On April 19, 1980, Violetta Barrios de Chamorro resigned as one of the five members of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua, citing health problems. But "there are official reports indicating that Mrs. Chamorro is far from satisfied with the plan to enlarge the Council of State, which was initially to be composed of 33 members" (International Herald Tribune, April 21, 1980).
Then on April 22, Alfonso Robelo Callejas, leader of the bourgeois Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) also resigned. In his press conference he stated: "The fundamental bases of the country's political unity have been broken, and the changes made in the composition of the Council of State show aspects of a totalitarian plan" (El País, April 24, 1980).
Robelo also explained that Violeta Chamorro had quit the junta for the same reason. The MDN called on its members to resign their positions in the govennment and public administration. Arturo Cruz, former high-level functionary of the Interamerican Development Bank in Washington and director of the Central Bank, resigned. A turning point in the Nicaraguan revolutionary process could be seen, one that had been brewing since mid- March.
In the relationship between the private, mixed, and state sectors of the economy, the weight of the private sector requires that sector actively participate if the economic recovery projected by the Plan for Economic Reactivation is to be achieved.
According to the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America (CE- PAL), the level of industrial production at the beginning of 1980 stood at the 1962 level (Barricada, March 18, 1980). Federico Cerda, the vice-minister of planning-after having explained that there are "ample possibilities for private initiative" and that various guarantees have been given to the industrialists (credits, collective contracts)-declared that "in the industrial sector, out of a total of 663 enterprises, some 296 have resumed operation, and of the sixty-three most important textile plants, an even higher proportion of factories are not functioning" (Barricada, March 29, 1980).
According to the minister of industry, those companies that are functioning are, on the average, functioning at only 50 percent of capacity. As Federico Cerda notes: "This process of 'decapitalization' has given rise to a watchful and suspicious attitude among the workers, who then respond by occupying factories as soon as they suspect the slightest moves toward 'decapitalization.'"
In this situation the employers are stepping up their recriminations and arguing that respect for private property is a precondition for their participation in the recovery plan, where their projected role is by no means negligible.
In agriculture there are many large and medium-scale property owners who are hesitating to get involved in the process of "reconstruction" given the present social and political context. Planning Minister Henry Ruiz indicates that production of corn, beans, and rice is lower than projected (Barricada, March 14, 1980).
Through their organizations, the ranchers, the big coffee producers, and the cotton growers are all demanding a halt to decisions to confiscate "intervened" lands (which they portray as contradicting the November 1979 decree) and are demanding that the Rural Workers Association (ATC) control its members and restrain the attempts by agricultural workers to occupy lands in their struggle against their extremely harsh conditions of exploitation. The crucial question of whether planting will take place on a large portion of the cotton lands remains unresolved.
In the distribution sector, big problems remain. Under the aegis of the Chamber of Commerce, merchants have formed an organization called ACOPORBAMA. They are openly opposed to Decree 323, whose aim is to freeze the prices of basic necessities.
Thus crises are developing in industry, agriculture, and distribution. The class polarization is deepening. The declarations of different sectors of the bourgeoisie express both their deep uneasiness-given the social, military, and political relationship of forces-and the precariousness of "reconstruction" along the guidelines outlined by the 1980 plan.
The April 11 London Financial Times commented: "An impasse is appearing in the relations between the government and the private sector. ... The businessmen are also uneasy about the fact that the government closes its eyes to the occupation of farms and factories that do not belong to Somoza or his cronies."
Then Arturo Cruz confides to the London bankers: "We do not know what might happen tomorrow"
Reconciling the Irreconcilable
In this context, the leadership is forced somewhat to shift the axis of its approach to the problems of economic recovery.
Of course, they repeat: "On the economic plane, the Reactivation Program is the concrete demonstration of the Sandinista willingness to recognize and stimulate the participation of every producer and merchant who wants to work for the restabilization of his homeland" (declaration of the FSLN leadership-Barricada, March 18, 1980).
