By Jean-Pierre Beauvais by veah-rierre beauvals
[The following article appeared in the September 25 issue of the French-language fortnightly Inprecor, published in Paris. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
All the imperialist powers hailed the June 29 elections as a step toward the stabilization of the Bolivian political situation. But less than three weeks after the elections the military had once again seized power in La Paz.
This coup, and General García Meza's brutal dictatorship, should not be viewed simply as a new version of the many pronunciamentos and military regimes that Bolivia has lived through, particularly in the past fifteen years. Because of the methods employed, the goals proclaimed, and the national, regional, and international framework in which the coup took place, the García Meza regime has characteristics that are relatively new for Bolivia and even for Latin America as a whole.
"This coup is the first one of the Reagan era," wrote an Argentine editorialist in the service of the Videla regime shortly after the events in La Paz. While this comment is based on a very iffy anticipation of the results of the coming U.S. elections, it does reveal the perspective in which Latin America's Southern Cone dictatorships are operating, dictatorships that are calling the tune in La Paz today.
But it would be much more meaningful to note that the victorious coup in Bolivia was the first one after the triumph of the Nicaraguan revolution.
I. The Build-Up to the Coup
The July 17 coup put an end to, and marked the failure of, the halfhearted attempt at "democratization" begun in early 1978 as the final phase of General Banzer's dictatorship.
Banzer had seized power in August 1971 in order to put a bloody end to the prerevolutionary crisis Bolivia had been going through since 1970. His seven-year rule was one of the most difficult periods the Bolivian working class and people have ever lived through.
Banzer systematically opened the coun try to imperialist capital, and to the multinational corporations and their Argentine and (above all) Brazilian partners. He unleashed fierce repression and imposed superexploitation on the workers in the cities, the mines, and the countryside.
Along with generalized corruption, these were some of the scarcely unique features of the period.
But Banzer's regime proved unable to even partially bring under control a catastrophic economic situation that was made worse by the effects of the international economic crisis. Mounting conflicts inside the military hierarchy and the exposure of numerous scandals led to the fall of the dictator.
In a chaotic economic and political situa tion, a halfhearted and continually threatened "democratic process" was opened up under the obvious pressure of the U.S. embassy.
Although limited and cautious, this attempt at a democratic opening failed to give the bourgeoisie any stability whatsoever. The extremely divided bourgeois political formations, most of which had arisen out of the breakup of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), were tearing into each other, usually over personal feuds rather than solutions to the deepening crisis.
A two year period from early 1978 to the first months of 1980 saw a veritable breakdown in the traditional bourgeois political formations.
During that short period there were two totally fraudulent general elections, three successful coups and many abortive attempts, and two governments that were only accepted officially as "provisional" governments.
In addition to this disintegration of the bourgeois political formations, in addition to the ludicrous impotence of successive parliaments and the resulting paralysis of part of the state apparatus, two new factors-and the danger that they could come together-alarmed the key sectors of the bourgeoisie in Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil, and along with them, U.S. imperialism. These were the deepening divisions within the armed forces and the revival of the Bolivian workers movement and its resurgence on the political scene.
Divisions Within the Armed Forces
Divisions within the armed forces are nothing new in Bolivia. Conflicts and differentiations within the military hierarchy constantly arise because of the direct and quasi-permanent intervention of the military in Bolivian political life. This constant intervention is, in turn, the result of the fact that the atomized bourgeois political parties lack any base and any coherence, which makes them incapable of playing a role in stabilizing the system of bourgeois rule.
Conflicts in the military arise over quite concrete problems, such as the distribution of "benefits" and privileges related to the day-to-day administration of the affairs of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state.
But above all, the divisions in the military are simply the expression of the specific interests of different sectors of the ruling class, which in other places are expressed within the framework of its political organizations. This state of affairs, when kept restricted to upper echel. ons of the hierarchy, has always proved to be manageable.
But the real danger for the established order is that in the event of intense polarization of class conflicts in the country, it becomes much easier for that polarization to be expressed throughout the military institution as a whole, as was made evident in the prerevolutionary period of 1970- 71.
Of course, at no time between the fall of Banzer and the July 17 coup did a similar situation develop, even embryonically, inside the armed forces.
But as the breakdown of the bourgeois political groupings accelerated, and the economic crisis got worse, the divisions among the top officers, the formation of clans and cliques, also got worse.
Each splintered and declining political group, each political sector, needed its own contacts and its own clique among the officers in order to try to influence the course of events.
This situation was revealed in all its scope by Col. Alberto Natusch's coup on November 1, 1979, and his short-lived but bloody dictatorship that was overthrown on November 16.
