To believe the bourgeois media, a major event of recent months has been the repeated attempts by the Soviets to "destabilize" Africa. Could Moscow be trying to establish workers states in certain African countries? The editorial writers for the major media would have a hard time giving an affirmative reply to this question. Their crusade against "destabilization" of the Black continent by the USSR, Cuba, and the "people's democracies" is part of the propaganda aimed at covering up imperialist tyranny.
The newspapers publish maps with fine shades of color ranging from pink to red, showing the inexorable spread of "Marxist countries." For quite some time, however, Western investors have understood that socialist phrasemongering and populist demagogy do not make a neocolonial regime into a "revolutionary" one. There is no greater foolishness than this masquerade of "African socialist regimes." No serious capitalist or bourgeois politician believes this fairy tale.
With the help of this vast propaganda campaign, the imperialists are trying to represent themselves as the defenders of "peaceful coexistence" against "Soviet expansionism." Their primary target, however, is still Cuba, not only because that is the country that has provided the largest number of troops, but also because Cuba stands as the first workers state in the western hemisphere. To millions of men and women in Latin America, Cuba represents their hope for a more just society, free from starvation, torture, or bloody dictatorships.
Thus, the American imperialists retain much of their old hostility toward Cuba. The attacks that cannot so easily be leveled against their Soviet partner in the SALT talks are focused on Cuba instead. Cuba's policy in Africa has thus become an important element of the current world situation.
The question of whether the Castro leadership is acting independently of Moscow is not a simple one. Answering it also involves answering the question of to what degree Cuba is integrated into the international policy of the Soviet bureaucracy.
The Kremlin and Imperialist Crisis of Leadership
The Soviet bureaucracy's international policy of peaceful coexistence is aimed at preventing any new revolutionary victory, and at blocking any revolutionary perspective. But the relations between the Kremlin bureaucracy and the imperialist states remain fraught with conflict, particularly in view of the West's continuing hostility toward the workers states.
Within the framework of peaceful coexistence, the Soviets constantly try to increase their diplomatic and even economic advantages through strengthening their ties with neocolonial regimes, even when this involves openly opposing the interests of the masses. The imperialist crisis of leadership offers them more ample room for maneuver than in the past.
The Angolan civil war, the crumbling of the Ethiopian imperial regime, the new rise of struggles in South Africa, and the armed struggles in Zimbabwe and Namibia are above all the result of the upsurge of the class struggles in the southern part of the African continent. The bourgeois conception of a confrontation between "blocs" and of "Soviet aggression" covers up this basic truth.
In this context, the Soviets may, in fact, try to score some points. This is done, however, with the assurance that the mass struggles will not lead to a socialist revolution, and that the American imperialists will not launch a large-scale counteroffensive.
In the case of Angola, Moscow correctly assessed that Washington could not intervene massively and openly alongside South Africa, and the Soviets were able to assist the MPLA, thereby reinforcing the political authority of its petty-bourgeois leadership.
Inasmuch as following such a policy depends on maintaining a relationship of forces with respect to American imperialism, the Soviets do not always stay on the defensive, sticking to playing a secondary role as a dike against the class struggle. They have a policy aimed at strengthening their influence within the framework of peaceful coexistence.
So, it would be an error to deduce mechanically from the existence of conflicts between Cuba and imperialism in Africa that the Castroist leadership stands outside the framework of peaceful coexistence. The Cuban intervention in Angola unmistakeably represented a defeat for the FNLA-UNITA-Zaïre-South Africa coalition, that is, a defeat for imperialism. But this is not sufficient to place Havana outside the arena of coexistence. Since "détente" does not mean that Moscow can permit the relationship of forces in Africa to shift sharply to its disadvantage, there was no contradiction involved in the Kremlin moving resolutely to block the South African offensive.
The Kremlin, moreover, has recently confirmed this assessment of its policy by explaining that détente means a fair division of spheres of influence: "Détente does not mean that the objective processes of historical evolution must be artificially contained. It does not constitute a safe conduct for rotten and corrupt antipopular regimes, for any and all rights and privileges inherited from the colonial past or obtained through unequal bargains or pacts... If the last outposts of racism and colonialism, the oppressive loathsome legacy of colonial domination that continues to block the progress of the African peoples and creates international tension, could be eliminated more rapidly, this could only be beneficial to détente." (Le Monde, June 23, 1978.)
