The longest struggle in the history of the working class in West Germany (with the exception of the Schleswig-Holstein metalworkers strike!) lasted six weeks. As it drew to a close January 11, 100,000 of the 150,000 organized workers in the steel industry in the Rhine, Ruhr, and Weser valleys were on strike for a reduction of the work week to thirty-five hours.
The steelworkers' strike was the first official union struggle in this branch of industry in about fifty years. But that reflects only one side of the actual situa tion of this section of the working class. Of course the steel industry is the only branch of industry that functions under "comanagement." But this does not mean that its workers did not play a decisive role in the class struggle in West Germany in the past.
In fact in 1969, through a spontaneous strike that ended in victory, the steelworkers fired the opening shot in the new rise of workers' struggles that followed the breakdown of the German "economic miracle" and continued through the generalization of the economic recession in 1974-75.
"We are reaping what we sowed," they said. In fact in 1973, through a spontaneous strike around wages, which was broken by the union bureaucracy, the steelworkers at Hoesch and Mannesmann unleashed the wave of struggles that fol lowed in the summer of that year.
The steelworkers strike was the fifth official union struggle in 1978, and IG Metall's? second of the year. That's already quite a schedule. Because of the battle lines on which it was fought, the steelworkers movement was like the struggles of the dockers, the printers, the Baden- Württemberg metalworkers, and the Berlin construction workers. That is, the mobilizations focused not on the question of wages, but rather on resistance to the economic crisis in the capitalist system.
The steelworkers' struggle faced many more obstacles than the earlier battles. In the first place, workers in the steel industry had their backs to the wall. In the last three years alone, more than 30,000 steel jobs were eliminated in the Rhine and the Ruhr valleys.
Second, the call for a thirty-five-hour week, which marks a qualitative breakthrough in demands, faced a united front of the entire West German capitalist class. However, the demand itself was adopted and put forward by only a segment of the union movement, or more accurately, by a single union.
Despite all these obstacles, the strikers showed great determination; their participation in the movement far surpassed all the usual norms of workers struggles in West Germany. The union leadership, however, used the unfavorable relationship of forces with the bourgeoisie to put forward a compromise, which they were able to impose on the workers after several attempts.
The agreement signed by the bureaucrats projects a reduction of one hour in the workweek for a portion (60%) of the steelworkers: those who work rotating shifts and those over fifty years of age. And that only in 1983.
Despite this unsatisfactory outcome the steelworkers' struggle deserves more detailed analysis since it sheds specific light on the class struggle in this "island of stability," as West Germany is called, and is an example for all workers in other countries who find themselves in the same situation.
The Thirty-Five-Hour Weeka Goal of Union Struggle
The overwhelming majority of the West German union bureaucracy still totally rejects the idea that the economic downturn of 1974-75 represents a watershed in the capitalist system, that there will be no return to the "economic miracle," and that trade-union activity must thus be aimed fundamentally against the system.
A phrase as simple as "the crisis of the capitalist system" sticks in the throats of the bureaucrats.
From 1974 to 1977, they maintained it was possible to incorporate the great majority of the working class into capitalism. They viewed the crisis as analogous to that of 1966-67, a passing incident, and professed total confidence in the Social Democratic government's ability to regulate the economic difficulties. For the broad masses this meant "toning down their demands" and "waiting for the upturn."
Plainly what they were talking about was an upturn in profits and speedup, things that are not designed to fight unemployment.
Meanwhile, took an upturn place, but not the one the bureaucrats expected. There was an upturn in mobilizations, in unions taking responsibility for struggles, in discussion inside the unions, and in the desire to find new solutions.
For years, revolutionary Marxists who called for dividing up the available work among all the available workers seemed to be preaching in the desert. Even the influential centrist movements fought this demand for a long time, using the same arguments the union bureaucracy did. The demand became popular after the slogan for a thirty-five-hour workweek was adopted at a general assembly of more than 10,000 workers at the Rüsselsheim Opel plant in April 1977. The assembly voted unanimously to place the demand for the thirty-five-hour week before the IG Metall convention.
As a result, in September 1977 the thirtyfive-hour-week demand was passed by a very slim majority at the IG Metall convention, but against the will of the leadership. This electoral victory was possible not only because of the presence of numerous delegates representing the workers (from the plant and office-staff committees), but also because a segment of the middle layer of the union bureaucracy sensed the changes taking place in the rank and file and took this into account in their vote.
