[On January 26, 1978, the Bourguiba government crushed a general strike that had been launched the day before (see Intercontinental Press/ Inprecor, February 13, 1978, p. 164). In the article we are publishing below, Nabil Said brings us up to date on the situation in Tunisia one year after the massacre.]
TUNIS-It has escaped no one that January 26 was a conspiracy, one that was planned and carried out by the government against the workers and the UGTT (General Union of Tunisian Workers), with the active support of imperialism. The massive repression aimed at the working class, and the elimination of the UGTT leadership, was intended to achieve social peace, to make it possible to implement an austerity plan, and to pave the way for the post-Bourguiba era. The setting of these goals came in a context characterized by an unstable situation in the region and a persistent economic crisis. What steps have been taken by the bourgeoisie to attain these objectives, and to what degree have they succeeded? How have the workers responded? What are the major tasks of revolutionists in the present situation?
Instability in the Region
To begin with, the Tunisian regime, even if it is geographically distant, has felt the shock waves from the Iranian revolution. This revolution has been a pointed reminder that no regime can endure by repression alone, and that one cannot rule against the will of an entire people with impunity. It has given renewed vigor to the Movement of Muslim Brotherhood, which is rooted in the deep social crisis, and seeks to appear, in the image of the powerful Shi'ite movement, as a solution to that crisis and as a credible alternative. This movement is beginning to look like a force that might threaten the regimehence the outery by Sayah, leader of the sole legal party, against "forces seeking to destabilize the regime under the cover of Islam."
In terms of the situation in the Maghreb, Boumediene's death has ushered in a political crisis that has not been settled by the appointment of Colonel Chadli.
Finally, the Libyan regime's course in recent years, both at home and in the Arab world, is a source of worry for the Tunisian regime. The Libyan regime has never given up its project of a fusion between Tunisia and Libya, and is trying to relaunch it by all available means (economic pressure, support to Arab nationalist oppoin Tunisia, hijackings of sition groups aircraft, etc.).
Barely a few months after Tunisian Premier Hedi Nouira's visit to Libya in June 1979, relations between the two regimes again became strained. A major source of friction was the Camp David accords, which the Tunisian government supported and the Libyan government condemned as the height of betrayal of the Arab cause. Moreover, the very evolution of the Libyan regime, marked by the proliferation of the People's Committees and the measures announced by Colonel Qaddafi on September 1, 1978, ("Land to the tiller, houses to those who live in them, factories to those who work in them") worries the Tunisian bourgeoisie. Such measures, despite their demagogic character, could have an impact on the Tunisian masses.
These elements as a whole-growing instability in the Middle East as a result of the Iranian revolution; continuing instability in the Maghreb; the Libyan regime's decidedly anti-American stance-mean that the role of the Tunisian regime, which has been stable up to now, has become relatively more important. To isolate the Libyan regime, stabilize the Maghreb (while settling the Sahara issue and bringing Algeria tightly into its orbit), and counteract the effect that the Iranian revolution may have on the region's masses, imperialism needs a stable regime in Tunisia. It firmly supports the Tunisian regime, economically, politically, and militarily, and is seeking to maintain it more or less in its present form.
A Persistent Economic Crisis
Tunisia, a country on capitalism's periphery, continues to feel the effects of the generalized crisis of the world capitalist system which began in 1973 and is far from over.
We will try to draw a concise balance sheet of the economic situation and compare it to the projections of the Fifth Plan, whose first year of implementation was 1977. Statistical data for 1978 will not be available for several months. We should recall that the Fifth Plan has three objectives: a 7.5% annual rate of growth; selfsufficiency in food production; and full employment.
The Tunisian economy's growth for 1977 was estimated at 4.1% in a report by the Tunisian Central Bank (BCT), published in August 1978. However, in his speech introducing the budget to the National Assembly in November 1978, Nouira put forward a much lower figure-1.1%.
Nouira has announced that the growth rate reached 8.9% in 1978, although the year was not yet over at the time of his speech, and he did not have the figures for the first three quarters. Thus, the Fifth Plan's objectives for 1977 were far from met, and we can bet that the 1978 figures, put forward as a counterbalance to the catastrophic 1977 statistics, will also be revised downward when all the statistics are available.