Natusch launched his operation without the support of a large part of his fellow officers, who considered it premature and ill-prepared. But his coup was carried out in close connection with politicians close to ex-President Víctor Paz Estenssoro, today the leader of the most conservative offspring of the MNR (the MNR-Alianza), and the Maoists of the CP-ML!
Rebirth of the Workers Movement
The Natusch coup showed the deepening divisions inside the top military hierarchy, and the risks that these entail for the cohesion of the military as an institution.
But Natusch's coup also inadvertently revealed a new and more basic factor in the political situation: the rebirth and resurgence of the workers movement and the exploited masses onto the political scene. This factor had not entered into the calculations of either the Bolivian or imperialist supporters of a cautious and limited democratic opening. On the contrary, they were counting on the masses being relatively passive following the Banzer dictatorship.
The reentry of the Bolivian workers movement on the political scene, after the accumulated defeats that marked the black years of Banzerism, was seen in the increase in economic and democratic struggles during 1978, the preparations for and the holding of the May 1979 congress of the Bolivian Workers Federation (COB), and the general strike the COB launched in August 1979 against the gross and massive electoral fraud perpetrated in the July elections.
And in their response to Natusch's coup the Bolivian workers and masses gave a true demonstration of the revival of their strength.
Despite the military occupation of the main cities, especially La Paz, and despite the state of siege, Natusch's supporters had to confront a true mass popular insurrection. The miners, the workers of the main industrial zones, students, and numerous peasant groups mobilized massively and spontaneously behind the COB.
Following confrontations that left more than 300 dead, 200 "disappeared," and 400 wounded, and abandoned by other sectors of the armed forces whose conviction that this was a premature adventure was confirmed, Natusch had to retreat and give up power.
The Turning Point of the Crisis
Natusch's adventure, however shortlived, is in many respects the key moment of the chaotic period that came to an end with the July 17 coup.
Revealing the divisions and the crisis inside the military hierarchy, it was also the culminating point of that crisis. Once the military officers were back in their barracks, all of them were traumatized, despite their disagreements, both by the defeat of one of their own in face of the popular mobilization and by its potential consequences. The officers set about reconstituting their unity, not without difficul ties and jolts, while setting narrow limits on the freedom of action of the provisional president named after November 16, Lidia Gueiler.
At the center of this operation was Gen. García Meza. Initially he forced President Gueiler to name generals Rubén Rocha and Armando Reyes-who had supported Natusch-to head the army; later he thrust himself into this post.
While showing the extent of the radicalization and the extent of the Bolivian workers' ability to mobilize, the response to the Natusch coup was also the high point of this wave of mobilizations.
Of course the Bolivian workers felt and
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understood this mobilization had been a victory. It immediately opened a new stage in the radicalization of important layers of the oppressed masses. It strengthened the COB. It stimulated the spirit of unity among numerous sectors. This was concretely expressed among the peasants by the development of the United Federation of Bolivian Peasants (CUCB), in which the majority of the peasant parties and associations participated, and which joined the COB, giving a new dimension to the workers-peasant alliance.
However, we should point out that this victory also created dangerous illusions about the relationship of forces in the country. The mobilization and the street fighting forced an adventurist-and temporarily isolated-sector of the armed forces to retreat. This was a vital experience for the masses to go through. But, for all that, it was not a victory over the army and the ruling classes as a whole-as many on the left believed.
Electoral Maneuvering- Disunity and Class Collaboration
Soon afterwards the political maneuvering with an eye to the June 1980 elections began. These maneuvers were to be impediments to the new spirit of workers and popular mobilization.
Although the leaderships of the main reformist workers organizations-the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which is a Social Democratic organization linked to the Socialist International-had remained largely passive during the anti-Natusch mobilizations, they felt it was necessary to use those mobilizations as the jumping off point for the election campaign. They ran in the elections in a coalition-the Democratic People's Unity (UDP)-with one of the most important bourgeois parties, the Left Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNRI) led by Siles Zuazo, who had clearly remained apart from the popular insurrection of November 1979.
This orientation was nothing new for these two organizations. In this crucial period, despite the still-fresh experience confirming the potential of an independent and united mobilization of the workers and the masses, this orientation led a very important sector to focus its energies and strength behind a coalition whose program and goals were those of an important faction of the Bolivian bourgeoisie and imperialism.
The U.S. State Department, through the intermediary of its embassy in La Paz, and especially the German Social Democracy, openly provided the UDP with material and political support throughout the campaign. They felt that in the chaotic situation in Bolivia, Siles Zuazo, the UDP's candidate, would be the best able to channel and contain the upsurge of the masses.
