(The following resolution was issued December 8 by the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Communist Group, Lebanese section of the Fourth International.]
1. Now that the first impulsive reactions have subsided to the visit by American imperialism's lackey, Anwar el-Sadat, to the Zionist state, it is necessary to assess this move soberly. It must be placed in its proper context, away from the realm of sentiments anchored in the petty-bourgeois nationalist tradition, which is forever concerned with the appearance of things, while ignoring-intentionally or not-their true essence.
The first realization we are forced to make, where Sadat's move is concerned, is that it falls naturally and totally into line with the search for a peaceful settlement with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, adopted November 22, 1967, and ratified by the three Arab states that had been defeated in June 1967. The Sost state to filet oasis 3a, and it did last state to ratify it was Syria, and it did during the October 1973 war.
It should be recalled that Resolution 242 includes a pledge by the parties involved to recognize the sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including the Zionist state, as well as their right to live in peace within secure, recognized, and inviolable borders, to be guaranteed by setting up demilitarized zones.
It should also be recalled that the Egyptian and Jordanian governments' ratification of Resolution 242 came only three months after the Arab summit conference in Khartoum in late August 1967. This conference became known for its three "noes": no to recognition, no to negotiation, no to peace. Egypt's abandonment of this emphatic resolution thus confirmed that bourgeois nationalism had reached the limit of its potential, and that since its defeat, it had become incapable of sticking to the first point of the nationalist platform it had adopted prior to 1967—the liberation of Palestine.
The other major steps in the process of reaching a capitulationist settlement were the Rogers plan in the summer of 1970; the Arab summit in Algiers in November 1973, which agreed in principle to the Geneva conference that met later that year; and the Sinai agreement in September 1975.
Sadat's latest move, which constitutes open recognition of the Zionist state and the beginning of direct negotiations with it, is one more step in the process of betrayal, and in no way departs from this general context. If anything distinguishes this move, it is its impudence, made possi ble by the relative success of the Sadat regime's efforts over the last few years to fool the Egyptian masses about its claims to patriotism. These efforts were based on the myth of the October 1973 war, prior to the capitulation, and also on the stamp of approval awarded to Sadat by the rightist leadership of the Palestinian resistance.
Sadat's move was also made possible by the inactivity of the Egyptian masses, who are bending under their burden of poverty. Although the government is trying to convince them that relief from their misery depends on peace-capitulation, what is really at stake is capitalist expansion and the success of economic overtures to American imperialism, which in no way involves raising the standard of living for the masses.
The immediate motive for Sadat's initiative is his fear of being dragged into a new war by the Zionist state, at a time when he is betting all he has on a peaceful settlement, and has even stripped his army of fighting ability by breaking with the Soviet Union.
To avoid a new war, Sadat decided to make the only concession capable of inducing the Zionist state to agree to Arab peace terms-opening up the Arab market, especially the Egyptian market, to Israel, and establishing "normal" relations with it. With this gesture, Sadat has completely departed from the realm of confrontation with Zionism. Overturning his rule has become a pressing task for the Arab revolution.
2. It is necessary to stress once again that what distinguishes the Syrian Baathist regime from Sadat's regime is not its degree of "patriotism," but its ability to capitulate. What separates the two regimes is not a disagreement, but a dissimilarity. The former generally fades with the disappearance of the latter.
The objective political conditions in Syria-such as the size of the Palestinian population and the patriotic opposition, as well as the nationalist consciousness of the Syrian masses, the proximity of Lebanon with its patriotic mass movement, and the proximity of Iraq, with the constant oneupmanship of the Baghdad governmentall impede the Damascus leadership's capitulationist course and prevent it from climbing onto the front of the train like Sadat (although when necessary it settles for one of the cars of this train).
For example, less than two months after having refused to participate in the Geneva conference at the end of 1973, the Syrian leadership fulfilled the conditions for participation (turning over a list of Israeli prisoners of war to Kissinger), and subsequently became staunch supporters of the conference.
Less than six months after having dissociated themselves from the January 1974 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement treaty at kilometer 101, the Syrian leadership signed a similar agreement at the end of May, under the auspices of the Geneva conference.
After having castigated the September 1975 Sinai agreement, the Damascus leadership signed a disguised nonaggression pact with the Zionist state a few months later, allowing Israel to intervene in Lebanon, and doing it a big favor by trying to crush the Palestinian resistance as a preliminary to peace.
