The assessment that most commentators made of the results of the June 3 Italian elections was fundamentally correct. That is, the situation has not changed radically. The instability has not been overcome. And achieving a political equilibrium in the government as well as in parliament remains quite difficult.
Nonetheless, we cannot fail to take note of a series of shifts on the electoral level that reflect rather significant developments over the last two years.
First, let us look at some general facts:
1. The vote for the parties and formations claiming to represent the workers movement dropped by 3.1% in the elections for the lower house and 2.1% for the Senate.' (The Communist Party vote was down by 4% in the lower house elections and 2% for the Senate. The Socialist Party vote increased by 0.2% for both houses. The far left gained 0.7%, getting a total of almost 800,000 votes.)
2. The Christian Democrats'
vote dropped by 0.4% for the lower house and 0.6% for the Senate. The small center and center-right parties gained 0.9% in the lower house elections and 2.6% for the Senate.
3. The vote for the fascist right, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), dropped by 0.8% for the lower house and by 0.9% for the Senate.
4. The Radical Party scored a major advance, increasing its vote by 2.3% for the lower house and 0.5% for the Senate. The success of some of its local slates should also be noted. The most spectacular was in Trieste, where the Radicals got 30% of the vote.
5. The number of abstentions was up by nearly a million and a half. A total of four million voters abstained in the elections for the lower house, bringing the abstention rate up to almost 10%, which is high for Italy. Along with this, the number of blank or invalid ballots rose by almost 40%, totalling more than 1.4 million in the elections for the lower house.
Some other facts should be noted to shed more light on these results.
The difference in the vote for the lower house and the Senate is an indicator of the orientation of the younger voters, since only those over twenty-five can vote for senators. This difference worked mainly against the CP, partly because the far-left groups have generally gained representa. tion in the lower house but not in the
1. I base myself on the figures given by the Italian press up to June 6; the final results may differ slightly.
Senate, and partly because the CP's influence is more limited among the newer generations.
The CP press itself has estimated that in 1976 about 40% of the young voters cast their ballots for the party and that this fell to about 28% in the June 3 election. The Radicals seem to have been the main gainers from the orientations of certain layers of youth.
The nationwide trends are more marked, sometimes strikingly so, in the big cities, which are the main centers of the political struggle and reflect changes or new phenomena more rapidy. Thus, the losses for the CP in the lower house vote exceeded the nationwide average in Rome, Naples, Turin, Genoa, Palermo, Cagliari, and Bari. In Milan the CP losses were the same as the nationwide drop. In Bologna, Florence, Venice, and Trieste, they were less.
Still more significantly, the CP vote dropped sharply, by more than the national average of 4%, in the key workingclass suburbs of Turin. In these same areas, there was a high abstention rate in places. Moreover, the Radicals scored some successes. The same trends could be seen in the working-class suburbs of Milan and in the poor neighborhoods in Rome.
The Christian Democrat vote dropped by 4.2% in Milan, 3% in Turin, 2.6% in Genoa, 2.4% in Bologna, 2.3% in Florence, 4% in Cagliari, and 13% in Trieste. It remained stable or advanced slightly in other cities such as Rome and Naples.
As for the Radical Party, it was precisely in the cities where it emerged as a consid erable force (in general reaching the position of the fourth largest party). It got 7.1% of the vote in Rome, 5.9% in Naples, 6.6% in Turin, 5.9% in Genoa, 4.7% in Bologna, 6.6% in Palermo, and 6.5% in Venice.
The setback for the CP was sharpest in the south, notably in the big cities and significant centers. Its vote was down by 10.3% in Naples, 8% in Palermo, 5.9% in Cagliari, 6.5% in Bari, 5.5% in the province of Taranto, 8.1% in the province of Catania, 6.5% in the province of Reggio di Calabria, and 8.9% in Caltanissetta.
The first observation that has to be made is that this is the first time since 1946 that the CP vote has fallen in an election.? And, considering the Italian voting patterns, this drop was unquestionably a major one. The setback was all the more important since the main aim of the Christian Democrats and the bourgeois formations was to weaken the CP. This objective was achieved.