This coy invitation to the imperialists clearly reveals the Soviets' desire to keep the social situation in Africa under control. But they have realized that the only way to achieve this goal is to grant a role without delay to the forces that are now struggling against the most backward aspects of neocolonialism and racism. Anxious not to let Africa flare up in unending struggles, they are keeping care ful watch. In essence, they are explaining that "this continent cannot be brazenly monopolized by the West."
While the Western media plays up the "tests of strength" between the East and West, revolutionary Marxists cannot fail to notice how much more paradoxical the African situation really is. The recent accords between the Western countries and SWAPO (Southwest Africa People's Organisation) over Namibia's gaining inde pendence have been accepted readily by South Africa, except for the question of the port of Walvis Bay. These accords, which authorize the keeping of racist troops along the northern frontier of a future independent Namibia, could not have been reached without the assent of the Angolans.
In Zimbabwe, the Patriotic Front—supported by the "front-line" states and the USSR—has agreed to discussions around the proposed "Anglo-American" settlement plan.
The Carter administration is toughening its stance toward the South African regime. Carter himself has made an attempt at rapprochement with the Nigerian regime, which is known for its unreserved friendliness toward Western investments, but also for its skillful diplomatic maneuvering between "East" and "West."
Last but not least, Angola and Zaire have agreed on a resumption of friendly relations. This rapprochement would not have been possible without an agreement on the FNLC (Front National de Libération du Congo-Congo National Liberation Front) and without the intervention of Washington and Moscow. A few weeks after Carter's diatribes about the invasion of Shaba by Cuban mercenaries, we saw Zaire and Angola (where a part of the FNLC's bases are undoubtedly located) pledge that they will keep the peace and maintain respect toward each other.
Thus, what is going on behind the scenes should be quite instructive for anyone who would be likely to think, like President Senghor of Senegal, that World War III "began in Angola." The truth is that Soviet and Cuban policy, which fits into the framework of peaceful coexistence, is fully operative on the African continent.
Will the Soviet-Cuban intervention usher in a new dialectic of partial victories? That, at least, is what the recent events in Zaire would lead us to believe. For there can be no doubt that the FNLC offensive was not supported, even politically, by the Angolans and their Cuban and Soviet allies. Only a few rabid editorial writers in the major media continued to assert such nonsense.
Cuban spokesman Isidoro Malmierca said: "Not only did we not support these actions, but we opposed them, and not for reasons of morality or legality." Clearly, this reflects the idea of a new "stage," in which stabilization of the Angolan state and economy takes precedence over any further extension of struggles in central Africa. The civil war in Zaire could have jeopardized all the efforts undertaken by the Angolan MPLA to inaugurate a period of "national reconstruction." It would have created so much international tension that the Cubans and Soviets could not have remained in the area for very long without having to get caught up in the confrontation.
Therefore, the struggles against the Mobutu regime can be sacrificed to the interests of the Angolan petty bourgeoisie and Kremlin diplomacy. The pact between Zaire and Angola, signed in July, as well as the pressure brought to bear by Luanda to get the Namibian SWAPO to accept the Western plan, were made possible by the Soviets' naïve notion of creating a climate of détente around Angola.
The depth of the diplomatic shakeups in Africa has even led to the beginnings of a rapprochement between the Angolan government and certain Western countries, such as the United States and Portugal. We have reached a stage in Angolan politics where aid from the COMECON countries is not sufficient. However, this has less to do with the extent of investments than with the concern of the new ruling class for diversifying its partners. Long before a type of situation like Egypt develops, or one or another faction in power breaks with Moscow, it is possible to work with both the imperialist and Soviet bureaucrats in building up the Angolan economy.
Thanks to peaceful coexistence, such collaboration may go quite far. For example, the Angolan Vice-Premier Carlos Rochas, has said: "It will be possible to keep better control over the use of advanced technology as a result of a policy of diversifying our capitalist partners. The best example of this is the new mode of operation of the oil companies. ... In Cabinda, Italian technicians will start up the plywood factory again. At the same time, they will train Romanians, who are responsible for providing technical assistance to this sophisticated unit, to maintain it.
"At the Petrangol refinery, Cubans are under contract to the Belgian Petrofina company [sic-C.G.]. In textiles, Swiss and Belgians will arrive any day now to supervise management and training of Angolan professionals, and to take charge of setting warehouses for replacement parts, up while socialist technical assistants plan the administration. At the Cellulose company, which has been sabotaged and paralyzed since 1975, a team of Czechoslovakian technicians is taking over the plant, which should soon go into a phase of experimental production. The technology is from Sweden."