As proof of the sincerity of their opposition to the Sinai agreement, the Syrian leadership forgot about it eighteen months later (although the accord lasts for three years, and were reconciled with Sadat, whom they had called a traitor shortly before.
Willful blindness to the real attitude of the Damascus leadership is the main danger looming over the two frontline battalions of the Arab masses today-the Palestinians and the Lebanese, whose fate largely depends on Syrian policy.
The resumption of an alliance with the Baath Party in power in Damascus, and the renewed praise for it in recent months by the right wing of the Palestinian resistance and the right wing of the Lebanese Patriotic Movement,' as well as the general reconciliation of the Damascus leadership with the Palestinian rejection front in Tripoli,? and of their Lebanese agents with the main components of the Lebanese Patriotic Movement in Beirut, all stem from an opportunist line.
This approach reflects neither the interests of the laboring masses nor tactical skill-as its practitioners claim-but in fact results from the shortsightedness of the bureaucratic leaderships. These leaderships are motivated either by a naive desire to win over the Syrian regime, or by an inability to rely on the masses and on themselves, and to do without Libyan financial support, which has strings attached.
However, it is necessary to make a distinction between those who have resorted to maneuvers to solve their financial problems, without deluding themselves as to the real intentions of the Syrian regime, and those who have become reconciled with it in the hope of an actual alliance. The near future will show which forces have maintained their independence and distrust with regard to the Syrian government.
Whatever the case, revolutionists must condemn all attempts to absolve the Damascus leadership of blame or to relax suspicion of it. There can be no doubt that,
1. A coalition of the Lebanese left that includes the reformist bourgeois party of Jumblatt, Stalinists, and various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist organizations.
2. The Tripoli summit conference, held December 2-5, 1977, followed Sadat's visit to Israel. It was attended by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad; Taha Yassin Jezrawi, a member of Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Council; President Houari Boumé- dienne of Algeria; President Salem Rubayi Ali of South Yemen; Col. Muammar el Quaddafi of Libya; Yassir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization; and George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
The conference issued a declaration that called for setting up an Arab "front for resistance and confrontation" to oppose the "high treason" of Sadat's peace initiatives, but did not reject outright the concept of a negotiated settlement.
sooner or later, these leaders will once again take part in the search for a peaceful settlement, as indicated by their recent behavior and the text of the resolution they rammed through at the Tripoli conference. The Syrian leadership will then come into conflict again with anyone who tries to impede their course, and will try to accomplish the task before them, that is, choking off anyone who opposes the settlement in its final form.
3. None of the Arab regimes that have opposed Sadat's move are in a position to provide a base of support for an effective and protracted struggle against Arab capitulation. As a matter of fact, neither the Algerian nor Southern Yemen regimes (despite the important differences in their social systems) follows a revolutionary Arab policy. Their position on the Palestinian question goes no further than that of the Soviet Union, which seeks to establish a "just and lasting peace" between the Arab states and Israel, enabling it to preserve its influence and friendly relations with bourgeois regimes in the Mideast.
As for the Iraqi government, its seeming intransigence does not go far beyond rhetoric, and actually enables it to avoid a real confrontation. It is afraid of really hampering the policy of American imperialism and its partners in the region, and thus exposing itself to pressure, particularly from Iran. The best illustration of its policy is the invitation that the Baghdad leadership gave to the shah of Iran at the very moment when its representative was taking a hard line at the Tripoli summit conference. Besides, the Arab masses know for a fact how great a distance separates the Iraqi government's claims from its actions, after the experiences of Jordan, Shatt-al-Arab, and the Lebanese war.3
As for the Libyan leadership, its policy in the Arab world is based primarily on its opposition to Sadat. Consequently, it supports or allies with anyone who opposes Sadat, as shown by its kid-glove treatment of the Syrian regime during the war in Lebanon. In fact, it is counting on its alliance with this regime, and putting pressure on its other allies, particularly the Palestinians, to collaborate with the Syrian leadership and make its job easier.
Finally, it goes without saying that the vague, hesitant reservations shown by the Saudi lackeys of U.S. imperialism toward Sadat's moves are nothing but a smoke screen. They are a way of dissociating the Saudi leaders from Sadat in case his suicide mission falls through, or he fails to consolidate his venture by eventually getting the Syrian government to back its "positive" results-that is, reactivating the peaceful settlement and removing the obstacles that have blocked it for two years.
