state and not to broadcast their own opinions.
A conference called by Ange Patassé's Movement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain (MLPC-Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People) and Dr. Abel Goumba's Front Patriotique Oubanguien (FPO-Ubangi Patriotic Front) was denied permission to meet and leaders of the MLPC were arrested, imprisoned, or exiled. Patassé and his supporters are still in jail. Some teachers' union leaders were also arrested after strikes and demonstrations, although they were later released.
The Union Démocratique Centrafricaine (UDC-Union of Central African Democrats), the single party set up by Dacko, which is a new version of MESAN, held its founding congress March 10-17. The founding president of the UDC is Dacko himself, and the secretary is Kazagui, who was formerly minister of national education under Bokassa.
In his speech opening the founding congress, Dacko defined the UDC as "basically a liberal organization. ... The UDC is a multitendency political party, which does not discriminate on the basis of region, religion, opinion, culture, or birth. ... As a true school for responsibility and integrity, the UDC must be the gathering point for honest patriots of integrity who support the activity of the founding president, but who should not hesitate to formulate in total freedom all criticisms that might improve that activity for the greater satisfaction of all."
In the UDC statutes, membership by the population is theoretically not obligatory. In practice, it is another matter. In the provinces the party has already begun to draft the village chiefs, the peasants, and so on.
In April the government tried to subordinate the youth to the party. This led to a stinging defeat for Dacko's adviser at that time, Alphonse Blagué, who had become minister of youth and is now in charge of national education.
The same thing happened with the Union Générale des Travailleurs Centrafricains (UGTC-General Union of Central African Workers) where the regime is trying to replace the present leadership, which is not tied to the government.
Personnel Changes
The new draft constitution and the establishment of a single party does not benefit all the members of the government. For example, the new constitution does not include the post of vice-president, which is now held by Henri Maidou. Maidou is no longer part of the leadership of the UDC. This means that if the new constitution goes into effect, Maidou could end up disappearing from the political scene.
Maidou's legal adviser, Manedjapou, has sharply criticized the draft of the constitution and the UDC, which he calls the "Union of Dacko's Cronies." That term has been picked up and is now widely used by Central Africans in referring to the UDC.
In July, Maidou went on the radio to say that he supports a multiparty system and he criticized the present government. He did this to try to increase his stature a little. It should be noted that he is very unpopular in the country, where they call him "Mister Denial," because when he was Bokassa's prime minister he denied that there had been a massacre of the school children.
Maidou, who in the opinion of Paris seems the most intelligent politician and "most looks the part," is trying to attract to the government university students who support him in his activity.
Rifts within the government began to appear with the "Guéret affair." Guéret was the minister of justice. The "Guéret affair" began when a young examining magistrate named Gatoua ordered the arrest of one of Dacko's cousins for diverting public funds. Gatoua also wanted to interrogate Maidou and Alphonse Koyamba, the minister of the economy and finances.
Dacko didn't want any interrogation and pressured Guéret, demanding that he fire the examining magistrate or turn in his own resignation. Guéret chose the latter course.
After resigning in March, Guéret blasted the government, going so far as to accuse Dacko of intending to free those condemned to death for crimes committed under Bokassa.
Added to these many problems is the unpopularity of Prime Minister Ayandho. The population feels he is guilty of tribalism, and opposes his placing of his own people (Yakomas) in positions of responsibility. Ayandho is also felt to be notoriously incompetent.
Finally, Minister of the Economy and Finances, Alphonse Koyamba, who is the richest man in the government and indeed in the country, continues to divert public funds into his own pocket. For example, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Dacko asked Koyamba for an accounting of his ministry. Koyamba stated with an absolutely straight face that he had been keeping the state's money in his personal account so it would be more "secure."
In July Dacko had to dissolve the government. The people expected that Ayandho and Maidou, the two most unpopular ministers, would leave the government. But this did not happen. Why not?