Of the two main workers parties, it was the Socialist Party that managed to maintain its positions. And this is a party that in the recent period has assumed the most ambiguous attitudes, launching violent attacks on the CP and seizing on every available issue for this purpose.
The second observation that has to be made is that the Christian Democrats did not improve their positions and even suffered losses in some important cities. This means that this party failed to achieve its No. 2 objective, that is to increase its percentage of the vote to 40%.
The extremely modest gains of the other center parties in the lower house of parliament do not compensate for the stagnation of the Christian Democrats, even though the center (and the center-left) gained some seats.
As for the fascist party, it failed to regain all the ground it lost as a result of the departure of the deputies and senators who formed the National Democratic Party (which won no seats and got no more than 0.6% of the vote). But it is more homogeneous than in 1976 and more radicalized in a rightist way.
The far left scored gains both in its numerical vote and in its percentage (which rose by 0.7%). It got six seats in the lower house (the same number as in 1976). It should be said in passing that this confirms the fact that in a highly politicalized country where all the political sectors are highly differentiated and where there is a system of proportional representation, similar, or relatively similar forces, get a bigger combined vote if they present separate slates.
This is a kind of political "law." We saw it operate in 1948, when the CP and SP ran a joint campaign as the Front for People's Democracy. There was another example in 1968, at the time of the ephemeral reunification of the SP and the Social Democrats. The same law operated in 1976 when the far left ran a joint campaign for the Proletarian Democracy slate.
It should be noted, moreover, that the far left today is still less able than it was in 1976 to present a general alternative. The wing represented by the United New Left was unable or unwilling to differentiate itself from the Radical Party or from the ultraleftist and "movementist" forces that are still on the scene.
The strongest far-left group in the electoral arena, on the other hand, is the Party of Proletarian Unity (PdUP). While this group criticized the historic compromise and enjoys important support in the "trade-union left," it was unable to offer a strategy qualitatively different from that of the reformists and maintains clearly gradualist conceptions of the transition to socialism (or the "way out" of capitalism, to use its terminology).a
It should be pointed out that the PUP made an agreement with the Workers Movement for Socialism (MLS), a formation that remains fundamentally Maoist, has a still more right-wing orientation, and is partially integrated into the tradeunion bureaucracy (especially in the Italian Federation of Trade Unions [UIL], the confederation influenced by the SP and the Social Democrats).4
As I have indicated, the setback for the CP, coming together with the success for the Radicals, is the salient fact about the June 3 elections. It should be pointed out that this advance for the Radicals comes at a time when a tendency only incipient in this party in 1976 has become notably stronger.
During a whole period, the Radical Party appeared to be a means for waging struggles for democratic rights, struggles in which the big workers parties, especially the CP, were late in getting involved. (One example is the fight for the right of divorce.) Then this party started to become a magnet for all sorts of malcontents, and it directed its fire mainly against the CP.
Already in 1976, the Radicals succeeded in capturing part of the potential electoral base of the far left. Now this phenomenon has assumed far greater dimensions. On the Radical slates, along with the "historic" leaders of the party, we find former leaders of Lotta Continua (including a member of the last Chamber of Deputies, Pinto, who was a leader of the unemployed movement in Naples in 1975); former CP deputies; former SP members; intellectuals like Sciascia, who was elected on the CP slate in Palermo in the 1975 municipal elections; and others such as Macciochi. (Sections of the "Autonomi" [anarchists], also called for a vote for the Radicals.)
What may come out of such a mishmash in the future is pure speculation. Let us say for the moment that the Radical phenomenon is a new manifestation of the crisis of the petty bourgeoisie. This stratum underwent radicalization, beginning in 1968-69. A section of it has come to adopt very ambiguous "anti-establishment" atti- 3. l'Unità of June 6 openly expressed satisfaction that the PUP-MLS scored a relative success vis-à-vis the United New Left in Milan and Bergamo.
and the mine, two.
tudes and is developing a bizarre ideology combining a socialist-oriented libertarianism, an outlook like that of the "new philosophers," and a peculiar kind of left Poujadism.* It exercises an influence even over fringes of the newer generations of workers.