4. The foregoing does not imply that all tactical approaches toward the regimes that took part in the Tripoli summit conference are worthless. Tactics must in any case be subordinated to the strategy they are intended to serve. In most cases, tactics toward the bourgeois and pettybourgeois regimes must consist of exposing them and putting them on the spot.
It is impossible to rely on such regimes; besides, they will not form an alliance with representatives of the working masses unless they are forced into it. Revolutionists rely only on the masses, and judge all positions by how well they help raise the level of consciousness of the masses and advance their struggle.
With this in mind, revolutionists have no choice but to reject the resolution adopted by the Tripoli summit conference, and to condemn any force within the mass movement that accepts it.
This resolution, apart from the provincialism it displays, which reveals the nature of its signers ("Egypt is neither the beginning nor the end"; "freezing" of relations; moving the headquarters of the Arab League outside Egypt), leaves open the possibility of a reconciliation with Sadat. It calls only for overturning the "results" of his visit, divorcing it from the nature of the Eyptian regime.
Furthermore, the resolution assigns a central role to the Syrian regime in the struggle against Israel, ignoring its real attitude. It calls for unconditional support to the Syrian regime, adding to the illusions surrounding it by announcing the creation of a "nationalist front," with its nucleus consisting of the Damascus leadership and the PLO.
Revolutionists reject the Tripoli front, and call for the formation of a front of struggle against Zionism, American imperialism, and its Arab underlings, based on the following program:
(1) Rejection of Resolutions 242 and 338. Rejection of all conditions on the withdrawal of the Zionist army from the territories occupied in 1967. No to recognition, no to negotiation, no to peace with Zionism!
(2) Support to the struggle of the Palestinian people, including armed struggle. Open the borders of all Arab states, to carry on this struggle without hindrance.
(3) Concentration of the Arab armies along the, lines of confrontation with the Zionist army. Concentrate the Syrian troops in Lebanon along its southern border, or withdraw these troops toward the Golan Heights.
(4) Restore democratic freedoms to enable mass struggles to develop. Release all the anti-imperialist prisoners held in all the Arab countries.
(5) Support the anti-imperialist forces in Egypt fighting to overturn the traitorous regime.
These are the five points of principle without which there can be no effective and thoroughgoing struggle against Zionism and American imperialism; they can serve as the basis for ongoing activity throughout the Arab region at the present time.
5. The resolution on the basis of which all the organizations belonging to the Palestinian resistance have joined the PLO does not stand in contradiction with our program. This resolution, while incomplete, is entirely compatible with genuine opposition to Zionism, American imperialism, and its Arab underlings.
It includes rejection of Resolution 242 and 338, and makes the setting up of a Palestinian state conditional upon its including any portion of Palestinian territory that may be liberated-without a peaceful settlement, without negotiation, and without recognition of Israel.
This condition dovetails completely with a demand that has been part of all our programs for several years, the demand for a total and unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist army from the territories occupied in 1967, in opposition to the partial withdrawal provided for by Resolution 242
However, the context in which the organizations adopted this resolution bars us from viewing it as a positive turn, or at least from overestimating it as a turn. In a subsequent telegram, the signers of the resolution called for the formation of a front of resistance and confrontation, to be made up of all of the participants in the Tripoli summit conference, including the Syrian regime. No conditions were placed on the formation of such a front. In particular, no conditions were placed on the participation of the Syrian government, despite the role that it has played and is still playing in Lebanon.
It is to be feared that this resolution is the price paid by the Palestinian supporters of a peaceful settlement—a low enough price, since it involves nothing more than signing a piece of paper—in exchange for bringing the rejectionist organizations back into the fold, with respect to both the internal life of the Palestinian movement and to its alliances with the Arab regimes. It is also aimed at preventing these organizations from taking advantage of their favorable position relative to the political bankruptcy of the Fateh leadership, which had been betting on Sadat.
By rejecting Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as peace, negotiations, and recognition of Israel, the Palestinian organizations' resolution takes a stand on behalf of the PLO, without demanding of the Arab governments that they do the same. This amounts to eliminating the criterion the Palestinian rejection front had used in its dealings with the various forces in the Arab region—that is, what attitude a government takes toward a peaceful settlement.
