A little more than two years ago Bolivia's rulers embarked on a process of "institutionalization," an attempt to carry out a gradual and orderly transition from military to civilian rule. A simple listing of the chronology of events since then provides eloquent evidence of the failure of that process.
On November 9, 1977, General Hugo Banzer, who had been in power for six years, a record for Bolivia, announced the opening of the new stage. New elections were slated for the following July and were to be preceded by an amnesty. Under pressure from an increasingly broad mass movement, the amnesty was rapidly turned into a general amnesty and all restrictions on trade-union activities were ended.
The elections took place on July 9, 1978. They were, however, characterized by flagrant vote frauds. Hernán Siles Zuazo, the candidate of the Democratic People's Unity (UDP), who in all probability won a majority of the votes, lost the election to the candidate of the right, Gen. Juan Pereda, who had the support of Gen. Banzer.
The National Electoral Court had to invalidate the election results. (Gen. Pereda himself had to ask that this be done.) On July 21, 1978, Pereda launched a coup and replaced Banzer before new elections could be held.
On November 18 Pereda announced that the new elections would not take place before May 1980. Three days later, on November 21, General David Padilla, the leader of what he calls the "institutionalist" military officers, overthrew Pereda and began to organize elections for July 1, 1979. He was supported by the UDP. Padilla himself had to confront two cabinet crises, one on January 15, 1979, and a second, more serious one, on May 9. On July 22 Gen. Padilla had to replace the minister of defense.
The elections took place on July 1, 1979, but none of the three presidential candidates received an absolute majority. The two front-runners, Siles Zuazo and Paz
Estenssoro, ran neck-and-neck. The parlia ment, which was to decide between the two, appeared to be opting for Paz Estens. soro. The Bolivian Workers Federation (COB) organized a general strike on August 2 to protest the fraudulent parliamentary maneuvers.
On August 8, despite the COB's efforts, a compromise solution was imposed. The parliament elected the president of the senate, Walter Guevara Arce, as president of Bolivia, although Guevara had not been one of the candidates in the general election.
Guevara announced that new elections would be held in May 1980 and formed a caretaker government made up of people who were not well-known political figures. He had to reshuffle his cabinet on October 12, 1979.
The previous day, October 11, an abortive military mini-coup had broken out in Beni. Its leaders were demanding the replacement of Guevara with a military man and dissolution of the parliament.
On November 1, Col Alberto Natusch Busch launched a new coup, but the big units in the interior and Gen. Padilla opposed it. Guevara refused to resign as president and the parliament refused to recognize Natusch's fait accompli. The COB organized the workers counterattack against the coup.
As a result, Natusch had to step down on November 16. In a new compromise, Lidia Gueiler, the president of the Chamber of Deputies and a supporter of the MNR. Alianza, was elected to replace Guevara. She formed a government composed of one military man (the minister of defense), 8 members of the MNRH (the group led by Victor Paz Estenssoro), 4 members of the PDC, 3 from the MNRI (led by Siles Zuazo), 2 from the PRIN, and one from the PC-ML.
On November 23, 1979, the right-wing Gen. García Meza was the leader of a dramatic protest against the designation of René Villarroel as commander of the army. García Meza won his demand: Gen. Hugo Rocha, a "hardliner," was named to head the army while Armando Reyes became head of the armed forces.
This is the balance sheet of two years of institutionalization!
Tin miners are a decisive sector of Bolivian working class.
An article in the April 16, 1979 Intercontinental Press/ Inprecor, p. 398, contained an analysis of the divisions that exist within the ruling class. These divisions have been confirmed in the clearest form, both through the elections and through what has taken place in the course of the past two months.
One grouping feels that the armed forces must continue to run the political regime, even if, after the prolonged experience of the Banzer regime, some civilian cover is needed.
Another grouping, which is itself divided, favors a return to civilian authority. A conservative wing is grouped around Paz Estenssoro, while a center-left or reformist wing supports Siles Zuazo.
Moreover, the successive coups last year by Pereda and Padilla, and the conflicts that broke out during Natusch's coup have confirmed that the armed forces themselves are divided along similar lines.
The previously mentioned article gave some indication of the social forces behind these political alignments. We must guard against setting up categories that are too rigid and might prove arbitrary. Nonetheless, it is clear that at the present stage the right wing on the whole represents the interests of the agrarian bourgeoisie, the layers involved in the exploitation of petroleum, and the big commercial interests, while the center-left is supported by the industrialists of the La Paz region, mining interests, other commercial sectors, and sectors of the construction industry. In terms of the masses, the elections confirmed that the bloc between the regime and important sectors of the peasants, which for quite some time had been a point of strength for the conservatives, has been deeply shaken.
What led to the fact that the compromise reached in August with the election of Guevara Arce was torpedoed faster than had been generally expected?
One element is the economic situation. The growth rate, which in the most favorable period fluctuated around 6 percent, had fallen to 3.6 percent in 1978. In 1979 it fell to 3 percent. (The population growth rate is around 2.6 percent.)
More significantly, the foreign debt reached enormous proportions. According to Guevara, the foreign debt is close to the total GNP. Moreover, Guevara asserted that "the crisis that was masked for years has reached a climax." There would be a further worsening of the economic situa tion if the United States actually carried out its decision to dump 35,000 tons of tin on the market, thereby reducing Bolivia's potential foreign exchange earnings.
Some observers feel that Washington was actually trying to blackmail Guevara to get him to accept the plan for economic recovery worked out by the International worked out hu the International