In the same vein, during an early March demonstration of workers demanding the confiscation of "intervened" enterprises, junta member Moises Hassan and Ramon Medrano, who is propaganda secretary of the Sandinista Workers Federation (CST), indicated that while they understood the reasons behind the workers' initiatives, they asked the workers not to precipitate events (Barricada, March 12, 1980).
But increasingly the FSLN leadership has had to issue warnings to the big landowners, to the industrialists who are carrying out sabotage, and to their business associations.
Henry Ruiz blasted the "reluctance of the bosses even though they have received loans." After attacking the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), Ruiz added that "we have instruments to suppress [the destabilizing forces] and we are not going to hesitate to do so.... There are problems with the production of cotton, but these are political problems. [The big landowners] are making political demands, using production as a weapon" (Barricada, March 14, 1980).
This line of attack is often combined with another: The bosses and big landowners are attacked for trying to use their place in the productive process to launch a counteroffensive on the political level.
In line with these injunctions, the minister of planning indicated that banking operations would still be carried out according to normal practices, but that there was no longer any reason for banking and commercial secrets to exist, as they have in the past. Similarly, measures are being studied to end the parallel dollar market.
The April-December 1980 budget gives priority to expenditures in education, health, social services, and defense. The tax system included in the budget is highly progressive in regard to landlord income, and aims to prevent tax evasion by corporations (Barricada, April 4, 1980).
Finally, workers' control is regularly pointed to as the weapon the workers must use to fight "decapitalization."
None of this does much to pacify the worries of the possessing classes, especially since the workers and peasants are using the new relationship of social forces and their higher degree of organization to press their demands.
The FSLN's declarations very consistently stress the primary role of the workers and peasants in leading the revolutionary process to its ultimate conclusion.
The press of the FSLN and of the CST also stress the role of the Assemblies of Economic Reactivation (ARE). The role of these bodies will be to simultaneously stimulate the production effort and to increase the possibilities for the workers to control production in the private sector and to help determine policies in the statecontrolled sector.
The development and activity of these bodies is still uneven. Poder Sandinista, the weekly newspaper that provides orientation for FSLN members, explained the function of the AREs in these terms:
"The AREs are schools where the workers and peasants can learn about the process of production better than they could simply through direct involvement in production. This is the first step toward their being able to directly intervene in the functioning of their enterprise and of the whole economy. Obviously this project is still subject to strong limitations....
The article also asserted that the AREs should coordinate their activities throughout entire branches of the economy: "In the case of sugar, for example, we ought to be able to organize AREs in which delegates from all the sugar mills participate, along with the administrators and representatives of the state, so that the workers could learn about and oversee the production plans for the entire branch."
The outbreak of a series of strikes (in construction, in sugar mills, and in Managua factories) during the first months of the year shows both the problems that the FSLN continues to face in the process of organizing unions and trying to achieve trade-union unity and also the difficulties that the FSLN's orientation itself creates.
In fact, the CST, asserting that the workers already effectively have power, focuses the main thrust of trade-union activity on pushing the recovery of production. The position the FSLN puts forward on trade-union unification, and its often virulent denunciation of the other union organizations-some of whose leaders do not favor unification but have real influence in certain sectors*-does not facilitate the process of trade-union unification. In order to overcome the obstacles and to challenge these leaders, there must be an attitude that combines real discussion with a defense of trade-union democracy. The FSLN's conception of these questions is too narrow.
The most important mass activity during the present phase is the literacy campaign. Since the campaign began there have been arguments about it between Robelo, the "private enterprise" sectors, and the FSLN. The bourgeoisie views the campaign as too politicized and as a pro-FSLN propaganda campaign.
The formation of the Sandinista People's Militias began around the theme "our defense is organized with the people in the militias." The FSLN leadership declaration entitled "The Present Period and Our Tasks" stated: "Imperialism and countries with reactionary governments feel it is fine to create a regular, professional army. For them, the danger lies in the formation of militias, because that means that the people are armed to defend the revolution."