What saintly collaboration! To be noted with interest is the fact that, contrary to the opinion of the staunch supporters of the "socialist Angola," this division of labor is not accidental, and that the leading financial or technological role most commonly falls to the capitalist countries.
All of this fine company moves in a social atmosphere that Alberto Bento Ribeiro, minister of industry, describes so prudently: "Inside the plants, each department has its supervisor. During the restructuring of the trade-union federation, the UNTA [União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola-National Union of Angolan Workers, the single trade union, tied to the MPLA] commissions were abolished and replaced by trade-union delegates. This has gotten rid of [sic—C.G.] factionally motivated demands" (Afrique-Asie, June 26, 1978).
A single "Marxist-Leninist" party, and "democratic centralism" extended to the nation as a whole, are not necessarily institutions offensive to foreign investors!
Must we therefore say that the Cubans are puppets of the Soviets, and that their policy in Africa is completely dependent on the decisions of the Kremlin? In the ab sence of adequate information, this question must be answered in a very cautious way. It is possible, at least, to proceed by elimination and reply to its most burning aspects.
Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other?
1. People's power and committees. Some political currents have a naive image of the Castroist leadership, attributing to it a more populist conception than that of the Soviets in its relations with the African mass movement. According to this conception, the Cubans are supposedly helping to set up people's committees, and thus demonstrating their independence from the Soviets. The facts of the matter invalidate this idea.
Both in Angola and in Ethiopia, the committees arose outside the authority of the nationalist or military leaders. Subsequently, a policy of integration/repression was adopted, which meant that the government could achieve legitimacy only by basing itself on "people's power." Institutionalization of the committees went hand in hand with repression aimed at the most radical activists, resulting in the stabilization of the government.
In Angola, as in Ethiopia, either through laws or by forming a civilian "political bureau," the leaders sought to associate themselves with the forms of organization thrown up by the masses, so as to more effectively impose their bonapartist form of rule. From the viewpoint of the presidential palace, the committees are nothing but temporary expedients. The Soviets and Cubans are camping on the steps of the presidential palaces, and their attitude is not much different from those who hold state power.
In Angola, the Cubans are said to have been close to the Nito Alves faction that made the coup attempt in May 1977. But this faction—no doubt more populist and more concerned with the fate of the committees-in no way broke with the general interests of the MPLA leadership.
Moreover, this faction took the lead in repressing the Maoists in these committees. The Cubans, who were interested in stabilizing an MPLA government in order to prevent any breaking of ties, probably did support Nito Alves and his friends for a while. But this support was accompanied by clear complicity in repressing the "far left." When the day came that this "left faction" lost its footing, the Cubans firmly supported the dominant camp of Agostinho Neto. Was such a poliey, followed in the heat of clashes between nationalist groups, different from that of the Soviets? It does not seem to be. Several firsthand accounts now offer proof that the latter also flirted with Nito Alves.
In Ethiopia, an analogous situation arose with the development of village and neighborhood committees and the emergence of strong left organizations giving "critical support" to the military junta. There, too, the Cubans were most concerned about the future of the regime and loyalty to their allies. There, too, the Cubans steered clear of giving support to the popular structures as such. Rather they turned their attention on the relations between the junta, which they publicly support, and the civilian political organizations.
The Cubans know that the Dergue can survive only if it solves the problems created by the breakup of the empire, by getting the centralized administration back on its feet, and by putting the peasants back to work. This can come about only if the military can use the committees as a transmission belt. This goal, in turn, can be achieved only by recognizing the authority of the left organizations that control these committees.
Thus, the idea that Mengistu and his Cuban allies share is the perspective of a single party, a kind of "revolutionary" movement serving as the backbone of society. For Mengistu, his organization, Seded, originally set up by "Marxist" officers, should constitute the nucleus. It seems clear that for the Cubans, the operation is only viable if it includes the Me'isone, the main organization, which went into semiclandestinity a few months ago.
Thus, the Cubans do not refuse to intervene openly in the affairs of the Dergue. By sheltering Negede, one of the leaders of the Me'isone, in their embassy, they were taking a calculated risk. Mengistu's travels to Moscow and Havana indicate that discussions are going full steam ahead.