The "success" achieved at the IG Metall convention was followed by another in May 1978 at the convention of the federation of unions.
This did not, however, prevent the thirtyfive-hour demand from sinking into oblivion. Aside from the IG Metall, only the printing union (IG Druck und Papier) officially put it forward and included it in its action program. In the other large unions (especially civil service and chemical) the bureaucracies were able to maintain rigid control until very recently. Their main concern however is not reducing the workweek but winning six weeks vacation.
Actually the thirty-five-hour demand was imposed on IG Metall's bureaucratic leadership against its will. This had two consequences. First, the bureaucrats did not make the slightest effort to mobilize the membership as a whole, and in fact continued to publicly call for six weeks vacation. Second, IG Metall's stance was on the whole followed by the majority of other union leaderships.
The objectives of this tactic couldn't be clearer. It was directed against the union ranks and has so far achieved its aims. In fact, polls show that despite the introduction of the demand for a thirty-five-hour week by the strikers, the majority of union members put six weeks vacation above a reduction in the workweek.' Situation in Metalworkers Union
With 2.7 million members, IG Metall is the most powerful West German union. It covers the metalworking industries (machines, electrical components, auto) as well as steel and iron. These latter two branches have separate contracts.
Since the end of the Second World War, IG Metall has participated in the decisions of the bosses through "bipartite representation" or co-management. Co-management was instituted after the war to deflect pressure for nationalizations.
does "bipartite representation" What mean? It means that the administrative council is made up of equal numbers of representatives of the unions and the bosses, to which an "independent" is added; and within the board of directors formed in this way, the union representative is in charge of work conditions.
In the 1950s and 1960s the leadership of IG Metall felt it could claim comanagement was a success and that it safeguarded the interests of its members. Statistics for that period have shown quite clearly that income and jobs in basic steel had little connection with the short-term situation in the industry, which was certainly not the case in the fabrication and assembly sectors. That is why pay levels in basic steel soon passed those in the metalworks.
Then toward the middle of the 1970s, the miracle of "participation" lost its attractive force. The steel trusts made clear they were no longer content with the suppression of jobs "inherent in the market" and instead began to use market fluctuations as a pretext for massive layoffs. At the same time steelworkers' pay fell below that of the metalworkers.
"Participation" played no part in the struggle to defend jobs and maintain purchasing power. The bureaucracy thus lost its magic wand, which had for years served as a substitute for an aggressive trade-union policy.
This became clearer during the spring 1978 strike in Baden-Württemberg (which took place against the wishes of the local union leaders) and in the delegate elections in the summer of 1978, where opposition slates formed in a large number of factories registered impressive successes.
4. A poll by Die Zeit showed that during the strike itself 44% of union members were for a reduction in the work week, 50% were for six weeks vacation, and 6% had no opinion.
Since the spring 1978 strike in Baden- Württemberg the atmosphere has been stormy throughout the organization. In the 1978 union elections opposition slates were set up in a number of the most important steel complexes. Avowedly Maoist slates received as much as 40% of the vote, and this took place in plants where the workers are 100% unionized.
Little by little the bureaucracy's lack of any experience in struggle in the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen also became a problem. The regional union leader personally complained to the delegates that during the previous wage negotiations one of the foundry owners had told him that he was not ready to make a concession because IG Metall was incapable of waging a strike!
Thus there was not a wide range of solutions for the regional union bureaucracy to choose among. It had to provide new perspectives that would replace the increasingly discredited "co-management" scheme, and provide proof through an opening-limited, of course-that it was • able to lead a strike. This was the only way to revive contact with the ranks. The Union Leadership's Thinking
This explains why the bureaucratic faction that took up the thirty-five-hour demand was the very faction that had fought hardest against the slogan. Of all the present union demands, it is the only one that, thanks to the word "Einstieg,
,"5 could in a short period establish a new perspec tive for reformist union activity while also being part of a struggle against layoffs.
But a new idea does not automatically bring about new practice. In West Germany hours of work and conditions of work are governed by "under the table" contracts, separate from those that fix wages. The union bureaucracy used these "under the table" agreements as a pretext to put forward the proposal "toward thirtyfive hours" without discussion with the members. In many factories and among the delegates there was great surprise. At first this demand was seen as a "trick" to raise the stakes in the overall negotiations with the bosses.