The question arises whether the Radical Party was the main gainer from the decline of the CP. It is not an easy one to answer. This can be done accurately only later on, based on a very detailed analysis of the vote. As on other occasions, there were probably compensating shifts, and it would be simplistic, if not outright wrong, to base a judgment solely on the raw percentages of gains and losses.
For example, it is possible, even probable, that a not inconsiderable part of those who voted for the Proletarian Democracy in 1976 cast their ballots in 1979 for the Radicals (let us remember that a whole wing of what remains of Lotta Continua supported the Radicals, while othere supported the United New Left). Likewise, the far-left slates in 1979 may very well have taken more votes from the CP than would appear to be the case on the basis of oversimplified calculations.
Nonetheless, it is indisputable that a section of those who voted previously for the CP, including in the working-class suburbs, cast their ballots for the Radicals. The CP itself has said this in its initial analyses. (l'Unità, the CP daily, wrote: "There is a very close relationship between our losses and the gains of the Radicals in areas and cities such as Rome, Turin, Trieste, Cuneo. This phenomenon is less marked, apparently, in the south.")
The Socialist Party does not seem to have profited from the CP's losses except very modestly in a few cases (notably in the south). In passing, it should be noted that the SP made some real gains in the south, lesser ones in the center, and it suffered losses in the north.
Such calculations are still more difficult for the center parties. In any case, these are negligible quantities.
On the other hand, the CP seems to have been hard hit by the phenomenon of abstentionism and the increase in the number of blank and invalid ballots. There is agreement among the commentators on this point. From the standpoint of the social forces involved, this is what /'Unità said:
There are strong grounds for saying that the greatest losses suffered by the CP came in those neighborhoods in the suburbs that are losing their social cohesiveness and in depressed areas. Notable losses also occurred in middle-class areas. The vote for the party in working-class areas remained substantially solid, although subject to some shifts. The peasant vote was consolidated.
The charm of the euphemism used to minimize the loss of working-class votes will not go unappreciated. But in general this analysis seems to correspond to the reality.
There is no need to dwell on the fact that the CP is paying the price for the policy it has been conducting since 1976 in the framework of its broader strategy of historic compromise. Now the CP leaders have to admit openly what we have pointed out on several occasions.
That is, it is easier to write in resolutions that the party is simultaneously a government party and a fighting party than it is to put this across in day-to-day activity. (See, for example, the interview with Occhetto in the June 7 issue of La Repubblica.) This is all the more true when you are working in a context of persistent economic problems and when the government you are supporting is applying a line of austerity, not as it is represented in the sophisticated and nebulous formulations developed by Berlinguer, but a very prosaic austerity that involves reducing the standard of living of the masses, both directly and indirectly, through inflation and increased unemployment.
In 1975-76, the CP was advancing in all areas. The working class was placing more confidence in it than ever before. Its influamong the middle ence was growing classes. Sections of the bourgeoisie itself thought that the CP could play a key role in putting their house in order by forcing the Christian Democrats to take a smaller share of the spoils. All of the manifold liberalizations in the CP's policies, of its theoretical elaborations and its "pluralistic" declarations, were designed precisely to achieve such results.
But as the policy of the CP was subjected to the test of practice, a boomerang effect started to be felt. Three years after 1976, the CP is running out of steam in all those areas where it had been on the advance. The results of the June 3 election reflected a threefold phenomenon:
1. A crisis of confidence in sections of the working class, even in the CP's bastions in the north. In this area the CP is also paying most of the price for the opportunist orientations of the union leaderships (even though it does not bear the sole responsibility for them), in particular for the way the present round of newcontract negotiations has been carried on.
2. A still deeper and more marked crisis of confidence among sections of the petty bourgeoisie, of the intelligentsia, and-in often still more spectacular forms-among the poor masses of the south (for example, in the chronically crisis-ridden cities such as Naples and Palermo).