For its part, the Fateh leadership has no difficulty at present in rejecting what the resolution rejects-inasmuch as it appears that the Zionist regime, the real "rejectionist" on this question, is not going to change its position concerning participation by the PLO as such in any negotiations that take place.
So that the resolution does not become a step forward followed by two steps back, and so that it does not go the way of the reconciliation between Habash and Arafat that took place in Beirut at the time of the Syrian intervention, and was promptly forgotten soon after, revolutionists active in the Palestinian struggle must adopt a thoroughgoing program of struggle against Zionism, imperialism and its Arab underlings as outlined above.
They must stress the need to be mistrustful of the Syrian regime in particular, so as not to fall into its trap. And they must struggle for democratic representation of the Palestinian masses, in the form of a Palestinian national council made up of representatives elected by the inhabitants of the refugee camps, instead of the bureaucratic apportionment of seats among the various organizations. This council can then put forward a new program for the Palestinian struggle, based on the resolution adopted by the Palestinian organizations at Tripoli, and elect a new central council of the PLO.
It is also the duty of revolutionary communists in the Palestinian movement to declare that their attitude toward any kind of Palestinian state is to work for the establishment of a revolutionary nationalist workers and farmers government, just as they are part of the struggle to establish such governments in all of the countries where they live.
6. In Lebanon, the duty of revolutionary communists is to expose the real face of the Syrian government and of its local agents, to condemn the policy of reconciliation with them, and to warn the activists of the Patriotic Movement about the dangers of such a policy. Revolutionary communists also reject the program put forward by the leadership of the Patriotic Movement and reiterated at the Tripoli conference, a program that calls for establishing "national unity" around the president of the republic. This is a bourgeois demand, all the more so since it is accompanied by a commitment on the part of the leadership of the Patriotic Movement to subordinate all other demands to it.
The minimum program, which must not be abandoned, for all activity in nationalist and democratic fronts in Lebanon should be the following:
(1) Solidarity with the Palestinian resistance and defense of its right to total freedom of action.
(2) The demand that the Syrian troops now in Lebanon be concentrated along the southern border to confront the Zionist enemy.
(3) Defense of democratic freedoms and struggle against whoever tries to repress them.
(4) Total secularization.
(5) Rejection of "unity" at the expense of the masses, and the struggle to establish the election of a constituent assembly, with representatives selected on the basis of a nationwide election and of a proportional vote not based on religion.
Revolutionary communists call on the rank-and-file members of the components of the Patriotic Movement to adopt this program and fight to have it adopted by their leadership. They warn against all attempts to use recent developments in Lebanon and throughout the Arab region to justify accepting Israeli terms in the south of Lebanon.* Furthermore, they affirm their support to the positions taken up to now by the Patriotic Movement in the south, considering that the present relationship of forces, barring a change in the Syrian position, makes any kind of "upping the ante" impossible to follow through on, adventurist, and irresponsible.
Nevertheless, there is no contradiction between a partial withdrawal as a tactical consideration imposed by the relationship of forces, and the position of revolutionary communists, one of unbending principle, that rejects all hindrances on the freedom of action of the Palestinian resistance of Lebanon, and urges the continuation of the armed struggle against Zionism.
Royal Canadian Mounted Plumbers
The Mounties, Canada's political police, "don't always have a pleasant or even an exciting time," the Vancouver Province reported December 16.
As a case in point, the British Columbia daily cited the following little-publicized exploit on the part of Canada's guardians of public order:
"President Tito is 86 and, with no recognizable successor in view, the foreign affairs desks in Washington and Moscow are concerned about the marshal's health. The marshal and his staff, of course, could not be asked. So the RCMP boys became real plumbers. When Tito visited Ottawa recently and stayed at the Chateau Laurier, the pipe of his toilet was diverted from its normal channels. Samples, let us say, were obtained, analyzed, and our allies in Washington given the good news that Tito was ticking over nicely, thank you."
Notes
3. A reference to the "neutrality" of the Iraqi army, stationed in Jordan during the crushing of the Palestinian resistance in September 1970, to the 1975 Iraqi-Iranian agreement, and to the vacillating attitude of the Iraqi government during the first months of the Lebanese civil war, as well as its subsequent inaction.
4. The Lebanese left demands the withdrawal of the combatants in the south of Lebanon, where Christian rightists are fighting Palestinian and progressive forces.