In terms of jobs, the additional demand for employment rose to 55,700 in 1977, with women comprising 20%. The premier himself, in his speech to the National Assembly, declared that "the number of jobs created in 1979 will be lower than the additional demand, hence the projected deficit of 12,000 ... but it should be possible to reabsorb this unemployment through employment abroad without too much difficulty."
A worsening of current unemployment (which is already very high) is thus officially and cynically expected, especially since "employment abroad" is experiencing the same difficulties. In the course of
1977, the BCT reports 27,000 workers emigrated to Libya compared to 1,500 to other countries, but the flow of emigration to Libya has slowed and may even stop.
For 1977, the BCT report estimated the number of unemployed at 106,000, and noted that: "the increased demand is ascribable not only to the fact that persons seeking work for the first time are entering the market. It can also be explained by the high number of persons seeking new jobs after having lost their jobs in branches of industry undergoing a slowdown, such as agriculture and textiles." It continued: "Taking into account younger job seekers, whose numbers are continuing to grow mainly as a result of school dismissals, the total number of persons in search of a job will be much higher."
Concerning self-sufficiency in food production, the plan's third objective, the failure is just as glaring. In 1977, the production of grain (the staple food in Tunisia) was only 7.5 million tons, a 35% drop from 1976. The government was forced to import an equivalent amount for nearly 40 million dinars (1 dinar= US$2.50). In 1978, production increased to 9 million tons, but the important projections are the same as for 1977.
Moreover, as a result of deteriorating terms of trade, 1977 exports of phosphates increased by 6.1% in volume but decreased by 19.9% in value. As for oil, in the first quarter of 1978, revenues showed a drop of 4.5% over the same period in 1977, even though the quantity exported remained constant.
The balance-of-trade deficit continues to worsen. Although exports covered 80% of imports in 1974, they covered only 51.7% in 1977, and 48.1% for the first six months of 1978 (BCT report and Bulletin Conjoneture).
As far as foreign investments in Tunisia are concerned, the official statistics project that the rate of foreign investments would go from 33% of total investment in 1978 to 35.8% in 1979, which the Fifth Plan did not foresee (355 million dinars of total investment). And debt service in 1979 will represent 12.7% of export revenues, as compared with 11.4% in 1978 (Nouira's speech to the National Assembly).
Finally, a series of big projects contained in the Fifth Plan have simply been abandoned. These include expansion of the Bizerte refinery, the El Fouledh plant, plans for a second sugar mill, the SEPA II project for manufacturing nitrate fertilizers, and development of the natural-gas reserves at Miskar, and the oil reserves at Isis.
Thus, from the economic standpoint, the government's policy is a total failure. The Bourgeoisie's Policy
After the crackdown on January 26, 1978, the regime's was conditioned by its desire to restabilize the political situation and patch up its instruments of rule. After the phase of mass repression in January and February 1978, which enabled it to crush the UGTT, it turned to less massive, more selective forms of repression, aimed at specific sectors and geared to the degree of mobilization of the workers and masses.
After the massacres, arrests, torture, and firings, repression against the workers remained a constant feature of the regime's policy. A vast system of surveillance and repression against the working class was carefully prepared and painstakingly implemented in the factories. The institution of "plant security," the creation of Destour Socialist Party (PSD) cells and puppet trade-union locals whose purpose is to spy on the workers and prevent any mobilizations, testify that daily repression is still going on, even if it is less dramatic than in the immediate aftermath of January 26.
Besides the workers, the youth are a particular target of the repression. The civilian service law was not the kind that is hastily passed and soon forgotten. To the contrary, thousands of young unemployed are rotting in forced-labor camps. Police raids and brutality against the youth remain nearly a daily occurrence. Repression against the student movement is continuing-the campuses are still being patrolled, and the Public Order Brigades intervene when they see fit, as was recently the case following the revolutionary victory in Iran.
The regime tolerated some expression of bourgeois opposition and even trade-union opposition beginning in March 1978, in order to improve its tarnished image. But repression again came crashing down when mobilizations for the release of imprisoned trade unionists reached a certain threshold. Prosecutions of trade unionists are continuing. The bourgeois opposition and its mouthpieces have also been hit.