The French government wants Maidou to succeed Dacko in the medium- or longterm. Maidou has to prepare the way for this by presenting himself as a liberal. Ayandho, who, along with his friend Dacko, is an objective embarrassment to Paris, remained in the government because there was as yet no designated replacement for him. But it is only a matter of time.
One of Giscard's advisers stated that "if we were to do Operation Barracuda over again, I am not sure that we would take David Dacko on one of our [transport planes], but it is too late."
Finally on August 22, when the unions threatened to go into the streets, Dacko did kick out his two closest collaborators. Does this mean that Maidou, whose residence was quickly surrounded by troops after his dismissal, is definitively removed from the regime? That is not certain. Not only does he still have political friends in the government, but the French government has not totally abandoned him. His withdrawal could mean that he is being held in reserve by the government.
The Real Problems
Since Operation Barracuda there has been little improvement in conditions in the Central African Republic.
While the salaries of executives have been adjusted, nothing has been done for the workers and peasants. A study done by a French mission indicates that a family in Bangui needs 60,000 CFA francs? (about $275) per month to live on. But the monthly minimum wage is, theoretically, 10,000 CFA francs ($46),* and some wages are even lower. There have been delays in the payment of wages. Often peasants never receive money for the sale of their crops.
Factory layoffs are increasing. Nearly all the employees of the Central African Agency for River Transport are threatened with layoffs. The civil service is reducing its staff and all hiring has been suspended. In the state-owned and state-controlled enterprises layoffs are increasing. All this adds up to a sharp rise in unemployment. There is no sign of a beginning of economic revival. Quite the contrary.
The budget deficit is 4.6 billion CFA francs ($20 million) and the public debt has risen above 75 billion CFA francs ($345 million).
While the country gets poorer the members of the government are getting richer. Since the fall of Bokassa the salaries of government ministers have tripled. Salaries of the president and cabinet ministers range from 2.5 million CFA francs ($11,500) per month down to 1 million francs ($4,600). Expense allowances have been raised to 30,000 CFA francs ($138) per day.
While he was prime minister, Ayandho built himself a luxurious villa in record time on the banks of the Ubangi river.
Simmering Unrest
The people hailed the fall of Bokassa. They were the ones who had struggled for months to drive him out of the country. But the mass of common people saw Paris and its flunkies in power grab the fruits of their struggle.
Since then struggles have resumed. The main demand is still democracy. Dacko, protected by the French paratroopers, opposes these struggles.
There was a resumption of strikes in the administration. In late April the government offices in Paoua were ransacked. In Bambari the cotton harvest was burned. Several times the minister of agriculture found it was not easy to conduct a dialogue with the peasants.
In Batangafo the peasants refused to fulfill the requirement to work on public works programs. They attacked the Central African police, and French legionnaires had to intervene to put down the uprising. (There are now about 8,000 French Legionnaires in the country.)
There were several strikes at the University of Bangui. In June high school students demonstrated their discontent over the ferocious tests for post-secondary school admissions.
Tension reigns throughout the country, and the government and the French troops cannot contain this movement for very long. The movement reflects deepgoing opposition to the French military intervention and the antipeople policy of the Dacko government.
The Political Forces
The growth of these struggles cannot help but pose problems for the regime, which owes its survival to the French presence, a presence that the Central Africans no longer fear so much. The real problem is the lack of structured organizations. To win their demands, the people will have to build such organizations.
Trade unionists now distrust certain opportunists who misused and tricked them once they were in power. They have already been disappointed by some of their former comrades in the struggle against Bokassa who are now in the government. This is especially true with respect to Alphonse Blagué, a former Maoist, who tells everyone who will listen that freedom and democracy have been established in the country.
The Central African political spectrum looks empty. Patassé's MLPC now exists in name only. The activity of Dr. Abel Goumba's FPO is restricted to distributing leaflets in Paris. The majority of its members have resigned, their reason being that Dr. Goumba no longer wants to fight. The FPO is in shambles. Goumba's right hand man, Idi Lala, has taken refuge in Chad after being accused of using movement funds for personal ends. Lepa, the person in charge of the group's "military wing" has joined the Central African army. Alphonse Blagué, who is today in the government, is thought to have been a member of the FPO at one time.