As I have already said, this crisis has assumed much greater proportions among the newer generations. The election results only confirmed a trend that had already been shown in the inability of the CP to win and consolidate a broad influence in the student movement and in the failure of the Young Communist Federation as a mass organization, which had to be openly admitted at the last party congress.
There has also been a change in the mood of those who continue to vote for the CP (and who, it must not be forgotten, still represent a very considerable force). In 1975-76, the CP seemed to them to offer a new perspective and the notable increase in the strength of the party reflected a radicalization that was not only continuing but broadening and deepening. The same cannot be said today.
The CP's policy of national unity has revealed the actual content of its strategy of historic compromise. The CP activists and voters have suffered profound disillusionment. The way they vote represents a class choice, which many of them consider inescapable, so long as there is no credible alternative. But it does not have the same significance and the same potential as it did three years ago.
The Christian Democrats, I repeat, got only half what they wanted, inasmuch as the CP's losses were not matched by gains for them. Nonetheless, they can take legitimate satisfaction from the progress that has been made in the last four years.
In 1975, the Christian Democrats had reason to fear that they would lose their lead in the percentage of the vote to the CP, a possibility that has been frequently discussed by the Italian press, even in the campaign that has just ended. But it was not only this. The Christian Democratic Party was being challenged more openly by very broad and very influential sections of the ruling class, which were thinking about finding a new political instrument.
Today, despite all the criticism, even virulent criticism, that the big press continues to direct against the ruling party and its governments, the indispensable role of the Christian Democracy is no longer put in question. Only a tiny fringe of voters decided to switch to the Liberal Party or other center parties on June 3.
The results of these latest elections offer the Christian Democrats more favorable conditions for confronting the CP. They can say that the voters have endorsed their decision to offer the CP a chance to collaborate in the framework of national unity but not to give the CP itself a role in the government. In the medium term, perhaps after their congress scheduled for the fall, they can try to develop a government based on special collaboration with the Socialist Party, with or without the contribution of the small parties of the old center-left, and with or without the direct or indirect support of the CP
In fact, the Christian Democrats have already opened their offensive to achieve this type of political solution. This was done in statements and interviews by the party leaders immediately after the elections.
The Socialist Party, on the other hand, finds itself in an uncomfortable position. It failed to gain any more bargaining power. But, nonetheless, the choice it makes can be decisive. It can make overtures to the Christian Democrats and go back to the governmental formula of the 1960s. Or it can line up alongside the CP in the opposition. Either choice would cause the SP serious problems from the standpoint of its general orientation and international situation.
It is also inevitable that serious conflicts will develop in the SP and that it will go through another one of the turbulent periods that it has experienced several times since the party was rebuilt in 1944-45.
The CP is also going to have to face difficult situations. For the first time since the end of the war, the leading group can no longer defend its line with the seemingly unchallengeable argument that the party's influence is steadily growing. A debate is inevitable, and it will also cut across the highest levels.
In recent months, the decision to stop supporting th' Andreotti government has already been subjected to criticism, from two different points of view. Some considered that it should have been made earlier. Others emphasized the danger of precipitating a governmental crisis that could only lead to earlier elections.
Today, in the phase that is opening up, we will probably see one tendency favoring a resumption of the process of political and ideological revision so as to improve the conditions for carrying out a policy of national unity or long-term compromise. There will probably also be a tendency favoring a tougher line, a reaffirmation of the identity of the party, and hence an accentuation of the shift begun in the middle of 1978, which was concretized in the party's leaving the governmental majority.
The elections have dealt the CP a lesson that it cannot take lightly. But that does not mean that a decision to return to the opposition for an entire period is an easy one for it to make. It cannot be unaware that if it sticks by the position it maintained during the elections and even after, that either both workers parties should go into the government or they should both go into opposition, and the SP goes along with this, it is going to lead to an extremely grave political crisis, or even a major confrontation.
Are the theoreticians of the historic compromise, which was designed precisely to avoid such a confrontation, ready to face it today, when the relationship of forces has shifted to their disadvantage, even though only partially? What, in particular, would they do if they have to face a Christian Democrat-SP government that makes some programmatic concessions on paper and calls on them to support the government from the outside?