The regime (especially the Sayah clique) has been trying since January 26 to put the PSD back in the saddle. This party has lost the following it had in the 1960s, partly as a result of the development of the UGTT.
Major resources have been mobilized to implant cells of the PSD in all sectors (factories, schools, regions), to distribute membership cards free of charge, and to compel citizens to turn to the party to solve the daily problems of existence. Officially, 200,000 new members have been announced since January 26.
At the same time, the regime is trying to establish a social base. The policy favoring small businessmen that Nouira announced to the National Assembly is an example of this. But nothing has yet materialized in this area, particularly in terms of tax policy, and from the economic standpoint the margin of maneuver is extremely narrow, as we have seen. It would be surprising if small businesses were able to develop in the context of an economic crisis.
From a more political standpoint, we should note the campaign being led by the PSD, particularly by the Nouira grouping. to win over liberal intellectuals (college teachers, lawyers, etc.), to include them in the preparations for the next congress and in the ruling circles. But there, too, Nouira's espousal of democratic principles, which is aimed at attracting certain intellectuals, is running up against the reality of the repression that he seeks to cover over.
After having housebroken the UGTT and kept the bourgeois opposition on the periphery, the ruling team is trying to take back the political initiative with the methods available to it.
The congress will be the framework in which the factional struggle developing within the regime will be settled. Two tendencies have emerged-one led by Nouira and one by Sayah. To be noted is the fact that while they may diverge on secondary questions they were unanimous in carrying out the January 26 massacre and agree on all essentials.
The Nouira grouping appears to favor limited expression for the bourgeois opposition. "We are not afraid of the Mestirites in the elections, we are a strong party," say his supporters (Mestiri is the leader of the bourgeois opposition political faction known as the "socialist democrats.") It reportedly also favors replacing Tijani Abid in the leadership of the UGTT with someone less compromised, so as to present a better trade-union façade both in the eyes of the workers and internationally. This does not mean that Nouira intends to allow the UGTT to regain its strength of yesteryear. His grouping reflects the ambitions of the big-business bourgeoisie, which is friendly to the West and is concentrated especially in the capital.
The Sayah group hopes to establish bourgeois political domination and ensure continuation of the regime by using the PSD's old recipes (banning of all demonstrations by the opposition, use of repressive forces, ete.). It reflects the ambitions of the parasitic bourgeois layers tied to the party and state apparatus, concentrated mainly in the interior.
Nouira has the support of French and U.S. imperialism and of big business. It has a coherent economic program to which no bourgeois faction can offer an alternative (not even the Mestirites). The constitution provides that in case of the death of the president, he is to be succeeded by the premier. Nouira is thus the crown prince.
Sayah has the support of the party, which is particularly important, and of Bourguiba. The most likely outcome of the clique warfare, as long as Bourguiba is still around, is the continuation of the present relationship of forces. Neither group is now in a position to eliminate the other once and for all.
Each of the two tendencies has its place inside the regime. Despite the blows they aim at one another, elimination of either would spell a weakening of the regime. The ouster of Sayah would mean a weakening of the party apparatus. The elimination of
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PRESIDENT-FOR-LIFE BOURGUIBA
Nouira would irritate the imperialists and big business. The PSD congress can do no more than indicate the relative stalemate between the two groupings.
The Working Class and Its Prospects for Struggle
January 26 was unquestionably a major defeat for the workers. The UGTT, which was the vehicle for the working-class radicalization, has collapsed like a house of cards under the blows of repression. Demobilization and resignation have affected hundreds of thousands of workers who found themselves overnight without any means of defense. Part of the gains wrung from the government and bosses through the struggles of recent years have been nullified.
But while there has been a defeat, the working class has not been crushed. The "Trade-Union Resistance," despite its weaknesses and limitations, is a reality. It was expressed in several ways throughout 1978 (coordination among the resisting trade unions and in public statements, mobilizations against the trials, petitions signed by thousands of workers, strikes, etc.). Unfortunately, the Trade-Union Resistance was centered entirely around slosolidarity with the imprisoned gans of trade unionists and repudiation of the UGTT puppet leadership. They neglected to connect these demands up closely with defense of the workers' immediate interests, which were gravely threatened by the bosses' offensive.