What remains is the unionists, the students, and the high-school students. They are the ones who shook Bokassa's throne until he fell. They are the ones who are still struggling and will continue to struggle against the Dacko government.
Today the Central African trade-union federation, the UGTC, is the only organized force, the only one with a following.
But it too now has to fight against certain people who have been won over by Dacko and who want the young leadership to collaborate with the regime.
The Association Nationale des Etudiants Centrafricains (ANECA-National Association of the Central African Students) is now paralyzed. It has broken into three small groups. One is subordinated to the regime, the second is pro-Patassé, and the third tendency calls itself independent.
The organization of high-school students (USCA), which was reorganized after Bokassa fell, seems to be quite unified, as witnessed by its repeated strikes and marches.
French Troops Out!
When Bokassa fell, French President Giscard d'Estaing did a song and dance about being a sincere democrat who had decided to jump into the front lines to save the Central Africans. What is left of the rationale?
The poverty in Central Africa is still there, as is the absence of all civil liberties. Government corruption is as bad as it was under Bokassa. And everything is done under the orders and control of the French army.
Stranded Haitian Refugees
Miami Herald contacted the White House on November 7.
At that time, Eugene Eidenberg, special assistant to President Carter, vowed to the Herald, "Either the Bahamian government solves this problem today or the U.S. government will pick these people up tonight or tomorrow, and bring them to Florida if necessary."
On November 11—thirty-three days after the Coast Guard sighting-the Bahamian government sent a "rescue" ship to Cayo Lobos.
The Haitians refused to go. The Bahamian authorities were going to take them back to Haiti.
"I can't go any place but Miami," explained Claude Pierre, the captain of the Haitians' boat. "We lost everything in Haiti. They will beat us up, kill us, put us in jail. It is a decision between life and death.'
In contrast, thirty-three Cubans leaving their homeland in 1970, stranded on the same island, were promptly rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard at the request of the Bahamian government.
Tens of thousands of Haitians are desperate to escape Duvalier's repression. The U.S. government refuses to grant them political asylum because it supports the under the orders and control of the French army.
That is why the first task of the workers and youth of the country is to struggle for basic rights— the right to work, the right to a free education for all, the right to strike, the right of association, the right to establish independent unions, freedom of the press, and so on. In this struggle the small nuclei of militants must buckle down to the hard work of building unions, youth groups, and political parties.
But from the start they will have to confront the French troops. For that reason, at the top of the list of democratic demands must be the demand for the immediate withdrawal of the French troops. Central African activists must concretely appeal to the French workers and the anti-imperialist movements to carry out their responsibilities and show their solidarity with the Central African people's movement.
The Dacko regime is a very revealing case-study of French imperialist policy in Africa. The country is occupied as a simple colony. This fact must be made known in France and everywhere else.
Notes
1. The Barre Plan, named for French Prime Minister Raymond Barre, includes measures for restructuring French industry and cutting social services.-IP
2. Movement d'Evolution Sociale de l'Afrique Noire (MESAN-Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa) was the only legal party under Bokassa. Membership in MESAN was compulsory for all people over thirty.—IP
3. CFA-African Financial Community. The CFA is made up of former French colonies. Its members are the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, and Cameroon. The CFA franc is issued by the Banque des États dè l'Afrique Centrale, with the French government naming three of the twelve members of the bank's Administrative Council.-IP
4. The former vice-president of the Supreme Court stated (as reported in Le Monde) that "the workers only earn 12,000 CFA francs per month, while a recent study showed that a family in Bangui needs 60,000 francs a month to make ends meet."
5. According to the July 25 Le Monde, "time is playing against President Dacko, whose only real trump cards are the school vacations and the presence of French troops."