When the demand was made public in the middle of last June, the union leadership did nothing to publicize it and even less to mobilize support for it. The thirty. five-hour week was increasingly termed a demand particular to the steel industry. The IG Metall leadership consciously refused to raise the same slogan in the metalworking industry, sticking there to the demand for six weeks vacation.
In the course of the first negotiations the bosses didn't want to listen to anything about a shorter work week. In the union commission on wages it was suggested upon" (the thirty-five-hour week), refers to a specific union plan of progressive steps toward the thirty-fivehour week over a five year period.
5. "Einstieg." literally "embark
that the thirty-five-hour week be dropped. But this time the bureaucrats didn't want to lose face. Instead they turned to those blast furnaces with a tradition of struggle and to the left-wing delegates in the union, explaining that they now had to "unleash the mobilization."
Meanwhile the negotiations became less frequent and shorter, to the benefit of the usual wage negotiations that fell at the very end of the year. The proposals from the factories regarding wage demands ranged from 8% to 10%.
To appease the bosses and to link the wage demand to the demand for the thirtyfive-hour week, the bureaucrats postponed the wage negotiations and, through an internal referendum, reduced their wage demand to 5%. But this self-control did not satisfy the bosses. In the first discussions the bosses proposed a 2.1% raise and two more days vacation for all.
The counterposed positions were hardening and it became increasingly difficult to find a solution around the negotiating table. The bureaucrats rediscovered a union left wing that they had until then forgotten about. Barely two weeks remained to popularize the demand and dissipate the fears the bureaucrats themselves had sown.
The Referendum and the Beginning of the Strike
In order to guarantee the success of the November 18-21, 1978 strike referendum, IG Metall called, on its eve, by regions, a warning strike or meetings held during work time. The call was answered by 120,000 workers and there were twenty-two demonstrations. This was the most important mass mobilization in the steel industry in decades. If one takes into account the long practice of negotiations without participation by the ranks, without warning strikes, it is clear that a movement of such breadth covered over some things hiding in the shadows. These were, unfortunately, rapidly revealed. A mobilization launched from above did not make possible the full development of the capacity for struggle.
The mobilizations often reflected the uneven state of preparation in different plants. In Dortmund (20,000 participants) and Duisburg (25,000 in three demonstrations) participation was higher than average. The workers did not wait for readybanners. They made them made themselves. The union leaders took a purely defensive stance, with the aim of demobilizing the struggle. They mocked the initiatives taken by the workers and provided them with no perspectives.
Despite this, the referendum was an enormous success. Of the 95.1% of the workers who voted, 86.96% voted yes. In the history of the IG Metall there has not been a single higher total than that.
Three days later the bosses stirred and presented their positions. To prevent the announced strike they offered the possibility that the "dream" of the unions might be achieved and immediately proposed six weeks vacation for all. On the eve of the referendum this "dream proposal" would have meant an end to the conflict. But in the meantime propaganda and agitation for the thirty-five-hour week had made headway among the steelworkers. The simple slogan "division of work among all available workers," having been put forward primarily by the bureaucracy and the factory union leaders themselves, had penetrated their consciousness. It was not possible for the bureaucracy to retreat now without paying the price of deepening internal conflicts and sharp disagreement.
The rejection of the employers' proposal completely changed the atmosphere in the factories. No doubts remained—the struggle was being actively prepared. Fear and reticence were swept away in a single stroke by the strike. One could almost speak of a sense of "euphoria."
In incorporating the thirty-five-hour week into its platform, the leadership of IG Metall, loyal to its long policy of class collaboration, planned to continue the same collaboration through different means, while providing medium-range perspectives. This would have allowed them, among other things, to regain their prestige among the ranks. The dream vanished like a pricked bubble when the steel barons forced the workers out on strike. The bosses' intransigent opposition to any reduction in the work week was a sharp obstacle. The noose was labelled "thirty-five hours" and rather than allow the bureaucrats to withdraw their heads from it, the bosses tightened it around their necks.
What is the explanation for this? Are the West German bosses stupider than their foreign counterparts? Are they too stupid to grasp the hand extended to them by the union bureaucracy, which wanted collaboration with a "new look"?
