During an extraordinary session of the Central Committee of the MPLA-Labor Party! in December 1978, a decision was made to abolish the post of prime minister and to dismiss Lopo do Nascimento from that position.
At the same time, an important government reshuffle was carried out. Heads rolled. Carlos Rocha Dilolwa resigned from his positions of responsibility in the party and government. Nascimento himself was deprived of political power, although he retained his place, for the moment, on the Central Committee.
Publicly, the regime presented this important decision as a strengthening of the party. But behind these so-called readjustments lies a serious warning for the regime.
It should be recalled that Luanda still faces blackmail from UNITA,? which is supported by South Africa, indicating that at least part of the country is under a war economy.
The civil war that destroyed most of the country's resources was followed by a policy of so-called economic "reconstruction," which included a state sector based the nationalization of formerly on Portuguese-owned industries, together with development projects involving imperialist capital and aid from Eastern European countries. Such an economy, whatever its specific features, remains a market economy. The balance of payments is dependent on sectors such as oil, diamonds, and the Benguela railway, in foreign capital or imperialist which markets play the central role.
As a result, the Angolan economy is marked by severe inflation, exacerbated by speculation carried on by the local petty bourgeoisie and bureaucrats.
In May 1977, the Nito Alves faction was ruthlessly eliminated after it had attempted a desperate putsch.
This faction of the regime had been known for its "defense" of the organs of "people's power." But in reality, Nito Alves had climbed to the top in 1976 when the task was to smash the class independence of the neighborhood committees and to repress the nascent far left. His policy consisted of stabilizing the regime and lending some legitimacy to the MPLA through a network of rank-and-file bodies devoid of any subversive content. Partly because of this, he won the support of the Soviets for a time.
The defeat of the reactionary coalition of the FNLA, UNITA, Zaire, and South Africa, however, opened up a new period for the petty-bourgeois leadership of the MPLA. Nito Alves's populist projects lost their usefulness and even threatened to put obstacles in the way of some of the majority's plans.
The downfall of this "left" faction was in reality a result of reducing the neighborhood committees to empty shells. As early as June 1976, the "Nitistas" threw their weight behind the "election" of representatives of People's Power. But only 10 percent of the voters turned out for this demagogic operation, while the MPLA proclaimed the "institutionalization" of People's Power, that is, its liquidation.
Alves, by relying on what he had helped reduce to nothingness while he was one of the regime's leading figures, was himself destined to be brought down by the majority of the MPLA.
That was the first phase of the crisis of the regime-a regime born out of fifteen years of armed struggle under the leadership of a nationalist petty bourgeoisie.
If the policy of the new state was to maintain a market economy, the MPLA regime had to preserve its legitimacy by taking on a pronounced Bonapartist character. But the Angolan economy is not the Algerian economy. Such an objective, steeped in contradictions, could at any moment cause a split in the weak, divided, and ossified leadership.
The present phase of the crisis in the MPLA developed against the background of the social and economic crisis. Clearly, it was necessary to adjust the wage policy in order to head off strong popular discontent and to try to rebuild a social base. But it was also necessary to find a scapegoat.
That role was played by Nascimento, in order to lay the blame on the government
Neto's leadership.
After having struck a blow at the left, the bureaucratic apparatus of the MPLA now had to appear to be striking out at the right. But Nascimento, even though he had made overtures to the West, could not be presented as a "pro-Western rightist" opposed to a "progressive line." Essentially, Nascimento had to pay the price for the regime's sudden need to refurbish its image and to create a charismatic aura around the figure of Neto.
The economic crisis is so serious and chronic, however, that this operation will not be enough. The next stage will involve an even greater opening toward Western capital. At that point, Agostinho Neto will gamble his future.
Meanwhile, in Luanda, they talk of "democratizing the state" by bringing back the People's Power committees. They denounce the bureaucratism of the state (and not the party?) and the lack of dynamism of the outgoing government. Neto has gone on a crusade to solve "the problems that the people face." He has announced a revision of the economic plan. He has criticized the violation of democratic rights and has announced a modifi. cation of salary grades.
The regime is robbing Peter to pay Paul. It is doing away with bonuses for government officials in order to raise certain industrial wages. It is easing conditions for small merchants and trying to revive the rural market, which will certainly involve a redefinition of the agricultural cooperatives.
By thus attempting to rebuild a mass following and to inject new life into the Bonapartist institutions, the regime is looking for a second wind. But it would be wrong to see this as a radicalization.
To the contrary, the class nature of the Angolan state pushes the leadership team naturally toward an economic overture to the West, in order to respond to greater pressures. Even though Neto reaffirmed his friendship with Moscow and Havana during the latest developments, imperialist investment projects are nevertheless multiplying and the MPLA is eyeing the Lomé accords.4