January 26 was not a magic wand that eliminated the economic, social, and political conditions that gave rise to the upsurge of struggles. Quite the contrary. The working class is still there, with its potential for struggle; the economic crisis is still just as grave; and the regime's political crisis, while less acute, has nonetheless not disappeared.
January 26 did not mark the beginning of a long-term lull in mass struggles, but rather a short interlude that will be followed by a resumption of struggles. The latest news reaching us from the factories indicates that the downturn is about to end, and that we can expect a partial resumption of struggles (the strike at the Jerissa mine and the tense atmosphere and agitation in several plants in the working-class suburbs of Tunis are two examples).
Since January 26, the regime's social policy can be summed up in one wordausterity. The workers are faced with a dizzying price rise and are being denied any wage increase. Meanwhile, the capitalists are amassing gigantic profits, the company chairmen continue to bestow all kinds of bonuses on themselves, and the yes-men in the National Assembly have just voted themselves an increase in "benefits," now twelve times the minimum wage.
With this perspective, the regime has decided to refuse to meet any workingclass demands, however minimal. The only scheduled increases are in the Social Pact, which gives official sanction to the reduction of the workers' standard of living. During the meeting between the PSD's Political Bureau and the "national organizations," Nouira came out clearly opposed to any revision of Article 13 of the Social Pact, which stipulates that there can be no revision of contracts that entails any additional expenses for the companies.
In this context, it is clear what the function of the UGTT's puppet leadership is. There can be no question of resurrecting the UGTT, under Tijani Abid, as it was before the crisis, when, through the leverage of pressure and discussions with the bosses and the government, it managed to win satisfaction of certain demands. Discussion and dialogue between the "social partners" are over. No concessions will be made to the workers. Tijani Abid's UGTT has been assigned to carry out the regime's social policy, which prescribes austerity for the working class.
In the overall political framework we have outlined, two big battles are looming. On the one hand, the struggle against austerity, and the relaunching of mass actions, which is fundamental today, and which the trade-union vanguard should focus its efforts and energies on. On the other hand, the struggle for democratic rights, which can and should become particularly broad around the time of the October 1979 elections.
The Trade-Union Resistance has been incapable of offering the workers a perspective of struggle. It has ignored dewith defense of the mands dealing workers' immediate interests. Some have even gone so far as to find a theoretical justification for this, saying that "as long as the UGTT leadership is in prison, we will freeze our demands and concentrate exclusively on winning their release."
Such practices are leading the tradeunion vanguard into isolation. One cannot ask workers who are facing daily capitalist exploitation to suspend their demands for any reason whatsoever. The preponderance of unions of intellectuals in the Trade-Union Resistance explains these limitations to a certain extent. But since October 1978, broader and broader sectors of the Trade Union Resistance have acknowledged the urgency of action around immediate demands.
In the present situation, the battle for the relaunching of mass action and the resumption of struggles is of paramount importance. On its success or failure depends the evolution of the relationship of forces between the bourgeoisie and the working class.
The two red-letter dates that the bourgeoisie has set for 1979—the PSD congress and the legislative "elections"-fall within the framework of its policy of restabilization and preparations for the post- Bourguiba era. The PSD congress must both give the illusion of popular support and establish a new relationship of forces between the cliques. This operation is to be topped off by the legislative "elections, designed to make it possible to assert that 99% of Tunisians support the PSD's policy.
Nevertheless, the "elections" will be an opportunity to run a broad campaign against the electoral farce and for democratic rights. That is the second big battle that must be waged in 1979.
In 1974, the regime appointed Bourguiba president for life and proceeded to a phony election without any significant reaction from the workers, students, or democratic intellectuals.
Since that time, things have changed. Mobilizations and struggles for democratic rights have developed considerably. The student movement was the first to initiate mass struggles around this issue. The workers movement followed in its footsteps beginning in 1977. Cracks appeared within the regime itself. A bourgeois tendency (Mestiri) is now lodged among the opposition and making demagogic statements on the issue. Democratic freedoms have become a demand of broad layers, whereas a few years ago only the campuses were mobilizing around them.