One thing is clear: while the German bosses are clearly the most economically powerful in Europe, they are undoubtedly not the sharpest and most lucid representatives of their class. Helmut Schmidt is much better than they are in the role. Put simply, for years they had grown accustomed to the union leadership's methods of functioning. "A barking dog doesn't bite," the proverb says. This "experience" with the union leadership led them in this past period to exacerbate the situation, even to throw gasoline on the fire, for instance by threatening the workers with lockouts.
But undoubtedly this is only the visible side of the bourgeoisie's calculations. Their attitude is also explained by many other motives. It stems from their portion of the the pie. Up to now nothing in the world would make them share it with the working class. They held tight to one fact: any decrease in the work week directly entails a decline in their profits.
Working-class combativity is rising and strikes and conflicts are becoming more numerous. But the breadth of these conflicts and the radicalization of the workers have not reached the point where they have forced the bourgeoisie onto the defensive.
What the bourgeoisie fears most is that each new struggle, even a partial struggle, could unleash an avalanche of expenses by stimulating the reactions of the unions.
The German employers today still feel they are strong enough to be able to force a "recalcitrant"
union to retreat, without this spurring a radicalization of the working class. Up to now, unfortunately, history has proven them correct.
It should be pointed out that the employers have a powerful argument-in the sphere of finances. Each workers struggle can draw on a special fund (workers who pay into the fund-1% of their salaryaccording to the rules, receive their full salary during a strike). But what can happen is that the money is used for other things, and there is not enough in the fund. Even the powerful IG Metall federation is not secure against such a risk.
The bosses have drawn the lessons of this, and two confrontational employers' organizations (BDA and BDI) have published an "employers' handbook" in which they suggest to their colleagues that in the event of workers resistance to measures outlined in this "handbook," the employers should use the tactic of locking out their employees and should hold out with the help of their own "struggle" fund in the event of a serious conflict.
In this "handbook" they list concessions that should not be granted:
• No workweek of less than 40 hours.
• No vacations over six weeks.
• No supplementary wage increases in contracts.
The Strike Unfolds
The high level of militancy that was evident from the first day of the strike surpassed all expectations. IG Metall concentrated all its efforts on eight plants with 40,000 workers. In all the struck plants there was no problem setting up picket lines and developing the mobilization.
No one was afraid of a long strike. Of course the union bureaucrats downplayed what the strike might actually win, but no one doubted that they had to move toward a plan to reduce the work week by stages. Above all, there was an expression of the objective of the mobilization, of the logic inherent in the reduction of the work week, and of the need to take new measures to prevent a speedup in the pace of work.
In the first days of the strike the union bureaucracy was undoubtedly the big winner. It had attained its goal-the strike. It had carried out what had been thought to be impossible and had drawn the steelworkers into the struggle. Its attitude had given it such credit among the workers that in the early period any criticism of the union leadership was seen as an affront to "His Majesty." This did not, however, mean rejection of the left-wing organizations. Anyone could discuss the strike as long as they were in solidarity with it and did not simply confine themselves to criticizing it.
From the first day of the strike the employers used the lockout against those workers already on strike and against 30,000 others working in seven different plants. The atmosphere hardened a little more and one delegate summarized the situation in this way: "This is the beginning of the end of harmony and comanagement in the steel industry."
The protest meeting at Bochum, called in total haste one day before the lockout, surpassed all expectations and brought together more than 10,000 workers.
The atmosphere was one of struggle, but, beginning with this mass meeting, the first demands upon the union leaderships saw the light of day: "Kurt (the first name of the local leader), you know what to hold out for; we want to work five hours less" was the theme that reverberated through the assembly.
The strikers and the delegates from factories that were not yet in the movement left the meeting with the firm conviction that spreading the strike was the only way to respond to the lockout. This is what was demanded in motions in several factories.
After the first week of the strike and a day after the lockout began, the leader of IG Metall in Baden-Württemberg proposed a token strike in the whole metalworking industry in order to fight the lockout. The bosses screamed. Loderer, the president of IG Metall, got scared and came out against the Württemberg leader's proposal and took disciplinary measures against him.
Meanwhile this proposal had been warmly received by the strikers and those who were locked out, and they publicly spoke against Loderer.
In the course of the meeting of union leaders that followed, Loderer was forced to retract his condemnation. He himself announced that the union recommended similar activities in Nordrhein-Westfalen and called on all the workers in the metalworking industry and other unions to participate. For the first time, Loderer's image was tarnished.