Moreover, the Me'isone has carefully refrained from burning its bridges to the military. It maintains a "subtle" analysis of the regime, making a distinction between the patriotic elements and the "bureaucracy" within it. The break has never been complete, and the two sides are casting glances at each other to the detriment of the masses and the Ethiopian revolution. The Cuban policy in this imbroglio is still far removed from support to the revolutionary struggles of the Ethiopian workers and peasants. What is involved are only murky transactions aimed at stabilizing a state that is, and will remain, bourgeois.
But does this political intervention by the Cubans in the internal affairs of a country constitute proof of their indepen dence from Moscow, which is more concerned about diplomacy? No. The Soviets are not the least bit inhibited, for their part, and they follow the same lines in practice as the Cubans. We should recall that in 1961, the Soviet ambassador to Guinea was expelled by Sékou Touré for having taken too strong an interest in the left wing of his party."
Clearly, the Soviets' counterrevolutionary support to bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist leaderships does not involve passivity on their part. They can, to the extent of their resources, support factions of a nature that could offer them a more stable and lasting alliance. By intervening in Ethiopian politics, the Cubans are not doing anything very original.
2. Eritrea and the national question in Ethiopia. We know how Havana has envisioned the settling of the national question in the Ethiopian empire. It is their view that it is necessary to defend the right of certain regions, like Eritrea, to selfdetermination in the framework of a united and revolutionary" Ethiopia. Such a conception pays little heed to the opinion of the masses and of the development of liberation struggles. It leaves out of the picture what the social nature of the central state is. Finally, it involves an authoritarian and repressive response to those who demand the right to selfdetermination and fight to win it.
In the case of the Ogaden, it is interesting to note how big the military involvement of the Soviets and Cubans was. The decisive battles against the Somalians were waged and won by the Soviet-Cuban forces. But in the name of "defending the Ethiopian revolution" against Somalian expansionism, the fate of the Somalian masses in the Ogaden was quite forgotten.
The fact that the Somalian regime enjoyed imperialist support through the intermediary of Saudi Arabia does not eliminate the problem of the Ogaden. Castro, the defender of the military conquests of Emperor Menelik, does not seem to make the slightest distinction between the Somalian regime (his former ally) and the disinherited peasants of that region. The Cuban workers were treated to nothing but stirring reports of military victories.
Military cretinism reached its zenith in Granma on March 14, 1978, which published a "summary of the military operations that led to the great victory of the Ethiopian revolution in Ogaden." It was a little military anthology, worthy of a patriotic magazine, showing the "brilliant" tactics of the allied forces in seven maps and nine photographs. The Cuban worker would come away from such reading with a completely reactionary point of view about the national question in the Ogaden.
Does the Castro leadership have a different attitude toward Eritrea?
Castro gives us the answer by letting an unfortunate sentence slip out after the war in Ogaden. "So, for all practical purposes, the war on the eastern front has ended." (Granma, March 26, 1978.) On the eastern front! Wouldn't the other front be Eritrea? In fact, the Cubans and Soviets did indeed prepare for an offensive in Eritrea. It mattered little to them that they had supported certain Eritrean nationalists for a while. There again, the dialectic of partial victories requires sacrificing everything to the stability of the Addis Ababa government. But, unlike the Ogaden, Eritrea poses more burning issues. A war in Eritrea necessarily involves a high death rate. It would then be necessary to explain to the Cuban workers that several hundred soldiers died fighting against a liberation movement.
The Eritreans are seasoned fighters and strongly rooted among the population. Going up against the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) and EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Forces) would mean getting involved in a bloody war. The Cubans no doubt preferred to serve on the Ethiopians' rear lines, in fields such as maintaining Soviet weapons and preparing them for use, troop training, and offering top-level military advice. Getting involved in the direct conflict with the Eritreans would be an adventure for them. Diplomatic reshuffling is still going on in the region, and the liberation fronts know how to maneuver as well.
On the other hand, the prospect of a single party formed out of the Me'isone requires a more flexible tactic from the Cubans on the Eritrean question, since the populist leadership of that organization has always made it plain that it is opposed to a military reconquest of the northern province.
Last but not least, a confrontation between the Soviet-Cuban forces and the Eritrean liberation fronts would cause grave tensions between Moscow and some of the Arab leaderships, such as Iraq and South Yemen. All of this has contributed to a readjustment of Cuban and Soviet policy in Ethiopia. The liberation fronts have paid visits to Moscow. Numerous contacts and negotiations have taken place, particularly in Yemen. But it is impossible to strike an even balance.