At the first national meeting called by the National Inter-Commission (CNI), Eden Pastora "stated the militias stand shoulder to shoulder with the EPS [Sandinista People's Army], the army of the people, the army of the workers and peasants. When a revolution is deep-going, it gives rise to counterrevolution, and that is why the enemies of the revolution, who are preparing to attack us, will rapidly find that the workers and peasants have an army of the poor people: the Sandinista People's Militias" (Barricada, April 14, 1980).
Support to the Salvadoran Struggle and Accords with the USSR
Since the end of March, in the press there has been increasing support to the struggle of the Salvadoran people and denunciations of the Salvadoran junta's "reform and repression" policy. There have also been a number of demonstrations supporting the struggle of the Salvadoran people. The communiqués of the Salvadoran revolutionary organizations are published in Barricada.
The newspaper of the July 19 Sandinista Youth, El Brigadista, which is widely distributed among the literacy teams, published an interview with a leader of the Association of University Students of El Salvador (which is linked to the BPR, the Revolutionary People's Bloc), who explained that "it is necessary to deepen and strengthen the revolutionary process in Nicaragua in order to effectively strengthen the revolutionary process in El Salvador" (April 1, 1980).
In response to the imperialist threats to intervene in El Salvador, Tomás Borge clearly indicated that an imperialist attack on the people of El Salvador would be considered an attack against the people of Nicaragua as well.
This is part of the growing antiimperialist mobilizations following the "revelation" of CIA activities (at the time of the vote in the U.S. Congress on the $75 million loan), the report of this vote, and various subversive operations stemming from Honduras.
On March 19, discussions took place international private banks on renegotiating Nicaragua's foreign debt. The managing director of the International Reconstruction Fund let it be known that the Nicaraguan delegation had rejected loans at the current 19 percent London interbank interest rate, and that "in our proposals and in our renegotiation plan we do not contemplate asking for aid from the International Monetary Fund." Various loans have already been obtained from European countries and from Venezuela.
In terms of aid, the most significant developments are the loans and bilateral treaties reached with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. The Nicaraguan delegation to the Soviet Union was made up of Tomás Borge, Humberto Ortega (minister of defense), Henry Ruiz, and Moises Hassan representing the Government of National Reconstruction.
According to the April 15, 1980, issue of the London Guardian, "the total aid obtained during the trip to Eastern Europe is not known. But press reports in Prague indicate that Czechoslovakia has agreed to a $20 million loan, and a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said that East Germany had also agreed to provide $20 million in aid."
The freezing of the American loanwhich the private sector was counting onalong with the opening of economic relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe can only increase the nervousness of the industrialists, the landlords, and their representatives in the halls of government and in the higher levels of the administration.
The Coalition Breaks Up
Along with the collisions with a portion of the private sector, the FSLN had increasing run-ins with Robelo, who has been pushing his attempt to pump up the MDN since his trip to the U.S. On its front page, the March 18 Barricada published the opinion of workers on the MDN and Robelo. "They are bourgeois who exploited us, and now they want to appear like great revolutionaries who defend the interests of the workers," said one of those quoted. The editorial in the FSLN daily stressed that the platform published by the MDN tries "to hide the MDN's real roots and class character." The attacks have continued.
Commander Carlos Núñez Téllez has denounced the insistence with which Robelo is calling for elections. He said he was afraid that "the MDN could become the reactionaries' Trojan horse" and could be "utilized by those who are carrying out decapitalization and are boycotting production" (Barricada, March 19, 1980).
The MDN stated in a communiqué that it "is not and will never be a refuge for reactionaries." Instead it wants to be "the legitimate banner of true revolutionaries who, whatever their social origin, want to lead our country to a genuinely Nicaraguan socialism with freedom" (Barricada, March 24, 1980). This is the classic language of a bourgeois or social-democratic opposition that is confronting a revolution on the march.