But IG Metall gave up on spreading the strike and declared its readiness to respond to the desires of the bosses and name an arbitrator. Thus the actions against the lockouts were to be restricted to three days duration. Meanwhile the local union leadership in Duisburg, under pressure from the workers, opposed the federal leadership. In one of the largest demonstrations of the strike, 35,000 persons marched through the streets of Duisburg chanting, "Down with the arbitrator, only the general strike will let us win!"
The demonstrations against the lockout, supposedly limited to three days, took place in more than thirty cities. More than 145,000 workers demonstrated. In many cities in the Ruhr valley they blocked traffic and distributed leaflets in the department stores. In Dortmund there was a veritable international demonstration. About sixty Dutch steelworkers came and chanted: "Long live international solidarity. Your strike is our strike!" But the mobilization was not a success everywhere. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, for example, a very halfhearted call did not suffice to mobilize the ranks, owing to the lack of a tradition of struggle.
It was clear from these actions that a change had taken place in the strike. There was a lack of enthusiasm and combativity among those not yet in the movement, while the strikers and the victims of the lockout adopted a wait-and-see attitude because the strike was not being widened and an arbitrator was intervening.
Speeches by union leaders in these meetings called on everyone to lower the pressure a bit and not get excited.
Effects of the Arbitration
The acceptance of Farthmann, Social Democratic labor minister of Nordrhein- Westfalen, as arbitrator was a bad sign.
no tim hu that to he Already the previous year he had obtained a rotten compromise for the steelworkers. In addition, he had openly come out in favor of a settlement that would bring advantages to only certain groups; that is, a solution on the same basis as the one proposed by the bosses. It was also clear that the union bureaucracy would think twice before causing a breakdown in the arbitration process by repudiating an important SPD politician and an old union bureaucrat.
The strikers were inclined to reject the political arbitration. Many felt that it was a sign of the way the leadership was now moving to end the conflict. Moreover, many felt that a satisfactory solution was scarcely imaginable while all the union's means of struggle were still far from exhausted. (At this point the automobile industry, which should have been one of the first affected by the strike, was shouting to the rooftops that it could still produce through the middle or end of January.)
But the arbitration weighed most heavily on the fighting spirit. The widely shared sentiment was that the workers' struggle would move to the wings while the negotiations with the arbitrator were going on. All of a sudden it was no longer the strikers but rather the arbitration that determined what would happen.
From being active participants in the battle the workers became passive spectators. To find out where things stood, one no longer discussed with one's comrades but rather tuned in punctually to the radio and television news. The scope of their aspirations was clearly diminished; but at the same time distrust of the leadership was growing. The leadership very rapidly lost the margin of trust it had recently acquired.
What Helmut Schmidt Did
Many observers were surprised that
Helmut Schmidt did not personally intervene in the strike as a mediator, and that he preferred to brown himself under the sun in Guadeloupe. Rather than intervene, the federal chancellor told the population in his televised Christmas message that "the strikes were not a national disaster" and said in interviews that "the thirty-fivehour week is possible and will come one day." In saying this he was not simply in accord with the line of the union bureaucracy, but also with the line of his party, the SPD, which often happens.
Shortly before the strike began, the SPD held a party congress to approve its program for the European parliament, in which it put forward the slogans "progressive introduction of the thirty-five-hour week" and "prohibition of the lockout." Helmut Schmidt knows that he has problems at present with the SPD's electoral base and that he has to do something to resolve them.
But the federal chancellor was not twiddling his thumbs. He preferred to act behind the scenes. The members of the cabinet were required to keep silent in public and to abstain from expressing an opinion on the workers' struggle. Certainly Schmidt did not lack a telephone with which to quietly ask the IG Metall leadership to hasten the end of the workers' struggle.
It is also certain that the leadership of IG Metall received effective advice from Schmidt to beat a retreat in order to win over a segment of the Wage Commission and to vote for a compromise. No part of these "backstage operations" became known publicly, but many strikers rapidly noted the sudden change in the attitude of their staff members between Christmas and New Year's.
Gap Between the Ranks and the Bureaucracy
The reason for this development was the growing gap between the leadership and apparatus on one side and the ranks of strikers on the other. The first difference was over whether to widen the strike or submit it to arbitration. The strike leaders and the delegate bodies openly took a position against the conduct of the union leadership.