This orientation of the PCB and the MIR
also caused a deepgoing division inside the workers movement, which had been united in the insurrection. The COB, whose weight and prestige were considerably strengthened on the basis of its leading role in the mobilizations against Natusch, paid the price for this.
While during the November confrontations, the PCB and MIR leaders did not make use of the important weight they have in the COB leadership apparatus, leaving their union leaders to do as they pleased, they took a totally different attitude when it came to the elections.
They did everything they could to oppose a COB candidate or a candidate supported by the COB, which could have extended the recent independent and united mobilization of the workers and the masses onto the electoral arena as well.
The candidacy of Juan Lechin, COB general secretary, must be viewed in this framework. A portion of the COB ranks and the majority of the revolutionary organizations-including our comrades of the Revolutionary Workers Party (POR Combate)-favored his running for president of the republic as the candidate of the COB. After many hesitations and negotiations, Lechín finally became a candidate, but not a candidate of the COB as such. He said this was to "preserve the unity and independence of the union," but in fact it was in order to avoid having to directly confront the orientation of the leaders of the PCB and the MIR.
Lechin was supported and put forward by a coalition basically made up of his own party, the PRIN, which is a small formation made up of members of the union apparatus who are unconditionally loyal to him, and several revolutionary organizations including the PRTB, the POR-C, and the VC-POR.*
The initial impact of Lechin's candidacy, which the workers looked at as the candidacy of the COB general secretary, led to new pressures from the PCB and the MIR, and to new and confused negotiations— largely secret-between them and Lechin.
Finally, Lechin withdrew from the race without even consulting his allies. This left them unable to put up another candidate owing to the constraints of the electoral laws. Lechín dropped out of the race in order to preserve his situation and post in the union apparatus, which the PCB and the MIR claimed was incompatible with his candidacy.
The contradiction between the electoral panorama-marked by collaboration with a party of the bourgeoisie and its imperial-
*PRIN-Revolutionary Party of the Nationalist Left; PRTB-Revolutionary Party of Bolivian Workers; POR (Combate)-Revolutionary Workers Party (Combate), Bolivian section of the Fourth International; VC-POR-Communist Vanguard of the POR. For further information on this electoral front, see Intercontinental Press, June 16, p. 622.—IP
ist mentors, division, confusion, and the absence of a working-class alternativeand the content and meaning of the November mobilizations was total. It had a considerable demobilizing and disorganizing effect.
In the elections the workers' only choice was between Siles Zuazo and Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz's Socialist Party-1 (SP-1), an organization with a radical but confused program. While the SP-1 is independent of the bourgeoisie, it has little presence in the union movement and workers mobilizations.
In face of this situation Gen. García Meza, with his efforts to rebuild the cohesiveness of the army and his preparations for a coup well under way, declared with total cynicism, but also with a certain realism from his own point of view: "The armed forces will respect the results of the June 29 elections, depending on which candidate emerges victorious."
Il. Election Results and the Coup
Despite pressures and threats from the military and the unpunished terrorist activity of extreme right civilian groups, the general elections took place on the scheduled date, June 29.
Among the factors that contributed toward making these elections, paradoxically, the least dishonest in a long time the international pressures, the were number of bourgeois candidates, the attitude of President Gueiler, as well as the strategy of the military general staff around García Meza, which primarily concerned preparations for and choosing the moment for its coup.
Polarization
The election results expressed, in a partial and deformed way, the class polarization and the increased weight of the workers movement on the political scene. The UDP and Siles Zuazo, who were put forward by the Bolivian CP and the MIR as the working-class and reformist alterna tive, had a great many resources for carry. ing out a demagogic nationalist and populist campaign, while remaining within a framework that was perfectly acceptable to their bourgeois and imperialist supporters. The UDP received about 40 percent of the vote, the majority being from workers and peasants.
The SP-1, whose vote totals had been extremely modest in earlier elections (2 to 3 percent), this time got a little over 12 percent of the vote. Despite the SP-1's confused positions, this total expressed a rejection by some of the most radicalized and advanced sectors of the workers of class collaboration, of the collaboration with the bourgeoisie practiced within the UDP.
The SP-1 scored its biggest totals in the workers' neighborhoods of La Paz and the main cities, and in certain mining areas, often doing better than the UDP in those places.
Thus between them the SP-1 and the UDP won a majority of the votes cast.
The polarization was also obvious on the right. It was expressed by the serious decline in the vote for Paz Estenssoro, the candidate of the MNR-Alianza, and a corresponding gain for the Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN), which ran Gen. Hugo Banzer, the former dietator. Banzer received a little over 20 percent of the vote. Although he did not make striking gains
Troops occupy the Siglo Veinte tin mine.