At the youth festival in Cuba, the Eritreans had to be included in the Arab delegations. Finally, and above all, it was necessary to prepare for and help organize an "independent" Ethiopian offensive against the Eritrean people. Thus, in July and August 1978, the Dergue won a pyrrhic victory, forcing the liberation fronts to retreat and fall back upon guerrilla warfare.
Cuba saved face by presenting itself as the necessary mediator between the adversaries. The fronts, forced back onto the defensive and hard pressed on all sides, kept their attacks on the Soviets and Cubans to a minimum. However, revolutionary Marxists, for their part, will remember that the Eritrean masses were attacked by an army given its weapons, logistics, and political credibility by the Soviets and Cubans.
3. The lineup with the Organization of African Unity (OAU). As a last-ditch defense, can it be argued that the Cubans were interested from a tactical standpoint in supporting the "progressive camp" of the African countries in order to weaken the imperialist camp? If the Castroists had such an idea, it would mean that they had a high degree of clarity about the nature of the OAU as a bourgeois institution. They should, in that case, firmly expose the fact that the worst kind of confusion has been created around the concept of "African unity.
But it is the opposite that has occurred, and for several months we have seen a shifting by Havana on this question. While during the Angolan civil war we could perceive some signs of independence on the Cubans' part with respect to African diplomatic intrigues (unlike the Soviets), recent events have demonstrated the total opportunism of the Castroists.
The clause in the OAU charter about respecting boundary lines inherited from colonialism is one of the mainstays of reactionary regimes on the continent. However, on the question of the Ogaden, Granma launches into a murky historical explanation that could satisfy any African dictator: "Those who are familiar with the situation in Africa [?—C.G.] know that in every. African nation there are tribes who live on either side of a border. There are many African states that haven't left the tribal stage completely behind yet [sic- C.G.]. Setting the precedent that a country could use force to seize territory which it was claiming would have been disastrous for Africa as a whole. That's why the African states [sic—C.G.] have said that there must be no border changes, much less border changes through the use of force." (March 26, 1978.)
This shining example of paternalism and contempt for the African masses is the polar opposite of a Leninist analysis of the in Black national and ethnic question Africa. It should be well established by now that, quite clearly, the problem of ethnic oppression cannot be solved by strengthening the bourgeois leaderships' ability to impose centralization. Rather than worrying about borders, a workers leadership like that of Cuba should be concerned with democratic rights. Such an approach would immediately require criticism of the Ethiopian Dergue and the Angolan MPLA.
Forget Nothing, Conceal Nothing
An analysis of Cuba's policy in Africa cannot be limited to merely listing its similarities with Soviet policy. What is most important is to characterize the practices of the Castroist leadership in their own right. The first element that should guide us is Cuba's open political and military support to bourgeois governments.
A big to-do is made about Angola and Ethiopia. But these two examples are not the most instructive. The following is an example of how Havana forms strong ties with other African regimes without imperialism seeing in this cause for a major conflict.
In the Congo (Brazzaville), where French imperialism dominates, and where the economy is most completely neocolonial, the regime that issued from the 1968 coup "opted" for "scientific socialism."
Once President Ngouabi had been assassinated, as a result of the need for readjusting alliances, it was Yhombi who rose to power. This officer, who is known for his stronger friendship with Paris, must nevertheless come to terms with the different factions in the army, and not dump his Marxist phrasemongering too hastily. Congo (Brazzaville) has a garrison of several thousand Cuban soldiers at Pointe Noire.
Not content with giving such support to a regime of poverty and repression, the Cubans are doing their utmost to prepare for the future. That is why they unblushingly support one Colonel Denis Sassou- Nguesso, going so far, according to some reports, as to serve as his personal bodyguards. This colonel is more favorable to relations with Moscow, and the Soviets are primarily interested in the slow diplomatic shifts in Brazzaville.
However, whether the dictator is Yhombi or Sassou, the Congolese masses are left without any choice. From Dahomey to the Congo, Cuban policy in Africa has proved not to be one of promoting the independence of the mass movement and the socialist revolution.
Castro is now trying to give the impression that he decided on supporting the Dergue after Mengistu came to power. He thus tries to give credence to the idea that only this "authentically revolutionary" left wing of the military receives aid from Havana.