On December 17 the arbitrator presented a proposal from the negotiations, widely reported in the press, that was based only on discussions and agreement with the president of IG Metall, Loderer.
But conditions for acceptance of the compromise seemed unfavorable. Strike leaders at many factories had been farsighted enough to convene plant-wide assemblies of strikers. They were concerned with the possibility of such a compromise, and so the assemblies called for rejection.
A new offer was presented on January 3, 1979. It did not differ in the slightest from the first one and failed to take into account the desire for a reduction in work time. The workers were astonished to learn that the bureaucracy had accepted this proposal "in principle and in specifics." These reports caused more discontent. Many delegate bodies sent detailed protest letters to the Wage Commission. More than 800 strikers, including all the plant-level strike leaders from some Duisburg and Dortmund factories, occupied the site of the Wage Commission and demanded to take part in the meeting. This was of course rejected.
When the final result of the arbitration was presented on January 6, 1,000 strikers were again assembled at the site of the Wage Commission. This time the precau tion had been taken to bolt the doors, and the members of the Wage Commission slipped in through the back. The compromise was accepted by an 88-to-37 vote.
But the bureaucracy had to pay a price for it. The representatives of the three most important steel mills wrote a resolution explaining their rejection and naming those responsible for the agreement: the regional bureaucracy and the federal leadership. They further explained that they were ready to coordinate and work together to "change something in the union," and they openly called on union members to vote "no" in the final vote. In the context of the strict norms of discipline in the West German unions, this was tantamount to rejecting an order.
It was nonetheless obvious at first glance that the bureaucracy would pull through the vote with a comfortable margin. There was 90.8% participation. Of those eligible to vote, 49.5% came out in favor of the compromise and 40.9% were opposed—a perfectly "normal" outcome. But when the results are broken down by plant, the picture is different:
• In the plants on strike from the beginning, the "no" vote ranged from 55% to 95%.
• In the plants that had gone out on strike in the last three days the "no" vote was still 40% to 50%
• Only in the plants that had not been on strike did the "no" vote not exceed 25%. The Limits of the Struggle
IG Metall's setback in its attempt to obtain real access to the thirty-five-hour week for all undoubtedly means a step back in the struggle for reduction of the work week. The other unions-which are much weaker-will reorient themselves after what has happened and give up this fight.
For the bureaucracy, the dilemma is as follows: On the one hand, the pressure of the ranks has been strengthened and the bureaucracy must react to it. On the other, any encouragement of militancy, however modest, puts the bureaucracy in conflict with the bourgeoisie. Each encouragement of struggle by the bureaucracy, moreover, provokes euphoria in the ranks and raises expectations. That is what happened this time for the first time, the bureaucracy provided, through the strike, the possibility for those with a class-struggle orienta-
DOCUMENTS
tion to coordinate their activities, and the chasm that the bureaucracy wanted to fill got still deeper.
But these class-struggle forces also have difficulties owing to their weak numerical importance and the low level of consciousness of the working class. They can draw in the masses only to the extent that they march in step with the official leadership. They can go so far as to explain and criticize the poor conduct of the official leadership, but they cannot yet pass from this criticism to independent action.
Many people opened their eyes to this problem during the strike. They have returned to work with bitterness. They feel they were duped by their leadership, but they are not demoralized. In the course of the strike they became conscious of their strength. They have now decided to use this strength in showdowns inside the unions, at the plant level first of all. It is more important to grasp this fact than to provide an answer to the question of whether the battle ended in a victory or a defeat.
out on a more or less regular basis today in Poland is estimated at twenty-five to fifty, not counting the books published in samizdat form.
The KOR has tried to find its own place within this general rebirth of the opposition by converting itself into the Committee for Social Self-Defense/Committee to
Notes
1. The metalworkers of Schleswig-Holstein went on strike in October 1956 to demand payment of full wages for sick leave. After 112 days they settled for a compromise guaranteeing them 76.2% of their pay.
2. Industriegewerkschaft Metall—Metal Industry Union.
3. The "Sozialistische Buro," for example, until the middle of 1977 explained that this demand could not be achieved on the economic plane and that reductions in work time automatically led to an acceleration of the pace of work and a decline in wages.