It is not the objective of this article to draw a general balance sheet of the dynamic of the Italian situation over the past three years. I would only caution against two evaluations, both equally wrong. The first involves what might be called a pessimistic view. That is, the elections confirm that there is an ebb, that the working class is seriously weakened, that the ruling class is succeeding in its offensive and that the relationship of forces is being reversed (this is a rather widespread opinion in far-left circles).
This view is basically an impressionistic assessment that fuzzes over the fundamental facts. It obscures the fact that the relationship of forces, even as reflected in the distorted mirror of elections, has not qualitatively changed. It diverts attention from the fact that the Christian Democratic Party has suffered further attrition and that in the present context any government is going to be weak and insecure. That is, regardless of whether there is any programmatic agreement between the Christian Democrats and the SP (or be tween the CP and SP), any government is going to have to try to impose an austerity policy, in either a direct or camouflaged way. No government is going to be able to reduce unemployment or choke off inflation. As shown by the struggles in recent months, the working class has not lost its combativity and is not ready to passively accept the blows it is suffering. And the new forms of the crisis hitting layers of the petty bourgeoisie do not at all mean political stability for the system.
It would be an equal and opposite error, however, to disregard or minimize certain changes and tendencies that have been reflected on the electoral level and which I have indicated, if only schematically, in my analysis of the vote. These are the disarray and loss of confidence on the part of sections of the working class; the partial reduction of the power of attraction of the working class and its organizations for other exploited layers-that is, strata of the radicalized petty bourgeoisie and the student movement; and a political identity crisis afflicting a considerable part of the youth.
An awareness of the difficulties that
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flow, and are inevitably going to continue to flow, from such tendencies must inspire the revolutionary Marxists to fight in the unions and mass movements to see that the battles that are on the agenda are fought without any concessions to the "spirit" of national unity that sacrifices the interests of th working class and the other exploited layers to the needs of restructuring the capitalist economy and achieving bourgeois "normalization." An awareness of these difficulties must inspire revolutionary Marxists to strive to assure that an overall alternative emerges from these partial struggles, which otherwise would very largely lose their meaning.
The Italian section of the Fourth International, the GCR, unable to run a slate of its own in the elections, called for a vote for any of the working-class slates. In its statement, it said:
Conflicting with the demand for the resumption of the policy of national unity are the real needs of the working masses-the need for a victory of the steelworkers and workers in other industries in the new contract negotiations; the need to fight for a thirty-five hour week and for a real general strike that would combat the arro. gance of the bosses. What is needed is a general strike that would not just reconfirm the relationship of forces that has emerged from the last ten years of struggle but would try to transform them on the level of the government and the state. .•…
We must work to assure that the diplomatic debate over parliamentary formulas does not undermine the strength and unity of the workers movement. We must strive rather to see that the independence of the trade-union movement from the bourgeoisie and from the diplomatic maneuvers between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic working-class leaderships is reaffirmed.
"We must strive," the statement constatement con cluded, "to help the activists of the reformist parties learn the lessons of the election results and think about a different perspective that would break from the illusions about the possibility of a historic compromise and the reformability of capitalism. Today it is necessary to back up those forces that have fought in a conscious way for the unity of the workingclass movement, for its independence, and for mobilizing its power against the bosses and against the bourgeois solutions....
Notes
2. It is difficult to assess the results of the 1948 elections, since the CP was combined with the SP in the Front for People's Democracy. The vote of the workers movement as a whole fell from its 1946 level, but this was probably a result of SP voters deserting to the Social Democrats [a rightwing splitoff] and the Christian Democracy.
3. A loss of influence and prestige among those sections of the middle bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs who flirted with the CP after the 1975 local elections in the hope that it would pull their chestnuts out of the fire.
4. On the basis of agreements made before the vote, the PdUP will get four deputies (it got three of the six Proletarian Democracy seats in 1976) and the MLS, two.
5. P.-M. Poujade, a right-wing demagogue who appealed to small shopkeepers, led an antitax movement in France in the 1950g.—IP/I