In reality, Granma announced the arrival of Cuban experts as early as December 1976, that is, two months before Mengistu's coup. Cuba no doubt increased its intervention based on a particular analysis of the Mengistu faction, but it nonetheless decided to give aid to the Dergue at a time when the strong man was still Bante.
While keeping up its propaganda about proletarian internationalism, the Castro leadership, to justify its policy, is miseducating the Cuban workers. The newspaper Granma has been reduced to using a kind of language that never makes a distinction between the regimes and the masses of friendly countries. Its conceptions of international relations have lost all dialectical aspects, and the USSR is invariably presented as a country "faithful to its traditional policy of support to populations under attack, to revolutionary processes, and to national liberation movements." (Granma, March 14, 1978.)
There are probably close to 40,000 Cubans in Black Africa. A large part of this expeditionary corps is made up of soldiers. Maintaining and supplying these troops requires the labor of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 persons in Cuba. In all, more than 50,000 Cubans participate directly in applying the Cuban CP's African policy. How can anyone imagine that such a thing will not have an effect on Cuban society in the not-too-distant future? As a matter of fact, what this amounts to is an enormous drain on the economy that cannot help but lead to a need for increasing aid from the USSR.
Not only is it impossible to imagine that the Cuban economy can bear the burden of the financial consequences of this policy, but the pressure on the Cuban social formation is not insignificant either. Several tens of thousands of persons applying themselves to the "internationalist" tasks of the CP-that is, involved in an incorrect policy of helping to build bourgeois states-represents a factor that may promote differentiations within the working class and the masses. The authoritarianism of the leadership can only grow as a result of a secret diplomacy based in Moscow.
Should we deduce from this that Cuba's policy in Africa means that we have to change our analysis of the Castro leadership? What we can say, at least, is that this foreign policy is an element accelerating the process of bureaucratization of the Cuban state.
It should be recalled how during the Angolan civil war certain bourgeois leaders questioned the correctness of the Western offensive against the MPLA. Since then, with the events in Shaba, Western diplomacy is trying to strike a balance between making threats and maintaining consensus with the Soviets. When Cuban spokesman Carlos Rafael Rodríguez declares, as he did in February 1978, that "Cuba is not aiding subversion, but on the contrary, as the American ambassador to the United Nations admitted, is participating in a project of stabilization, of struggle against subversion," even the dumbest diplomat would call for thinking this over.
The imperialist leaderships are faced with a rapid development of the social situation in Black Africa. This region is shot through with various conflicts, from the liberation struggle against white rule to the challenging of neocolonial regimes. While the movements involved are massive and militant, they are poorly organized and lack a vanguard leadership. That is why the key at this time to the class struggles in Africa remains the relations between imperialism and the nationalist and petty-bourgeois teams that for the time being are in the leadership of the mass movements.
The error a number of bourgeois politicians recognized in the Angolan case was to refuse to make any concessions and to take a rigid stance, supposedly required by the Soviet and Cuban role. This involved risking the development of a radicalization that could move in an anticapitalist direction. In reality, the imperialists are seeking at the present time to reorganize their rule in Africa. A shift is taking place, both with regard to the imperialists' relations with the indigenous bourgeois leaderships in power and with the liberation move ments. Negotiations over a "transfer of technology" and regulation of the price of raw materials, recognition of SWAPO in Namibia, and respectful relations with the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe are some of the familiar aspects of this shift.
In a recent interview with Le Monde, Giscard d'Estaing let it be known that in "North-South" relations, he was in favor of the socialist countries teaming up with the capitalist countries to give aid to the Third World. The Western countries are beginning to realize that the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola is not a threat to the social order.
Rather than relaunch a new cold war, the imperialist leaderships find it more rational to keep up the economic pressure on states such as Angola and to reinte grate them bit by bit into the normal workings of their system of domination. This policy has already been applied toward Guinea-Bissau, at a time when Mozambique and Angola are about to adhere to the Lomé accords, which regulate the relations between forty-nine neocolonial countries and the EEC.
But the Cuban intervention in Africa gives rise to a major contradiction, since according to the Soviets, détente has been defended by supporting ongoing struggles against backward regimes. There is not always a great deal of maneuvering room. The Dergue was compelled to give arms to the militias and to the committees. The Patriotic Front, to sustain itself, must step up the armed struggle.