In a nutshell, the conditions exist for developing a broad campaign around the following issues:
• Amnesty for all political prisoners and for all trade unionists (special mention must be made of those imprisoned in 1968 who, after eleven years in prison, still face a triple wall of silence-from the regime that imprisoned them, the Mestirites who directly participated in repressing them, and from their comrades of El Amal Ettounsi [the Tunisian Worker], who excluded them from their group and no longer acknowledge them).
• Total freedom of expression, assembly, and organization.
• Trade-union freedom and recognition of the right to strike without any limits. The right of the workers to have an independent trade-union organization.
• Abolition of all repressive laws and dissolution of the repressive bodies (DST, BOP, militias, State Security Court, etc.).
• Free election of a Constituent Assembly, with all parties having the right to run candidates and to have access to the official media (newspapers, television, and radio).
The student movement was conspicuous by its absence in the course of the last two years. Weakened by internal contradictions and led by ultrasectarian groups, it was incapable throughout 1977 of intervening politically alongside the workers to win the objective it has been fighting for since 1972—namely, a genuinely represendemocratic, independent tative, and
UGTT. After January 26, the same misunderstanding of political tasks and the same sectarian practices continued.
The student leadership recently proved unable to take advantage of the demagogic policy of the new minister of higher education in regard to student representation, the UGET (General Union of Tunisian Students), and the patrols. Instead of using this opening to once again put forward the main demands of the student movement—namely, departure of the patrols, reinstatement of the expelled students, an independent UGET, the fight against restricted admissions-and mobilizing tens of thousands around these demands, the student leadership was satisfied with saying that these slogans were "demagogy" and that "We are not concerned with them."
The Maoist groups that have led the student movement since 1976 bear a historic responsibility for its paralysis.
But the student movement is not dead. Its potential is still great. It can rise from its ashes faster than is believed and line up its forces with the workers in the struggle against the bourgeois regime.
The Muslim Brotherhood's growing influence among the youth as a whole, owing in part to the Iranian revolution, is a phenomenon that revolutionists must analyze in depth. What is involved is something relatively new that cannot be reduced to the usual perfunctory analyses- "a fascist movement manipulated by the regime." A discussion on the Brotherhood is necessary to provide some answers to the questions it raises, and work out a tactic for struggling against it.
The Iranian revolutionary process, the workers' struggle for their demands, the fight for democratic rights, the struggle against women's exploitation and oppression are among the clarifying issues that can arm revolutionists for their confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood
The regime's austerity policy, one of the effects of which is unemployment and the relegation of women to the home, on the one hand, and the growth of Muslim fundamentalism on the other, raise the problem of struggling against women's oppression in a sharper way than before.
While some struggles were carried out prior to January 26, giving rise to an embryonic trade-union women's current (the strike by women workers at El Athir, conferences on women's on-the-job training, and so on, the fact remains that Tunisian working women have not yet acquired their own experience in struggle. Their development has been blocked by the blow that the working class suffered on January 26.
Among the student youth, on the other hand, conditions seem to favor the blos. soming of an independent women's move. ment. Testifying to this, for example, was the way people flocked to the lectures given by Nawal Saadoui (an Egyptian feminist) in February. The birth of an independent women's movement would be an event of great significance. Revolutionary activists must be an integral part of this movement, to press for linking it up with the workers' struggles, and to get the trade unions to take responsibility for raising the problems and demands of working women.
The brutality of the crackdown on January 26 and the relative stabilization afterward should not fool anyone. The bourgeois regime has lost the domination it managed to establish in the wake of independence. It no longer enjoys any popular support. Only repression, and the lack of a socialist alternative are holding it up.
It is to building a socialist alternative to the regime that we must apply ourselves. Such an alternative will not be built in an ivory tower, but through the day-to-day struggles of workers, women, students, and peasants. The Iranian masses have shown us the way forward. The struggles that will be forthcoming in Tunisia in 1979 will be a step in this direction.
March 1979
Tip of the Iceberg
A U.S. Energy Department investigation of seven large oil companies, made public May 2, confirmed what everyone who drives an automobile already knows. They are being robbed blind.
Even this cautious peek at the books revealed that in the last six years Texaco, Gulf, Standard of California, Atlantic Richfield, Standard of Indiana, Standard of Ohio, and Marathon overcharged custo mers a total of $1.7 billion-about $6 million a week.