The FSLN's warnings and reproaches aimed at the MDN do not appear to be aimed at a split. The FSLN is stressing the need to maintain the "patriotic bloc" (the alliance between the FSLN, the MDN, and others). Rather, the FSLN has been trying to pressure the MDN, to push it to take its distance from those who resist increasing their investments, to get it to endorse the government's policy (which would strengthen the FSLN position in its campaign against decapitalization), and, finally, to prepare for the establishment of a new Council of State, a "consultative and legislative" body that will begin functioning on May 4.
The question of the Council of State is going to exacerbate the contradictions. It will show the fragility of a course that combines increased FSLN control on the political-military level and a greater degree of mass organization with the application of a plan based on a "mixed economy," at a time when a very large percentage of the companies remain closed.
The June 1979 Program of Government that was developed in Costa Rica before Somoza fell contemplated a thirty-three-member Council of State, including representatives of the parties in the Broad Opposition Front and employers' organizations belonging to the COSEP. The plan to enlarge the Council of State from the thirty-three members to forty-seven makes possible the inclusion of delegates from the Sandinista Defense Committees, the Sandinista Trade-Union Federation, the Rural Workers Association, and other mass organizations led by the FSLN.
At the time of his resignation, Robelo protested the fact that "the Council of State includes at least twenty-seven members linked to the FSLN, while his movement has only a single delegate" (Le Monde, April 24, 1980).
In an editorial, the April 11 Barricada repeated the statement of junta member Sergio Ramirez that "in the first place, this consultative-legislative body will have broad national representation, and in the second place the living forces of the revolution will be present in it in accord with their real following."
Robelo chose to use the composition of the Council of State to take the initiative in opening the crisis. He called on all those in the MDN to quit their government and administrative posts, asserting that they held 26 percent of the positions (El País, April 24, 1980). Several high officials did resign in response to Robelo's call. COSEP fell into step and presented a series of demands to the junta—now made up of three FSLN members—and on the FSLN leadership. Negotiations began.
Washington immediately responded by threatening to break relations with Managua if "the Nicaraguan government's commitment to pluralism is abandoned by the Nicaraguan authorities."
The FSLN-controlled media severely criticized Robelo. Humberto Ortega characterized the MDN point man's maneuvers by noting that "he has not been able to identify with a political plan that restricts unlimited wealth in Nicaragua and benefits the country's dispossessed majority" (El País, April 25, 1980). For now, the leadership of the FSLN continues to proclaim its attachment to the mixed economy and to pluralism.
Robelo precipitated this conflict in a context marked by important events in the economic field (cotton and the stagnating industrial production), by the blackmail regarding international economic aid, and by U.S. imperialism's increasingly concrete intentions of striking a blow in Central America. Robelo's move is a warning shot aimed at trying to wring concessions from the FSLN and, in this context, reorganize the forces opposing the revolution.
This crisis has logically taken the form of a split in the coalition at the governmental level and resignations from the state apparatus. The crisis strikes at the heart of the special situation of dual power that developed with the July 1979 victory over Somoza.
Regarding the FSLN's immediate responses to COSEP, general statements about the mixed economy will be less important than any potential agreement that might put a damper on the activity of the laboring masses, which would have a direct effect on the evolution of the relationship of forces between classes.
The outcome of the crisis will depend on several things. It will especially depend on whether there is a continuation of mass mobilizations, whether the workers and peasants union organizations are consolidated, and what kind of measures are developed to control against sabotage.
In turn, all these things relate back to extending and coordinating the various forms of independent mass organization, and to the mass organizations having an input in the Council of State and in the future functioning of that body. Military preparations against a reactionary offensive have long been a major FSLN concern.
Depending on how the FSLN and the mass movement respond, the governmental and institutional crisis provoked by the resignations of Chamorro, Robelo, and their allies could result in a decisive step toward the establishment of a workers and farmers government.
April 25, 1980
Notes
*The leaders of the CUS (Confederation of Trade Union Unification) and the CTN (Confederation of Nicaraguan Workers) are opposed to a united union federation. The CAUS (Confederation of Trade Union Action and Unification) led a series of strikes in the last period.