Since the revolutionary spiral is not independent of these social movements and struggles, we can imagine the extent to which the different imperialist factions are hesitating and vacillating in their reactions.
The mass movement is always ready to flow through any breach and take advantage of the opportunities it is offered. Angola was a good example of this. Didn't the need to defeat the South African and Zairian troops open up a new period in South Africa and Zaire, with the Soweto uprising and the Shaba crisis? The Cubans, who nowadays find the Zairian FNLC quite a burden, nevertheless helped create this new situation by crushing the Zaïrian forces in northern Angola in 1976.
The Carter administration is divided on this question, between Brzezinski, who still uses the formulas of the McCarthy period, and Young, who plays the soft cop. Vance's diplomacy selects whatever tone is necessary. This shift in imperialist tactics could not be visualized without the complicity of the Soviets.
Claude Cheysson, a member of the Brussels Commission of the EEC, recently displayed glowing optimism on these questions. "The only criterion we can see is how good their administration is, whether it is socialist or capitalist. We're making a lot of headway in Ethiopia and Guinea (Conakry), probably because we are by far the biggest providers of aid to those two countries....
"Where aid for development is concerned, the USSR and its partners suffer from a terrible handicap-they are not yet equipped to really take part in developing the Third World. Financially, their total contribution is limited, it is said, to be $500 million a year, while the oil producing countries contribute $5 billion, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, $15 billion. ...
"They are also able to give a swift and efficient answer to military problems, as they did when Angola had reached the point of collapse. ... It might be said that Angola's disappearance as an independent country was averted thanks [sic-C.G.] to the Soviet intervention, which was organized in a way that no Western country would have been able to match under the circumstances."
Cheysson, observing that "to reduce all of Africa's problems to destabilization, or to the conflict between East and West, is an untruth," adds that, to his way of thinking, this fear of the Soviets in Africa is not only "an absurd oversimplification, but such a remarkable deception that I am sometimes led to wonder if it isn't deliberate." (Nouvel Observateur, August 5, 1978.)
General Akuffo, head of the pro-Western military junta that now controls Ghana, declared, "Frankly, we do not think that the presence of Cuban troops in Africa constitutes a danger. From our point of view, the existence of countries on this continent where the white minority has usurped power is a much heavier threat hanging over our independence and security." (Le Monde, August 2, 1978.)
Only the extreme right-wing French politician, Jacques Soustelle, worries about this. But he expresses his concern in terms that confirm what sort of debates are going on within the bourgeoisie: "According to reports that have ceased to be confidential, the sharp turnabout in American policy fits into a general plan—a kind of African Yalta. ... Certain economic circles, so they say, are dreaming of doing good business with the African Marxist countries." (Le Monde, July 9, 1978.)
That is where the real stakes lie. Peaceful coexistence is also having its effects in Africa. The Cuban leadership basically respects this framework. The duty of revolutionary Marxists is to denounce these practices. The defense of the Cuban workers state against imperialism will be that much clearer.
Notes
1. Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola).—IP/I
2. Since this article was written, the South African government pulled back somewhat from the United Nations proposals on Namibia, or ganizing staged elections in favor of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, which advocates continued relations between Namibia and South Africa.-IP/I
3. In reality, within this front, the USSR and Zambia essentially support ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), led by Nkomo. The latter's forces are trained mainly in Angola by the Cubans. The meeting between Nkomo and Smith, the Rhodesian prime minister, in August, also shows how a recomposition favorable to détente is taking place within the front.
4. Neto is said to have agreed to remove Zairian refugees from the northern frontier to prevent the FNLC from obtaining support and recruits among them.
5. This is not the only country where the USSR may be trying to establish ties with an organization that is not "pro-Soviet" and has a large following to the left of petty-bourgeois national ism. This is also the case, for instance, with the JVP in Sri Lanka today.
6. In 1976, a Soviet diplomat in Angola was expelled for having had too many ties with the Nito Alves faction.
7. The military command is made up of Ethiopian, Cuban, and Soviet officers.
8. The EEC provides $200 million in assistance to Ethiopia in the framework of the Lomé accords, and $11 billion outside the pact on an individual basis. Claude Cheysson of the EEC explained with regard to the Cubans in Ethiopia: "Even if a nation is not organized the way Mr. Debré (a French Gaullist politician) would like, it can still reject outside intervention."